THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POLICE
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The report of an independent inquiry established by the Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute
INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO
THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POLICE

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The Report of an independent inquiry established by:

POLICE FOUNDATION and POLICY STUDIES INSTITUTE
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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td></td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td></td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Difficulties Facing the Police</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level and pattern of crime</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expenditure on the police</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growth of the private security industry</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Improving the Safety of Communities</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-agency crime prevention</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organising, managing and implementing crime prevention</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A way forward for community safety</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Enhancing Patrol</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public views of patrol</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternatives to current patrol arrangements</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Sedgefield Community Force</em></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Wandsworth Parks Constabulary</em></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Private security patrols</em></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Special Constabulary</em></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Stadswacht in the Netherlands</em></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>The Politiesurveillant in the Netherlands</em></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Involving the Private Security Industry</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current arrangements for regulating private security</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The powers available to private security personnel</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulating private security</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The role and responsibilities of the police
Foreword

The field of study of the Independent Committee on the Role and Responsibilities of the Police is one of outstanding interest and public importance, and all members of the committee have been grateful for the opportunity which the initiative of the Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute in setting up this inquiry has given them to take part in its work.

We are particularly indebted to the generosity of the Nuffield Foundation, the Esmee Fairbairn Charitable Trust, the Baring Foundation and the Dulverton Trust whose contributions have together funded our work. We also owe a great debt to all those who have in one way or another helped us with our work by submitting evidence, taking part in meetings organised by us or otherwise contributing to our thinking.

We particularly wish to place on record our gratitude to the excellent work done by our secretary, Bill Saulsbury, and our director of research, Tim Newburn. Bill Saulsbury has organised the work of the committee indefatigably and made many contributions to the development of its thinking. Tim Newburn’s own research in the field of criminology and his extensive knowledge of work throughout the field have been indispensable to us. A heavy burden of drafting has fallen on both.

Members of the committee have been prepared to devote much time and effort to our work despite at times very pressing other calls on their energies. The meetings of the committee have throughout been characterised by a desire on all sides to contribute positively, by lively debate and by good humour. All this has made the task of chairman a pleasant one, and for that I thank my colleagues most warmly.

John Cassels
Chairman
Preface

Over the past ten years the police service has operated in a climate of increasing scrutiny of its central purpose, organisational arrangements and effectiveness. During 1992-1993 three government-initiated inquiries – the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, the Sheehy Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and the Home Secretary’s White Paper on Police Reform – examined various aspects of policing. In the second half of 1993 and within weeks of one another, the results of the three reviews were made public. Each recommended radical change in the structure and functioning of policing. The government’s response was reflected in the 1994 Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act.

Prior to the announcement of the earliest review the Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute recognised that the reform of policing was emerging as a major public policy issue. It was anticipated that as the findings of the individual inquiries became known, debate would naturally ensue. Such a debate was welcomed by both organisations. As sensible change was the goal, it seemed vital that serious consideration be given to society’s expectations of our police both in principle and practice. How and by whom should the central task of the police be defined? What systems are most appropriate for accomplishing these tasks? What is the role of other agencies – voluntary, statutory and private – in delivering policing services? Are the boundaries and division of labour between these agencies and the police properly drawn, properly regulated and in practice workable?

For this reason, the Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute convened a committee to examine independently the role and responsibilities of the police. Both organisations appreciated that it might not always be immediately apparent how general definitions of the role and responsibilities of an organisation directly affect its daily operations. Nevertheless it was felt that a definition of this kind gives much greater coherence to an organisation’s strategic and tactical decisions and is therefore of profound importance over the longer term.

In the case of public services there is a further benefit. The role of definitions and mission statements of the public services are of practical importance in supporting the democratic process. In principle they allow the public to understand the intentions of policy-makers, as well as to judge the direction in which the management of the service is being guided. This
is especially important in the case of the police, whose operations so closely affect the lives of ordinary citizens.

**Formation and composition of the committee**

The committee was established in the spring of 1993 and first met in July of that year. It was funded entirely from charitable contributions from the Nuffield Foundation, Esme Fairbairn Charitable Trust, Baring Foundation and the Dulverton Trust. In concept, organisation and conduct the inquiry was independent of influence from the government, the police and all political parties.

The main purpose of the committee was to inform the ongoing discussion of the role and responsibilities of the police and how they may be best fulfilled among those who have a particular interest in policing policy. More generally, it sought to raise the level of public understanding of the issues involved. A summary of the committee’s findings and recommendations appear at Annex 1. The committee’s terms of reference appear at Annex 2.

**The approach of the committee**

The committee initially sought written evidence on the themes of: policing in the broader social context; the role and operations of the police; police accountability; and sharing responsibility for policing. Of 175 organisations and individuals with an immediate stake in policing activities that were invited to submit evidence, over 75 responded.

The committee reviewed the available research evidence and policy documents relevant to its central concerns. It commissioned from academic researchers and the police service papers on a range of subjects felt by the group to be critical to its deliberations. A selection of these papers appears in this report’s companion document *Themes in Contemporary Policing*. A full list is contained in Annex 3.

The committee published an interim Discussion Document in 1994. Following this a series of seminars was organised to examine propositions and questions that had been raised in that document. The seminar themes were: the fundamental powers that should remain the exclusive preserve of the sworn police officer; the crime management model of police operations; accountability of public and private policing; and arrangements for crime prevention/community safety.

Many organisations and individuals provided evidence in response to the committee’s initial series of background questions, Discussion Document, invitation to participate in seminar discussions, and commissioning of papers. To all of these the committee owes a debt of gratitude. They are listed at Annex 4.
INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO
THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POLICE

The Committee

Chairman
Sir John Cassels, Director, National Commission on Education

Members
Ian Bynoe, Research Associate, Institute for Public Policy Research, former Legal Director, MIND
Pauline Clare, Chief Constable, Lancashire Constabulary
Richard L. Everitt, Director, Strategy and Compliance, British Airports Authority plc
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Secretary
William Saulsbury, The Police Foundation

Director of Research
Tim Newburn, Policy Studies Institute
1 Introduction

1.1 This inquiry arose out of a concern that, despite the fact that far-reaching changes to the police service in England and Wales were being planned, insufficient thought was being given to what the fundamental role and responsibilities of the police actually are. There was further concern that the result of some of the changes being discussed might be to undermine valuable work by the police and, more important still, to lower their standing in the eyes of the public.

1.2 Despite the controversy that inevitably attends their work, the British police enjoy a high level of public regard and trust. They remain largely unarmed, retain the principle of the minimum use of force, continue to patrol on foot, have strong local ties and encourage community consultation. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) is regarded as a model of operational accountability in much of the rest of the world. The British policing tradition is something of which the country can be proud. If there is to be change, therefore, it has to be the right change, carried out in the right way and for the right reasons. That is the kind of change that this Committee wishes to encourage.

1.3 During the first half of the 1990s there were a series of major inquiries into the police. Each of them – the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, the Sheehy Inquiry into Police Remuneration and Rewards, the internal Home Office review and subsequent White Paper on Police Reform, and the Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks – assumed that the role and responsibilities of the police were well known and subject to overall consensus. It turns out, however, that such a consensus does not in fact exist. In describing the role of the police these various inquiries contradicted each other. Sheehy, for instance, named the four main aims of policing as: to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen’s peace; and to protect, help and reassure the community. By contrast, the White Paper took the view that ‘fighting crime should be the priority for police officers ... a priority that local communities should share’; keeping the Queen’s peace was nowhere mentioned.

1.4 That there should be confusion among policy-makers about the fundamental role of the police causes concern within the service and provides little comfort to an increasingly insecure public. It is therefore of fundamental importance to establish and reinforce in the public mind what the major functions of the police are. In our view, the definition contained...
in the police service's Statement of Common Purpose remains a helpful one. It is as follows:

The purpose of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen's peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.

We endorse this definition. No definition, however, is without difficulties. Many of the functions set out above are not for the police alone. We comment elsewhere on crime prevention (where many agencies are involved); there is obviously room for debate about the use of the word 'firmly'; and, most important of all, the keeping of the Queen's Peace is over-arching. But this definition at least gives an indication of the breadth of police functions and the fundamental contribution made by the police to the maintenance of a civilised society.

1.5 We are of the view that it is neither possible, nor desirable, to attempt to reach either a narrower or a more rigid definition of the role of the police. Thus, for example, 'preventing crime' and, still more, 'catching criminals' cannot and should not invariably be given priority above all other police responsibilities. Clearly there may be occasions when police priorities conflict. Where this is the case, we have no hesitation in reiterating Lord Scarman's emphasis on the importance of maintaining public order in the last resort. He stated that in the event of a conflict of aims between the maintenance of public tranquillity and enforcement of the law, the former should be the primary responsibility of the police. It is surely right that on those occasions when the enforcement of the law is not compatible with the maintenance of the public order, it is the maintenance of order which should have priority. In practice, it is for the Chief Constable to establish an intelligent balance between prevention, detection and order maintenance.

1.6 In addition, we would underline Lord Scarman's observation that a police service that fails to consult will fail to be efficient. Moreover, the reassertion of any definition of the role and responsibilities of the police should not be seen as an attempt to remove the responsibility which rests on police authorities and, in practical implementation, on chief constables to plan and to use their resources as they judge best, in the knowledge that they must be able to account publicly for their actions. Whilst there will always be certain events such as major public order incidents or murder inquiries that require a particular response, much of what the police do day-to-day requires judgements to be made about how best to use the finite resources that are available. Local communities, given appropriate opportunities, will make their views known about what they consider to be the most pressing priorities for the police in their areas. In a similar vein, the Home Secretary should be able to indicate what he considers to be strategic priorities for the service as a whole. This, however, should not become a narrow form of 'target-setting' for all forces in a way which clearly cannot take account of local circumstances and the needs of shifting demands at different times.
1.7 Although we depart, therefore, from the way in which the role of the police was presented in some recent official documents, we are also of the view that the pressures currently falling on the police make continuing preoccupation with their activities inevitable. Crucially, there are a number of problems in relation to the way in which the police are able to discharge their responsibilities in today’s world.

1.8 First, there is the issue of crime and its control. Although there have been decreases in recorded crime in some areas in the last two years, we have lived through a significant and sustained rise in levels of crime for several decades. Linked to this has been a rapid increase in feelings of insecurity and fear of crime. These have increased the demands on the police and have affected both public expectations and public opinion about the police. Not only has the level of different types of crime changed but the pattern of crime has also altered. As means of transport and methods of communication have developed, so some forms of crime have themselves become geographically more complex. This has important consequences for the ability of the police to respond and has implications also for the structure of police organisations.

1.9 It has become increasingly clear that the police can have only a relatively limited impact on aggregate crime statistics and, indeed, that the whole criminal justice apparatus can only ever be one part in an overall strategy to reduce crime. As a result increasing emphasis has been placed on a wide variety of other bodies and agencies in crime prevention and community safety strategies. Whilst we have learnt much about the need for cooperation and multi-agency working, it is clear that stubborn problems remain in relation to the coordination, control and management of such work. Too often it appears to be the case that one agency will work without giving thought to whether its goals and strategies are compatible with those of others. Too often, innovative and potentially productive programmes of work break down because of lack of appropriate co-ordination. All too frequently, agencies that have a potentially important role to play in crime prevention and community safety strategies are hampered because proper liaison does not exist. There is an urgent need to address these problems.

1.10 The second set of problems are those associated with expenditure and performance. In recent times the increase in the number of crimes reported to the police has far outstripped the increase in the number of police officers. Recorded crimes per officer rose from approximately 26 per officer in 1982 to 42 per officer in 1992. Although the amount of money spent on the criminal justice in general, and the police in particular, increased very substantially in the 1980s, and continued to increase in the 1990s though less quickly, the government has not only sought to stem this increase but has put in place measures designed to ensure that maximum advantage is taken of the resources that are currently spent. Constraints on resources are unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future whichever political party is in power, and for this reason alone, though there are others, there is an urgent need to seek to improve value for money. It is axiomatic that all public services should take seriously the need to
operate efficiently and should use their available resources in the most cost-effective way.

1.11 The third set of problems are those relating to the relationship between the police and the public. As already stated, the overall trend in crime in recent years has been upward. Furthermore, for a variety of reasons – some of which are to do with the nature and structure of modern society – we appear also to have witnessed fairly steady increases in people’s general sense of insecurity and fear of crime. At the same time, although public expenditure on policing has increased markedly, it has not kept pace with the increases in crime and the demands that are placed on the police. One consequence of this is that greater emphasis has been placed on identifying priorities for the use of police resources and negotiating these priorities with the public.

1.12 This leads more or less directly to another issue. We have witnessed since the Second World War a steady growth in the size of the private security industry and the kind of activities in which it is involved. Indeed, the private sector has responded quite remarkably to the public desire for greater security, and this has increasingly brought it into areas we traditionally associate with public policing. In part this has been facilitated by important changes in the use of public space – in particular the development of private shopping malls – creating new private areas to which the public has access. These are areas which tend to be ‘policed’ by private security employees. In addition, the increasing range of activities undertaken by the private security sector has meant that the police often find themselves working alongside, or even establishing partnerships (such as Business Watch) with, private concerns. Both the police and the public need to feel comfortable about the adequacy and appropriateness of the staff working in this part of the private sector and the functions which they carry out. Currently, however, there is no statutory licensing or other regulation of this industry.

1.13 We consider each of these sets of issues in greater detail below. In the chapter which follows immediately we examine four connected issues: the level and pattern of crime today; expenditure on the police; increasing public insecurity; and the rise of the private security industry. All these developments combined pose sharp problems for the police. In combination, they produce what we consider to be the central impasse currently facing the police: that is, given the fact that the resources available to the police will inevitably be limited, how are they to meet the apparently insatiable public demand for policing and for increased security? How is this impasse, and the problems related to it, to be tackled? In attempting to resolve this impasse the subsequent chapters contain recommendations in five areas: the means of improving the general safety of communities; enhancing the capabilities of the police; working with the private sector; establishing effective structures for the organisation of the police, particularly in relation to the wider system of justice; and developing the way the police manage their activities and account for what they do.
2 The Difficulties Facing the Police

2.1 An understanding of change in recent years is essential to thinking about the future. The ways in which our society is changing will affect the future of policing in important ways. These changes are being shaped by social and economic factors that are substantially beyond the immediate control of politicians and policy-makers. Nevertheless, very important choices do have to be made and our aim is to have a positive effect on the future pattern of policing. The British policing tradition is widely admired at home and abroad. We must strive to preserve the tradition of ‘policing by consent’ which has been and remains the hallmark of British policing.

2.2 We highlight the following major features in the social context of policing:

- There has been a steep increase in the incidence of crime since the 1950s, even if the rate of increase has not been as great as the figures for recorded crime suggest. Further, the prevailing explanations of that increased incidence – the greater availability of relatively anonymous and easily disposable property together with declining informal social controls – suggests that the long-term trend will not be easy to reverse. By contrast with property crime, however, the rise in violent crime over the same period has been much less acute.

- There has been a growth in public concern about crime and fear of crime such that ‘law and order’ has become a major public policy issue and, therefore, political issue. This trend too is unlikely to be reversed. Parallel with it has been an increased awareness of the risk of becoming a victim of crime.

- There has been a real growth in Government expenditure on ‘law and order’ services in general and policing in particular, at a time when public expenditure on many other public services has been held steady or reduced. In addition, private security services are developing rapidly and recent years have seen the emergence of voluntary, self-help organisations providing protection for local communities. However, this has not satisfied public demand and it is not at all clear how the desire for increased ‘security’ and insulation from or the reduction of risk could be fully satisfied in future.

We now consider each of these issues in more detail. In doing this we are very conscious that there are concerns in some quarters about the possible consequences of this ever-increasing public demand for more ‘policing’ (be it public, private or voluntary self-help) for the freedom of the individual. Some commentators have expressed doubts about whether police methods and priorities take sufficient account of the basic rights and freedoms of individual citizens or ensure equity between communities.

Level and pattern of crime

2.3 Crime is not easy to measure over relatively lengthy historical periods. In relation to crimes recorded by the police there have been a number of
far-reaching changes in the law which have either created new offences or have redefined old ones. Moreover, in 1980 the basis on which national criminal statistics was compiled was changed substantially. However, it is possible to make a series of adjustments to take account of the most significant of these changes. The figure below illustrates the increase in the rate of offences recorded by the police in England and Wales between 1950 and 1993 – an increase from around 1 per 100 of the population in 1950 to 10 per hundred in 1993. Increases in relation to some specific offences were even greater than this: there was, for example, a 28-fold increase in motor vehicle theft in the same period, and a 48-fold increase in robbery.

Figure 1 Recorded crime per 100 population in England and Wales
1950-1993

Source: Criminal Statistics

2.4 Using a second source of data – the British Crime Survey (BCS) – it is possible to get a picture of trends in crime in the more recent period of 1981-1993. Looking at those offences where it is possible to make comparisons with recorded crimes, the BCS estimated that, because of the problems associated with reporting and recording crime, only just over a quarter of (comparable) crimes noted by the BCS actually ended up in police records. Although there are differences between the two sources of information, the underlying upward trend is not in dispute. Whereas between 1981 and 1993 recorded crimes more than doubled (rising by 111 per cent), the comparable rise according to the BCS was 77 per cent. Significantly, both police statistics and the BCS show ‘acquisitive’ crimes – which account for around two-thirds of recorded crime – to have more than doubled between 1981 and 1993, with especially large increases in vehicle thefts and burglary.

Figure 2 Indexed trends in acquisitive crime 1981-91

The role and responsibilities of the police
2.5 In the public mind there is perceived to have been a dramatic rise in violent crime and some support for such a view is found in official statistics which show recorded crimes of violence to have doubled between 1981 and 1991. By contrast, however, the BCS estimates that offences of violence (wounding and robbery) to have increased by approximately one fifth.

Figure 3 Indexed trends in violence 1981-91
2.6  Similar trends in crime are to be found in most countries with advanced economies. The notable exception to this is Japan where recorded crime has remained relatively steady throughout the whole of the post-war period and, to a lesser extent, the United States, where recorded crime has fallen in recent years previously having reached extremely high levels by the standards of the United Kingdom or any other member countries of the European Union. A wide variety of reasons have been advanced to explain the relentless rise in crime since the War in most developed societies. Many of these are contested, but there is some agreement that both an increase in the opportunities for crime and also a decline in effective informal social controls have played a significant role. Certainly, the fact that motor vehicle crime accounts for upwards of one quarter of all recorded crime points to the increasing importance of the car – and all the expensive and portable equipment that is often contained therein – as a target for criminal activity.

2.7  One of the things that these trends indicate is that in almost all countries with advanced economies the pressures on the police have increased significantly in recent decades. Although it is fairly firmly fixed in the public mind that the police are crucial in determining crime levels at any particular time, it is in fact a mistake to assume that the police or indeed the wider criminal justice system is, or could ever be, the most decisive factor in determining crime levels. In part this is because, as successive British Crime Surveys have shown, something less than one half of all offences committed actually come to the attention of the police. Furthermore, of these, only 30 per cent are actually recorded, and 7 per cent cleared up (i.e., attributed to a specific offender). Only 3 per cent result in a caution or conviction and 2 per cent in a conviction. In addition, then, to being only one part of the job, ‘tackling crime’ – in the sense of controlling crime levels – is not a task that the police can realistically expect to manage alone. The police obviously have a key role to play, but we must not burden them with expectations they cannot possibly fulfil. One of the questions which arises therefore is: how is crime to be controlled, and what is the role of the police (and other policing organisations) in this? We return to this question at several points.

2.8  Crime, at least among the young male population, is relatively common. One third of males have a criminal conviction by their early 30s. The great majority of them do not persist in a ‘criminal career’. Rather than looking always for the causes of crime, therefore, it can be more enlightening to ask why it is that most people do not commit crimes most of the time, given the relatively low chances of detection and conviction. The reasons, it is suggested, lie in the informal sanctions that are brought to bear by families, schools, employers and the ‘communities’ in which people live, and the investments in relationships within these settings which they stand to lose if they transgress commonly-held rules. It has been convincingly argued that the nature of change in the late modern world has been characterised by a decline in the effectiveness of just such informal social controls and social bonds, and that this is central to any explanation of the increase in crime in countries with developed economies since the Second World War.

xviii The role and responsibilities of the police
2.9 The pattern of crime has changed as well. In particular, ease of movement made possible by new forms of transport and communication have led to the rise of organised national and international criminal networks involved in activities such as drug trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, lorry and car ringing, document forgery, counterfeiting, trading in stolen antiques and works of art, and prostitution.

2.10 It is difficult to provide reliable estimates of the extent of these activities. However, information from some of the bodies involved in attempting to prevent or detect and prosecute these forms of crime gives some indications. Thus, for example, in 1992-3 the Customs and Excise prevented drugs worth an estimated £900 million from entering the country, in the process making over 9,000 drugs seizures and almost 2,700 arrests which resulted in 1,700 convictions. Moreover, their investigations resulted in the breaking up of what they described as 47 major drug smuggling organisations.\(^8\) To take one example of international fraud: in 1990 a messenger in the City of London was robbed of a case containing £292 million of securities. The investigation conducted by the police resulted in the arrest of over eighty people, and involved police operations to recover bonds in the United States, Peru, Cyprus, Germany, Singapore, Holland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Switzerland and Brazil.\(^9\) The development of organised crime structures that cross both local and national police boundaries raises the question of how the police should be organised, and what balance should be struck between local, regional, national and international policing bodies. We return to this in a later chapter.

**Expenditure on the police**

2.11 Until the 1970s there was a large measure of agreement between the two main political parties in relation to the police and policing.\(^10\) From that point onward, however, policing became a highly politicised topic, and ‘law and order’ became a key issue in the 1979 general election and has been the subject of continuing debate ever since. In 1979, the then Conservative opposition promised that, if elected, they would increase spending on the police with the aim of reducing crime. Once in government, they honoured their pledge to implement immediately and in full the Edmund Davies Committee’s far-reaching recommendations on increasing police pay. The consequence was that public expenditure on the police rose remarkably quickly in the period 1979-1984 (see Figure 4).
2.12 Although the Government initially pursued a policy of increasing expenditure on the police whilst attempting to cut back on most other public services in the early 1980s, the publication of Home Office circular 114/1983 signalled that the climate had changed. Since that period, the Government has sought to apply private sector management methods and market disciplines to all public services, including the police, and funding of the police has been much more constrained.

2.13 Changing the resources available for policing is unlikely to produce very noticeable results in crime control terms. We welcome the additional funding announced in late 1995 by the Prime Minister. It is essential, of course, that this extra money is properly utilised by the police service. Nevertheless, very real questions remain about how much should be spent on policing. Nothing is more certain, however, than the fact that governments will continue to focus sharply on efficiency and the measurement of performance.

Insecurity

2.14 As Lord Scarman pointed out almost a decade and a half ago, it is not surprising that the British police face a variety of pressures that go wider and deeper than any which have previously confronted them: ‘These pressures reflect changes in society, in social values and attitudes, and in policing itself’. The second half of the twentieth century has seen significant structural socio-economic changes, including a major decline in manufacturing industry, the development of new technologies and the rise of 'consumerism', the increasing mobility of capital and of criminal activity, and the growth of long-term unemployment. These changes, together with the rise of new forms of telecommunication, with changes in social stratification, and the partial replacement of social class by other
forms of social differentiation, have led to a much greater emphasis on individualism and have posed a significant challenge to many traditional forms of social control.

2.15 The heightened sense of insecurity which has resulted has added to the demands made of the police. The public continue in some respects to view the role of the police as being to stem increases in crime, and the police have of course, in these terms, inevitably been unsuccessful. This has led to an increasing tendency to turn to other organisations as well as the police in attempt to increase security.

Growth of the private security industry

2.16 Although the primary focus of our attention is on public constabularies, a number of factors have drawn our attention to the future of the private security industry and, in particular, to the question of regulation of all or parts of the industry. First, is the mere fact that there is an increasing proliferation of private security firms, many of which work in fairly close conjunction with the police. Given that this is the case it is clearly important that the police feel secure about the organisations with which they are entering into partnerships. Secondly, during the period of this inquiry the possibility of increasing privatisation of public policing functions has frequently been raised in public discussion. It is important, therefore, to be clear about what functions the private sector currently undertakes, and on what basis.

2.17 Thirdly, the respective roles of the police and of private security organisations increasingly overlap, or at least the boundaries between them are becoming less clear. In part, at least, this has resulted from a process referred to as the 'decreasing congruence between private property and private space'13. The second half of the twentieth century has seen a rapid growth in property which is privately owned but to which the public usually have access. It includes shopping centres, residential estates, parks, offices, leisure centres and factories. More and more of public life is now taking place on private property. Because of this, the protection of property (a central aim of private security) has increasingly come to include the maintenance of order, as for example when there are demonstrations against new road construction. Thus, private security has increasingly impinged on what used to be considered the exclusive domain of the public police. So far this has caused few difficulties. In order, however, that the public and the police are assured of the integrity with which such work is carried out, the issue of regulation and control of the industry is of significance for our inquiry.

2.18 The private security industry is a large, profitable and growing part of the UK economy. Although there are varying estimates of the number of organisations trading in this sector and the numbers of people employed, few of these appear to be reliable. The best available figures suggest that, in broad terms, the number of employees in the private security sector, including those involved in manufacturing and installation, is at least the equivalent of the total complement of the 43 constabularies in England and Wales.14
2.19 As the industry has grown and, perhaps more importantly, as it has increasingly undertaken work more traditionally associated with the public police, so greater attention has been paid to the conduct of private security personnel. Concern has been expressed in a number of quarters about the functions undertaken by the private security sector, the backgrounds of some of those employed, and the extent to which it is possible for those with criminal records to gain employment in the industry. Indeed, there has been a growing feeling both within and outside the industry in recent years that some type of formal regulation of part or all of the sector ought to be introduced.

Conclusion

2.20 To summarise, then, there is a fundamental problem facing the police. How is the apparently insatiable demand by the public for more policing, and the public’s reasonable demand that they and their property be better protected, to be satisfied, given that there will need to be continued limits on public spending and that there is concern that what the public demands in terms of extra policing is not likely to have an impact on levels of crime at all commensurate with the added cost?

2.21 All the possible solutions to this impasse are bound to pose awkward choices. Because politicians must be seen to be responding to real public concern they may be tempted to introduce apparently tough measures which in practice have little long-term impact. Because they must be seen to be on the side of ‘law and order’, they may be reluctant to think sufficiently radically or to challenge the established practices and vested interests of the police, a much-respected and powerful British institution. Moreover, resources are finite and the police, as currently conceived and organised, are unavoidably costly.

2.22 The chapters which follow explore ways out of the current impasse and incorporate our recommendations for change.
3 Improving the Safety of Communities

3.1 It has, in recent years, been increasingly recognised that the police are but one of many organisations that are, or should be, involved in the prevention of crime or the enhancement of safety within communities. Nevertheless, crime prevention remains one of the key aspects of police work.

3.2 It is not however clear exactly what crime prevention should be taken to include, for on one level all social policy may play some part in preventing crime. There needs to be greater clarity about the nature of crime prevention. Secondly, there is no consensus about what the police should and should not do by way of crime prevention activities. Thirdly, in so far as the prevention of crime is the responsibility of many agencies and not merely the police, responsibility for taking the lead in crime prevention programmes at local level has not as yet been clearly allocated. A key question therefore arises: where is the primary responsibility for coordinating crime prevention and community safety initiatives and monitoring their implementation to lie?

3.3 Much of the work undertaken within police forces under the label of ‘crime prevention’ is of a fairly narrow technical kind and most police ‘crime prevention activity’ is largely reactive, responding to the demands of the public to do surveys... or responding to the need of the service in general to try to reduce the time spent on false alarm calls’. Where more socially-based or ‘community’ initiatives have been undertaken in the past, their objectives have not always been clearly defined, though this is now changing.

3.4 The emphasis upon community and upon what has since become known as ‘inter-agency co-operation’ has broadened the scope of crime prevention to include attention to the social conditions which provide the context of, and the social organisations which are involved in, regulating behaviour defined as criminal. The changing emphasis within crime prevention has also been reflected by such changes as the shift of the curriculum at the Home Office Training Centre at Stafford which has moved away from ‘the previous locks and bars emphasis towards community involvement, crime pattern analysis and inter-agency work’.

3.5 Community-focused policing initiatives were many and varied during the 1980s, but although little systematically collected evidence is available there is some evidence which casts doubt on the amount of success that has been achieved. Thus, research on community constables, directed patrolling, focused patrolling, neighbourhood policing and Neighbourhood Watch has illustrated the difficulties in planning, implementing and evaluating community-focused crime prevention measures. The majority of problems that have been identified have stemmed from poor implementation – particularly finding people willing to undertake the job – rather than fundamental flaws in the philosophy that underpins them.
3.6 However, the current situation is one in which there are mixed messages about crime prevention. The government stresses the importance of crime prevention initiatives and programmes and yet has not clearly stated exactly what the role of the police – and by implication the role of other agencies – should be in preventing crime. The question, for example, of whether the police or local authorities should be the lead agency in stimulating and coordinating local crime prevention and community safety activities has never been answered satisfactorily. In our view, a decision not only must be taken about where primary responsibility is, in the future, to lie, but also it must be put into effect. Whether it is to be with the police or local authorities, the implications for the role of the police must be clearly spelt out.

3.7 We consider that greater emphasis now needs to be placed on community crime prevention, by which we mean measures which emphasise strategies to change the social, economic and demographic conditions which sustain crime in communities. Attempts to stimulate such activity have taken place for over a decade now. Home Office Circular 8/1984, for example, emphasised the need for a partnership approach between the police and local government to ensure a comprehensive crime prevention strategy for a ‘safer Britain’. In encouraging community-based crime prevention initiatives, the government sought to broaden responsibility for such work and bring about a situation where ‘preventing crime is a task for the whole community’. This gave rise to a wide range of projects and to an approach to the work generally labelled as ‘multi-agency’.

**Multi-agency crime prevention**

3.8 In the mid- to late-1980s, the multi-agency approach was heralded as a panacea for many criminal justice problems, among them the successful implementation of community crime prevention initiatives. Accordingly there has commonly been sufficient agreement to get agencies working together, resources allocated and communities ‘involved’. The highlighting of partnerships between the police and other organisations, and the development of multi-agency strategies, have brought about some significant successes particularly in the area of child protection but also, for example, in relation to other forms of crime such as burglary prevention in Rochdale or some of the specific objectives of the Safer Cities programme in England and Wales among others. Although the gains from multi-agency work have not always been as significant as might have been hoped there is clearly a major price to pay in terms of wasted resources, energy and effort if agencies do not communicate. Nevertheless, despite the very real gains made in some areas, the best laid plans have frequently led to relatively little action and even less success in practice. A number of significant problems have been identified in relation to multi-agency work.

3.9 First, there is the question of ‘power’. With the multi-agency approach there is always the possibility that one agency – if it is sufficiently powerful – will attempt to set the agenda irrespective of the wishes of the other members of the group. In addition, there is often a lack of fit between
agencies in the criminal justice system. All too often agencies ‘do not start on equal terms’.  

3.10 The second problem has often been that of resistance and non-cooperation. Whilst positive examples of the impact of the multi-agency approach exist, it is apparent that a number of obstacles tend to beset such initiatives. There is the practical question of whether the groups brought together are actually able to identify a common problem and objective and whether their understandings are compatible. There are also likely to be sectional interests within any particular locality, which immediately makes representation problematic. Not only may it be extremely difficult to organise representation of all elements of a community, but such attempts as are made may be undermined by the disinclination of certain groups to be represented on multi-agency panels. 

3.11 In addition to the difficulties in reaching common understandings, there is also the question of the ‘status’ of communications. In particular, there are often difficult questions about the sharing of information. There is the problem of the breaking of confidentialities and, as some would have it, the inherent threat to civil liberties. Informal working arrangements are held, on the one hand, to be dangerous because they are essentially unaccountable and, on the other, to be beneficial because they stimulate and facilitate fluid and creative practices. 

3.12 Finally, and perhaps crucially, there is the problem of the lack of a responsible agency or individual. One of the potential problems in implementing crime prevention measures results directly from there being no agency or individual with overall responsibility for taking the lead in organising the initiative. Thus, in one school vandalism project one of the reasons that some of the agreed crime prevention measures had not been implemented after two years of the project was that the agencies involved – the schools, the local authority and the police – each thought that another party was responsible for driving the programme. Similarly, a study of an inter-agency racial harassment project concluded that ‘in future multi-agency efforts it seems imperative to vest someone with the role of coordinator responsible for carrying out the administrative work of the project’, though they went on to stress that the coordinator ‘should not be seen as a substitute for agency engagement with the substantive work of the project’. 

Organising, managing and implementing crime prevention

3.13 It seems reasonable to argue therefore, especially in relation to the role of the police, that it is the issues of information, organisation, management and implementation that are key. Taking information first, crime pattern analysis – particularly focusing on the important new developments in relation to repeat victimisation – has the potential to bring about significant advances in the way in which police resources are targeted and the way in which crime prevention activity is organised. Currently, there exists no national system for crime recording or for crime pattern analysis except for serious crimes, and there are no national standards for the sharing of information. These are important deficiencies, and we
recommend that the Home Office and ACPO, who acknowledge their urgency, should give very high priority to remedying them. Doing so has fundamental implications for the better management of forces and cooperation between forces in the future.  

3.14 In relation to organisation, management and implementation, which agency should take primary responsibility for co-ordinating community-based crime prevention initiatives becomes perhaps the crucial question. Recent discussion has been dominated by the recommendations made in a report by the Standing Conference on Crime Prevention in 1991 (generally referred to as the Morgan Report). The Morgan Committee noted that in many of the successful examples of multi-agency crime prevention initiatives that they had studied the person in the lead role was the local operational police commander. Furthermore, they concluded that the available evidence indicated ‘that progress towards community safety has been most impressive where the local police commander has encouraged and supported local authority Chief Executives in taking an active and leading part in coordinating a multi-agency approach’.

3.15 Nonetheless, despite the very real things that had been achieved, the Morgan Committee found that there were still many cases where local authorities had not taken up the challenge of community safety. They took the view that community safety should be confirmed as a clear and legitimate concern of local government and, therefore, recommended that ‘local authorities, working in conjunction with the police, should have clear statutory responsibility for the development and stimulation of community safety and crime prevention programmes, and for progressing at a local level a multi-agency approach to community safety.’

3.16 This key recommendation from the Morgan Committee initially met with considerable support outside government. Government itself, however, has not been persuaded that such a statutory responsibility should rest with local authorities. Indeed, one particularly complicating factor is that the years since the publication of the Morgan Report have seen the intensification of the programme for the restructuring of local government. Such has been the extent of change that, in crude terms, local government has been progressively replaced by a system of ‘local governance in which local authorities find themselves increasingly working alongside a range of other agencies in their localities’.

3.17 Thus, Training and Enterprise Councils assumed responsibilities for further education and training; further education institutions have become corporate bodies detached from their former parent local authorities; Urban Development Corporations and Housing Action Trusts have assumed a measure of responsibility for development; functions such as transport and waste disposal have, in part, been privatised; grant maintained schools and hospital trusts have set up outside local authority control; and joint boards have been established in the wake of the abolition of the metropolitan counties to oversee policing, fire, waste disposal and public transport. Most important of all, perhaps, is the ongoing process of local government reorganisation which, in addition to the creation of further joint boards,
will see the formation of a variety of forms of unitary local authority alongside a diminished number of two-tier systems of local government.

3.18 One consequence of all this change is that the role of local authorities within the new system of local governance has significantly diminished. Decision-making is now shared with a variety of other bodies and, perhaps more importantly, local finance is now much more effectively controlled from the centre than was previously the case. Indeed, local taxation now accounts for only about one fifth of local authority income, the remainder coming from central government and other national sources. Furthermore, through the annual Standard Spending Assessment and its powers to cap local budgets, central government is able to maintain a high level of control over local expenditure. The result is what has been referred to as a 'crisis of accountability'.

3.19 The issue of accountability in relation to policing is complex. One crucial aspect of this results from the passage of the Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994. Previously under the arrangements laid down by the 1964 Police Act, each of the 41 provincial police forces in England and Wales was subject to a police authority consisting of two-thirds elected councillors and one-third magistrates from the force area. There were three different types of local police authority. In single-county police forces (‘shire forces’) the police authorities function as a committee of the county council. In the former metropolitan areas, the police authorities are ‘joint boards’ made up of district councillors and magistrates from the metropolitan districts. Finally, police forces covering more than one administrative county come under ‘combined police authorities’ consisting of councillors and magistrates in equal proportions from each of the constituent areas.

3.20 The Police and Magistrates’ Courts Act introduced a number of amendments to the provisions of the 1964 Police Act. First, from April 1995, all police authorities became independent precepting bodies, and were no longer integrated within the local government structure. The new authorities have a much smaller membership. In most cases, they are restricted to a maximum of 17 members (although the Home Secretary has allowed three exceptions to this rule so far). Secondly, there is a smaller representation of elected people on these new authorities. The majority of police authorities (those with 17 members) consist of nine local councillors, three magistrates and five appointees. Each authority elects its own chair from among its members.

3.21 Local expenditure on the police has not historically been subject to cash limits. Under the amended arrangements, each new police authority will receive a cash limited amount of police grant. The new police authorities will continue to receive funding through the revenue support grant, non-domestic rates and council tax. Section 27 establishes the new police authorities as precepting bodies for local government finance purposes. The Home Secretary no longer decides how many police officers provincial forces have. That is decided by the chief constable and police authority.

3.22 Even more important are the provisions under the new Act for local policing plans. Under the new Act the local police authority (not the chief
constable and not the Home Secretary) shall ‘determine policing objectives’ and, to this end, publish an annual policing plan. How meaningful this part of the Act will be in terms of local power clearly depends on what are the main influences on this plan. Critics of the Act note that it states that the police authority’s plan should be made having regard to the national objectives laid down by the Home Secretary. However, the Act also states that ‘before determining objectives... a police authority shall:

a) consult the chief constable for the area, and

b) consider any views obtained by it in accordance with arrangements made under section 106 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (arrangements for obtaining the views of the community on policing)’ [Section 4A-(3)]

3.23 Although there have been many criticisms of the new arrangements for local governance of the police, it is important to recognise the potential they contain. In the past, much of the blame for the relative ineffectiveness of local police authorities has been laid at the door of the authorities themselves. The opportunities that are now available, via the setting of local budgets and policing plans, are there to be grasped by the new bodies and can quite obviously be made to work to the benefit of local communities, given the will to do that.

3.24 Where does this leave crime prevention and community safety measures and, more particularly, the key question of the coordination and leadership in deciding upon such measures? The first point we wish to make in this respect is that any proposals must clearly be designed to complement and strengthen the work of the police authorities and not to cut across the new arrangements introduced in the 1994 Act.

3.25 In addition to costed policing plans, the White Paper on Police Reform said that each police authority would be expected to draw up a local strategy for developing partnership with the public. According to Home Office circular 27/1994 it is expected that this strategy would be set out in the local policing plan. It is in the formulation of this strategy, in our belief, that the most obvious base in the future for the development of local community safety initiatives can be found. The questions which arise are: what role, if any, will local authorities have in the development of such strategies; how will local opinion be canvassed so as to establish priorities for community safety; and what will the relationship be between a partnership strategy for the safety of a local community and the police authorities’ strategy?

A way forward for community safety

3.26 Following the Morgan Report, but allowing both for the very significant changes that have taken place in local government and the limited expertise and capacity that local authorities have in relation to community safety, in the first place we propose in the first place that a statutory obligation be placed upon unitary local authorities (which will form the majority of local authorities) to prepare a draft community safety plan for submission to the relevant police authority. In order to prepare such
a plan the local authority should be required and empowered to bring together all the relevant local authority departments, agencies and other bodies within its borders to draw up the plan. There is no question here of transferring to the local authority in question new executive powers to implement measures or to require measures to be implemented: its responsibility is to take the lead in bringing together all the relevant parties to produce a plan and subsequently to monitor its execution by those responsible for implementation, subject to such modifications as the police authority’s response may require. In order that this process should be compatible with, and not cut across, new police authorities, we propose that Police Community Consultative Groups (PCCGs) established under s.106 of PACE should be adapted so that the areas they cover coincide with the boundaries of local authorities (as is already the case in London) rather than police administrative areas (as is generally, though not exclusively, the case outside London).

3.27 We propose also that where there are two-tier local authority organisations, responsibility for taking the lead in formulating plans should normally fall on District Councils, with of course contributions from the appropriate responsible heads of services run by County Councils as well as from other relevant agencies. To be effective, therefore, each PCCG would need to include a member of the police authority, the relevant local police commander, as well as a variety of others including local councillors, representatives of statutory agencies, community groups and so on, determined by the local authority so as to enable local views to be represented. We consider that in order for such groups to be effective, the police would have to make available crime and incident pattern analyses to each PCCG for their area and would also have to be responsive to demands for information made on them by the PCCGs.

3.28 It will be apparent that our central objective is to ensure that policing plans are made as effective as possible through the input of local community safety plans. These new arrangements would ensure that the local authority would have a clear channel of communication to the police authority via its PCCG. The police authority would, through the PCCG, have a natural channel to the local authority when preparing its annual policing plan. Moreover, the local authority would have a mechanism with which to start thinking about community safety needs and plans. In this manner the potential of the PCCGs might be more fully realised, not least because a local authority that was dissatisfied with the policing of its area would have a vested interest in using the PCCG mechanism to demonstrate the fact. Similarly, if local community safety problems were not primarily about policing, but were more to do with deficiencies in other community services and facilities, then that would emerge from PCCG deliberations, and the police and the police authority, through their representation on the PCCG, should be able to press home the point.

3.29 In order for local needs and priorities to be assessed, particularly given the variable size of the local authorities in which PCCGs will be based, it may well be necessary for PCCGs to establish sector or neighbourhood sub-groups. Though there may be exceptions in particular circumstances,
the principle should be that each unitary local authority (or in their absence District Councils), in consultation with the police and the police authority, should decide what consultation arrangements are needed within its area. The structure of the relationships between the various bodies is illustrated in Figure 5.
3.30 Of course, such relationships would not be static. Consultation, discussion and the development of plans — plans which inform and feed into each other — is better thought of as a process. The way in which this process might work is illustrated in Figure 6.

3.31 There is, finally, the position of the Metropolitan Police (and the City of London police) neither of which reports to a police authority with majority elected representation. The Metropolitan Police obviously has unique national functions. We nonetheless consider that both of these forces should be subject to police authorities with majority elected representation, as forces are elsewhere in England and Wales. So long, however, as the present position remains, we think that analogous arrangements to those which we propose for the rest of England and Wales should be introduced for the purpose of promoting community safety.

**Conclusion**

3.32 To summarise, the Committee recommends the introduction of a national system for crime recording and crime pattern analysis, together with national standards for the sharing of information. In relation to the organisation and oversight of community safety, we propose that a statutory obligation be placed upon unitary local authorities to prepare draft community safety plans. These should be prepared by a committee with
representatives from all major local authority departments, agencies and other bodies within the borders of the authority, and then submitted to the relevant police authority. In cases where there are two-tier local authority organisations, responsibility for taking the lead in formulating plans should normally fall on District Councils, with support from relevant County Council staff. The Committee proposes that Police Community Consultative Groups should be adapted to coincide with the boundaries of local authorities.
4 Enhancing Patrol

4.1 The definition of the fundamental purpose of the police in ACPO’s corporate mission statement quoted in paragraph 1.4 includes upholding the law, preventing crime, pursuing and bringing to justice those who break the law, keeping the peace, and protecting and reassuring the community. It is worth stressing here that information provided by the public is usually the crucial factor determining whether crimes are cleared up. Such information mostly comes either from victims or others at the scene. Consequently, the effectiveness of the police is fundamentally dependent upon establishing and maintaining high levels of public confidence and trust.

4.2 In principle, it might appear that more visible police patrolling would have a useful impact on crime. A number of experiments have in fact been undertaken – mainly in North America – to test the impact of differing levels of patrol coverage. An early British study found that provided that patrol was maintained at some level, the precise level at which it was provided seemed not to impact greatly on recorded crime rates. The largest and best known of all the experiments was the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment which considered the effects of varying levels of mobile patrol in one part of Kansas City. What it showed was that simply increasing the level of vehicle patrol, even as much as two or three fold, had no discernible impact on crime levels, whether they were measured using police statistics or via victim surveys. Similarly, studies in Newark, New Jersey and Flint, Michigan also found that merely introducing or withdrawing patrols in particular areas did not appear to have a significant impact on crime rates.

4.3 The crime control limitations of patrol are further illustrated by studies of the impact of the speed with which calls for service are responded to by mobile patrols. This research suggests that increasing the speed with which patrols respond to calls from the public is unlikely to achieve a great deal because the vast majority of offenses are not discovered until some time has passed. Even a short delay in notifying the police means that an immediate response is unlikely to result in an arrest at or near the scene, and is unlikely to increase witness availability or help in assisting an injured citizen. A managed response rather than blanket response to calls from the public is now the norm and the practice is based on the knowledge that those making non-emergency calls are more concerned with receiving an accurate indication of when a response can be expected than with how quickly it will actually arrive.

4.4 There is other evidence, however, that supports a more positive view of the potential of visible patrol. For example, some evidence that targeted patrol activity directed towards ‘crime hotspots’ may produce positive results in crime control terms. There is research, once again American, which suggests that intensive patrolling may reduce crime in settings as varied as shopping malls, housing estates, car parks and railway stations at least as long as the intensive patrol activity continues. As with much
work on the prevention of crime, what is less clear is the extent to which these measured reductions in crime simply mean that the offenses are now taking place outside the area where the experiment is taking place, i.e., the crime has been displaced rather than prevented. Though it is difficult to measure such an effect, the best conclusion seems to be that “it is unlikely that intensive patrolling ever results in 100 per cent displacement. The challenge is to find the best trade-off between the duration (and thus cost) of intensive patrol, the geographical coverage of patrol and the extent of displacement.”

That said, data-led, targeted patrolling appears to be one way in which much modern policing is going. Stimulated at least in part by the pressures for greater efficiency emanating from the Audit Commission, forces have attempted to identify best practices such as improving integration and definition of responsibilities between uniformed branch and CID, the setting up of crime desks and crime management units, and the targeting of repeat offenders. This approach – collectively referred to as ‘crime management’ in some quarters – is still in its infancy, though operations such as ‘Bumblebee’ appear to offer promise.

Public views of patrol

4.5 What do the public think about police patrol activities? In opinion surveys questions about public views of the priority that should be attached to police activities seem to produce a fairly consistent response. As Skogan put it when summarising the available material: ‘the high affection the public has for foot patrol can be found in all the national and local surveys’. On occasion, foot patrol is even ranked above responding quickly to 999 calls in importance, and it is frequently ranked above investigating crime and arresting offenders.

4.6 Given what we have said about the crime control limitations of patrol as an activity, a problem clearly arises. The public appear to assume that increased foot patrols are likely to have a significant impact on crime, but the indications are that in practice the impact is likely to be less significant than hoped for. It is understandable that senior police officers, faced with increasing demands and limited resources, are forced to consider to what extent this form of activity can be continued at existing levels. On occasion, in various parts of the country, it appears that the consequence has been a decline in the number of foot patrols and hence in their visibility. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the public in general tend to view foot patrol as a, if not the, central policing priority. How public demand is to be met given the resource issues already alluded to is one of the key questions now faced by the police service.

4.7 The financial constraints that currently bear on police forces together with increasing demands on the police that come from other sources are likely to mean, in our opinion, that the ability of the police to meet public expectations for a visible patrol presence will continue to be tightly constrained and may in the long term diminish. This will almost certainly occur if, as seems likely, public demands for greater policing continue to rise. Careful thought therefore needs to be given to how, if at all, this unmet demand is to be satisfied. It is important to note here that it might reasonably be argued that public demand for visible patrol is so great that
it is unlikely that it could be satisfied under any circumstances and, moreover, that if it were met the negative impact of so obtrusive a police presence might outweigh any obvious benefits. There are clear dangers in an uncritical acceptance of public demands. That said, there is evidence that the police find it increasingly difficult to provide a level of visible patrol which inspires public confidence and that, as a result, some communities have been turning to other forms of provision.

4.8 Although criminologists are currently casting some doubt on the idea of fear of crime being ‘a problem in its own right’, we believe that there are good reasons to keep fear-reduction and maintaining public confidence as key objectives of police patrol. First, the ‘Broken Windows’ thesis proposed by the American criminologists Wilson and Kelling suggests that certain forms of often low-level public disorderliness may set off a spiral of neighbourhood decline which results first of all in rising fear of crime, subsequently in diminished local informal social control as the law-abiding ‘migrate’ or merely hide and, eventually, in increased levels of serious crime. Again, there is the point that the police are heavily dependent upon the public for information about crime. Police strategies, therefore, which increase confidence and trust in the police are likely to be important as part of a broader strategy to tackle local crime problems. Thus, although in strict crime control terms it is clear that there are considerable limitations on the effectiveness of patrol, its popularity, its potential impact on insecurity and the likelihood that it may help sustain public confidence in the police all suggest that a visible uniformed presence must continue to play a significant part in modern policing.

4.9 How is public demand for increased visible patrol to be satisfied given that there will need to be continued limits on public spending? One way forward is to explore ways of providing the basic patrol service in a more cost-effective manner – ones which free up resources for other policing activities, without undermining the positive relationships which exist between police and public.

**Alternatives to current patrol arrangements**

4.10 When thinking about current and possible future policing arrangements, it is important to recognise how large and complex the modern system of policing is. A brief overview of some of the organisations currently involved in providing a ‘police patrol’ function, gives a more balanced picture of the modern division of policing labour. The examples below vary by the type of organisation employing the patrol officer (they may be constabularies, municipalities or private companies) and in terms of the nature of the work undertaken, the powers available to them, and the ways in which they interpret and use their powers. Most of the examples are drawn from the UK, though recent experience in Holland is drawn upon to illustrate two possibilities that so far have not been explored in the UK.

i) **Sedgefield Community Force**

4.11 For many years local councils have employed in-house security operations to protect council property and employees. The Sedgefield Community
Force, which is a local authority police force, became operational in January 1994. The force provides a 24-hour patrolling service within the geographical confines of the District – an area of 85 sq miles and a population of 90,000 people. The patrol officers wear uniforms similar to those worn by police officers. They travel mainly in cars, though they are encouraged to leave them to patrol on foot. They received 1,284 calls from the public in the first year. Although they provide a visible patrol, they were set up as a non-confrontational force and have a policy of ‘observe and report’, with a presumption that they will not use their citizen’s powers of arrest.

ii) Wandsworth Parks Constabulary

4.12 Under the Public Health (Amendment) Act 1907, all local authorities in England and Wales can swear in park employees as special constables, though there are few examples of any doing so. Legislation, bearing upon London only, has however been used by several boroughs in the capital to set up Parks Constabularies. Under the Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Greater London Parks and Open Spaces) Act 1967, Wandsworth established its Parks Constabulary in 1985. There are 30 full-time uniformed officers and 25 part-timers in the Parks Constabulary. They patrol the parks and open spaces in Wandsworth – about 850 acres in all – and aim to act primarily as a deterrent rather than an enforcement body. The problems that they deal with include: dog control; truancy; problems with cyclists; and general criminal activity (gross indecency, drugs, drunkenness, low-level violence, traffic violations). Just over 100 arrests were made by Parks Constables in 1994. In addition, they also monitor the CCTV cameras that are positioned in the Parks, act as keyholder in relation to a large number of local authority buildings, provide a cash-in-transit service for some local authority functions, and escort some local authority employees. Similar though generally less wide-ranging Parks Police also operate in Kensington and Chelsea, and in Greenwich.

iii) Private security patrols

4.13 A great deal of publicity has been given in recent times to the apparently increasing number of examples of private security firms being hired to patrol the streets of a number of communities in England and Wales. There are no solid data on how many such patrols exist, and where they exist not much information about how long they have been in operation, or on what basis. In mid-1994 The Times estimated that there were over twenty private security patrols in operation. Two experiments with private security have been undertaken by local borough councils in London. One of these, Southwark, started in February 1994, with six men from Chubb Security employed to provide a visible presence on the streets of a local estate, to deter potential troublemakers, to reassure local residents, and to pass on information to the local Neighbourhood Office. The patrol operates seven days a week, for ten hours a day.

iv) The Special Constabulary

4.14 Established in 1831, and consolidated by the Police Act 1964, the Special Constabulary is a volunteer police force. Drawn from the local community, special constables undertake a variety of policing tasks, though routine
The role and responsibilities of the police

patrol is the most common. Such constables carry the full powers of a regular police constables whilst on duty, but are not able to exercise police powers when out of uniform. The strength of the Special Constabulary has varied over time and currently stands something slightly in excess of 20,000 across England and Wales. A number of attempts have been made to increase the number of special constables since clearly this is a potentially cheap and flexible way of adding to police patrol capabilities. Moreover, the Special Constabulary provides another route through which the numbers of women and ethnic minority recruits can be increased, as well as an opportunity for people generally to participate in crime prevention. Historically, however, it has proved fairly difficult not only to increase substantially the number of recruits, and also to reduce the high turnover of staff within the Special Constabulary.

v) The Stadswacht in the Netherlands

4.15 Stadswacht translates as ‘city warden’. These city wardens – around 650 in all – patrol approximately 26 Dutch cities. They carry radios, but have no special powers over and above those enjoyed by Dutch citizens. Their most basic function is to provide a visible daytime patrol. The wardens are considered to be ‘ambassadors of the city’, are available to respond to public inquiries and, where possible, assist in preventing crime, controlling nuisance behaviour and providing public reassurance. They enjoy a reasonably close relationship with the police; some of the warden schemes are directly managed by the police, others are managed by a police officer on secondment. One of the major social functions of the Stadswacht is to provide employment for those who might otherwise be out of work. There are two basic models for this. In the first, wardens are appointed for one year, during which they attend a training course linked to the job. Many of the wardens trained in this way go on to find jobs in the private security industry. In the second model, the warden is employed permanently, though the levels of pay are such that turnover remains high. Wardens are expected to apply diplomatic skills in endeavouring to ensure that individuals cease to do what they are discovered doing. Their relationship with the police is as a series of extra ‘eyes and ears’ on the streets, not as a law enforcement auxiliary.

vi) The Politiesurveillant in the Netherlands

4.16 In the Netherlands, as in the UK, uniformed police foot patrol has been less and less common in recent years as other demands have risen. Patrol, where it occurs, tends to take place in vehicles. However, and once again in parallel with the situation in the UK, public demand for visible street presence remains undiminished. In order to respond to this, some Dutch forces have appointed officers with the title ‘politiesurveillant’, or ‘police patroller’. This is a new rank of police officer, below that of the ordinary constable, but significantly higher than that of the stadswacht. There are fewer schemes employing politiesurveillant than there are stadswacht, but several of the largest Dutch cities do employ such officers.

4.17 The patrollers – for this is their primary task – are trained full-time for three months, and after a specific period of satisfactory service, patrollers become eligible to undertake further training in order to become full constables. They wear a full police uniform, the only difference being that
their special distinguishing shoulder badge. They carry a police radio, handcuffs and a truncheon, but are not allowed to carry a firearm. They are an official rank in the Dutch police, and have the same powers as a full constable, though in many cases such officers are managed and supervised in such a way as to minimise the likelihood that they will be called upon to use such powers.

Conclusion

4.18 All of these examples suggest various ways in which current police patrol provision might conceivably be augmented. In our final chapter we emphasise the advantages that will come as police forces develop as learning organisations. With such developments will come a greater readiness to welcome new solutions and adopt new approaches which offer realistic hope of improving the safety of communities and the effectiveness of policing. We consider here what opportunities the examples which we describe above may have to offer. They fall broadly into four categories.

4.19 First, there is the possibility of augmenting the reach of police patrols by forms of ‘eyes and ears’ patrol provided by local authorities, as in the case of Sedgefield. We believe that local authorities should continue to be free to take advantage of this kind of possibility. The scheme in Sedgefield appears to be well received locally and to be proving of benefit. Further experiments along the same lines would provide a better basis for forming general conclusions about their long-term potential and the extent to which they should be actively encouraged.

4.20 Secondly, there is the possibility of local patrols provided by private security firms. The powers available to the patrollers would be those of the ordinary citizen, and their activities would be confined in the main to providing ‘eyes and ears’. If private security firms are to be used in this way, the case for regulation as developed in our next chapter will be stronger and we would expect some form of co-ordination with the police to be established to ensure that the patrols in question fit in with local police activities and local priorities. We presume that funding of these patrols will normally be provided by local authorities; there are obvious difficulties about ad hoc groups of residents or local organisations clubbing together to buy this service. We consider that, if local authorities wish to experiment with the use of private patrols, they should be free to do so. As with patrols provided directly, experimentation on a wider scale would provide a better basis for reaching general conclusions about their long-term potential and the extent to which they should be actively encouraged.

4.21 A third possibility would be to establish municipal patrol forces with powers of arrest greater than those of citizens. A proposal to this effect was made in 1994 by Wandsworth Borough Council, which sought to allow its Parks Constabulary to operate in local housing estates. We do not believe that there is sufficient evidence at present to warrant the establishment of patrols in public places generally with powers that go beyond those of the private citizen if they are not under the direct control of the Chief Constable.
4.22 Finally, there is the possibility of a greater degree of experimentation within police forces themselves. The two Dutch examples quoted above are relevant here. **We would wish to emphasise at once that we would not favour any development which could justifiably be stigmatised as introducing a ‘two-tier’ element into the police service because some police officers would be expected to operate with powers inferior to those available to the police generally.**

4.23 What is readily apparent is that flexibility in the deployment of police officers is a great aid to providing effective patrol because it enables officers to be available when and where the need for them is likely to arise. Flexibility is already made possible in various ways. Shift systems are operated so as to enable cover to be provided round the clock. Overtime can be used when necessary – but can be very expensive and is open to abuse if it is overused. Officers – as already commonly happens with women police officers with young children – may be employed on a part-time basis. ‘Specials’ – unpaid volunteers who are trained and sworn in as police constables – are widely used on patrol work, especially for example to help to police special events and rural localities.

4.24 We consider that wider experimentation with ways of enabling more public patrolling to be provided by police forces would be valuable and we recommend that the Home Office, police authorities and Chief Constables should be alert to the need to initiate and to encourage such experimentation. Among the possibilities to be considered is whether the existing designation of ranks of police officer and the terms on which they are employed might be opened up to a degree of variation going beyond what is currently practised or permitted. We do not assert that the particular examples of innovation adopted in the Netherlands could simply be transplanted here. They do however suggest that it would be unwise to close minds against the possibility of introducing fresh thinking into areas such as this where it is easy to regard the familiar as being unchangeable.
5 Involving the Private Security Industry

5.1 An increasingly significant contribution to everyday policing is now being made by the private security industry, and efficient use of the private sector provides an important way in which routine policing can be further enhanced. In our view, however, this will be possible only if a degree of public regulation of the private sector is introduced, as we now argue.

5.2 As the industry has grown and, perhaps more importantly, as it has increasingly undertaken work more traditionally associated with the police, so greater attention has been paid to the conduct of private security personnel. Concern has been expressed in a number of quarters about the backgrounds of some of those employed in the private security sector, the extent to which it is possible for those with criminal records to gain employment in the industry, and about some of the functions now carried out by the private security sector. Indeed, there has been a growing feeling both within and outside the industry in recent years that some type of formal regulation of part or all of the industry ought to be considered.

Current arrangements for regulating private security

5.3 No licensing system (or other formal system of government regulation) currently exists for the private security system in the UK as a whole. This contrasts with most other European countries. Britain stands virtually alone in having no admission requirements to performing the types of activities associated with private security and, together with Germany, is alone in not setting performance requirements. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland all have some form of legislative control of their private security industries.

5.4 The system of control in Britain remains one of self-regulation by the various trade associations covering the industry. The largest of these is the British Security Industry Association (BSIA). Its membership is small in terms of total numbers of firms (124 firms covering about 70,000 employees by the end of the 1980s according to Johnston (1992)), though it can claim to include among its members some of the largest and most influential of companies. Since the 1970s, the BSIA has worked to develop standards and other criteria to regulate the conduct of member companies. They introduced Codes of Practice which cover various activities of member firms. The BSIA has introduced a number of initiatives in the field of self-regulation. For example, its attempts to regulate the intruder alarm sector led eventually to the establishment of a National Supervisory Council for Intruder Alarms (NSCIA).

5.5 The Manned Services Inspectorate (MSI) was formed by the BSIA in 1982 as a quality control body for the manned (sic) sector. In 1992, the MSI was merged into a new ‘independent’ inspectorate, set up jointly by the BSIA and the International Professional Security Association (IPSA). This
new Inspectorate for the Security Industry (ISI) included representatives of the industry, insurers, customers, the police and government departments. The ISI inspects guarding and cash-in-transit companies against British Standard BS 7499 and industry codes of practice. This joint venture led to speculation that the two main associations in the private security industry were considering a merger but this diminished when IPSA withdrew from the ISI.

5.6 IPSA represents both organisations and individuals concerned with security, membership being open to all employers of, or employees engaged in, private security work on a full-time basis. In March 1990, IPSA established the British Security Register, which was intended to record CV-type information on a database for individuals working within the security industry. There are a number of other specialist representative organisations working in the field. The main body representing the lockmaking industry is the Master Locksmiths Association (MLA). The alarm industry is covered by two main bodies, the National Approval Council for Security Systems (NACOSS) and the smaller Security Systems and Alarms Inspections Board (SSAIB).

5.7 The private investigation industry has two main representative bodies. The main industry body is the Association of British Investigators (ABI), and the other trade association is the Institute of Professional Investigators (IPI). The ABI has openly criticised the standards of conduct of some parts of the private investigation industry, and contrasts this with its code of ethics and the use of its membership list by the Law Society; the IPI requires members to hold either a vocational qualification at management level or an academic qualification of 'appropriate standing', and is strongly in favour of formal regulation of the industry.

5.8 Clearly there need to be important reasons of public interest to introduce statutory regulation into a sector of activity which has hitherto been free of it. Here, as throughout employment, the labour market should be allowed to function with the minimum of regulation compatible with the public interest. The reasons in this case can be grouped under three broad headings – standards of conduct; reliability of staff; and standards of product and service. The degree to which any of these are relevant varies depending upon which section of the industry is being considered.

5.9 The police staff associations have contended over the years that it is too easy for people with inappropriate criminal histories to gain employment in the security industry. In 1988, a report by the Association of Chief Police Officers attracted considerable attention, as it claimed to highlight a number of deficiencies within the private security industry, the largest among which was 'employer/employee having a criminal record'. More recently, evidence was provided by ACPO to the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (HAC) once again alleging the relatively widespread presence of employees in the industry with criminal records.

5.10 There are currently two major blocks on the effective vetting of security staff. First, companies cannot submit names for checking on the Police
National Computer, i.e. they do not have access to the criminal histories of applicants without the applicant’s permission. Secondly, the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 restrict the checks that companies can make on employees. The Act allows for convictions for offenses which have resulted in sentences of up to two and a half years in prison to be ‘ignored’ if the offender stays out of trouble for a specified time after the first conviction. Some of the private security trade associations have argued that, although it is important to protect the rights of ex-prisoners in respect of most avenues of potential employment, an exemption should be introduced for jobs in the private security industry because of the specific circumstances associated with such jobs. After its consideration of the current situation the HAC concluded that: ‘vetting procedures for the industry as they currently stand are, in our opinion, inadequate’.

5.11 Providing a poor standard of service is a criticism that has most often been levelled at the intruder alarm sector, despite the application of British Standards for some years. It is certainly true that the vast majority of activations are false alarms. This has, over the years, been a huge drain on police resources and led in 1990 to the introduction of a national burglar alarm policy by ACPO. This involved the withdrawal of response for a set period to frequently problematic devices. The number of false activations of intruder alarms reported in the 1990 National Intruder Alarm Statistics published by the ACPO Intruder alarms sub-committee showed only a 3 per cent decline on the previous year; the proportion of false alarms is still very high.

5.12 For a variety of reasons the private security industry is playing an increasingly major role in the ‘policing’ of our society. In part this stems from the fact that members of the public spend increasing amounts of time in what have been referred to as ‘mass private spaces’, such as shopping malls, where policing is undertaken by private organisations. In addition, as demands on the police have expanded, so they have increasingly taken advantage of the skills available in the private sector. This is to be welcomed. The overall consequence of both these processes is that the public are increasingly policed by private organisations. Because the public should feel assured that those responsible for their safety and security in ‘private’ locations are suitable for the job and, furthermore, because the police should be able to feel confident that the private security agencies which they work in partnership are credible and trustworthy, we consider that official or statutory regulation should be introduced.

5.13 In fact, the case for introducing some form of statutory regulation and control of the private security sector has very widespread support. Earlier this year the HAC recommended that an agency be created that would be empowered to licence both individuals and companies in the manned guarding sector. The Independent Committee concurs with the general consensus of opinion that some form of statutory regulation is necessary. There are several important questions which follow from this. First, who is to be regulated? There needs to be clarity of definition when describing the private security industry. Secondly, will the same system of regulation be appropriate for each element of the private security sector? Thirdly,
what will regulation involve? Finally, what exactly will be the nature of the regulatory body?

**The powers available to private security personnel**

5.14 Before moving on to our response to these questions, there is one further issue which needs to be clarified: what powers should be available to private security personnel? More specifically, should staff employed by private companies that are engaged in street patrols, the guarding of shops and other sites, have greater powers of arrest, search and detention than those available to the ordinary citizen? The Committee has heard no convincing arguments, or found any convincing evidence, to suggest that private security personnel require powers greater than those of the ordinary citizen for dealing with the types of situation with which they are likely to be confronted when guarding or even when on patrol. Indeed given the concerns that exist about private security guards patrolling public streets, the fact that only citizen’s powers are available should itself provide a check on the actions of such personnel.

**Regulating private security**

5.15 In considering the nature and extent of possible future regulation, the Committee’s view is that the key area is where private security staff are involved in the policing of space which the public considers to be public, even though it is actually private, i.e. places like shopping malls, football grounds and so on. Consequently, any new form of regulation should certainly cover the work of private security guards (including contract and in-house guards). The HAC excluded in-house staff from its recommendations. However, although there are clearly fewer complaints about the in-house sector, the fact that there is significant movement between the contract and the in-house sectors leads us to believe that any new system of licensing should cover both. Given their role in relation to either private property or private space to which the public have access, both nightclub door staff and installers of electronic surveillance/security equipment ought also to come within a new system of regulation.

5.16 As to how the licensing should be done, the Committee agrees with the recommendation of the HAC that an independent licensing authority should be established. This body would be responsible for managing and implementing a system of accreditation for those companies working in the areas of private security identified above. Licensing would be of the firm rather than the individual employee. However, the issuing of a licence would be dependent on compliance with a set of standards which would include vetting of staff, the provision of adequate training, the holding of appropriate insurance, and the investigation of complaints against staff. The licensing system, and in particular the standards set, would need to be flexible, taking account of the differing functions and responsibilities in various parts of the industry. A system of independent and rigorous inspection would also need to be instituted.
as would the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism – though the latter could also be an arm of the licensing authority itself.

Conclusion

5.17 For the reasons set out above, we consider that the introduction of official or statutory regulation of the private security industry should be introduced. This should cover the work of private security guards (including contract and in-house guards), nightclub door staff and installers of electronic surveillance/security equipment. In line with the HAC, we recommend the establishment of an independent licensing authority responsible for managing and implementing a system of accreditation for those companies working in the areas of private security identified above. Firms should be licensed. Licence holders should be required to comply with a set of standards relating to the vetting of staff, the provision of training, the holding of appropriate insurance, and the independent investigation of complaints. Finally, in relation to the functions that the industry performs, the Committee has heard no convincing evidence to support any increase in citizen’s powers. Accordingly, we recommend be no change in this area.
6  The Organisation of the Police Service

6.1 In this chapter we address two key issues. First, because the police are themselves one part of the wider criminal justice system – and indeed are the ‘gatekeepers’ to it – the organisation and functioning of the police service is profoundly affected by the criminal justice system. It is necessary to consider how well-coordinated that system is. Secondly, policing is organised at a variety of different levels – not just at the local level – and it is important to consider whether the current structure of local, regional, national and international policing is the right one.

The police and the criminal justice system

6.2 One of the consequences of the efforts to improve the use of public resources and introduce performance indicators has been to throw into sharp relief the fact that agencies in the criminal justice system do not always work to the same agenda and indeed on occasion may develop practices that run counter to the goals of other agencies. An example of this can be seen in the consequences of the rationalisation of the number of magistrates’ courts across the country. The aim of this process was to use court facilities better, but as a result prosecution and defence witnesses as well as prisoners now need to travel greater distances in order to attend cases listed for trial. Moreover, because of the high number of listed trials in which guilty pleas are entered on the day of the trial and the number of trial adjournments – on average 3.5 hearings for each case – the cost in terms of expenditure and annoyance is considerable. A large percentage of the witnesses, of course, will be police officers. Home Office research suggests that the wasted costs to the police alone is nearly £10 million a year.

6.3 A further example of a lack of uniformity within the system is the fact that there exists no unique reference number that identifies the offender, the case or the file across the criminal justice agencies. Admittedly, identifying a number that would be genuinely unique through the life of a case, as well as operationally usable, is not easy. The Committee for the Coordination of Computerisation in the Criminal Justice System has suggested how it may be achieved, but progress toward accomplishing this has been slow. If there is to be effective management of cases from charge to disposal this must be made a criminal justice system priority.

6.4 Some of the dissonance between agencies is exacerbated by the fact that the geographical areas into which the various agencies are organised are not coterminous. Thus, as Lord Justice Woolf noted, the areas into which the prison service was reorganised a few years ago do not match the organisation of the probation service, the Court Service, the Crown Prosecution Service or the police. The consequences of this are gaps in communication, a lack of coordination, failures of cooperation, and a tendency not to consider the wider goals of the criminal justice system.
These charges can be levelled equally at all the main agencies in the system.

6.5 One of Woolf’s proposals was the creation of a Criminal Justice Consultative Council (CJCC). He did not propose that such a body should have any executive authority or collective voice, but rather that it should be ‘able to make a practical and immediate contribution to improving mutual understanding and the necessary degree of cooperation and coordination within the criminal justice system’. It would achieve this ‘by identifying issues and areas which need to be examined ... it would receive reports ... encourage the identification and collection of information ... oversee the development of (Home Office) Special Conferences ... (and) be responsible for overseeing Local Committees’. These Local Committees – of which there are 24 – were to be ‘primarily concerned with practical problems thrown up because of the interfaces between the various services involved in dealing with crime’. 54

6.6 Whilst there is little hard evidence that either the CJCC or its local committees have, as yet, achieved much, they are in place and judges, among others, are involved in discussions about the practical problems of implementation in a way that would have been inconceivable a few years ago. Given that much policing is highly localised and that there is a need for close cooperation between the police and other agencies, there is also the fact that many of the most significant changes in criminal justice policy in recent years have been the product of local decision-makers. It is clear that, despite their current limitations, the CJCC and its local committees may provide an increasingly useful means of improving efficiency and removing obstacles to close working in the future. It is, at the very least, one example of the ways in which the different participants in the system can be brought together.

6.7 Nevertheless, as the recently published Efficiency Scrutiny on Administrative Burdens on the Police points out, it remains the case that ‘no published objectives or performance indicators are shared across the criminal justice system. Nor do the current national policing objectives include the prosecution process.’ 55 Or as the scrutiny team more succinctly stated it: ‘the cogs do not mesh’. Therefore we endorse the conclusions of the scrutiny team that what is required is a greater recognition of the interdependence of the individual agencies, both nationally and locally, and a greater willingness to work together, both bilaterally and across the criminal justice system. Our own view is that without closer congruence between the geographical areas into which the major agencies are organised, attempts to establish common goals will probably be poorly rewarded.

**National and international policing**

6.8 In outlining a number of key issues confronting the police at the outset of this report, we argue that, although the majority of crime remains steadfastly local in character, there is growing evidence that relatively highly organised criminal networks which cut across local, regional and national boundaries are becoming more common. Thus, although the
primary focus of this report is on local policing, and in our work we have concentrated almost exclusively on that, we cannot ignore the development of wider policing problems and the organisational response to those that may be required.

6.9 In considering what balance needs to be struck between local, regional, national and international policing bodies it is worth, first, briefly noting what structures currently exist outside the 43 constabularies in England and Wales. The past 35 years have seen not only the amalgamation of a large number of constabularies – and proposals to take the process significantly further – but also the development of such bodies as regional crime squads and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS).

6.10 The Police Act 1964 provided the basis upon which Regional Crime Squads (RCSs) were first established. There are currently six RCSs in England and Wales, each of which has responsibilities for an area covered by several forces, and which is staffed by officers on secondment from those forces. The central functions of the RCSs are: to identify and arrest those responsible for serious criminal offenses which transcend force and regional boundaries; to cooperate with regional criminal intelligence offices in generating intelligence; and, where appropriate, to assist in the investigation of serious crime.

6.11 There has recently been increasing pressure to establish specialist national organisations to combat various forms of criminal activity which, it is argued, cannot be effectively or efficiently dealt with within existing force or regional structures. There has also been pressure for increasing international cooperation as a result of the developing European Union. The 1989 Home Affairs Committee investigation into drug trafficking and related serious crime heard from several senior police officers that there was a need for greater national coordination of certain policing activities. Plans for a national criminal intelligence unit got underway in 1990, the intention being that it should integrate the work of the already existing National Football Intelligence Unit, the National Drugs Intelligence Unit, the Art and Antiques Squad, the regional criminal intelligence offices and a variety of other bodies. At the most recent Conservative Party conference the Home Secretary announced the establishment of an operational national force to deal with serious crimes.

6.12 In addition to these developments at regional and national level, recent years have also seen new developments in international policing arrangements. The oldest and largest of these, Interpol, is a communications network which passes criminal intelligence and other messages and requests between national police authorities. Interpol has become international rather than European in its ambit, and has over 150 members.

6.13 The second of the major international policing organisations is the Trevi Group. It was set up in 1975 and was originally intended as a platform for EC Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs to develop counter-terrorist measures. Its remit has, however, gradually extended and now covers police training and technology, serious crime and public order and disaster.
prevention. A third international structure is the Schengen Group, established after the abolition of border controls between France and Germany in 1984, and these two nations were joined by the Benelux countries as part of the Schengen Agreement of 1985. A second implementation in 1990 brought all but three EC countries – the UK, Ireland and Denmark – into the agreement. In addition to the removal of border checks the agreements provide for increased police cooperation between the countries within this new ‘border’. Key to this is a common information system – the Schengen Information System – and, potentially, the possibility of the right of ‘hot pursuit’, entailing the use of police powers by officers outside their own jurisdictions.

6.14 Finally, there is Europol. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1991 and in force since November 1993, brought policing and criminal justice policy under the umbrella of the European Community. This was the beginnings of what was known as the ‘third pillar’ of what became the European Union in late 1993. More specifically, under Articles K.1.9 and K.4 the Maastricht Treaty established new structures – to replace Trevi – which were to form the basis for Europol. The intention was to develop an information exchange system which could be used to help prevent and combat terrorism, drug-trafficking and other serious crime. It would also help coordinate international investigations and encourage other forms of international cooperation.

6.15 The emergence of these organisations raises a number of issues one of which, that of accountability and control, is of particular relevance to this inquiry. Most importantly, it has been suggested by a number of commentators that there exists at best a flimsy statutory basis for most of these international or supranational policing arrangements. In addition, questions also arise in relation to the accountability of Regional Crime Squads and national policing structures. There are two reasons why the question of accountability arises in relation to RCSs. First, they cover areas significantly larger than those covered by normal lines of police accountability. Secondly, the squads have no formal statutory basis – they are set up under s.13 of the 1964 Act, which enables voluntary collaborative agreements between forces.

6.16 The focus of this committee’s considerations has overwhelmingly been on the organisation and functioning of local policing. It is evidently the case, however, that new policing structures are emerging both nationally and internationally and that there are some pressures for the expansion of these or, indeed, for the creation of new bodies. Article K.1.9 of the Maastricht Treaty provides a basis for further police cooperation in Europe, though questions certainly remain about how such organisations are to be held accountable. We welcome the fact that further thought is being given to the establishment of an operational national crime squad. Such a squad should have its responsibilities clearly articulated and have proper lines of accountability (all the more so if this is to involve MI5). We favour direct accountability to Parliament through the Home Secretary.
Conclusion

6.17 The Committee takes the view that greater attention needs to be paid by all involved to interdependence of the individual agencies in both local and national systems of criminal justice. In addition there needs to be a greater willingness to work together, both bilaterally and across the system. Closer congruence between the geographical areas into which the major agencies are organised is the necessary basis for these developments.

6.18 The main focus of the Committee’s work has been on local as opposed to national or international policing developments. We nevertheless support moves to establish an operational national crime squad. It is vital, however, that the responsibilities of such a squad are clearly set out and that proper lines of accountability are created.
7 Police Performance and Accountability

7.1 This report highlights at many points the mounting pressures on the police to raise their performance coupled with the limits within which extra funds are likely to be available to contribute to better performance (notwithstanding the relatively generous allocation of funds to the police in the 1995 budget).

7.2 In much of the public sector higher performance has been sought by means of privatisation. In the police service increased civilianisation and the contracting-out of some services have contributed much to raising performance while keeping costs within bounds. There is no case, however, for privatising the police service as a whole. We believe that such a course would not be acceptable either to Parliament or to the public, essentially because the police are seen as charged with preserving the conditions in which a democratic state can continue to exist and its citizens can live in freedom, a responsibility that cannot be handed over to organisations whose basic motivation is profit.

7.3 Parliament has chosen to exercise close control over powers:

- to arrest, detain and search citizens, and to search and seize property;
- to bear arms and exercise force for the purpose of policing; and
- to have access to criminal records and criminal intelligence for the purposes of operational policing.

In our view, Parliament should be very slow to relax its control over these powers, and we have no proposals for it to do so in relation to policing and security work.

Relationship between Home Secretary, Police Authorities and Chief Constables

7.4 We see the relationship between the Home Secretary and his department on the one hand and the police authorities and Chief Constables on the other as holding the key to enabling police performance to be steadily improved in the period ahead. Both share a responsibility and concern for the preservation of law and order and for the effectiveness and efficiency with which police forces discharge their role and responsibilities. Much can now be done to develop their relationship in a way which will encourage and make possible continually rising performance.

7.5 It is necessary here to recall the police service’s statement of common purpose which we endorse at the beginning of this report. This reads as follows:

The purpose of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who
break the law; to keep the Queen’s peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.

7.6 It must be said at once that carrying out a ‘mission statement’ of this kind calls for a wide variety of skills at all levels in the police service including, especially at senior levels, management skills of a very high order coupled with excellent judgement. It is not the sort of task that can be turned into a set of cut and dried instructions from the centre to be carried out by each police force. It is scarcely necessary to add that the degree of success in performing an individual police force’s mission cannot be adequately measured solely by reference to a series of quantitative objectives and performance indicators decreed from the centre.

7.7 To illustrate this last point, an example of a performance indicator might be the number of arrests per officer in a police force, something that might be relatively easily measured. If however a police force is successful in reducing crime, the number of arrests per officer ought logically to decrease, not rise; and there is an obvious danger that, as a result of encouraging a high level of arrests per officer, other responsibilities of the police may be put at risk – notably those for reassuring the community and for operating with integrity, common sense and sound judgement. At a deeper level, how would ‘keeping the Queen’s peace’ be made the subject of mandatory objectives and quantified indicators? Or indeed ‘preventing crime’? The simple and straightforward answer is that they cannot.

7.8 These considerations do not at all suggest that performance indicators have no useful purpose; far from it, as we stress later in this chapter. They do, however, point to something of fundamental importance, namely that the relationship between the centre (the Home Secretary and his department) and those responsible for implementation locally (police authorities and Chief Constables) cannot properly be expressed either in command terms or in contractual terms. Instead, it needs to be expressed in other terms which fully recognise both the national, leadership task of the centre and the role and responsibilities which the police are called upon to discharge through the way they operate in practice.

7.9 The nature of this relationship is more appropriately defined as a partnership between the centre and the police, or as a covenant binding them together. Both subscribe fully to the ‘mission statement’ for the police – or, if they do not, that needs to be made the subject of a searching joint study until agreement on the terms of the police’s mission is reached. It is then for the centre to make clear its overall view of the main priorities, as seen nationally, for developing the way police forces carry out their mission over the period ahead, and to allocate public resources to the police for that purpose. Again, given that the relationship is one of a partnership or covenant, the terms in which those priorities are expressed and the allocation of resources need to be the subject of full discussion with representatives of police authorities and the police before they are promulgated.
7.10 The existence of a basic relationship of this nature by no means rules out elements of a mandatory kind intended to improve performance. For example, it does not suggest that there is anything improper about requiring the Home Secretary’s approval for the appointment of Chief Constables. Nor does it suggest that the centre should relinquish its interest in performance indicators; on the contrary, it is very important indeed that it should continue to work with the police to improve and refine performance indicators and to monitor what effects, both benign and unwelcome, they may be having when applied operationally. Again, there are many areas, such as for example developments in the use of IT (information technology), where joint action between the Home Office and the police is not merely appropriate but highly desirable or even essential in the quest for continually improved performance.

7.11 A major responsibility for encouraging better performance falls on HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. There is of course no incompatibility between the use of inspection to monitor the performance of the police and the kind of basic relationship between the centre and the police which we propose. Inspection is essential to safeguard standards in police operations, and is a necessary aid to Chief Constables, police authorities and the Home Office alike in ensuring that corrective action is quickly taken where standards are deficient. In addition, however, we would particularly underline its positive role in identifying best practice and encouraging its wider adoption throughout the police service.

7.12 To this we wish to add two comments. First, we have been impressed by the quality and practical usefulness of the work of the Audit Commission in its studies of police operations and we would like to see this exploited still further in future. Secondly, we think that there is a strong case for involving others in the work of police inspection. Just as we want to see local communities to be much more actively involved in the promotion of community safety, we consider that inspection teams should include members drawn from a much wider range of backgrounds so as to reflect more fully the concerns of communities with police work, and we recommend that this should become accepted practice.

Knowledge-led policing

7.13 As to the way in which the work of individual police forces is organised, we see important opportunities for development which offer a real possibility of meeting more nearly the pre-occupations of the public, while at the same time preserving and enhancing the high level of regard and trust which is so important to both public and police.

7.14 Profound changes are now sweeping through organisations of all kinds and revolutionising their ability to carry out their functions effectively and efficiently. This is both the cause and the result of the ‘knowledge revolution’ which is taking place in countries throughout the world, a process in which the possession of knowledge and the ability to apply it to desired ends is supplanting the possession of capital as the mainspring of economic and social advance.57
The type of organisation which emerged from the industrial revolution and which proved highly successful for perhaps as long as two centuries was typified by:

- multi-layered management structures designed to ensure accurate compliance by employees with plans and orders formulated and transmitted from the top
- reaction to problems rather than anticipation of them
- acceptance of change only when made inescapable by outside events
- a requirement for obedience by employees in the performance of well-defined tasks, with little or no room for any contribution by them to the development of the working of the organisation.

In recent decades organisations so organised have increasingly been supplanted by learning organisations which have proved themselves far more capable of adapting to and taking full advantage of the knowledge revolution. Most learning organisations have some or all of the following characteristics:

- they have a clear mission
- they have set themselves clear goals as a means of pursuing their mission
- their ethos is active rather than reactive, and they communicate positively and continuously with the outside world
- they constantly initiate change rather than respond to it
- internally they rely less and less on rigid command structures and more and more on flexible working methods and extensive teamwork
- they use both 'hard' and 'soft' performance indicators to gauge their progress, always alert to the likelihood that 'proxy' indicators will tend in time to distort and harm their performance overall
- they recognise that in the modern world success already lies, and will in the future more and more lie, in collecting and applying information in a focused way to achieve desired outcomes
- and, accordingly, they continually invest both in advanced technology and in the development of the capabilities of their employees.

There is unceasing pressure on companies in the private sector, wherever open competition is the order of the day, to anticipate, capitalise on and adapt to changes in their markets and environment. They have no guarantee of survival and they have to take often most drastic steps to secure that they do survive. They have in particular to ensure always that the 'bottom line' – the financial results they achieve – are sufficient to enable them to continue in business.

In a well-led organisation in the public sector the ethos of public service is a great stimulus to good performance and to the fulfilment of a mission which is in the end to be reckoned not in financial terms but in terms of service to fellow-citizens. Such an ethos is capable of stimulating a deep
sense of loyalty and a willingness to carry out demanding and dangerous work with courage and determination when the needs of the public require it. These are benefits of immense value to the community. Nevertheless, in the absence of a financial ‘bottom line’ which brooks no argument, it takes the most strenuous efforts on the part of those responsible for public sector organisations to ensure that they continually adapt to changing circumstances and develop fast enough to meet the rising expectations of the public and so retain its trust and goodwill.

7.19 These considerations apply in full measure to the police, and the question must continually be asked whether individual police forces and the police service as a whole are learning organisations in the fullest sense of the term, and exhibit the characteristics of learning organisations listed above. Our work has led us to conclude that there are encouraging signs of how the police are embracing change and moving in this direction. Many forces are now placing increasing emphasis on the use of information-based strategies – in surveillance, in crime-pattern analysis and in improved forensic techniques, for example – together with the watchful management of resources in order to improve the prevention and clearing up of crime. An approach developed with the help of the Audit Commission, often referred to as the ‘crime management model’, is now being adopted in several forces and holds the promise of marked success.

7.20 The crime management model itself suggests new possibilities for improving the effectiveness of police operations. Central to the model is the idea of targeting highly persistent criminals, since Home Office studies suggest that a small proportion of persistent criminals commit a greatly disproportionate number of crimes. The approach could, we believe, be much reinforced if greater attention were also paid to repeat victimisation since, according to the 1992 British Crime Survey, the 4 per cent of all victims who are most frequently victimised suffer 44 per cent of all reported crimes. As the National Board for Crime Prevention has pointed out: ‘A history of victimisation against a person or place provides the police with an opportunity to combine their investigative and preventive tasks to improve detection rates and victim protection.’

7.21 It is possible that the Citizen’s Charter can also make a useful contribution to improving police performance by heightening the public’s awareness of what it is entitled to expect of police service. There are however limits to what can realistically be expected of the Charter. Many of those who most need the help of the police are, for a variety of reasons, least able to insist on the rights embodied in it. Moreover, the police are routinely confronted by situations involving two or more parties, where the question at issue is not of ensuring that all concerned are able to exercise their rights but of resolving conflicting interests.

7.22 We consider that there is a most important opportunity now, which we hope will be seized, to extend the kind of knowledge-led strategy exemplified by the crime management model to cover the full range of activities which the role and responsibilities of the police require them to carry out. The prime need in order to make the most of this opportunity is for the Home Office, the police authorities and Chief Constables to
develop their relationship on the basis of a partnership or covenant so as to foster the development of police forces as learning organisations in the fullest sense. To this end we wish to see leadership exercised by the Home Secretary and the Home Office in a manner which explicitly recognises the role and responsibilities of the police in their entirety and the commitment of all concerned to the performance of that mission to the full.

7.23 We recommend that every police force should be expected to develop and operate as a true learning organisation. We recommend further that the Home Office and the police should develop criteria covering the full range of their role and responsibilities by which to judge the extent to which individual forces have progressed in this direction. To suggest a few examples only, such criteria might cover such matters as the following:

- whether a force is investing in and making full use of advanced technology essential for gathering and processing information so as to direct and focus its activities to best effect
- whether a force is so organised and managed that it is continuously seeking step-by-step improvement of its operations and responding flexibly to new opportunities to do so
- whether a force reaches the Investors in People standard in its approach to training its staff and developing their capabilities
- whether a force shows by its actions that it is committed to listening and responding to the wishes of the local communities which it serves.

It would follow that particular efforts would be made to persuade and assist those forces which are identified as having furthest to go to make satisfactory progress. There should be suitable incentives for success, as well as appropriate sanctions for failure.

7.24 Finally, again we emphasise that, while performance indicators must always be used with great care because of their inherent openness to distortion, they are an indispensable aid to progress. They should be vigorously developed by the Home Office and ACPO in collaboration and should be constantly reviewed and refined in the light of experience. We recommend in particular that special attention be given to developing indicators of public satisfaction with the police. In these, the views of all sections of the public, including especially young adults, minority groups and those who have been the victim of crime, must be clearly reflected. These indicators above all will help to inform police authorities, the police service and the public about the extent to which the police are successfully fulfilling their essential role to the satisfaction of their fellow-citizens.
Notes


11. At para 5.3.


15. See for example the evidence given by ACPO to the Home Affairs Committee, HMSO 1995.


47. See for example the evidence given by ACPO to the Home Affairs Committee, HMSO 1995.


54. Prison Disturbances April 1990, Report of an Inquiry by the Rt Hon Lord Justice Woolf (Parts I and II) and His Hon Judge Stephen Tumim (Part II), Cm 1456, London: HMSO, paras 10.157-10.188.


60. The Investors in People programme backed by the Government sets a world class standard for employers in developing a skilled and flexible workforce. See, for example, the Investors in People Pack available from: Metrotec (Wigan) Ltd, Lancashire WN3 5ZZ.
INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO
THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POLICE

Annex 1 Findings and Recommendations

• In our view, the definition contained in the police service’s Statement of Common Purpose remains a helpful one. It is as follows:

The purpose of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime, to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen’s peace; to protect, help and reassure the community; and to be seen to do this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.

We endorse this definition. [Para 1.4]

• It has become increasingly clear that the police can have only a relatively limited impact on aggregate crime statistics and, indeed, that the whole criminal justice apparatus can only ever be one part in an overall strategy to reduce crime. [Para 1.9]

Crime prevention and community safety

• Any proposals must clearly be designed to complement and strengthen the work of the police authorities and not to cut across the new arrangements introduced in the 1994 Act. [Para 3.24]

• We propose that a statutory obligation be placed upon unitary local authorities (which will form the majority of local authorities) to prepare a draft community safety plan for submission to the relevant police authority. In order to prepare such a plan the local authority should be required and empowered to bring together all the relevant local authority departments, agencies and other bodies within its borders to draw up the plan. [Para 3.26]

• In order that this process should be compatible with, and not cut across, new police authorities, we propose that Police Community Consultative Groups (PCCGs) established under s.106 of PACE should be adapted so that the areas they cover coincide with the boundaries of local authorities (as is already the case in London) rather than police administrative areas (as is generally, though not exclusively, the case outside London). [Para 3.26]

• We propose also that where there are two-tier local authority organisations, responsibility for taking the lead in formulating plans should normally fall on District Councils, with of course contributions from the appropriate responsible heads of services run by County Councils as well as from other relevant agencies. [Para 3.27]

• We consider that in order for such groups to be effective, the police would have to make available crime and incident pattern analyses to each PCCG.
for their area and would also have to be responsive to demands for information made on them by the PCCGs. [Para 3.27]

• There exists no national system for crime recording or for crime pattern analysis except for serious crimes, and there are no national standards for the sharing of information. These are important deficiencies, and we recommend that the Home Office and ACPO, who acknowledge their urgency, should give very high priority to remedying them. [Para 3.13]

**Preventive patrol and its enhancement**

• Although in strict control terms it is clear that there are considerable limitations on the effectiveness of patrol, its popularity, its potential impact on insecurity and the likelihood that it may help sustain public confidence in the police all suggest that a visible uniformed presence must continue to play a significant part in modern policing. [Para 4.8]

• There is the possibility of augmenting the reach of police patrols by forms of ‘eyes and ears’ patrol provided by local authorities, as in the case of Sedgefield. We believe that local authorities should continue to be free to take advantage of this kind of possibility. [Para 4.19]

• We consider that, if local authorities wish to experiment with the use of private patrols, they should be free to do so. [Para 4.20]

• We do not believe that there is sufficient evidence at present to warrant the establishment of patrols in public places generally with powers that go beyond those of the private citizen if they are not under the direct control of the Chief Constable. [Para 4.21]

• We would wish to emphasise at once that we would not favour any development which could justifiably be stigmatised as introducing a ‘two-tier’ element into the police service because some police officers would be expected to operate with powers inferior to those available to the police generally. [Para 4.22]

• We consider that wider experimentation with ways of enabling more public patrolling to be provided by police forces would be valuable and we recommend that the Home Office, police authorities and Chief Constables should be alert to the need to initiate and to encourage such experimentation. [Para 4.24]

**Private security**

• Clearly there need to be important reasons of public interest to introduce statutory regulation into a sector of activity which has hitherto been free of it. Here, as throughout employment, the labour market should be allowed to function with the minimum of regulation compatible with the public interest. [Para 5.8]

• Because the public should feel assured that those responsible for their safety and security in ‘private’ locations are suitable for the job and, furthermore, because the police should be able to feel confident that the private security agencies with which they work in partnership are credible and trustworthy,
we consider that official or statutory regulation should be introduced. [Para 5.12]

- The Committee has heard no convincing arguments, or found any convincing evidence, to suggest that private security personnel require powers greater than those of the ordinary citizen for dealing with the types of situation with which they are likely to be confronted when guarding or even when on patrol. Indeed given the concerns that exist about private security guards patrolling public streets, the fact that only citizen’s powers are available should itself provide a check on the actions of such personnel. [Para 5.14]

- Any new form of regulation should certainly cover the work of private security guards (including contract and in-house guards). [Para 5.15]

- Given their role in relation to either private property or private space to which the public have access, both nightclub door staff and installers of electronic surveillance/security equipment ought also to come within a new system of regulation. [Para 5.15]

- As to how the licensing should be done, the Committee agrees with the recommendation of the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons that an independent licensing authority should be established. [Para 5.16]

- Licensing should be of the firm rather than the individual employee. However, the issuing of a licence would be dependent on compliance with a set of standards which would include vetting of staff, the provision of adequate training, the holding of appropriate insurance, and the investigation of complaints against staff. [Para 5.16]

- A system of independent and rigorous inspection would also need to be instituted, as would the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism – though the latter could also be an arm of the licensing authority itself. [Para 5.16]

**The organisation of the police service**

- We endorse the conclusions of the Cabinet Efficiency Scrutiny of Administrative Burdens on the Police that what is required is a greater recognition of the interdependence of the individual agencies, both nationally and locally, and a greater willingness to work together, both bilaterally and across the criminal justice system. Our own view is that without closer congruence between the geographical areas into which the major agencies are organised, attempts to establish common goals will probably be poorly rewarded. [Para 6.7]

- We welcome the fact that further thought is being given to the establishment of an operational national crime squad. Such a squad should have its responsibilities clearly articulated and have proper lines of accountability (all the more so if this is to involve MI5). We favour direct accountability to Parliament through the Home Secretary. [Para 6.16]

**Police performance and accountability**

- There is no case for privatising the police service as a whole. [Para 7.2]
• Parliament has chosen to exercise close control over powers:
  • to arrest, detain and search citizens, and to search and seize property;
  • to bear arms and exercise force for the purpose of policing; and
  • to have access to criminal records and criminal intelligence for the
    purposes of operational policing

In our view, Parliament should be very slow to relax its control over these
powers, and we have no proposals for it to do so in relation to policing
and security work. [Para 7.3]

• The degree of success in performing an individual police force’s mission
cannot be adequately measured solely by reference to a series of quantitative
objectives and performance indicators decreed from the centre. [Para 7.6]

• We have been impressed by the quality and practical usefulness of the work
of the Audit Commission in its studies of police operations, and we would
like to see this exploited still further in future. [Para 7.12]

• We think that there is a strong case for involving others in the work of police
inspection. [Para 7.12]

• We consider that inspection teams should include members drawn from a
much wider range of backgrounds so as to reflect more fully the concerns
of communities with police work, and we recommend that this should
become accepted practice. [Para 7.12]

• We consider that there is a most important opportunity now, which we hope
will be seized, to extend the kind of knowledge-led strategy exemplified by
the crime management model to cover the full range of activities which the
role and responsibilities of the police require them to carry out. The prime
need in order to make the most of this opportunity is for the Home Office,
the police authorities and Chief Constables to develop their relationship on
the basis of a partnership or covenant so as to foster the development of
police forces as learning organisations in the fullest sense. To this end we
wish to see leadership exercised by the Home Secretary and the Home Office
in a manner which explicitly recognises the role and responsibilities of the
police in their entirety and the commitment of all concerned to the
performance of that mission to the full. [Para 7.22]

• We recommend that every police force should be expected to develop and
operate as a true learning organisation. We recommend further that the
Home Office and the police should develop criteria covering the full range
of their role and responsibilities by which to judge the extent to which
individual forces have progressed in this direction. [Para 7.23]

• We emphasise that, while performance indicators must always be used with
great care because of their inherent openness to distortion, they are an
indispensable aid to progress. They should be vigorously developed by the
Home Office and ACPO in collaboration and should be constantly reviewed
and refined in the light of experience. We recommend in particular that
special attention be given to developing indicators of public satisfaction with
the police. [Para 7.24]
Annex 2 Terms of Reference

1 Objectives

1.1 To carry out an independent inquiry into the role and responsibilities of the police in the light of the work of the Royal Commission, the Sheehy Inquiry, and the internal Home Office inquiry ordered by the Home Secretary.

1.2 To encourage informed discussion among those who have a particular interest in policing policy including police officers, local authorities, private sector organisations with an interest in security, the probation service, statutory and voluntary social service agencies, and academics.

1.3 More generally, to raise the level of public understanding and debate about the role and responsibilities of the police and how they may be best fulfilled.

2 Terms of reference

2.1 The Committee of Inquiry is asked to consider: what the core tasks of the police should be; how and by whom they should be defined; what systems are most appropriate for accomplishing these tasks; the role of other agencies — voluntary, statutory and private — in delivering what might broadly be termed policing services; and whether the boundaries and division of labour between these agencies and the police are properly drawn, properly regulated and in practice workable.

2.2 The Committee of Inquiry is expected to decide its own mode of working, which may in particular include:

a. inviting testimony from individuals and organisations felt to have relevant perspectives on issues under discussion;

b. commission briefing papers relevant to its discussions;

c. advise on the themes for the research papers to be undertaken by the Policy Studies Institute;

d. convene conferences of interested parties for the presentation and discussion of findings;

e. publish briefing papers, research papers and reports as may be thought appropriate; and

f. devise a coordinated plan for the dissemination of the findings of the Committee of Inquiry.
3 Structure of the inquiry

3.1 The Committee of Inquiry has been established jointly by the Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute and is expected to work in partnership with those bodies.

3.2 The Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute will use their best endeavours to provide the Committee of Inquiry with the resources essential to carrying out its work.

3.3 The Police Foundation will serve as secretariat of the Committee and take responsibility for commissioning the background papers or external studies required by the Committee.

3.4 The Policy Studies Institute will produce, with the guidance of the Committee, a series of research papers intended to evaluate the options for future change in the three broad areas of:
   a. the core functions of the police;
   b. the boundaries between public and private policing;
   c. the balance between central and local control and the issue of accountability.

3.5 The Police Foundation and the Policy Studies Institute will have joint responsibility for implementing the coordinated plan for disseminating the findings of the Committee of Inquiry.
Annex 3 Themes in Contemporary Policing

As part of its deliberations the committee invited leading scholars in the field to submit briefing papers on key issues. These papers are published in the committee's companion volume, *Themes in Contemporary Policing* (Saulsbury, W., Mott, J. and Newburn, T., eds, 1996). The following papers appear in the volume:

Explaining Crime Trends  
*David J. Smith*

Crime and Policing in a Changing Social Context  
*Anthony Bottoms and Paul Wiles*

What Do the Police Do?  
*David H. Bayley*

Enforcement, Service and Community Models of Policing  
*Nigel Fielding*

The Police Patrol Function: What Research Can Tell Us  
*Michael Hough*

Public Opinion and the Police  
*Wesley G. Skogan*

Public and Private Policing  
*Clifford Shearing*

Opportunities for Crime Prevention: The Need for Incentives  
*Ken Pease*

The Regulation and Control of the Private Security Industry  
*Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn*

Police Accountability  
*Tim Newburn and Trevor Jones*
Annex 4  Individuals and Organisations that Submitted Evidence
or Participated in Seminars

Acton, Jack, Director, Home Office Crime Prevention Centre and Assistant Chief Constable, West Yorkshire
Age Concern
Alderson, John, Retired Chief Constable, Devon and Cornwall Constabulary
Almonds, John, Director, Security and Investigations, British Telecom
Association of British Insurers
Association of Chief Officers of Probation
Association of Chief Police Officers of England and Wales
Association of County Councils
Association of District Councils
Association of Metropolitan Authorities
Audit Commission
Avon and Somerset Constabulary
Barrow Borough Council
Bath City Council
Bayley, David, Professor of Criminology, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany
Bensley, J.P., Chief Constable, Lincolnshire Police
Blaby District Council
Blackburn, Borough of
Blair, Ian, Assistant Chief Constable, Thames Valley Police
Blakey, D.C., Chief Constable, West Mercia Constabulary
Blyth Valley, Directorate of Central Services, Northumberland
Bodfish, Ken, West Sussex Police Authority
Boileau, G.P.
Boothferry Borough Council
Bottoms, Anthony, Wolfson Professor of Criminology, University of Cambridge
Bottoms, David, Croydon Consultative Group
Bright, John, Crime Concern
Brighton Borough Council
British Transport Police
Bromsgrove District Council
Burrow, John H., Chief Constable, Essex Police
Butler, A.J.P., Chief Constable, Gloucestershire Constabulary
Cambridgeshire Constabulary
Caradon District Council
Castree, Allen, Assistant Chief Constable, Greater Manchester Police and
Vice Chair, ACPO Crime Prevention Committee
Centre for Studies in Crime and Social Justice, Edge Hill University College
Chatterton, Michael, Henry Fielding Centre, University of Manchester
Cheshire Constabulary
City of London Police
Coe, A.T., Chief Constable, Suffolk Constabulary,
Colchester Borough Council
Commission for Racial Equality
Crawley Borough Council
Crew, Edward, Chief Constable, Northamptonshire Police
Criminal Bar Association
Crompton, D., Chief Constable, Nottinghamshire Constabulary
Cutler, David, Hammersmith and Fulham Community Safety Office
de Wulf, Phillipe, Gendarmerie, Belgium
Devon and Cornwall Police Authority
Dickinson, David, Marketing Director, Group 4 Total Security Ltd
Dyer, Alan, Chief Constable, Bedfordshire Police
Ealing Community and Police Consultative Group
East Hampshire District Council
East Devon District Council
Elliott, A.G., Chief Constable, Cumbria Constabulary
Elmbridge Borough Council
Emery, Jerry, Home Office
Fareham Borough Council
Faulkner, David E.R., Fellow, St John's College, Oxford
Fielding, Nigel, Professor of Sociology and Deputy Dean of Human Studies,
University of Surrey
Flannery, Kate, Local Government Studies Directorate, Audit Commission
Francis, David J., Superintendent, South Wales Constabulary
Fylde Borough Council
Gillingham Borough Council
Grange, Terence, Assistant Chief Constable, Avon and Somerset Constabulary
Golder, N.A.
Group 4 Total Security Ltd
Gwent Constabulary
Gwent County Council
Hadfield, Sr Ron, Chief Constable, West Midlands Police
Hale, Chris, Professor of Criminology, Canterbury Business School, University of Kent
Hampshire Constabulary
Hancock, Paul D., Superintendent, Derbyshire Constabulary
Harborough District Council
Harris, Sandy, Fylde Victim Support Scheme
Hastings Borough Council
Hedges, Michael, Assistant Chief Constable, South Yorkshire Police
Hellawell, Keith, Chief Constable, West Yorkshire Police
H M Inspectorate of Constabulary
Hertfordshire Police Authority
Hoare, M.A., Chairman, Risk and Security Management Forum
Hope, Tim, Reader in Criminology, University of Keele
Hough, Michael, Professor of Social Policy, South Bank University
Humberside County Council
Jenkins, Simon, The Times
Johnson, Les, Principal Lecturer, School of Human Studies, University of Teeside
Jones, Trevor, Policy Studies Institute
Justices' Clerks' Society England and Wales
Kelly, C.H., Chief Constable, Staffordshire Police
Kent Police Authority
Lancashire Constabulary
Lancaster City Council
Landriau, Michael, Greater Manchester Victim Support
Lawrence, W.I.R., Chief Constable, South Wales Constabulary
Laycock, Gloria, Home Office
Lewis, Michael J., Chief Superintendent, HMIC
Long, Stephen M., Superintendent, Suffolk Constabulary
Loveday, Barry, Principal Lecturer, IPCS, University of Portsmouth
Lustgarten, Lawrence, Professor of Law, Department of Law, University of Southampton
Luton Borough Council
Maidstone Borough Council
Marnoch, Alex E.
McClellan, John, Post Office Investigation Division
McKinnis, Kenneth, Chief Superintendent, Strathclyde Police
Mediation UK
Merseyside Police Authority
Merseyside Police
Mid Bedfordshire District Council
Ministry of Defence Police
Morgan, James, Morgan, Harris, Burrows
National Association of Special Constabulary Officers
New Forest District Council
Newark and Sherwood District Council
Newing, John, Chief Constable, Derbyshire Constabulary
Neyroud, Peter, Superintendent, Hampshire Constabulary
Nicholl, Caroline, Chief Superintendent, Thames Valley Police
Norendal, Halvor, Cumbria County Council
North Yorkshire County Council
North Wales Police
North Warwickshire Borough Council
North West Leicestershire District Council
Northamptonshire County Council
Norwich City Council
Patten, Robert, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States
Payne, Ronald
Pease, Ken, Professor of Criminology, Huddersfield University
Peterborough City Council
Phillips, John David, Chief Constable, Kent County Constabulary
Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales
Pollard, Charles, Chief Constable, Thames Valley Police
Poole Borough Council
Portsmouth City Council
Post Office Investigation Department
Powell, George
Prichard, David, Managing Director, Resolution Security Ltd
Priestly, Daphne, Thames Valley Police Authority
Purbeck District Council
Reddington, J., Ministry of Defence Police
Redditch Consultative Forum
Reiner, Robert, Professor of Criminology, Department of Law, London School of Economics
Ross, Nick, Crimewatch UK
Royal Ulster Constabulary
Sandell, Graeme, National Association for the Care and Rehabilitation of Offenders
Scarborough Borough Council
Scott, Ingrid, Wandsworth Police Community Consultative Committee
Sewcharan, Monica, Derby Safer Cities Project
Sharpe, P.S., Chief Constable, Hertfordshire Constabulary
Shearing, Clifford, Professor of Criminology, University of Toronto, Centre of Criminology
Skitt, B.H., Chief Constable, Hertfordshire Police
Skogan, Wesley, Professor of Political Science, Centre for Urban Affairs & Policy Research, Northwestern University
Smith, David, Professor of Criminology, University of Edinburgh
Smith, Sr John, Deputy Commissioner, Metropolitan Police
Smith, Peter, Chairman, Securicor Group plc
South Lakeland District Council
South Wales Constabulary
South Staffordshire Council
Southwark Council
Staffordshire County Council
Stanko, Betsy, Reader in Criminology, Department of Law, Brunel University
Stevens, J.A., Chief Constable, Northumbria Police
Surrey Police
Surrey County Council
Surrey Heath Borough Council
Sussex Police Authority
Sweeney, Vincent, Assistant Chief Constable, Greater Manchester Police
Taggart, Neil, West Yorkshire Police Authority
Tamworth Borough Council
Taunton Constituency Labour Party
Taylor, Frank W., Chief Constable, Durham Constabulary
Todd, Michael, Assistant Chief Constable, Nottinghamshire Constabulary
Todd, Peter, Chief Superintendent, Bedfordshire Police
Truman, Crispin, Revolving Door Agency
Uglow, Steve, Law Department, University of Kent
Victim Support
Wandsworth Policing Consultative Committee
Wansdyke District Council
Watson, Malcolm, Association of County Councils
Weight, B.H., Chief Constable, Dorset Police
West Oxfordshire District Council
Weymouth and Portland Borough Council
White, R., Chief Constable, Dyfed-Powys Police
Whitehouse, Paul, Chief Constable, Sussex Police
Wickens, Peter, Director of Personnel and Information Systems, Nissan Motor Manufacturing (UK) Ltd
Wilding, Barbara, Assistant Chief Constable, Kent County Constabulary
Wiles, Paul, Professor of Criminology and Dean of the Law Faculty, University of Sheffield
Williams, Alan, Director, Finance and Administration, Bedfordshire Police
Williams, David J., Chief Constable, Surrey Police
Williams, K.R., Chief Constable, Norfolk Constabulary
Wilmot, D., Chief Constable, Greater Manchester Police
Wiltshire Constabulary
Wycombe District Council
Yuen, John, Royal Hong Kong Police
Zander, Michael, Professor, Department of Law, London School of Economics