the policefoundation

improving policing for the benefit of the public

The governance of supra-force specialist policing capabilities

A review by the Police Foundation

Final report
5 December 2016

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About the Police Foundation

The Police Foundation is the only independent think tank focused entirely on developing knowledge and understanding of policing and crime reduction, while challenging the police service and the government to improve policing for the benefit of the public. The Police Foundation acts as a bridge between the public, the police and the government, while being owned by none of them

Executive summary

Background

- The police service faces the challenge of keeping the public safe from increasingly sophisticated threats, while continuing to deliver efficiencies, and doing so in ways that accord with principles of good governance and local democratic accountability.

- The potential for ad hoc inter-force collaboration agreements to deliver significant further progress in this regard has been questioned. Work examining a more systematic approach to the delivery of some specialist policing capabilities is being led by the Specialist Capabilities Board, which sits under the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) Police Reform and Transformation Board.

- Acknowledging concerns about the implications of increasingly complex cross-force working arrangements for governance and accountability, the Board established a governance working group chaired by PCC Paddy Tipping.

- On behalf of the NPCC and APCC the working group commissioned the Police Foundation to review relevant literature, consult with key stakeholders and assess options for governance and accountability arrangements for specialist policing capabilities delivered across multiple-force territories, reflecting on existing collaborative practice.

- After the consultation period had concluded the Specialist Capabilities Programme team published proposals for a Networked Policing Model advocating incremental transition to a state of 'planned interdependence' through developing what has come to be referred to as a 'mutual mindset' within the police service.

Literature review

- The current structure of policing in England and Wales emphasises force-level provision of capabilities; this is reinforced by the system of democratic accountability provided by force-level Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs).

- Attempts to improve resilience and efficiency by delivering capabilities across a larger geographic scale have mostly relied on forces entering into collaboration agreements.

- Where collaboration occurs, PCCs are required by legislation to work together to provide joint oversight. In practice, governance arrangements vary considerably across collaborations, in part reflecting the variation in collaborative models themselves – for example, across Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs).

- Despite a statutory duty to collaborate, and efforts by government to incentivise greater joint working, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has concluded that progress is 'unsatisfactory'.

- There are established principles for 'good governance' in policing, notably those produced by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountability (CIPFA).

Consultation findings

- On 19 September 2016 a consultation questionnaire was sent to all chief constables

and Police and Crime Commissioners; 19 chief constables and 14 PCCs responded (including five joint responses). Supplementary telephone discussions were undertaken with five chief constables and three PCCs or their representatives, and in total the consultation received responses from 37 respondents.

- There is broad agreement on the principles of good governance, although chief constables place greatest emphasis on the importance of integrity while PCCs emphasise risk and performance management. Both place the least emphasis on defining outcomes in terms of sustainable benefits.

- A mixed economy of collaborative arrangements was described as having delivered benefits including efficiencies and resilience, but these also presented challenges.

- We heard mixed views about current governance arrangements (including for Regional Organised Crime Units) and operating models emerge as an important dependency.

- Other reported success factors included: well matched collaborative forces, strong interpersonal relationships, clear lines of accountability, well defined outcomes, and timely and comprehensive performance data.

- The complexity of some collaborative arrangements can be bureaucratic, obscure accountability and liability, and can limit the time and scope for robust scrutiny.

- There is a lack of consensus about lines of operational accountability and Direction and Control. For example, amongst both PCCs and chief constables, opinion was split on whether officers should always be accountable to the chief constable of the force in which they are working.

- More hidden aspects of policing pose a challenge and, in some cases, views are quite polarised about governance in this area.

- We encountered broad but qualified support for regional over national collaborated capabilities, deployed according to objective assessments of risk, threat and harm, and a preference for 'involved' joint-venture approaches as opposed to lead-force or commissioned models. Chief constables are more convinced of the need for a more 'designed' future, PCCs less so.

- Parochial concerns are a barrier, reflecting differences in the characteristics of forces, the priorities of forces and their PCCs (including between immediate neighbours), and the dilution of local chief constable to PCC accountability with widening geographical scale. A particular challenge concerns the degree to which specialist capabilities should accommodate local priorities when deployment decisions are being made.

- There are concerns, particularly from smaller and more rural forces, that shared capabilities and objective 'borderless' tasking would pull resources to urban areas.

- A subtle distinction is drawn between control of and confidence about access to capabilities, with the latter particularly relating to surge capacity; currently, confidence is often dependent on physical proximity of shared resources and personal trust between collaborating partners.

- A common view is that many elements of specialist capabilities not already brigaded in ROCUs are core to routine local policing, roads policing being a recurrent example.

- Except for Technical Support Units, local control over the deployment of all the capability areas currently under review is considered moderately or greatly important by a

majority of chief constables and PCCs. This points to the need for a fine grained disaggregation of capabilities, with those that are less visible to the public, more highly specialised and used less often appearing most suitable for greater cross-force provision.

Networked policing

- The consultation responses summarised here were provided before details of the Networked Policing Model were published by the NPCC on 5 October 2016. Nevertheless, reflecting on the proposals and consultation results, four issues are highlighted at this stage as requirements for good governance of the Networked Policing Model:

  1. 'Good governance' at the level of forces and regional collaborations.

  2. Stronger mechanisms for collective decision making and a more robust 'strategic centre' in policing.

  3. Clarity on the accountability principles for specialist capabilities provided and procured through the Network, standardised where possible.

  4. The need for representative governance of any Network Broker and Specialist Capability Strategic Leads.

- The Police Foundation has developed a governance proposition for the Networked Policing Model, to form the starting point for discussions. This addresses accountability principles, routine representative governance of the Network Broker and Specialist Capability Strategic Leads, and collective strategic decision making by PCCs and chief constables. Key points include:

  1. Governance arrangements for Networked Policing should sit on top of, rather than

replace, existing governance at the level of forces and collaborations.

  2. The PCCs of forces that participate in the network should hold their chief constables to account for the implications of their participation for efficient and effective policing in their force areas (with collaborative governance arrangements fulfilling the equivalent function).

  3. A standardised approach to the retention or transfer of Direction and Control should be agreed and adopted.

  4. Contractual accountability should exist between Network providers and users.

  5. A Network Policing Board should be established to provide representative governance of Specialist Capability Strategic Leads and the Networked Policing Broker.

  6. Mechanisms for collective decision making should be developed and used to agree Network mechanisms, principles and rules.

Unresolved questions

- Examining governance highlights a number of fundamental but unresolved systemic questions, which will need to be addressed if the public and government are to have confidence in policing as a 'self-improving system'. These include:

  1. Does policing have a strategic centre that is strong enough to ensure that the system is functioning as more than the sum of its parts?

  2. What decision making mechanisms will be required if Police and Crime Commissioners and chief constables are to play a wider strategic role?

  3. What are the respective roles of the PCC

and chief constable, and is the existing one-to-one accountability arrangement fit for purpose?

4. What is operational and therefore within the purview of the chief constable? Is the decision to collaborate a policy matter or an operational matter?

5. What is commissioned, and by whom?

6. What is 'local' and what is the 'totality of policing' in an increasingly collaborated and interconnected policing landscape?

7. Is the concept of Direction and Control (and related liabilities) sufficiently clear?

8. Should PCCs be able to delegate aspects of their authority to their peers in other forces?

1. Introduction

The Police Foundation was commissioned by the governance working group of the Specialist Capabilities Board, which sits under the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) Police Reform and Transformation Board, to carry out a short evidence review on the governance of policing capabilities delivered above the level of the individual police force. This report presents the findings of that review and considers the implications for the proposed Networked Policing Model that has been developed through the Specialist Capabilities programme.

The specialist capability areas currently being considered under the Specialist Capabilities Programme are:

Phase one covers
- Technical Support Units
- Surveillance
- Armed policing
- Roads policing
- Major investigations

Phase two is proposed to cover
- Cyber crime
- Intelligence
- Proactive crime

The Police Foundation was asked to examine possible models for the future governance of supra-force capabilities. To do so, the Foundation undertook a review of the existing secondary literature on supra-force governance, and then a consultation involving all Police and Crime Commissioners and chief constables.

This report comes in four parts:

- Chapter 2 sets out the background to the work, drawing on a review of the relevant literature.

- Chapter 3 presents the results of our consultation with Police and Crime Commissioners and chief constables.

- Chapter 4 reflects on the Networked Policing Model that has been developed through the Specialist Capabilities Programme and presents a governance proposition for the Model, intended as a starting point for debate and discussion.

- Chapter 5 offers some brief conclusions.

2. Literature review

2.1 Background

British policing is undergoing a period of significant change. This is in part because of reduced resources. Between 2010/11 and 2015/16 there was an 18 per cent real-terms budget cut across the service[1], with those forces most reliant on central funding being affected the most.[2] To meet this financial challenge forces have implemented cost-cutting programmes characterised by substantial workforce re-organisation, redundancies and recruitment freezes, reduced overtime budgets, outsourcing and revised procurement deals alongside a 'patchwork' of force alliances and collaborative arrangements.

Despite a degree of respite offered by the nominal protection of police budgets in the 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review[3], the pace of change shows no sign of letting up – not least because the police service is having to adapt to radically changing demand. This includes a fall in the level of traditional volume crime, the rise in crime enabled by the internet, and growing public concern about high harm areas such as domestic abuse and sexual offences. The police service not only has to adapt to austerity, it also has to meet the policing challenges of an increasingly globalised and networked world as well as a changing set of priorities[4].

In their 2014 report *Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge,* Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) commended forces for delivering over £2.5bn of savings in four years [5], but also raised a number of concerns, including the 'unsatisfactory' (p.95) degree of collaboration between forces, and the lack of co-ordination of reform efforts across the police service as a whole. They conclude:

> *Extensive collaboration is not materialising in the majority of forces, and only a few are achieving substantial savings...Nor is collaboration leading to the development of the most effective regional and national policing capability. (P.38)*

Adding:

> *There needs to be a more systematic approach by government, police forces and police and crime commissioners to the organisation of policing at a regional and national level so the police service is placed in the best possible position to meet future threats to the safety of our citizens and communities in the context of reducing budgets. (P.38)*

In June 2015, responding to HMIC's call for a national debate on the issues raised, an Advisory Group of police leaders, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), staff associations and scrutineers published *Reshaping Policing for the Public* [6]. In it they set out a 'possible new approach' through which:

> *Specialist capabilities (such as those within the Strategic Policing Requirement) and areas of operational and criminal justice support are consolidated into cross-force functions,*

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[1] Crawford, R. Disney R. and Innes, D. (2015) *Funding the English and Welsh Police Service: from boom to bust?* IFS Briefing Note BN179. London: Institute of Fiscal Studies. http://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/BN179.pdf

[2] National Audit Office (2015) *Financial Sustainability of Police Forces in England and Wales.* London: National Audit Office. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Financial-sustainability-of-police-forces.pdf

[3] The 2015 CSR protected police budgets, subject to council tax precepts being raised every year by the maximum amount permitted (see Hales, G. (2015) *What the CSR means for the police service – some early reflections*. London: The Police Foundation. http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/uploads/news-docs/CSR_implications.pdf).

[4] Higgins, A. and Hales, G. (2016) *Cutting crime in the 21st century: Informed proactivity in the midst of social and organisational change*. London: Police Foundation. http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/uploads/holding/projects/changing_world_paper_1.pdf

[5] HMIC (2014) *Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge*. London: HMIC. https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf

[6] National debate advisory group (2015) *Reshaping policing for the public*. London: HMIC. https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/publications/reshaping-policing-for-the-public/

strategically located and operating to national standards. The most highly specialised capabilities (such as counter-terrorism) should be provided nationally. This would minimise the number of locations required to support an effective police service; allow capabilities common to different policing activities to be deployed flexibly; and preserve access to capabilities for all forces without losing the ability to deploy rapidly on the basis of threat, risk and harm. (Para. 1.2)

The group made a number of additional points regarding the implications of this type of supra-force model, including:

- The important role of police forces in ensuring "connectivity" between local policing and regional and national functions (Para. 4.19);

- The flexible and pragmatic approach that should be adopted to build such functions out of existing collaborative arrangements, or anew where necessary (Para. 4.29);

- The possibility of direct funding for cross-force specialisms (rather than routing money through PCCs and forces) (Para. 4.41); and

- The need for particular attention to the governance and accountability mechanisms for such capabilities so that:

Police and crime commissioners (or elected mayors where cities choose to take advantage of the devolution of power to the cities) and local police leaders will continue to be accountable for the maintenance of an efficient and effective police service in their areas. They will therefore require robust governance and accountability arrangements that span the different elements of this new approach to allow them to discharge all of their responsibilities. (Para. 1.7)

They also warned that:

Current experience in the police service is that governance of cross-force functions will also need to improve if local police leaders are to have confidence that the tasking and co-ordination process in relation to these functions can provide their forces with the support they need, when they need it. (Para. 4.27)

Work on developing shared specialist policing capabilities (with an initial focus on Technical Support Units, surveillance, armed policing, roads and major investigations) is in progress under the Specialist Capabilities Board [7] with a working group specifically addressing these complex and challenging governance matters.

2.2 Existing police force collaboration

Formal collaboration between police forces provides one possible basis for the delivery of specialist capabilities at a cross-force, regional or national level.

Collaboration arrangements between forces allow one or more policing functions to be delivered through a shared capability operating across combined force territories. Such arrangements may apply across two forces, a region or nationally and can apply to a narrow and specific function or to a wider set of shared capabilities. At the extreme end collaborations can result in arrangements approximating force mergers, such as that undertaken through the Warwickshire and West Mercia Strategic Alliance [8]. Such arrangements can allow forces to reduce and share overheads, including senior management posts, permit a leaner staffing model to cover pooled demand and allow efficient practices to be identified and retained, while less efficient ones are eliminated. They can also promote increased effectiveness through greater specialism, resilience and interoperability[9].

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[7] http://www.npcc.police.uk/NPCCBusinessAreas/ReformandTransformation/Specialistcapabilities.aspx

[8] Police Foundation (2014) *Police force collaboration: An independent review of the Warwickshire/West Mercia Strategic Alliance.* London: Police Foundation. http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/uploads/catalogerfiles/Roundtable-on-police-leadership/police_force_collaboration.pdf

[9] HMIC (2013) *Policing in Austerity*: *Rising to the Challenge.* London: HMIC. (P.75) https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/policing-in-austerity-ris-

Co-operation and joint working between forces – ranging from informal agreements to Mutual Aid and more structured, long-term arrangements – have long been a feature of British policing, historically undertaken largely for reasons of resilience. Following the decision by Government not to proceed with the compulsory merging of forces in 2006, the Home Office actively encouraged forces to explore collaborative options as a cost-saving mechanism. However in 2010 HMIC concluded that any progress made at that time was largely limited to initiatives for which extra government funding had been made available [10].

With the advent of austerity, Government sought to catalyse collaborative savings including by strengthening the legislative imperative to collaborate in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. The Act placed additional duties on chief officers and policing bodies (PCCs and their equivalents) both to keep collaboration opportunities under review and to enter into collaboration where it is judged to be in the best interests of their own or another force (or group of forces). Significantly, the duty applies regardless of whether the chief officer's and policing body's own force is expected to benefit from the arrangement, so long as it is in the best interests of one or more other forces. In doing so the Act extends the responsibility of chief officers for the efficiency and effectiveness of policing beyond the boundaries of their own force, and of PCCs to act in the wider public interest, not just that of their electorate[11]. The Act and associated guidance is not explicit as to whether the duty applies in conditions in which one force could be expected to experience disbenefits through a collaboration that is in the interests of one or more other forces.

Recent progress on collaboration has been charted through a succession of inspection reports. In spring 2011 (several months before the new duties came into force) HMIC noted that only 29 of 43 forces had plans to make cashable savings through collaboration[12]. Later that year however they reported a change in pace and identified 381 (active or planned) collaborations between forces (in addition to numerous examples of partnership with private and other public sector organisation) which would deliver an estimated £169m of savings by 2015 – 11 per cent of the savings requirement – although significant variation was apparent between forces.

This momentum was not sustained however; by 2013 progress appeared to have stalled with projections for the proportion of the saving gap to be delivered through collaboration falling back to just seven per cent[13]. Although the hiatus was attributed in part to disruption and readjustment following the first PCC elections in 2012, HMIC deemed the situation '*deeply disappointing*' and called for '*a fundamental rethink about how to provide higher quality lower cost services to the public through collaboration*' (p.81).

Despite the award of £50m of central funding to support innovation and collaboration in 2014/15[14], subsequent progress has remained modest. HMIC's 2014 inspection report noted a slight increase in the proportion of savings planned for delivery through collaboration (from seven to 10 per cent), with marked variation persisting, along with increased fragmentation and complexity, leading to further calls for a review of the approach to delivering an overall policing service that is both more efficient and effective but remains accountable at the local level[15].

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ing-to-the-challenge.pdf

[10] HMIC (2010) *Valuing the Police: Policing in an age of austerity*. London: HMIC. (P.12) http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/valuing-the-police-policing-in-an-age-of-austerity-20100720.pdf

[11] Home Office (2012) *Statutory Guidance for Police Collaboration.* London: Home Office (Para. 32). https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117559/police-collaboration.pdf

[12] HMIC (2011) *Adjusting to austerity: A review of police force and authority preparedness for the 2011/12 – 14/15 CSR period*. London: HMIC. http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/adapting-to-austerity-20110721.pdf

[13] HMIC (2013) *Policing in austerity: Rising to the challenge*. London: HMIC. http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/media/adapting-to-austerity-20110721.pdf

[14] Home Office (2014) *Home Office rewards police innovation with £50 million*. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-office-rewards-police-innovation-with-50-million Accessed 16 November 2016.

[15] HMIC (2014) Policing in Austerity: Meeting the Challenge. London: HMIC. https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/policing-in-austerity-meeting-the-challenge.pdf

2.3   What is good governance in policing?

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountability (CIPFA) publishes guidance on delivering good governance for policing bodies in England and Wales[16]. In it they define governance as *'The arrangements put in place to ensure that the intended outcomes for stakeholders are defined and achieved'*. In addition, public sector entities '*must try to achieve their entity's objectives while acting in the public interest at all times' (para 27).*

The latest edition of the guidance takes specific account of the increasing complexity in partnership, collaboration and integration between police force and between the police and other bodies. Drawing on their International Framework for good public sector governance[17], as well as earlier reports including the Cadbury Report (1992)[18] (which identified openness, integrity and accountability as three fundamental principles of corporate governance) and Standards in Public Life (1995)[19] (which described seven principles of Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty and Leadership), they set out processes for delivering good governance under seven principles.

a. Behaving with integrity, demonstrating strong commitment to ethical values and respecting the rule of law.

b. Ensuring openness and comprehensive stakeholder engagement.

c. Defining outcomes in terms of sustainable economic, social and environmental benefits.

d. Determining the interventions necessary to optimise the achievement of the intended outcomes.

e. Developing the entity's capacity, including the capability of its leadership and the individuals within it.

f. Managing risks and performance through robust internal control and strong public financial management.

g. Implementing good practices in transparency, reporting and audit to deliver effective accountability

As corporations sole both chief officers and policing bodies (PCCs) have responsibility for governance within their own organisations, and to establish local governance arrangements that make clear how they will govern separately and jointly.

2.4   The current model of police governance in England and Wales

Between 1964 and the election of the first Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in 2012, responsibility for the policing in England and Wales was distributed across a tripartite arrangement, of chief constables, police authorities and the Home Secretary. Police authorities consisting of local councillors, magistrates and appointed independent members were responsible for setting force level strategy, priorities and targets, appointing senior officers, holding police budgets, setting the precept and holding the chief constable to account on behalf of the local community.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century a consensus formed that the tripartite system had

[16] CIPFA (2016) *Delivering Good Governance: Guidance Notes for Policing Bodies in England and Wales, 2016 Edition.London*: CIPFA. http://www.cipfa.org/policy-and-guidance/publications/d/delivering-good-governance-guidance-notes-for-policing-bodies-in-england-and-wales-2016-edition

[17] CIPFA and IFAC (2014) *International Framework: Good Governance in the Public Sector.* London: CIPFA. http://www.cipfa.org/-/media/files/cipfa%20thinks/keystones/international%20framework%20%20good%20governance%20in%20the%20public%20sector.pdf?la=en.

[18] The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) *Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance*. Gee: London http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf

[19] The Committee on Standards in Public Life (1995) First Report. London: HMSO. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/336919/1stInquiryReport.pdf

become unbalanced, with the Home Office asserting too much influence over local policing and chief constables holding too much power locally, while police authorities had proved themselves 'weak, unaccountable and remote'. [20] [21]

In the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 the Coalition Government set about a radical overhaul of police governance. Police authorities were abolished and replaced by directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (in 41 out of 43 forces, with separate arrangements made for the two London forces) with responsibility for appointing, holding to account and, if necessary, dismissing chief constables who retained operational independence, control of all other officers and responsibility for delivering efficient and effective policing for their area. PCCs also took on responsibility for many of the functions previously held by police authorities including setting strategy and objectives (which they should set out in a Police and Crime Plan), holding budgets and setting the precept. They also took on a broader community safety remit including commissioning victim and crime reduction services. The Act also made provision for the creation of Police and Crime Panels to provide support and challenge to PCCs, and to scrutinise their actions and decisions to allow the public to hold PCCs to account. [22] [23]

Despite low voter turnout for the first PCC elections in 2012, a number of commentators have concluded that the reforms have improved the accountability of local policing, speeded up decision making, invigorated public engagement and driven local innovation.[24] [25]

2.5 The PCC model and collaboration

One consequence of the insertion of this model of direct democratic accountability into policing is the structural emphasis it has placed on the force level geography. PCCs set strategic priorities and objectives at the force level and are held accountable by an electorate defined by that geography. While not incompatible with the organisation of policing at other territorial hierarchies – including both more fine-grained areas (such as OCUs / Local Authority areas, neighbourhoods or wards) or more extensive ones (regional or national) – this has made decision making and accountability at these levels more complex and potentially more opaque and less robust. The role of Community Safety Partnerships, for example, responsible for co-coordinating community safety work at the (sub-force) local authority area level since 1998 (initially as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships), has become less clear cut following the move to the PCC system [26].

The potential implications of the PCC model for supra-force policing co-ordination efforts were recognised at an early stage. Giving evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2008 Sir Ronnie Flanagan said:

> I think in the whole area of accountability there are two areas that require attention. For me one is at the level above an individual force… I think there should be a mechanism of accountability that looks regionally and then, at the other end of the scale, I think much more has to be done to give people

[20] Select Committee on Home Affairs (2008) Seventh Report (232-236) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36409.htm

[21] Muir, R. and Lodge, G. (2008) *A New Beat: Options for more accountable policing*. IPPR: London. http://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/a_new_beat_1644.pdf?noredirect=1

[22] Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, c.13. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/13/contents/enacted

[23] Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) (no date) *Role of the PCC*. http://www.apccs.police.uk/role-of-the-pcc/ Accessed 16 November 2016.

[24] National Audit Office (2014) *Police Accountability: Landscape review*. London: The Stationary Office. https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Police-accountability-Landscape-review.pdf

[25] Loader, I. and Muir, R. (2016) *Embracing Police and Crime Commissioners: Lessons from the Past, Directions for the Future.* London: Police Foundation. http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/uploads/holding/projects/embracing_pccs.pdf

[26] See for example European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS) (2016) *Methods and Tool for a Strategic Approach to Urban Security - Country profile: United Kingdom*. https://efus.eu/files/2016/05/AUDITS_Fichepays_UK_ENG.pdf

a feel that they can have a say in setting the policing priorities for their area. [27]

The related challenge of reconciling the localism inherent in the PCC model with the collaboration agenda was also voiced at the consultation stage. As a joint submission from two collaborating forces to the Home Affairs Select Committee stated in 2011:

> *Localism may, however, continue to require and drive differences, complicating the performance landscape for collaborative units. The performance of Norfolk and Suffolk is becoming inextricably linked to the performance of the collaborative units…How does this play out against the localism agenda of the soon to be directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners?* [28]

Recognising the potential for difficulties and tensions such as those suggested above, Section 22A of the 2011 Act gave specific attention to the governance of collaborative arrangements between forces; the provisions are described in supporting statutory guidance[29]. A number of its key points are set out below:

Duty to collaborate

- Chief officers and policing bodies (currently PCCs and their equivalents) have a duty to keep collaboration opportunities under review and "where collaboration is judged to be the best option [for delivering efficient and effective policing], they must collaborate". As previously described, this applies even if they do not expect their own force to benefit directly – so long as it is in the best interests of one of more other forces, they must collaborate. (Paras. 32-39)

Direction and Control

- Section 22A collaboration agreements between

forces can be used to specify arrangements for the transfer of the Direction and Control of officers from one chief constable to another (along with equivalent arrangements for police staff)[30] (Paras. 5, 15, 16, 19, 50, 51)

Accountability

- Policing bodies must hold their chief officer to account for the discharge of functions by anyone acting under the collaboration agreement who is also under their Direction and Control, (including those transferred to their Direction and Control from another chief officer). (Para. 91)

- Policing bodies continue to have responsibility for the delivery of efficient and effective policing in their own area. (Para. 92)

- Policing bodies entering into collaboration must make additional, joint arrangements with the other policing bodies involved, for holding their chief officer to account for the collaboration, for example through a joint oversight committee. (Paras. 93-95)

Other

- Collaboration agreements should make provisions for the sharing of costs and benefits of such arrangements. (Para. 57)

- Accountability arrangements for the oversight of collaborative arrangements must be published. (Para. 78)

The Act, however, allows for considerable flexibility in how collaborating forces choose to structure their agreements and governance arrangements, a number of variations adopted by forces currently collaborat-

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27 Select Committee on Home Affairs (2008) Seventh Report (para. 238). http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmhaff/364/36409.htm

28 Home Affairs Committee (2011) *New Landscape of Policing*. London: TSO. (para. 212) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/939/939.pdf

29 Home Office (2012) *Statutory Guidance for Police Collaboration*. London: Home Office. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117559/police-collaboration.pdf

30 Liabilities, health and safety and complaints handling responsibilities transfer with Direction and Control while disciplinary matters remain with the home force. Direction and Control can also be passed from one chief constable to another on a short term basis under Section 24 of the act, relating to mutual aid (paras. 21-22). Ad hoc assistance and joint working between forces is established practice and does not require the passing of Direction and Control. Such arrangements however would 'be expected to be of a more short term nature' (paras. 23-24) (see Appendix C).

ing to deliver specialist capabilities at a regional level (through Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs)) are described in the next section.

2.6 Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCU)

Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) currently deliver a number of specialist policing capabilities for tackling serious and organised crime at a regional level [31]. As of November 2015 all 10 ROCUs covering England and Wales included a:

- Regional Intelligence Unit

- Asset recovery team

- Fraud Investigation capability

- Protected persons capability

- Cyber-crime Unit

- GAIN (Government Agency Intelligence Network)

- Prison Intelligence function

- Asset Confiscation Enforcement (ACE)

A number of additional capabilities were not held by all ROCUs at November 2015, but are now:

- Regional Confidential Unit

- Operational Security Advisor

- Operational Investigation Teams

- Under-cover policing and specialist surveillance

ROCUs work closely with the national counter terrorism network and are the principal interface between the National Crime Agency and the 43 police forces of England and Wales; they are therefore a vital part of the serious and organised crime law enforcement system.

ROCUs are the product of collaborative cost sharing agreements between their participating forces but also receive additional central funding. A recent HMIC (2015) review noted the rapid development of the ROCU network over recent years but highlighted the variation in their structure, size and effectiveness resulting from the 'piecemeal' fashion in which they have developed. HMIC expressed a clear view that those that have taken on a more extensive set of capabilities represent the most effective practice, and were critical of the '*personalities and other local decisions which have acted against the central vision for ROCUs' (p.5)* and stymied the growth of the least developed.

According to HMIC the East Midlands Special Operations Unit (EMSOU) presents *'a model that other regions can emulate' (p.16)*. In addition to the 13 agreed ROCU capabilities EMSOU also provides a major investigations function across the region. HMIC noted that the relative similarity of the five participating forces had facilitated progress in the East Midlands, while elsewhere an imbalance in size (such as that in the West Midlands region) had proved more problematic, generating concern among smaller partners that a larger neighbour might dominate.

West Midlands (WMROCU), Yorkshire and Humber (ODYSSEY) and London were identified (at the time of the HMIC inspection in 2015) as the least developed ROCUs and tended to operate as co-ordination functions for capabilities retained within forces. [32] HMIC have consistently warned against the possibility of unnecessary duplication of capabilities at both force and regional level and are clear that this should not occur.

The variation between ROCUs extends to the structure of their collaboration arrangements and the governance and oversight provisions these put in place within the respective regions. The publicly available documentation is limited in some cases, but illustrates the flexibility permissible under

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[31] HMIC (2015) *Regional Organised Crime Units: A review of capability and effectiveness*. London: HMIC. http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/regional-organised-crime-units.pdf

[32] We understand that since the HMIC inspection, both WMROCU and ODYSSEY have made progress, the former significant progress.

current legislation. Three examples of the differing models in operation are set out below.

East Midlands (EMSOU) [33]

- Officers and staff working for EMSOU do so under the Direction and Control of their home force chief constables, but take instruction through a chain of command that leads through a dedicated East Midlands Region DCC. The DCC (although employed and under the Direction and Control of the chief constable of Derbyshire Police) is accountable to all five chief constables. The five chiefs are in turn accountable to a joint committee of all five PCCs. The collaboration is funded by all forces in proportion to their relative central government grant award, but all five are equal partners within the collaboration.

South East (SEROCU) [34]

- Although SEROCU is the only other force currently delivering all 13 ROCU capabilities, and to be under the command of a dedicated chief officer (HMIC, 2015: 22), it operates under a very different model. While EMSOU is very much a joint endeavour, four of the forces in the South East region effectively commission ROCU capabilities from the fifth (Thames Valley Police). All officers and staff working within SEROCU are employed by (and thus under the Direction and Control of the chief constable of) Thames Valley Police[35]. In addition, although the Thames Valley PCC has responsibility for holding the TVP chief constable to account for policing services provided by TVP, including the SEROCU which the force hosts (HMIC, 2015: 23), the four other PCCs also provide formal

oversight and scrutiny through regular regional governance board meetings.

Yorkshire and Humber (ODYSSEY) [36]

- The ODYSSEY model shares characteristics with both of the previous examples. Like SEROCU it operates through a lead force (in this case West Yorkshire) however rather than employing all officers and staff, these are seconded from the other forces (with Direction and Control also transferred). In this model however the chief constable of the lead force is held to account by a Regional Collaboration Board which includes all four participating chief constables and PCCs. All participating forces are also involved at the tactical level with senior officers from each force meeting regularly.

What these three examples clearly demonstrate is the interplay between operating models and approaches to matters of Direction Control and operational command. This is a theme to which we will return in considering governance arrangements for the Networked Policing Model in chapter 4.

2.7 Non-collaborative models for the delivery of specialist capabilities

Although the Policing Protocol Order 2011 states that the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 gives Police and Crime Commissioners (and their mayoral equivalents) 'responsibility for the *totality of policing* within their force area' (emphasis added) [37], at present there are a number of policing functions that can and do operate within force territories, but fall outside of PCC governance structures. These provide possible alternative options for delivering specialist capabilities.

[33] http://www.empcp.org.uk/about-us/ Accessed 19 August 2016.

[34] South East ROCU (no date) *Introduction to the South East Regional Organised Crime Unit (SEROCU).* http://www.serocu.org.uk/about.aspx Accessed 19 August 2016.

[35] Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey (2014) *Section 22a Agreement in relation to South East Regional Collaborative Units. 2 May.* http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/062_2014-04-30-PCC-decision-re-SEROCU-S22A.pdf

[36] *ODYSSEY Functional Collaboration Agreement (2 May 2015)* http://www.northyorkshire-pcc.gov.uk/content/uploads/2015/02/2-April-2015-Odyssey-Functional-Collaboration-Agreement.pdf

[37] Policing Protocol Order 2011 (para. 11) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117474/policing-protocol-order.pdf

The National Crime Agency

- The National Crime Agency (NCA) came into being in October 2013 (and became fully operational in Northern Ireland in May 2015) with the remit of leading the UK's fight to cut serious and organised crime; it replaced the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), subsumed the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Agency (CEOP) and took on a number of other policing functions. The NCA operates as a Non-Ministerial Government Department headed by a Director General who is directly accountable to the Home Secretary; it is also subject to scrutiny by the devolved administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland and subject to inspection by HMIC, the IPCC and other bodies. NCA officers operate under the direction of the Director General with internal governance provided by a management board [38].

- The agency operates a 'two-way voluntary tasking and assistance arrangement' with forces, but legislation provides for the Director General to direct chief officers in circumstances where a voluntary agreement cannot be made. It operates in close co-operation with counter-terrorist policing functions and Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCU) and has a stated commitment to work in partnership with PCCs including by providing access to information, delivering annual engagement days and attending regional meetings [39].

- The NCA has some breadth within its remit to lead on tackling serious and organised crime and its role includes providing '*support to partners to help them meet their objectives*

by working in partnership and by providing specialist resources or services'. [40] As such, in theory, it represents a possible vehicle for hosting national capabilities that entirely or (perhaps) predominantly relate to tackling organised crime (such as surveillance and technical support for example) although the tasking infra-structure supporting such an arrangement would need to be carefully considered.

National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) units

- There are currently a number of national policing units that operate from the NPCC structure, these include administrative or support services (such as the ACRO Criminal Records Office and the National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit (NPFIDU)), co-ordination functions (such as the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC)), and national specialist intelligence functions (National Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service (NaVCis), National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS)) and specialist operational units (National Wildlife Crime Unit (NWCU)) [41].

- While some of these units work to internal governance boards [42], there currently appears to be no separate external oversight arrangements for these functions outside of the section 22A agreement covering the NPCC as a whole [43]. It is also open to question as to whether all of these units fall within the agreed functions of the NPCC as set out by that agreement (any variation to which must be agreed by the Secretary of State (para 7.1)) and it is understood that the

[38] National Crime Agency (2015a) *Revised Framework document for the National Crime Agency.* London: Home Office. http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/557-nca-framework-document/file

[39] National Crime Agency (2015b) *The NCA Commitment to Working in Partnership with Police and Crime Commissioners*. London: NCA. http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/177-the-nca-commitment-to-working-in-partnership-with-police-and-crime-commissioners/file

[40] National Crime Agency (2015b) p.5.

[41] NPCC (no date) '*National Policing*' http://www.npcc.police.uk/NationalPolicing/Default.aspx Accessed 16 November 2016.

[42] See for instance *https://www.acro.police.uk/How_we_make_our_decisions.aspx*

[43] Eversheds LLP (2015) *National Police Collaboration Agreement–in relation to the setting up of a Co-ordinating Body known as the National Police Chiefs' Council ("NPCC")*. Leeds: Eversheds LLP. *http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/NPCC%20Section%2022a%20Agreement.pdf*

requirement for separate collaboration agreements relating to these functions is currently under review. While it is perhaps possible that new national capabilities might be hosted by the NPCC, there appear to be significant barriers to this and this would seem to run counter to the current momentum.

- The NPCC also hosts the UK National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTP HQ). Separate coordination and oversight arrangements exist for CT Policing, and NCTPHQ reports to the NPCC and the government. [44]

Other national policing entities

- British Transport Police (BTP) and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary are overseen by Police Authorities, while the Ministry of Defence Police are overseen by a Police Committee; these are appointed respectively by the Secretaries of State for Transport, Energy and Climate Change, and Defence [45] [46] [47]. As such, they sit outside of the oversight of PCCs (and their equivalents). Their remits are narrowly defined and are therefore unlikely to be suitable entities to deliver the specialist policing capabilities under consideration here. In relation to BTP it is notable that there is currently debate about oversight arrangements in Scotland [48].

2.8 The Networked Policing Model

In early October 2016, shortly after the completion of the consultation exercise described in the next chapter, the Specialist Capabilities Programme team published *The Specialist Capabilities Programme –*

Phase One Report. [49]

The report represents a significant departure from the vision of strategically designed regional or national specialist capability provision envisaged by the National Debate Advisory Group in 2015. Instead of centrally organised brigading of specialist capabilities, it recommends incremental transition to a state of 'planned interdependence'.

The Networked Policing Model envisaged in the report retains the current mixed economy of police forces and collaborative ventures, but seeks to strengthen the links between them in such a way that better connects supply to demand on a national basis. The model requires the development of a 'mutual' mindset, supported by better data on cost, supply/availability and demand, by a shared understanding of risk, and by the creation of strategic national Capability Leads.

Such a model clearly has governance implications, including a need for a more holistic or 'networked' approach to governance, and the need to establish the parameters and rules within which the Network might operate.

2.9 Conclusion

Power and leadership in English and Welsh policing is largely held at the level of the generalist territorial police force. Chief constables have long operated with the autonomy granted to them under the legal doctrine of 'operational independence'. The introduction of directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners has reinforced localism by strengthening accountability at the force level.

At the same time as this system of more distributed leadership and accountability has developed,

[44] http://www.npcc.police.uk/NPCCBusinessAreas/TerrorismandAlliedMatters.aspx Accessed 25 November 2016.

[45] Yasin, L. (2013) *Corporate Governance Code*. London: British Transport Police Authority. http://btpa.police.uk/livesite/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/20130315-New-Governance-Code-v3.0-released.pdf

[46] Ministry of Defence Police (2015) *Policing Plan 2015*-16. Wethersfield: Ministry of Defence Police. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439774/Policing_Plan15-16_low_res_final.pdf

[47] Civil Nuclear Police Authority (no date) *Our governance*. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/civil-nuclear-police-authority/about/our-governance Accessed 16 November 2016.

[48] Murray, K. (2016) *Integrating British Transport Police into Police Scotland on a 'shoogly peg'*. https://policinginsight.com/analysis/integrating-british-transport-police-police-scotland-shoogly-peg/ Accessed 16 November 2016.

[49] NPCC (2016) *The Specialist Capabilities Programme – Phase One Report*. London: NPCC. http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/Specialist%20Capabilities%20Programme%20Phase%20One%20Report.pdf

there has been an on-going concern that some things would be better delivered regionally and nationally. The attempt by the then Labour government to mandate a solution to this through a force merger programme ran into considerable local resistance. The present government has made it clear that it is for the police service itself to work out what capabilities would best be delivered locally, regionally and nationally.

The current Specialist Capabilities Programme is the main vehicle through which policing is attempting to resolve, for itself, the long-standing question of what capabilities are best provided at what spatial scale. This question has become particularly pressing in light of austerity and the rise of crime patterns that cross force boundaries.

The current governance model means that power and accountability are held largely at force level. The Specialist Capabilities Programme is proceeding on the basis that whatever is done in terms of new delivery models and governance must evolve out of that existing structure rather than supplant it. New models of governance will therefore require local chief constables and Police and Crime Commissioners to play a leading role. That is why as part of this project we decided to undertake a consultation with chief constables and PCCs. The results of that consultation are set out in the next chapter.

3. Consultation findings

In recognition of the need to take stock of current collaborative governance practices and to collate and understand the views and concerns of chief constables and PCCs, it was considered essential that this review be informed by a stakeholder consultation.

3.1 The consultation process

Working with the Specialist Capabilities Programme governance working group, the Police Foundation developed a questionnaire covering six key subject areas and including a mixture of structured (tick box) and unstructured (free text) responses (see Appendix D).

On 19 September 2016, the questionnaire was sent by email to all chief constables and PCCs, via the NPCC and APCC, with a covering letter from PCC Paddy Tipping, the working group chair. Responses were invited by 30 September.

The final response was received on 7 October, at which point a total of 29 completed responses had been received, five of which were joint responses (three from PCCs and chief constables of the same force; two from chief constables of adjacent, collaborating forces). For the purposes of reporting, these have been disaggregated, giving a base of 33 respondents (19 chief constables and 14 PCCs). One response, including free text responses only, was received from the operational lead of a collaborative entity; this has been excluded from the quantitative base but incorporated into the qualitative analysis.

To supplement the written feedback, 16 key stakeholders were nominated by the working group to be invited to participate in short (30 minute) telephone interviews. All eight who replied were subsequently interviewed (five CCs and three PCCs or, in several cases, their representatives).

All contributors are listed in Appendix A.

The Police Foundation provided the Specialist Capabilities Programme governance working group with a verbal update on emerging findings on 5 October and an 'emerging findings' report on 11 October (which was circulated to all CCs and PCCs). The NPCC Specialist Capabilities Programme Phase One Report was published on 5 October.

The Police Foundation presented interim findings to the APCC Annual General Meeting on 20 October, and then a second interim report was circulated on 26 October in advance of the NPCC Specialist Capabilities Programme Board on 3 November, at which the Police Foundation provided a further verbal update. A further draft was circulated to the Specialist Capabilities governance working group on 11 November.

A note on the survey findings: *as not all consultees responded to the consultation, the results may not be representative of all views, particularly if there are non-random reasons for decisions to respond or not.*

3.2 Police leaders' understanding of good governance

Consultation and interview responses indicate that governance is understood differently among chief constables and PCCs. Some respondents equated governance with accountability or performance management, while others emphasised scrutiny over 'hidden' or covert areas. One respondent suggested that governance was too often confused with management. Terms such as 'assurance' and oversight were also used, although it is not clear that these are always given consistent meanings.

An emphasis on defining objectives, desired outcomes and 'what success look like' was advocated

Table 1: *On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is 'not at all important' and 7 is 'very important', how would you rate the relative importance of these principles when considering the governance arrangements for specialist policing capabilities delivered on a cross-force/regional/national basis?*

CIPFA Principles of Good Governance	Chief Constables (19)		Police and Crime Commissioners (14)		All (33)	
	Mean score (0ut of 7)	Rank (1= most important)	Mean score (out of 7)	Rank (1=most important)	Mean score (out of 7)	Rank (1=most important)
A: Behaving with integrity, demonstrating strong commitment to ethical values and respecting the rule of law.	7.0	1	6.6	2	6.8	1
B: Ensuring openness and comprehensive stakeholder engagement	6.6	2	6.4	4	6.5	2
C: Defining outcomes in terms of sustainable economic, social and environmental benefits.	5.4	7	5.7	7	5.5	7
D: Determining the interventions necessary to optimise the achievements of the intended outcomes.	5.7	6	6.0	6	5.8	6
E: Developing the entity's capacity, including the capacity of its leadership and the individuals within it.	6.1	4	6.1	5	6.1	5
F: Managing risks and performance through robust internal control and strong public financial management.	6.1	4	6.7	1	6.4	4
G: Implementing good practices in transparency, reporting and audit to deliver effective accountability.	6.4	3	6.6	3	6.5	3

in several responses – although it is interesting to note that this was not among the most important aspects of governance for the overall survey sample (see above).

It is clear that views about governance in relation to collaborations are intertwined with some of policing's unresolved debates. For instance, is the decision to collaborate purely an operational matter? If so, the governance role of PCCs can be framed narrowly in terms of assessing outputs and value for money as these apply to a single force. If, however, the 'commissioning' part of a PCC's role is emphasised, this might justify a broader role and more intrusive form of 'top down' scrutiny. We return to these 'unresolved questions' in Chapter 4.

Principles of good governance

Survey respondents were asked to rate each of sev-

en good governance principles[50] based on their importance to multi-force arrangements. Mean scores out of 7 are shown in Table 1, which shows that:

- All seven principles were felt to be important and given high scores (average scores for all respondents were between 5.5 and 6.8 out of 7).

- Chief constables gave principle A (relating to integrity, ethical values and upholding the law) the highest average rating.

- PCCs and chief constables differed most markedly in regard to the importance attached to principle F (relating to managing risk and performance), which PCCs on average rated as most important (compared to fourth for chief constables).

50 Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountability (CIPFA) (2016) *Delivering Good Governance: Guidance Notes for Policing Bodies in England and Wales, 2016 Edition*. London: CIPFA http://www.cipfa.org/policy-and-guidance/publications/d/delivering-good-governance-guidance-notes-for-policing-bodies-in-england-and-wales-2016-edition

- Both groups rated principle C (relating to defining economic, social and environmental outcomes) as least important – although this still received an overall average of 5.5 out of 7.

- One chief constable respondent expressed concern that principle D (relating to interventions) strays into operational matters, while a PCC described an example of working with their chief constable to develop a new capability and suggested that the policy/operation distinction is often not clear in practice.

3.3 Reflections on current collaborative practice

Respondents described a complex and often *ad-hoc* collaboration landscape featuring a wide range of operating models at a variety of levels of overlapping geography.

In many cases, existing collaborative arrangements are described as having delivered operational benefits including efficiencies and resilience. This is particularly the case where governance arrangements either work well or have been improved. There are also examples of adaptation, experimentation and maturation in terms of delivery models, governance processes, and innovations. These include, for example, lead PCCs with responsibility for 'matrix' scrutiny of other forces, integrated performance frameworks, and shared policy staff jointly employed by two or more PCCs' offices.

It is also clear that challenges have been encountered and respondents gave differing views about the governance of the same collaboration. For example, some chief constables and PCCs were less positive than their peers about the same ROCU. This suggests that the same collaborative arrangements can work better for some partners than others.

It is also evident that the complexity of some arrangements can be bureaucratic, obscure accountability and limit the time and scope for robust scrutiny. Access to necessary data can be problematic. There

are very different views about the governance of the more hidden aspects of policing. For example, one chief constable stressed the need for 'assurance' rather than governance in this area, while a PCC emphasised the particular risks to public confidence arising from covert activity and the importance of a more formal governance role.

Views on ROCU arrangements

Respondents were asked how satisfied they are with various aspects of arrangements relating to the Regional Organised Crime Unit (ROCU) in which their force participates. Responses are illustrated in chart 1 (overleaf) and show that:

- A majority of both PCCs and chief constables are satisfied with arrangements relating to their ROCU. However, differences were noted between participants in the same ROCU, and in some cases between chief constables and PCCs from the same force.

- Nearly half (43 per cent) of PCCs said they are dissatisfied that current arrangements ensure that the ROCU contributes to the delivery of their Police and Crime Plan, while an equal proportion are satisfied.

- A third of PCCs (35 per cent) are dissatisfied that current arrangements allow them to effectively scrutinise ROCU performance.

- More than a quarter of chief constables (26 per cent) are dissatisfied that ROCU arrangements include clear lines of accountability.

3.4 How accountability operates under existing arrangements

A number of respondents expressed concerns about the implications of complex collaboration arrangements for the accountability of chief constables for policing within their force area. The prospect of ever-greater complexity and interconnectivity in the future heightened the need for greater clarity.

It was not uncommon, however, for respondents to

Chart 1: *Thinking specifically about the ROCU in which your force participates, how satisfied are you that the arrangements currently in place… (Figures are per cent of respondents, to the nearest whole number).*

Legend: ■ Very dissatisfied ■ Somewhat dissatisfied ▨ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied ■ Somewhat satisfied ■ Very satisfied

Provide good value for money?

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Chief Constables (19)	11	16	16	32	26
PCCs (14)		14	57	21	7

Allow you to effectively scrutinise performance?

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Chief Constables (19)		11	16	63	11
PCCs (14)	14	21	7	43	14

Include Clear lines of accountability?

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Chief Constables (19)		26	16	37	21
PCCs (14)	14	7	21	36	21

Adequately ensure that the capabilities contribute to your Police and Crime Plan / Control Strategy?

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Chief Constables (19)		11	26	42	21
PCCs (14)	7	36	14	36	7

Adequately ensure democratic oversight of these capabilities?

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Chief Constables (19)			53	37	11
PCCs (14)	7	21	29	43	

Allow you to draw on specialist capabilities when they are needed?

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Chief Constables (19)		21	11	42	26
PCCs (14)		21	14	64	

Facilitate continuous improvement of specialist capabilities?

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Chief Constables (19)		11	32	21	37
PCCs (14)		21	43	21	14

Overall, how satisfied are with the governance arrangements of your force's ROCU?

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Chief Constables (19)	5	11	11	47	26
PCCs (14)	7	14	7	71	

How satisfied are you with the service you receive, relative to your forces contribution to ROCU?

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Chief Constables (19)	5	5	26	37	26
PCCs (14)	7	14	21	50	7

Legend: ■ Very dissatisfied ■ Somewhat dissatisfied ▨ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied ■ Somewhat satisfied ■ Very satisfied

indicate a relative degree of comfort with the current complexity and ambiguity, to suggest that problems are more theoretical than real, and that 'managing the tension' – in balance against the benefits of collaboration – is part of their role. However, confidence about the availability of shared capacity is often dependent on physical proximity and personal trust between collaborating partners. This hints at weak formal governance arrangements.

The importance of maintaining local accountability, and the primacy of the chief constable/PCC relationship as the principle mechanism of accountability, was often emphasised, as was the importance of 'always knowing who the boss is'. For instance, an example was given where members of a locally-based operational unit sitting under a national structure were unsure to whom they were ultimately accountable.

It is clear that the principle that the PCC should hold the chief constable to account for the 'totality of policing' is under strain. This is because of 'exceptions' (such the National Crime Agency and British Transport Police) and due to the boundaries of policing become blurred, for example with regard to local safeguarding partnership work. One respondent suggested that chief constables should be held accountable for the relationship with these other contributors to the 'totality' of local policing, and others reinforced the importance of communication and locally accountable individuals being 'kept informed' by others operating in the area.

There are particular concerns about the technical and legal implications of complex collaborations for employment liabilities and Direction and Control, and differing views on the degree to which these overlap with, or should be separated from, questions of 'performance' accountability.

Lines of accountability

In addition to open ended questions, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with three statements about appropriate accountability and Direction and Control lines for officers and police staff. Responses reveal a lack of consensus and clarity about the operation of lines of accountability and Direction and Control across the service.

As chart 2 (overleaf) illustrates:

- On all three statements both PCCs and chief constables exhibit a considerable range of views.

- Overall, the majority of both chief constables and PCCs agree that police officers and staff should always be accountable to the chief constable of the force in which they are working, although in both cases a notable minority disagree.

- A majority of chief constables disagree that officers and staff should be under the Direction and Control of the chief constable of the force in which they were working, although a third (37 per cent) agree. PCC views are more finely balanced (43 per cent agree and disagree).

- An equal proportion of chief constables agree (42 per cent) and disagree (43 per cent) that the day to day chain of command should mirror Direction and Control, whereas most PCCs (72 per cent) agree that it should.

3.5 The importance of localism

There is disagreement about the extent to which deployment and tasking should be based on the application of standard criteria (e.g. 'threat, risk and harm') or whether this should seek to accommodate force level preferences. Survey responses detailed in chart 3 (below) show that:

- A large majority of both chief constables and PCCs agree both that deployment should be based on objective criteria *and* that deployment should accommodate local preferences and priorities.

- The proportion of PCCs opposed to each statement was identical (21 per cent).

- When asked to choose just one approach, both groups chose objective criteria by a large majority (but not unanimously) although PCCs were more likely to emphasise local priorities.

These responses reveal significant concerns about the ability of shared capabilities to adequately respond to locally identified need.

Respondents were also asked the extent to which they think each of the eight capability areas under consideration within phases one and two of the Specialist Capabilities Programme require local control over deployment for delivery against Police and Crime Plans and Control Strategies. Chart 4 shows the views of chief constables and PCCs combined.

Chart 2: *To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Figures are per cent of respondents, to the nearest whole number.)*


Chief Constables (19) %

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
When providing a capability for a police force police officers and staff should always be accountable to the Chief Constable of that force	11	26	11	32	21
Police officers and staff should always be under the Direction and Control of the Chief Constable of a force in which they are providing a capability (other than in exceptional circumstances).	21	42		26	11
The day to day chain of command should always mirror Direction and Control (other than in exceptional circumstances)	11	32	16	26	16

■ Strongly disagree ■ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ■ Somewhat agree ■ Strongly agree

PCCs (14) %

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
When providing a capability for a police force police officers and staff should always be accountable to the Chief Constable of that force		36	21	29	14
Police officers and staff should always be under the Direction and Control of the Chief Constable of a force in which they are providing a capability (other than in exceptional circumstances).		43	14	36	7
The day to day chain of command should always mirror Direction and Control (other than in exceptional circumstances)		14	14	43	29

■ Strongly disagree ■ Somewhat disagree ☐ Neither agree nor disagree ■ Somewhat agree ■ Strongly agree

Chart 3: *To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Figures are per cent of respondents, to the nearest whole number.)*


Headline messages include:

- With the exception of Technical Support Units (TSUs), local control over the deployment of all capabilities is considered moderately or greatly important by a large majority of respondents (between two-thirds and four-fifths).

- For surveillance, armed and roads policing, and major investigations, more respondents answered that these capabilities are required for delivering local plans / strategies to a great than a moderate extent

- For public order and especially cyber-crime and economic crime, more said this is to a moderate than a great extent.

- Although not shown in the chart, there is no notable difference between chief constable and PCC responses to these questions.

These responses indicate considerable concern about more extensive and centrally organised sharing of some specialist capabilities. In particular, there is a

Chart 4: *To what extent is the delivery of the particular priorities set out in your current Police and Crime Plan / Control Strategy contingent on your force having control over the deployment of the following specialist capabilities. Base: all (Chief constables and PCCs combined) who responded (29-31). Figures are per cent to nearest whole number.*

view that many elements of specialist capabilities not already brigaded in ROCUs are in fact core to routine local policing, both operationally and reflecting the local character and experience of policing.

One respondent was at pains to emphasise the need to assess risk, threat and harm *in context*, which is clearly a challenge for supra-force capabilities. In this respect, roads policing seems to arouse particular concern, while one respondent focussed on the role of public order policing in defining how policing is experienced in their force area. There is more consensus that TSUs need not be locally based, in part because the function is largely invisible to the public.

In addition, there are also concerns, particularly from smaller and more rural force areas, that objective tasking on the basis of assessments of risk, threat and harm, will inevitably pull resources to urban centres leaving them unable to provide an acceptable level of local response.

Conversely, there are those who are critical of previous instances of apparently 'politically' motivated tasking decisions taken to show a commitment to forces typically attracting less resource within a collaboration. One chief constable stated that management information data in a particular collaboration had clearly demonstrated that partners 'got out what they put in'.

There is support for capability areas being further disaggregated. Some aspects within the capability areas might be acceptable for delivery at the multi-force level, rather than those areas as a whole. This emphasises the need to identify those elements of the capabilities that are less visible, more specialist and required less frequently.

3.6 Structures and governance models

Governance models are linked to the collaborative delivery model across which they sit. With reference to

Chart 5: Thinking specifically about their implications for governance and accountability please indicate your general level of support for each model. Net support shown.(Figures are per cent of respondents, to the nearest whole number).

1. Single force
2. Ad-hoc collaborations
3. Regional 'hosted joint venture'
4. Regional 'lead force'
5. Regional 'commissioned'
6. National 'hosted joint venture'
7. National 'lead force'
8. National commissioned
9. National non-collaborative

their implications for governance, respondents were asked for their general level of support for nine hypothetical delivery models. These ranged from single force and ad hoc collaborations, various forms of regional and national collaboration (lead-force, joint-ventured, commissioned services etc.) and one national non-collaborative model, in which specialist capabilities might be provided by an organisation such as the National Crime Agency (see section 6 of the questionnaire at Appendix D). The overall net support (or opposition) to the various models is shown above in chart 5, with the full details included in Appendix B.

The key findings are that:

- A majority of chief constable respondents oppose single-force (69 per cent) and ad hoc collaboration (61 per cent) models, however the views of PCCs are more mixed with a small majority supportive of these 'status-quo' options.

- Of the regionally or nationally structured options, both chief constables and PCCs were most strongly in favour of regional 'hosted

joint venture' models, in which all participants are actively involved in delivery and decision making.

- There was a similar level of support for a regional 'lead force' model, although respondents tended to be somewhat as opposed to very supportive.

- There was little support from either group for national models.

These responses reflect a view, particularly among chief constables, that 'evolutionary' collaboration may be reaching its practical limits and that a degree of design is required for overall service delivery – even if this is a 'light touch' framework. PCCs seem less convinced. Respondents stressed the historical, geographic and political factors that dictated the current collaboration landscape and were wary of centralised brigading that ignored these nuances.

The model preferences expressed here are likely to reflect past experience of collaboration but also concerns about access to capabilities when required. Regional rather than national, and 'involved' and personal rather than delegated and contractual models, appear currently to offer those assurances.

3.7 Consultation conclusions

This survey reflects the views of only a minority of PCCs and chief constables. Nonetheless, it provides a window on the balance of views regarding the governance of existing and future collaborative models.

Collaboration is believed to have delivered efficiencies, but there are concerns that arrangements are often complex, which can produce bureaucracy and weaken accountability.

Confidence in collaborative arrangements is contingent on personal trust, on geographical constraints, on historical relations between forces and on similarities in their size, outlook and character. There is opposition to any centrally organised brigading of capabilities that might ignore local nuances and

undermine efforts already invested in collaboration.

There is support for more specialist capabilities being delivered through regional clusters. Nonetheless there are concerns about whether shared capabilities will be available when required and will arrive in a form sympathetic to the character of local policing.

In light of this it is clear to see why a model for the future that leaves existing and emerging regional structures intact – as the Networked Policing Model does – is a pragmatic approach. That said, it is likely that the transition to a Networked Policing Model will present governance challenges. Our consultation responses suggest a lack of consensus on basic principles, including around lines of accountability. Collective agreement on these basic principles would seem to be a prerequisite for the kind of Networked Policing Model envisaged by the Specialist Capabilities Programme. The next chapter explores these questions in more detail.

Box 1: Summary of consultation findings

- The consultation responses reflect a complex and often ad-hoc collaboration landscape featuring a wide range of operating models at a variety of levels of overlapping geography.

- Success factors for effective governance identified by chief constables and PCCs include: the type of operating model, well matched collaborative forces, strong interpersonal relationships, clear lines of accountability, well defined outcomes, and timely and comprehensive performance data.

- The complexity of arrangements can be bureaucratic, obscure accountability, and limit the time and scope for robust scrutiny.

- There is broad but qualified support for regional over national collaborated capabilities and for 'joint ventures' over 'commissioned models'.

- There is support for objective assessments of risk, threat and harm when making tasking decisions but it is also clear that there are concerns about a loss of local control. These concerns reflect differences in the priorities of forces and their PCCs, a worry about the dilution of local PCC to chief constable accountability with widening geographical scale, and a concern from smaller and more rural forces that resources will migrate to urban centres.

- There is a view that many elements of specialist capabilities are core to routine local policing (both operationally and reflecting the local character of policing).

- There is agreement among our sample that Technical Support Units (TSUs) need not be locally based.

- A distinction was drawn by some between *control* of and *confidence about* access to capabilities, with the latter particularly relating to surge capacity.

- Geographic proximity of shared resources and personal relationships are key to establishing confidence about collaborative arrangements, but also hint at weak formal governance.

- While there is a general acceptance from chief constables that evolutionary, ad-hoc collaboration may have run its course, there are more mixed views among PCCs, and there are concerns that further top-down brigading may ignore the nuances of force compatibility.

4. The governance of the Networked Policing Model

The Specialist Capabilities Programme has developed a concept of 'Networked Policing', which seeks to maintain existing force and regional collaborative structures, but strengthen the connections between them so to provide specialist capabilities in a more effective and efficient way and bolster resilience. This chapter explores the governance implications of this model and makes a number of recommendations, which are intended as a starting point for discussion.

It should be noted that the first details of the Networked Policing Model emerged after the formal end date of the Police Foundation consultation, and as a result it was not possible to ask chief constables and PCCs any specific questions about the proposals.[51] Nevertheless, drawing on the consultation responses and our wider review of the landscape, we provide the following reflections on the implications of the Networked Policing Model for governance.

4.1 The Networked Policing Model as an incremental solution

At its simplest, the Networked Policing Model encompasses three things.

1. First, it would allow a strategic understanding of a specialist capability across all of its constituent parts and across borders, up to and including the national level if all forces participate. This would help the police service answer the following questions: what does a capability look like across the Network as a whole and how resilient is it, how does supply relate to demand, where are there gaps in provision, and where is there scope for greater efficiency?

2. Second, it would facilitate a more strategic approach to the development of specialist capabilities, including their leadership, tactics and standards, at a higher level of aggregation than is currently seen in most existing collaborations.

3. Third, the model would encompass a brokerage service. In practical terms this Network Broker could constitute an extension of the functions of the National Police Co-ordination Centre (NPoCC)[52] from exceptional and reactive circumstances to more mainstream and planned activities. This would enable individual forces and collaborations to access specialist capabilities from – and/or offer to supply them to – their peers in other parts of the country, beyond the boundaries of police forces and existing collaborations.

The Networked Policing Model can therefore be seen as an incremental development that goes with the grain of existing arrangements rather than supplanting them.

That said, it seems inevitable that introducing a more structured Networked Policing Model will shine a bright light on existing collaborative arrangements, including their governance, which will be a key dependency for the efficient and effective operation of the system as a whole. Furthermore, it seems likely that the Networked Policing Model will itself incentivise changes to the operating models and governance of collaborative arrangements over time, not least through making demands for (and making transparent) data on capacity, costs and prices – and potentially user feedback on service delivery.

A more radical interpretation of the Networked Policing Model is that it marks a step-change in the deliv-

51 NPCC (2016) *The Specialist Capabilities Programme – Phase One Report*. London: NPCC. http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/Specialist%20Capabilities%20Programme%20Phase%20One%20Report.pdf

52 NPCC (no date) *National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC)*. http://www.npcc.police.uk/NationalPolicing/NPoCC/home.aspx Accessed 16 November 2016.

ery of policing services – albeit in the first instance in relation to very few, highly specialist capabilities, and on one reading in a way that is not so different to current practice around mutual aid[53]. This is reflected in the language of a 'mutual' mindset, adopted following the publication of the Specialist Capabilities Programme Phase 1 report, and which implies a more strategic and potentially entrepreneurial approach to delivering policing.

4.2 Preconditions for introducing a Networked Policing Model

A number of conditions will need to be met if a Networked Policing Model is to be successfully developed, many of which relate to governance:

1. There will need to be consensus on a number of rules, mechanisms and principles, including:

    a. How the brokerage service and strategic leads will be funded;

    b. How capabilities will be funded and/or priced;

    c. The degree to which local priorities should be factored into deployment decisions when there are multiple bids for the same assets;

    d. Arrangements for ethical oversight and approval;

    e. Arrangements around lines of accountability and liability (including in respect of Direction and Control);

    f. How to deal with emergencies and exigencies (when resources may need to be recalled or redeployed at short notice);

    g. How user feedback will be facilitated;

    h. Whether suppliers should be able to make 'profits', and whether any profits should be ring-fenced for the capability in question.

2. In the event that more than one network develops (for example, encompassing wider regional collaborations rather than operating nationally), it may nevertheless be important to ensure consistency of rules, mechanisms and principles across networks, to avoid the risk of designing out the potential for future consolidation.

3. The model requires consistent, comprehensive, timely and transparent data on demand for and the supply (capacity and availability) of specialist capabilities.[54]

4. There will need to be consensus on (and oversight of) the necessary levels of specialist capability strategic contingency, to mitigate supply failure risks[55], ensure that reasonably foreseeable surges in demand can be met, and to ensure specialist assets have sufficient time rostered in for training and CPD. Supply must at least meet demand, moderated by an assessment of the degree to which the latter is elastic.

5. There will need to be a much greater focus on ensuring interoperability and compliance with (or exceeding) national standards, which the Networked Policing Model should itself incentivise – perhaps as a condition of a police force or collaboration offering capabilities to the Network. The relationship between the Specialist Capability Strategic Leads (see 4.3

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[53] NPCC (2016) *National Policing Guidelines on Charging for Police Services: Mutual Aid Cost Recovery.* London: NPCC. http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/finance/2015/NPCC%20Guidelines%20on%20Charging%20for%20Police%20Services%20Mutual%20Aid.pdf

[54] The distinction between *capacity and availability* in terms of supply reflects practical factors such as the geographical limits of deployment that might exist: while capacity might exist nationally, particular components of it might not be available to all forces, especially at short notice

[55] For example, if a significant single provider withdraws from the Network or is constrained by a regulatory intervention, or if smaller forces increasingly rely on their larger peers to provide specialist capabilities.

below) and the College of Policing will be critical in ensuring this and it may make sense for the Capability Leads to be employed by the College of Policing. [56] Similarly, the role of HMIC in inspecting compliance would need to be considered.

6. Mechanisms will be required to appoint and appropriately hold to account any new Specialist Capability Strategic Leads. These leads would have to be accountable to the wider Network or, more precisely, to a body acting on behalf of that wider Network.

7. In all of these matters, there will need to be consensus on the appropriate balance between efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy.

In addition, the Networked Policing Model raises a number of fundamental but **unresolved systemic questions,** which will need to be addressed if the public and government are to have confidence in policing as a 'self-improving system'. These include:

8. Does policing have a strategic centre that is strong enough to ensure that the system is functioning as more than the sum of its parts?

9. Relatedly, if Police and Crime Commissioners and chief constables are to play the wider strategic role required by the Networked Policing Model, what decision making mechanisms will be required? Such mechanisms will need to strike a balance between inclusive participation and the need for efficient decision-making.

10. Is there a need for greater clarity around key concepts bequeathed by the 2011 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act and Policing Protocol Order [57]? Our analysis of the consultation responses has highlighted a number of unresolved constitutional questions:

   a. What are the respective roles of the PCC and chief constable, and is the one-to-one accountability arrangement as currently

formalised in legislation fit for purpose?

   b. What is operational and therefore within the purview of the chief constable? Is the decision to collaborate a policy matter or an operational matter?

   c. What is commissioned, and by whom?

   d. What is 'local' and what is the 'totality of policing' in an increasingly collaborated and interconnected policing landscape?

   e. Is the concept of Direction and Control (and related liabilities) sufficiently clear?

   f. Should PCCs be able to delegate aspects of their authority to their peers in other forces?

11. To what extent should the Network be permeable to other providers and users, including non-territorial police forces (such as the National Crime Agency and British Transport Police), other jurisdictions (for example, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Scotland and the Irish An Garda Síochána), and non-state actors?

On this basis we conclude that the 'good governance' of the Networked Policing Model requires:

1. 'Good governance' at the level of forces and regional collaborations.

2. Stronger mechanisms for collective decision making and a more robust 'strategic centre' in policing.

3. Clarity on the accountability principles for specialist capabilities provided and procured through the Network, standardised where possible.

4. The need for representative governance of any Network Broker and Specialist Capability Strategic Leads.

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[56] It should be noted that the College of Policing has responsibility for setting these standards.

[57] Policing Protocol Order 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117474/policing-protocol-order.pdf

4.3 A proposition for future governance arrangements of the Networked Policing Model

The Networked Policing Model requires a model of governance that is as simple and clear as possible, built on a foundation of agreed principles. To that end, we propose the following as a starting point for discussion (to note: these relate to the Networked Policing Model and not the internal governance of collaborations).

In doing so we recognise that any framework will be subject to bottom-up buy-in from forces and existing collaborations and there will be a spectrum of possible outcomes, for example extending from a Network facilitating the deployment of specialist capabilities that are jointly owned and funded by all Network participants through to more transactional arrangements, particularly at the very highly specialist end of the spectrum (reflected in points 3 and 4 below). We also note that the development of a Networked Policing Model will be an incremental and evolving process and suggest that these principles could apply to early adopters as much as any final end state model.

1. Both single forces and formal collaborations (i.e. those with a Section 22A agreement in place) may participate in the Network as suppliers or procurers of policing services (or as both). The identity of the Network participant (i.e. as an individual force or specified collaboration) must always be explicit.

2. The internal governance of Network participants should continue as at present, operating at police force and collaborative levels, although it is recognised that Network participation may require or incentivise some evolution of internal processes.

3. In order to simplify lines of accountability amid a complex landscape, we propose that a standard set of principles are applied wherever policing services are procured and supplied through the Network, specifically:

a. Where a single force procures policing services from others in the Network, the PCC of the procuring force should hold their own force chief constable to account for the implications of their procurement decisions for efficient and effective policing in their area. (Where the procuring Network participant is a collaboration, the collaboration's governance mechanism(s) must fulfil the equivalent role.)

b. Where a single force supplies policing services to others in the Network, the PCC of the supplying force must hold their force chief constable to account for implications of their decisions to supply for efficient and effective policing in their area. (Where the supplier is a collaboration, the collaboration's governance mechanism(s) must fulfil the equivalent role.)

4. In order to ensure consistent oversight of networked specialist capabilities, particularly where officers from one force may operate in a number of others over time, it may be beneficial to establish a more consistent service-wide approach to Direction and Control. For example, it may be appropriate for Direction and Control (and related liabilities) to always remain with the provider (or always pass to the force in which operational activity is taking place), although it is acknowledged that at present different forces and collaborations adopt different practices, and the consultation highlighted a wide range of views about Direction and Control and accountability matters amongst respondents (see section 3.4 above).

a. We see potential advantages of adopting the principle that Direction and Control should be retained by the provider namely:

– Maintaining consistent oversight of

officers and capabilities that may deploy in a number of force areas over a period of time.

– Distributing governance responsibilities across both the procuring Network participant (in terms of scrutinising the effectiveness and efficiency of the services provided - see point 3a above) and the supplying participant (through Direction and Control).

b. Some disadvantages can also be envisaged, notably that:

– Specialist capabilities are likely to be deployed in support of other operational activity, in contrast for example to ROCUs that will generally take a leading role. This could result in different Direction and Control lines within the same operation.

c. Direction and Control is discussed in Home Office Statutory Guidance for Police Collaboration, paragraphs from which are reproduced at Appendix C. The key principles are that:

– Under collaboration and Mutual Aid arrangements, a chief constable may authorise the passing of Direction and Control to the chief constable of another force.

– Under 'ad hoc assistance arrangements', assistance is 'provided to another force without Direction and Control passing'. Significantly, these arrangements are described as '[giving] rise to a co-operation network from which all forces benefit' (at para. 23, p.10).

5. PCCs (and collaboration oversight boards) would need access to frank and transparent feedback on the performance of those capabilities from users within the Network to provide effective oversight of supplied services.

6. In all cases, contractual accountability would exist between provider and user, dealt with by way of documentation that should be standardised as far as possible.

7. **A Networked Policing Broker** should be established, to house data on demand, supply, availability and prices, match users to providers, and to collate and publish (anonymised but verified) user feedback. This could be an extended version of the National Police Co-ordination Centre (NPoCC) currently housed by the NPCC.

8. **Specialist Capability Strategic Leads** should be appointed to provide strategic leadership of the specialist capability domains, including overseeing (and certifying) standards, the development of capabilities (leadership, tactics), interoperability, strategic capacity, and risks. Their relationship to the College of Policing, which sets standards for the police service – and which has its own governance arrangements – would need to be discussed further, but the College might be the obvious employer.

9. A **Networked Policing Board** should be established to provide representative governance of the Networked Policing Broker and Specialist Capability Strategic Leads, potentially including wider stakeholder and non-executive members. The Board would routinely – perhaps annually – report to all chief constables and PCCs (potentially limited to those participating in the Network) and other parties where deemed appropriate, for example the Home Office and HMIC. The composition of the Board would in any case need to be periodically reviewed in recognition of the fact that the participants in the Network may change over time, as will individual chief constables and PCCs.

10. Networked Policing market **rules, mechanisms and principles should be collectively developed, agreed and (where necessary) reviewed by all principle Network members** (that is, all chief constables and PCCs, potentially limited to those participating in the Network).

4.4 A stronger mechanism for collective decision making

Policing has moved from a tripartite system in which local accountability was relatively weak and in which, over time, the Home Office had taken a leading role in policy and 'system leadership', to one in which PCCs primarily hold police forces to account and central government has pulled back from its previously dominant policy role. As a result we have a system with highly distributed power and accountability and a relatively weak centre. As *corporations sole*, under current legislation chief constables and PCCs cannot be bound into financial, resource or structural decisions taken by their peers.

The aspiration of both government and the service itself is that policing should become more of a 'self-improving system', which contains the right mix of incentives, institutions, relationships, 'backbone infrastructure' and culture to improve and adapt to changing demand without the need for central government intervention.

The Networked Policing Model can be a key element in achieving that aspiration and would involve some capabilities that are currently delivered locally being delivered across a wider geography, as well as stronger connections between the bodies delivering those capabilities.

Rather than involving structural changes or investment decisions (with some small scale exceptions relating to the strategic leads, broker and board), the Networked Policing Model is focused on stronger *interconnectivity* and *interoperability* between forces (and their collaborations) in pursuit of greater efficiency and resilience. As identified above, implementing the model would require collective decision making at two levels:

1. Strategic decisions which must involve all Police and Crime Commissioners and chief constables through meetings of the NPCC and the APCC (whether separately or together). These would address the preconditions identified above at 4.2, in particular the rules, mechanisms and principles that would need to be agreed by all Network participants. Examples include the pricing models for specialist capabilities delivered through the Network and deployment decision protocols.

2. Decisions relating to the routine governance (including performance management, leadership and oversight) of the Networked Policing Model delivery, which should be delegated to a Board, as outlined above.

Of these two, the more obvious challenge seems to exist in relation to the first. Here decisions need to be taken that would indeed bind all Network participants to a set of common rules and so on (indeed, agreeing to be bound by a particular decision making mechanism would be a condition of Network membership). Current arrangements that allow individual chief constables the right to derogate from decisions (e.g. at Chiefs' Council) may prove problematic because they would effectively (self-) exclude those forces from the Network or imply that individuals hold a power of veto, both of which could serve to limit the strategic potential for the Networked Policing Model to deliver efficiency and effectiveness advantages.

The rules for collective decision making would themselves need to be discussed and agreed, and might in some cases require legislative change. While a number of models could be imagined, we offer one proposal to form the starting point for a wider discussion among PCCs, police forces and stakeholders. This proposed approach would effectively democratise strategic decision making, with decisions subject to:

1. One vote per chief constable and PCC (or police authority, where applicable) as *corporations sole*.

2. Decisions passed by a double threshold majority, for example a basic majority or two-thirds of *both* chief constables *and* PCCs.

This process might best be aligned with something along the lines of a **Strategic Policing AGM**, attended by all chief constables and PCCs, at which strategic decisions affecting the whole of the police service could be tabled and determined.

This proposed approach is intended to allow strategic decisions to be taken efficiently (with no party holding a power of veto) and in a way that would facilitate genuine reform, mitigate the risk that proposals are diluted to a lowest common denominator in order to be agreed and implemented, and also to ensure a balance between the interests of chief constables and PCCs.

5. Conclusion

The current geographical policing landscape in England and Wales is characterised by a complex patchwork of collaborative arrangements that have generally emerged without reference to the national strategic interest. These vary greatly in their complexity and are characterised by governance arrangements that work better in some cases than others and for some participants more than others; common dependencies such as personal trust, geographical proximity and similar force sizes and characters certainly hint at formal governance weaknesses.

The ambition to generate both greater efficiencies and more timely and reliable resilience arrangements has given rise to a proposed Networked Policing Model, which will effectively sit on top of and bridge existing arrangements, connecting potential providers and users of specialist capabilities, reducing duplication, saving money, ensuring national resilience, and in theory driving improvements in standards.

In order for it to do so effectively, however, it is dependent on the effective governance of its constituents and on their ability to collectively reach consensus on a number of critical market rules, mechanisms and principles. At the same time, the creation of a strategic network predicated on a 'mutual' mindset gives rise to a number of concerns that emphasise the importance of a strong strategic centre.

The Networked Policing Model offers the prospect of a new paradigm for accessing and providing specialist capabilities, but in doing so highlights current weaknesses and makes new demands of police forces and their political counterparts. A governance architecture established to provide stronger local accountability must now be challenged to step up to a wider and more strategic role. The recommendations contained in this paper are intended to provoke discussion as to how this might be achieved.

Appendix A: Consultation respondents

The Police Foundation would like to thank the following office holders (and where relevant, their representatives) for completing consultation questionnaires, participating in telephone interviews or both.

Avon and Somerset CC

Avon and Somerset PCC

Cambridgeshire PCC

Cheshire CC

Cheshire PCC

Cleveland CC

Derbyshire CC

Devon and Cornwall CC

Devon and Cornwall PCC

Dorset CC

Durham CC

Dyfed Powys CC

Gloucestershire CC

Greater Manchester PCC

Hampshire PCC

Humberside CC

Lancashire CC

Lancashire PCC

Merseyside PCC

Norfolk CC

North Wales CC

North Yorkshire PCC

Northamptonshire CC

Northumbria CC

Northumbria PCC

Nottinghamshire CC

Nottinghamshire PCC

South Wales CC

Suffolk CC

Surrey PCC

Sussex PCC

Thames Valley CC

Thames Valley PCC

West Midlands PCC

West Mercia PCC

West Yorkshire CC

Seven Force Strategic Collaboration Programme DCC

Appendix B: Support for operating models

Chart 6: *Thinking specifically about their implications for governance and accountability please indicate your general level of support for each model. (Figures are per cent of respondents, to the nearest whole number).*

	Very opposed	Somewhat opposed	Neither supportive nor opposed	Somewhat supportive	Very supportive

1. Single force

Chief Constables (19)	37	32		21	11
PCCs (13)	8	15	15	23	38

2. Ad-hoc collaborations

Chief Constables (18)	28	33	17	11	11
PCCs (13)	15	23	8	31	23

3. Regional 'hosted joint venture' model

Chief Constables (19)	5	5	16	32	42
PCCs (12)		33		25	42

4. Regional 'lead force' model

Chief Constables (18)	6	17	6	61	11
PCCs (13)	15	15	8	46	15

5 Regional 'commissioned' model

Chief Constables (19)	37	26	16	16	5
PCCs (13)	23	38	8	23	8

6. National 'hosted joint venture' model

Chief Constables (19)	42	37	16	5	
PCCs (12)	33	33	17	17	

7. National 'lead force' model

Chief Constables (19)	42	42	11	5	
PCCs (13)	31	54	8	8	

8. National 'commissioned' model

Chief Constables (18)	50	28	22		
PCCs (13)	31	54	15		

9. National non-collaborative option

Chief Constables (19)	58	16	16	5	5
PCCs (12)	33	33	17	17	

	Very opposed	Somewhat opposed	Neither supportive nor opposed	Somewhat supportive	Very supportive

Appendix C: Direction and Control

The following paragraphs dealing with Direction and Control are from the October 2012 Home Office Statutory Guidance for Police Collaboration (pp. 8-10), with emphasis added. [58]

Police powers and force areas

15. A constable will be under the direction and control of his/her chief officer unless direction and control is transferred to another chief officer as is permitted under sections 22A or 24 of the [Police Reform and Social Responsibility] Act [2011]…

16. Section 23AA of the Act provides for a collaboration agreement to allow police staff who are designated as having police powers to exercise those powers in the force area of a collaboration partner (see Legal requirements for collaboration).

Direction and Control

17. A police force is under the direction and control of the chief officer for that force… the chief officer remains ultimately responsible for actions carried out by others under his/her authority…

18. Where the chief officer and those giving and receiving the order are all members of the same force, it is clear that responsibility rests with the chief officer.

19. **A chief officer ("the first chief officer") may authorise the passing of direction and control of police officers or members of police staff to the chief officer of another force ("the second chief officer") under the terms of a collaboration agreement, or direction and control may pass by virtue of the officers or staff being provided**

under mutual aid arrangements. The police officers or members of police staff will thus be required to take orders on a day to day basis from the second chief officer (or from an officer or member of police staff of the second force lawfully delegated by him to exercise command and control). Where the direction and control passes under the terms of a collaboration agreement or under mutual aid, the second chief officer will be ultimately responsible for those police officers and members of police staff, and will be liable for any unlawful conduct by them in the performance or purported performance of their functions as if the second chief officer was their employer (section 88).

20. Where a senior police officer is appointed with special responsibility for collaboration, for example on behalf of a policing region, his/her position in terms of direction and control should be clarified within collaboration agreements.

Assistance between forces through the provision of mutual aid

21. Section 24 of the Act provides for one chief officer to provide "constables or other assistance" to another chief officer on request, which is envisaged as a short term measure. Such assistance can be provided "for the purpose of enabling the other force to meet any special demand on its resources". **Any constable or member of police staff provided under section 24 will be under the direction and control of the chief officer of the receiving force** (section 24(3) and (3A)). In this way, section 24 provides a mechanism whereby direction and control can pass from one chief officer to another. The Secretary of State can direct a force to provide assis-

58 Home Office (2012) *Statutory Guidance for Police Collaboration*. October. London: Home Office. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117559/police-collaboration.pdf

tance to another force under section 24 for the purposes of meeting a special demand on the recipient's resources where he/she is satisfied that arrangements cannot be made, or cannot be made in time, between forces for that purpose (section 24(2)).

22. Where assistance is provided under section 24, the policing body of the receiving force will pay to the policing body of the donor force "such contribution as may be agreed upon" between those two policing bodies or, in the absence of such agreement, under any agreement between all policing bodies generally or, in the absence of such agreement, as may be determined by the Secretary of State (section 24(4)). Section 24 is a method of temporarily moving police resources (in the form of officers) from one force to another to meet special demands and is therefore a clear statutory exception to the basic principle that a chief officer should use his other officers to police his other own area or to deal with crime related to his other own area…

Ad hoc assistance arrangements

23. **It is not uncommon for ad hoc assistance arrangements to be made between forces whereby assistance is provided to another force without direction and control passing**. Such ad hoc arrangements do not rely on the existence of a special demand on resources (eg, they could cover regular training) or the approval of the relevant policing bodies. **Where officers from several different forces work together under such arrangements they remain under the direction and control of their chief officers but take their day to day operational instructions from (ie, work under the command and control of) the lead officer within the team (who may be from any participating force) and work on behalf of the recipient force. Such arrangements give rise to a co-operation network from which all forces benefit**. Due to the fact that a particular force may hold particular expertise or resources, the

mutual aid arrangements improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of policing. HMIC is regularly involved in identifying the relevant expertise and resources and liaising with the chief officers in question. It could be argued that appropriate use of sections 22A or 24 should be used over such ad hoc arrangements. However, **ad hoc arrangements are a very well established practice and provide an important means of ensuring that assistance can be provided where there is no special demand on a force's resources and that direction and control (and liability) does not transfer with such assistance**. Where forces assist each other on an ad hoc basis payment arrangements vary. Such assistance is often given for mutual benefit with only additional costs (such as overtime and subsistence) being recovered.

24. The provisions in the Act do not specify any minimal qualification for arrangements requiring section 22A collaboration agreements but this does not imply that less formal ad hoc arrangements are not permitted. **The police forces and policing bodies planning to work together will need to agree on the extent to which the issues covered by this Guidance come into play** and require the protection and security of a more formal, written agreement. Such issues might include the complexity of the arrangement, risks, funding, **whether there would be advantages in transferring direction and control under the arrangement (including more appropriate assignment of responsibilities and liabilities)** and whether the distribution of costs and/or benefits require formal agreements. Ad hoc arrangements would also be expected to be of a more short-term nature than collaborations that require a formal agreement.

Appendix D: Consultation questionnaire

Consultation: Governance of supra-force specialist police capabilities

The Police Foundation has been commissioned by the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) to draft an **options paper on governance and accountability arrangements for specialist policing capabilities delivered across multiple force territories.** This work relates in particular to the case for cross-force/regional/national provision of a number of specialist capabilities currently being assessed under the NPCC Specialist Capabilities Programme. These capabilities are:

Phase one

- Technical Support Units
- Surveillance
- Armed policing
- Roads policing
- Major investigations

Phase two

- Cyber crime
- Economic crime
- Public Order

This process will also inform thinking on governance issues relating to the wider Transformation Programme, including the development of Digital Intelligence and Investigations (DII) and Joint Forensics and Biometric Services (JFBS). More broadly the programme acknowledges the fast changing landscape of force collaborations, and the need to take stock of current practice and understand the key challenges being faced.

Consultation

As part of our work, the Police Foundation is consulting with all Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables, as well as other key stakeholders.

You are invited to contribute to the consultation by completing this questionnaire and returning it to consultation@police-foundation.org.uk by 30th September 2016. Should you wish to discuss any of the issues raised, or any aspect of the consultation process with us, please get in touch via the same email address and a member of the team will contact you.

The consultation questionnaire covers six themed areas with a mixture of structured questions and free text fields. You are invited to submit a response to each, but you do not have to answer all of the questions.

Confidentiality and anonymity: All responses will be treated as confidential and any quotations used in reporting will be anonymous and attributed only to a generic role (e.g. Chief Constable, PCC, other contributor) with no reference to the individual or force given or implied. The Police Foundation will name the forces and organisations that respond to this questionnaire in an appendix.

1. Principles of governance and accountability

▶ **Question 1a:**

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountability (CIPFA) publishes guidance on delivering good governance for policing bodies in England and Wales [59], in which they set out seven Core Principles.

On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is 'not at all important' and 7 is 'very important', how would you rate the relative importance of these principles when considering the governance arrangements for specialist policing capabilities delivered on a cross-force/regional/national basis? (Please indicate with an 'x')

	1. Not at all important	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7. Very Important
A: Behaving with integrity, demonstrating strong commitment to ethical values and respecting the rule of law.							
B: Ensuring openness and comprehensive stakeholder engagement.							
C: Defining outcomes in terms of sustainable economic, social and environmental benefits.							
D: Determining the interventions necessary to optimise the achievement of the intended outcomes.							
E: Developing the entity's capacity, including the capability of its leadership and the individuals within it.							
F: Managing risks and performance through robust internal control and strong public financial management.							
G: Implementing good practices in transparency, reporting and audit to deliver effective accountability.							

Are there any other principles that you feel are important in designing governance arrangements for specialist capabilities delivered at a cross-force/regional/national level? Please set out in the box below.

Answer (box will expand as you write):

---

[59] http://www.cipfa.org/policy-and-guidance/publications/d/delivering-good-governance-guidance-notes-for-policing-bodies-in-england-and-wales-2016-edition

2. Reflections on current practice in cross-force/regional/national governance and accountability

▶   **Question 2a:**

What, in your experience, constitute strong and effective governance arrangements for policing capabilities delivered at a cross-force/regional/national level?

Please provide one or more examples of arrangements in which your force participates which you feel, in whole or part, represent good practice in relation to governance. For each please describe:

- The capability (or capabilities) delivered

- The number of forces involved

- The features of the governance arrangement you consider effective and strong

- Any factors you consider crucial to the strength and effectiveness of the governance arrangements

Answer (box will expand as you write):

▶ **Question 2b:**

What problems or issues of concern have arisen – or are reasonably foreseeable – in relation to governance and accountability for the cross-force/regional/national arrangements <u>in which your force participates</u>?

Please provide one or more examples of arrangements which you feel, in whole or part, are <u>problematic</u> or provide <u>cause for concern</u>. For each please describe:

- The capability (or capabilities) delivered

- The number of forces involved

- The features of the arrangement you consider problematic or concerning with respect to governance and accountability, and the reasons for concern

- Any steps that have or could be taken to address these concerns

Answer (box will expand as you write):

▶ **Question 2c:**

Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs) are examples of regional specialist capability in which all forces participate. The varied and contrasting arrangements relating to these provide an opportunity to compare the issues that arise under different models.

Thinking specifically about the ROCU in which your force participates, how satisfied are you that the arrangements currently in place… (Please indicate with an 'x'):

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
Provide good value for money?					
Allow you to effectively scrutinise performance?					
Include clear lines of accountability?					
Adequately ensure that the capabilities contribute to the delivery of your Police and Crime Plan / Control Strategy?					
Adequately ensure democratic oversight of these capabilities?					
Allow you to draw on specialist capabilities when they are needed?					
Facilitate continuous improvement of specialist capabilities?					

Overall… (Please indicate with an 'x'):

	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Neither satisfied not dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied
How satisfied are you with the governance arrangements of your force's ROCU?					
How satisfied are you with the service you receive, relative to your force's contribution to the ROCU?					

Are there any other comments you would like to make about the governance arrangements for the ROCU in which your force participates?

Answer:

3. Lines of accountability

▶ **Question 3a:**

Is it acceptable for police officers and staff routinely delivering a policing capability for a force, and operating within that force area, to be unaccountable to the Chief Constable of that force? If so, under what circumstances and with what provisions in place? Feel free to use specific examples.

Answer:

▶ **Question 3b:**

Should police officers and staff routinely delivering a policing capability for a force, and operating within a force area, always be under the Direction and Control of the Chief Constable of that force? If not, under what circumstances and with what provisions in place? Feel free to use specific examples.

Answer:

▶ **Question 3c:**

To what degree do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Please indicate with an 'x')

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
When providing a capability for a police force police officers and staff should always be accountable to the Chief Constable of that force.					
Police officers and staff should always be under the Direction and Control of the Chief Constable of a force in which they are providing a capability (other than in exceptional circumstances).					
The day to day chain of command should always mirror Direction and Control (other than in exceptional circumstances).					

Please feel free to add any further comments below

Answer:

4.   The role of Police and Crime Commissioners

▶   **Question 4a:**

How can Police and Crime Commissioners best contribute to setting strategic direction and developing the capacity and capability of specialist policing functions delivered at a cross-force/regional/national level? Please feel free to use examples from your experience of working in collaborative arrangements.

Answer:

▶   **Question 4b:**

What structures, mechanisms or other provisions need to be in place to enable this to happen?

Answer:

5. Delivering localism

▶ **Question 5a:**

Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following two statements (please indicate with an 'x')

	Strongly disagree	Somewhat disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat agree	Strongly agree
Cross-force/regional/national specialist capabilities should aim to deliver a standardised service and deploy according to objective, agreed criteria (e.g. risk, threat and harm).					
Cross-force/regional/national specialist capabilities should seek to accommodate force-level service preferences and take account of force-level priorities when making deployment decisions.					

▶ **Question 5b:**

If you had to make a choice between these two approaches, which one would be your preferred model? (please indicate with an 'x')

Cross-force/regional/national specialist capabilities should aim to deliver **a standardised service and deploy according to objective, agreed criteria** (e.g. risk, threat and harm).	
Cross-force/regional/national specialist capabilities should seek to **accommodate force-level service preferences and take account of force-level priorities** when making deployment decisions.	

Please feel free to provide any additional comments relating to the basis on which specialist capabilities make deployment decisions, in particular the balance between making objective/standardised assessments and accommodating variation in local priorities.

Comments:

▶ **Question 5c:**

This question seeks to explore issues around tasking and access to specialist capabilities, and the degree to which local priorities might generate a greater demand for a capability than an 'objective' or standardised assessment (of e.g. risk, threat and harm) over a wider area might indicate to be proportionate.

To what extent is the delivery of the <u>particular priorities set out in your current Police and Crime Plan / Control Strategy</u> contingent on your force having control over the deployment of the following specialist capabilities? (For each capability area please indicate the extent with an 'x')

Within each capability area, are there <u>particular elements or aspects of service</u> over which you feel it is important to maintain full control of tasking and ensure 'on demand' access? If so please describe these in the comments box for each capability area.

	Not at all	To a minor extent	To a moderate extent	To a great extent
Example			**X**	
	Comments: *Concerns over access to A as frequently deployed to deliver our local commitment to X.*			
Technical Support Units				
	Comments:			
Surveillance				
	Comments:			
Armed policing				
	Comments:			
Roads policing				
	Comments:			
Major investigations teams				
	Comments:			
Cyber crime				
	Comments:			
Economic crime				
	Comments:			
Public Order				
	Comments:			

6.   Structure and governance models

▶   **Question 6a:**

What model(s) is (are) most suitable for the future delivery of specialist policing capabilities?

The skeleton descriptions below set out some possible, hypothetical models for future delivery of specialist policing capabilities.

Thinking specifically about their implications for governance and accountability please indicate (with an 'x') in the table that follows, your general level of support for each model and include any comments you may have, including about their suitability for different capabilities.

> 1. **Single force delivery** with capabilities confined to the geographical boundaries of the force and falling under the Direction and Control of the Chief Constable.

> 2. **Ad hoc cross force collaborations** developed 'organically' by forces, without the creation of an overall national or regional structure.

> 3. **Regional 'hosted joint venture' model**
>
> - Regional force groupings (of approximately three to six forces) formed within a national framework (similar to current ROCU structure).
>
> - All participating forces remain actively involved in delivery, contributing officers, staff and other resources.
>
> - Direction and Control of all officers and staff remains with home forces, but officers and staff work within a command structure under a senior officer, who is accountable to all participating Chief Constables.
>
> - Chief Constables are held to account by a joint committee of all participating PCCs (in addition to own PCC).

4. Regional 'lead force' model

- Regional force groupings (of approximately three to six forces) formed within a national framework.

- Capabilities delivered by one 'lead' force across each region.

- Staff and officers are employed by the lead force or seconded to it from other participating forces, with Direction and Control passing to the lead force Chief Constable.

- Senior officers of all forces have regular tactical / operational input.

- Lead Chief Constable is held to account by a strategic board / joint oversight committee including the Chief Constables and PCCs of all participating forces.

- Force Chief Constables remain accountable to their own PCC for efficient and effective policing.

5. Regional 'commissioned' model

- Regional force groupings (of approx. three to six forces) formed within a national framework.

- One force delivers capability across all force territories within the region; all officers and staff are employed by the lead force.

- Chief Constable of lead/commissioned force is held to account by their own PCC for the service delivered across whole region.

- All Chief Constables remain accountable to their own PCC for efficient and effective policing.

- These Chief Constables held to account by a committee of (e.g.) regionally representative PCCs.

- Force Chief Constables remain accountable to their own PCC for efficient and effective policing.

6. National 'hosted joint venture' model

- A national service is established hosted by a single force.

- All forces remain involved in service delivery, contributing officers, staff and other resources.

- Direction and Control of all officers and staff remains with home forces but officers and staff work within a command structure under a senior officer.

- The senior officer is accountable to all participating Chief Constables, represented by a committee of (e.g.) regional representatives.

- These Chief Constables held to account by a committee of (e.g.) regionally representative PCCs.

- Force Chief Constables remain accountable to their own PCC for efficient and effective policing.

7. National 'lead force' model

- National service established hosted and led by one force.

- Staff and officers are employed by the lead force, or seconded to it from other participating forces, with Direction and Control passing to the lead force Chief Constable.

- The lead Chief Constable is held to account by a strategic board / joint oversight committee including (e.g.) regionally representative PCCs.

- Force Chief Constables remain accountable to own PCCs for efficiency and effectiveness.

8. National 'commissioned' model

- National service established, hosted and led by one force.

- One force delivers capability across all force territories; all officers and staff are employed by lead force.

- Chief Constable of the lead/commissioned force is held to account by their own PCC for service across all force territories.

- All force Chief Constables remain accountable to their own PCC for efficient and effective policing.

9. National non-collaborative option

- Capabilities delivered by a national body (such as the National Crime Agency or a similar, newly constituted body).

- Mechanisms are put in place for regular consultation and communication with force Chief Constables and PCCs, but the service is ultimately accountable to Parliament.

- The scope of efficient and effective policing for which Chief Constables are held to account by PCCs is formally defined and narrowed.

Thinking specifically about their implications for governance and accountability please indicate (with an 'x') in the table below, your general level of support for each model and include any comments you may have, including about the suitability of each for different capabilities.

	Very opposed	Somewhat opposed	Neither supportive nor opposed	Somewhat supportive	Very supportive
0. Example				X	
	Comments: Model is generally good at providing assurance about A, but there is a lack of clarity about B and C.				
1. Single force					
	Comments:				
2. Ad-hoc collaborations					
	Comments:				
3. Regional 'hosted joint venture' model					
	Comments:				
4. Regional 'lead force' model					
	Comments:				
5. Regional 'commissioned' model					
	Comments:				
6. National 'hosted joint venture'					
	Comments:				
7. National 'lead force' model					
	Comments:				
8. National 'commissioned' model					
	Comments:				
9. National non-collaborative option					
	Comments:				

7. Any other comments?

Please feel free to provide any additional comments that you may have relating to the governance and accountability of cross-force/regional/national specialist capabilities.

Answer

8. Thanks and next steps

Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire and helping to inform discussions about the governance and accountability of specialist police capabilities in England and Wales. While the Police Foundation will name the forces and organisations that respond to this questionnaire in a list of respondents, please be assured that the Police Foundation will treat your answers in confidence and at no point will you or your force/organisation be identified alongside any analysis.

We would be grateful if you could e-mail your response to consultation@police-foundation.org.uk by 30th September 2016.

If at any point you have any comments or questions about this consultation, please do not hesitate to contact us at the above email address or on 020 3752 5630.

Finally, we would be grateful if you could indicate (with an 'x' in the relevant box below) whether you would be happy for us to contact you if there is anything in your answers we would find it helpful to discuss further.

Yes, I am happy for the Police Foundation to contact me to discuss my answers	
No, I would prefer not to be contacted further	