POLICE EFFECTIVENESS IN A CHANGING WORLD

LUTON SITE REPORT

Andy Higgins, Gavin Hales and John Chapman

December 2017

THE POLICE FOUNDATION

The UK's policing think tank

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About the Police Foundation

The Police Foundation is an independent think tank focused on developing knowledge and understanding of policing while challenging the police service and the government to improve policing for the benefit of the public. The Police Foundation acts as a bridge between the public, the police and the government, while being owned by none of them.

Contents

Summary

The *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project set out to investigate how local police services might respond more effectively to the challenges presented by global socio-economic and technological change, at time when they are themselves in the process of significant organisational transformation. Over a five year period, working in two English towns – Luton and Slough – that had experienced the local impacts of global change acutely, the Police Foundation research team collaborated with the local police and their community safety partners to identify persistent local crime problems, improve the way in which these were understood, develop and implement appropriate interventions, and assess both the outcomes of these and the challenges of doing so. In the process it was hoped that valuable lessons might be learned about the routes to, enablers for and dependencies of effective policing under current conditions and in the context of change. This report documents the findings of the project from its Luton site [1].

Police effectiveness in a changing world

The issue of police effectiveness has never been more pressing. Austere times call for greater attention to delivering value for money and the logic of cutting costs by reducing demand has intensified the appeal of impactful 'up-stream' intervention. However, public sector spending cuts are not the only source of change that present challenges for local police services in the second decade of the 21st century. While recorded crime is falling, the police workload is becoming more complex; the internet has created new forms of crime and transformed old ones, growing international mobility, migration and increasingly globalised markets have created new criminal opportunities, the harms from which inevitably play out in local neighbourhoods – becoming the business of local police and their partner services. In addition, these conditions have led to greater transience, heterogeneity, and atomisation in some neighbourhoods, and therefore to populations that are potentially less visible, more isolated, more difficult to engage and less capable of dealing with problems as a community. To add further complexity, recent years have seen a marked societal shift in the forms of crime considered most important for the police to tackle, with concerns for managing 'threat, harm and risk' increasingly coming to the fore, while new forms of governance have overhauled the way the police are held to account for the outcomes achieved, the methods employed and the decisions made. In short, local policing is operating under conditions of fast-paced, multi-dimensional change.

Such shifts in mission and context inevitably complicate the debate about what it means for the police to be *effective*, however 'cutting crime' remains central to the formal and day-to-day police remit, and therefore the body of evidence about *'what works'* in crime reduction can be used to characterise the mode of working best suited to delivering results. In synthesis the evidence tells us that an effective police function intervenes creatively, purposefully and proactively, with others, based on an understanding of the conditions that make specific types of crime more likely to occur in particular places. This mode of working, which we have termed 'informed proactivity' fits well with Problem-Oriented approaches such as SARA [2], which have been shown to work (at least 'modestly' well) and which were used to structure the action-research approach followed in this study.

[1] Findings from Slough are contained in a separate report.

[2] Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment.

A problem-oriented approach

In the initial scanning phase of the project in Luton (described in Chapter 2) a pragmatic harm and suitability assessment process was undertaken to identify options for focusing the project on crime types, areas of town and/or priority population groups. The decision made, in conjunction with local stakeholders, to focus on residential burglary and on two fast-changing town centre wards (identified here by the pseudonyms Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills) reflected the established local priority picture at that time.

The subsequent research and analysis phase (Chapter 3) used crime data analysis, mapping techniques and qualitative interview research to deepen and expand the local understanding of Luton's burglary problem, particularly as it impacted on these wards. Overall, this suggested that burglary in Luton exhibited both 'traditional' and 'new' characteristics. Consistent with the existing research base, burglary was found to concentrate in relatively persistent hotspots which tended to be in more deprived parts of town, it also displayed a modest tendency to intensify in winter months with darker evenings, and could principally be linked to a locally resident cohort of offenders, many of whom were problematic drug-users (although other offender 'types', including a younger group of more generalist 'lifestyle' offenders, were also identified). Offenders' target selection decisions were largely 'opportunistic', with ease of access and concerns to avoid attracting attention their principal concerns. There was little evidence that particular population groups were being disproportionately targeted – although the experience of being burgled could leave victims feeling isolated and singled out – but a significant level of repeat and near-repeat victimisation was identified. Evidence suggested that a number of factors, including the concentration of offender residences, access routes, home security deficiencies and the location of open drugs markets were linked to the geographic pattern of burglary within the town.

In addition however, there were clear indications that the local burglary problem was responding to social change in the town. In particular, the finding that the prevalence of private renting in a neighbourhood was the strongest available correlate of the burglary rate suggested that changes in tenure structure, specifically the burgeoning 'low-end' private rented sector, might be linked to poor home-security standards and thus driving burglary. The extent of population change and diversity in these neighbourhoods also posed questions about 'collective efficacy' – the capacity of hotspot residents to look out for one another and to deal with problems themselves. Technological change and the widespread ownership of personal technology devices (laptops and smart-phones) were also reflected in the items targeted most often during offences.

The process of moving from 'analysis to action', (Chapter 4) involved developing intervention options through consultation workshops, drawing on the broader evidence-base and factoring in pragmatic concerns about the local delivery context. This led to the development of a plan for a 'core programme' of multi-agency work aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in burglary hotspots. It was hoped that by identifying the most vulnerable dwellings in the parts of Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills with persistently high burglary rates, targeting their residents with the offer of a Home Security

Assessment and following-up with several channels of tailored support (including for those living in rented accommodation), that opportunities for burglary offending could be minimised and offence levels reduced. It was also hoped that mechanisms could be developed for leveraging home security improvements in the local private rented sector – for example, through work with landlords and lettings agents. In addition, it was reasoned that these parts of town would benefit from activities that forged closer ties between neighbours, bolstered resilience, improved the community's capability to affect change and increased neighbourhood watchfulness. Additional options for improving offender management/care coordination and reducing the attractiveness of 'locatable' items of personal technology were also put forward.

This plan formed the basis of the soLUTiONs [3] Burglary Reduction Initiative (BRI) delivered by a multi-agency working group (and supported by the Police Foundation) between August 2014 and July 2015. During the 'response' phase (described in Chapter 5) considerable efforts and commitment across local agencies resulted in a number of key outputs; these included a set of multi-agency 'street-survey' inspection visits, a year-long programme of targeted communications focused most intensively on 'vulnerable' dwellings, and the provision of a Home Security Assessment service and on-going assistance to the small number of hotspot residents who requested help. A neighbourhood improvement group was also formed in Wood Ridge. Other aspects of the intervention plan however were left undeveloped and, overall, the delivery year was characterised by substantial implementation challenges.

The context for these challenges was explored in a process evaluation which drew on the candid reflections of many of the town's key community safety practitioners. This emphasised the acute demand and service pressures experienced by police and local authority staff in Luton during the period. It also highlighted the changing local priority picture, within which issues of risk and vulnerability were increasingly marginalising concerns about acquisitive crime, including burglary. In addition, the reactive policing model operated by Bedfordshire Police at the time had a major bearing on the BRI, providing very few proactive resources, and fostering processes, mind-sets and skill-sets geared to short-term responsive, rather than pre-planned preventative activity. It had also led to a low baseline of police/community engagement, which was reflected in the reticent response to the initiative from local residents. The impact of the local partnership dynamic, which was rebuilding after a period of some discord and retrenchment, was also apparent.

Given these implementation conditions, it is perhaps unsurprising that the impact assessment (Chapter 6) showed no identifiable effect on burglary levels. This analysis did however indicate that the 'street survey' work had some predictive (although not protective) utility, and suggested that previously persistent geographic burglary patterns were changing and becoming less predictable, with long term hotspots 'cooling' while new ones appeared.

The lack of a programme impact in Luton is a disappointing outcome for the project; despite this however the broader research journey offers a set of learning about the prospects for, and dependencies of police effectiveness in the context of change. Overall,

[3] soLUTiONs is the local branding of the town's Community Safety Partnership.

(as discussed in Chapter 7) it suggests the high-level conclusion that the conditions of internal (policing) and external (social) change make informed proactivity more important but also more difficult to achieve.

The importance of informed proactivity

The first reason why informed police (and partner) proactivity is more important in current conditions relates to the shift in the priority subject matter of local policing. With threat, harm and risk, in their myriad new crime-type forms supplanting volume crime in local priority lists, the onus is on the police and their partners to work preventatively as well as to manage and respond to risk on a case-by-case basis. This will require analytically informed understanding of local crime and harm generators, as well as multi-agency practice development, from a baseline well below that which already exists for 'traditional' problems like burglary, robbery or vehicle crime.

Second, as demonstrated here, 'old world' crime problems like burglary are also responsive to social and technological change. Changes in the local housing tenure structure, the deficit of 'collective efficacy' in transient neighbourhoods and mass ownership of personal technology all impacted on burglary in Luton and have a bearing on how the problem might best be tackled. If local responses are to resist obsolescence it will be necessary to continually review and refresh local understanding based on up to date analysis. As discussed below however, it is equally important that the police and others are capable of developing and implementing innovative responses based on new insights such as these.

Third, informed proactivity is important because we cannot rely on those who suffer the types of harm now being prioritised, or those living in the fractured neighbourhoods where burglars and other offenders can find footholds, to come to the police with their problems, or to cooperate in police-led activities, without concerted and on-going engagement efforts. The BRI intervention came up against widespread reticence among those living in burglary hotspots, which was, in part, a product of a policing model in which neighbourhood engagement work had been largely stripped out. Relying on a reactive police response to 'patent' demand and taking a baseline level of cooperation for granted, will not deliver effectiveness, particularly in fluxing and atomised neighbourhoods.

The challenge of informed proactivity

This study hints at external challenges to delivering informed proactivity. There were indications in the data for Luton that fast-paced socio-demographic change is making burglary patterns less stable and therefore less easy to predict and target, for example by attending to hotspots. While further research would be required to examine this hypothesis in more depth, the possibility that a changing world may also be a less predictable one, has potentially far reaching consequences for crime analysis.

Overall however, the experience of the project in Luton suggests that internal, organisational change is having at least as much impact on police effectiveness as the changing world outside, and the implementation challenges encountered in delivering the BRI in Luton offer a set of reminders about the prerequisites of effective policing.

Most bluntly, to be effective the police need resources to do proactive work. Whether the lack of resource for proactivity encountered in Luton was due to 'raw' under-funding as opposed to the way in which funds were utilised (efficiency) is beyond the scope of this study. It is clear however that corralling resource to deliver what, in other circumstances might be considered a modest and focused piece of discretionary work, was a significant challenge and one familiar to those engaged in regular service delivery in the town.

Particularly when resources are scarce, the police also need appropriate mechanisms for prioritising the issues they need to tackle, and for these to lead to realistic and substantive programmes of discretionary work. It is also important to align these priorities with local partners and embed them within corporate and individual decision making.

Local policing also needs to be structured in such a way as to enable efforts to be directed at non-immediate goals. At its most basic level, developing proactive capability involves ring-fencing resources, but it also involves fostering a more strategic mind-set at all ranks, embedding project management skills and developing tasking and compliance-monitoring systems that mean non-time critical instructions do not get forgotten.

Perhaps most fundamentally, to achieve effectiveness the police must maintain and cultivate an underlying bedrock of community engagement and consistent personal connections with those who live in the places they are trying to police and improve. In Luton in 2014/15, the wholesale removal of neighbourhood police officers had significantly weakened this foundation and the effectiveness of the BRI, as well as other aspects of policing, was compromised as a result.

Finally, if the police are to change places for the better, they need to work collaboratively with the other agencies who share the same broad goals. Fundamentally, this involves developing a close consensus on priorities and joining-up objectives to delivery through tasking processes that function across agencies, backed by solid accountability to a united executive.

Taken together, the deficits in these dependencies evident in Luton in 2014/15 carry a broader lesson for policing. In the run up to the 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review the image of a 'stripped-back' future police service, focusing on supposed 'core', 'emergency-service' functions was painted increasingly vividly. The policing model operating in Luton during the project intervention phase can be seen as a partial experiment with this brand of 'back to basics' functionality – however, based on the evidence collected here, it is clear that the experiment did not work; a new understanding of what is essential and 'core' to local policing will need to be formulated.

Achieving informed proactivity

While problem-orientation (and SARA) remain invaluable tools, the experience of the project in Luton highlights a number of issues relating to the processes through which informed proactivity might be achieved, especially in the context of change.

First, fast-paced social change and shifting priorities require nimble responses; with hindsight, what was gained in this instance through thorough analysis

and regular consultation, may have been lost in delays to action.

Second, linked to scanning, the process of local priority setting is ripe for attention. The extent to which established strategic assessment processes can adequately deal with myriad 'new' forms of harm is questionable; the overlapping architecture of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) has potential to confuse responsibility and pull the police in different directions, and the political aspects of priority setting can overshadow the instrumental value.

Third, while problem orientation is crucial, developing effective responses is likely to entail blending local analysis with the broader evidence base about 'what works' and factoring in expedient concerns about implementation capability. A model that balances problem-orientation, evidence-orientation and pragmatic-orientation might prove a useful tool.

Fourth, assessing the impact of small-scale local interventions is an intrinsically imperfect and contingent exercise, but one that can be optimised by formulating specific measures, creatively identifying comparators and by 'realist' inspired enquiry. The Evidence-Based Policing programme might benefit from emphasising these 'real world' assessment tools to practitioners, over more rigorous but less widely applicable techniques.

Finally, in conditions where the range of feasible responses is limited by the kinds of resource and other constraints outlined here, problem-orientation can only ever be part of the solution. Increasing the range of feasible response options, and hence the potency of informed proactivity, requires strategic thinking that cuts across the range of crime and other problems impacting a local area. Long-term investment in neighbourhood policing, for example, is unlikely to be a proportionate response to a specific, local crime problem – however thoroughly it is scanned and analysed. Viewed holistically however, across the set of issues impacting an area, and with a mind to those problems that might emerge in the future, this might prove the most effective contribution that police leaders and their strategic partners can make.

1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

In 2010 the Police Foundation secured funding to conduct a major, long-term, action research project to explore the challenges of effective policing in two English towns – Luton and Slough [4] – that were experiencing the local impacts of global patterns of change particularly acutely. Between 2011 and 2015 the Police Foundation research team worked closely with the police and their community safety partners in each site, to identify persistent crime problems, improve the way in which these were understood, develop and implement appropriate interventions, and assess both the outcomes of these and the challenges of doing so. This report documents the process, experiences and findings of the project in its Luton site. Along with a 'twin' report covering Slough, it forms the evidence-base for a set of papers addressing some of the key issues facing British policing in 2016 and beyond.

1.2 Crime and policing in a changing world

As its title suggests, the *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project was developed in recognition of the challenges presented for the police by long-term socio-economic and technological change, and the impacts of these on crime and demands for security (Manning, 2011; Brodeur, 2010; Reiner, 2010). In 2011, at the outset of the project, crime in England and Wales had fallen to half of the peak level seen in the mid-1990s and was confounding expectations by continuing to fall as the UK economy underwent a period of recession and stagnation (Flatley et al., 2010). Not all forms of volume crime were in decline however. Internet-related crime and thefts of small, expensive, 'CRAVED' [5] electronic goods had bucked the trend, providing challenge to many of the theories put forward to account for the broader phenomenon of international crime reduction (Farrell et al., 2010). Alongside new cyber-threats to businesses and institutions, the nature of 'traditional' forms of crimes such as fraud, sexual offending and harassment were being transformed by the increasingly online and interconnected nature of all aspects of business and social life (McGuire and Dowling, 2013). Meanwhile, transnational migration, geo-political instability and the globalisation of markets for goods and services were creating new criminal opportunities for the illicit trafficking and smuggling of people, firearms, drugs, natural resources and counterfeit goods (UNODC, 2010). These are not only concerns for governments and specialist, international law enforcement agencies; in an increasingly globalised and interconnected world, the harms resulting from new criminal threats are diffused throughout local communities and therefore become everyday business for those who police them.

At the same time, new patterns of mobility and migration, growing inequality and the fragmentation of families and communities have had a polarising effect. While many places have thrived, other areas have been left behind by skills gaps, widening income inequality and reduced social mobility (Dorling, 2010), leaving those who live there increasingly vulnerable and insecure. Often, these places have long been the focus of police attention, however population churn and heterogeneity mean that local populations may be less able to come together to deal with problems themselves (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997; Foster, 1995), while the form of police attention they do receive may leave them feeling over-policed but

[4] Luton is a town of 211,000 inhabitants located 30 miles north of central London in the county of Bedfordshire. It is a unitary local authority area and falls within Bedfordshire Police force area. Slough has a population of 140,000; it is around 20 miles from the centre of London and abuts its western edge. Slough is also a unitary local authority area and sits within the territory of Thames Valley Police.

[5] Clarke (1999) suggests that Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable and Disposable (CRAVED) items are attractive targets for theft.

The Changing World – England and Wales in 2011 [6]

- Population growing faster than at any time since the 1950s – seven per cent in ten years – more than half from net migration.
- 13 per cent of residents born outside the UK – half arrived in the last ten years.
- 12 per cent of households (with two or more people) had members from different ethnic groups.
- A quarter of the population claimed no religious affiliation – a 10 percentage point increase in 10 years.
- 15 per cent of households rented from a private landlord – up six percentage points since 2001.
- More people had degree level qualifications than no qualifications.
- The number of people employed full-time was falling, while part-time working and self-employment were becoming more common [7].
- Growing disparity in financial security between the richest and poorest [8].
- 64 per cent of adults used the internet every day (or almost every day) – up from 35 per cent in 2006 (ONS, 2015).
- Leisure habits changing – fewer visits to pubs, restaurants and (in particular) night-clubs while spending on home leisure and gym membership remained strong [9].

under-protected, undermining police legitimacy and creating barriers to the co-production of security (Miller, 2005; Phillips, 2003; Loader, 1996). Places that have fared better also generate expectations and demand for the police, as well as difficult questions about the value of and justification for 'reassurance policing' (Fleming and Grabosky, 2009; Fielding and Innes, 2006).

The *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project set out to understand how local police services might operate more effectively in this rapidly changing environment.

1.3 Luton and Slough – changing places

(Please note: the content of this section is based on information sources accessed during the earlier stages of the project).

Luton and Slough were selected as ideal sites in which to investigate these themes and we are grateful to the senior leaders of Bedfordshire and Thames Valley Police, and practitioners from a number of agencies in both towns, for allowing access and facilitating our research. In many ways these towns symbolise the local impacts of globalisation, increased mobility and migration, and the fragmentation of communities; both towns have benefited from rapid socio-economic change but are also experiencing some of its effects less positively.

Although they are towns rather than cities, both Luton and Slough are globally connected through proximity to national transport infrastructure, international airports and London. Both towns have experienced growth in employment from high-tech and service industries – with Slough benefiting from its links to the

[6] ONS (2011) unless otherwise stated.

[7] Between March to May 2008 and March to May 2011 the number of full time employees in the UK fell by 3.6 per cent while the number of part-time employees increased by 4.5 per cent and self-employment increased by 4.5 per cent (ONS, 2016).

[8] The median wealth of the top 20 per cent income group increased by 64 per cent between 2005 and 2012/13, while that of the bottom 20 per cent fell by 57 per cent (Broughton, Kanabar and Martin, 2015).

[9] Zolfo Cooper, 2011.

M4 technology corridor, while Luton retains a stronger manufacturing base (Safer Slough Partnership, 2011; Luton Borough Council (no date)). Both have also seen significant inward migration over a prolonged period reflected in established Asian minority populations, combined with recent settlement by those from EU accession states in Eastern Europe and from African countries. As a result they are among the most ethnically diverse towns in Britain.[10]

Along with high birth rates, migration has also resulted in strong working-age population profiles, in both towns however there is also a significant skills gap between their resident populations and the available employment opportunities. As a result both Luton and Slough have relatively high unemployment for their respective regions and significant inequality between urban residents and the suburban and commuter populations living in their surrounding areas. Slough abuts contrasting London boroughs, the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead, and the affluent 'stockbroker belt' of South Buckinghamshire, while Luton is surrounded by a less wealthy but still prosperous rural hinterland. Luton has substantially higher levels of deprivation than its unitary authority counterparts in Bedfordshire, and according to the Index of Multiple Deprivation, became relatively more deprived in the period between 2004 and 2010, being ranked 69th most deprived (out of 326 local authorities) nationally.[11] In comparison, deprivation in Slough is less acute, but the town does have pockets of significant disadvantage and the proportion of children living in poverty in the town is higher than the national average (English Public Health Observatories, 2012) and rose by 20 per cent between 2007 and 2010 (Safer Slough Partnership, 2012).

At the start of 2011 both Luton and Slough experienced relatively high and persistent levels of crime and disorder, with patterns approximating those in outer London boroughs, with increases recorded in some volume crime categories.[12] In both places organised crime and terrorism were issues of concern and local stakeholders have repeatedly asserted that their towns have 'London borough problems' but without the equivalent levels of funding. These characteristics made Luton and Slough ideal locations for exploring the ways in which different (and in many ways contrasting) police forces, working with others, can best respond to diverse and changing demands and expectations.

1.4 The changing world of policing

In 2011, as the project got underway, the programme for a period of significant reform to British policing was beginning to take shape, which would provide another dimension to exploring effective policing in the context of change. Following the election of the Conservative-led Coalition Government in 2010, police forces in both project sites and across the country were getting to grips with the ramifications of a sustained period of public sector austerity, a shift in the role of the Home Office and a broad programme of workforce, governance and scrutiny reforms (Home Office, 2010a)[13]. The prospect of fewer resources and new forms of accountability – notably in the shape of elected Police and Crime Commissioners from 2012 – brought new dimensions to questions of effectiveness and bound these more tightly, and in different ways, to others about efficiency and legitimacy.

Looking back from 2016, it is clear that the *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project was

[10] According to 2011 Census findings, Slough is the most ethnically diverse town in Britain outside of London, and (along with Luton and Leicester) is one of only three non-London local authority areas where 'White British' residents comprise less than half the local populace (Simpson, 2011).

[11] In 2007 Luton was ranked as the 87th most deprived local authority in the Index of Multiple Deprivation and in 2004 as the 101st.

[12] Overall the two towns were seen to have comparable crime patterns and similar socio-demographic compositions, reflected in the fact that they were in the same Home Office 'Most Similar Family' grouping.

[13] Notably under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011.

undertaken during a period of significant organisational change for the police. Whereas the last Labour government had opted for centralised police performance management under the rubric of New Public Management, the 2010-15 Coalition and subsequent Conservative governments – and in particular the Home Secretary under both regimes, Theresa May – have taken a radically different approach. In line with the Localism motif, centrally-mandated numerical targets, Public Service Agreements and Key Performance Indicators were all scrapped, while the police where given an apparently straightforward yet contentious mission, which was *'nothing more, and nothing less, than to cut crime'* (Home Office, 2010b). In 2012, responsibility for setting priorities was notionally delegated to a force/local level, reflected in the introduction of elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), who replaced Police Authorities and took control of a number of funding streams previously managed by Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs). At the same time, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) was given a larger budget and more ambitious remit under its first non-police HM Chief Inspector Sir Tom Winsor, while the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) also saw a significant uplift in resources.

The withdrawal of central performance targets followed significant reductions in 'volume' crimes (including burglary and vehicle crime) and heralded a general decline in their perceived importance, while lower volume but high harm forms of crime took on increasing prominence. The child sexual exploitation scandals and associated public service (including police) failings uncovered in Rotherham, Rochdale and other areas, exposed the way that property crime had been prioritised at the cost of less visible but more significant harms perpetrated against vulnerable groups (GMP, 2014). Similarly, the emergence of large volumes of historical sexual abuse allegations, most infamously concerning TV and radio personality Jimmy Savile, further highlighted the way that victims had been failed by public institutions and triggered a surge in reporting of both recent and older sexual offences. In general, however the period saw a reduction in the public salience of crime and law and order issues as matters of national political significance (Ipsos MORI, 2016). Set against the reduction in the volume of crime, a change in the nature of police demand was identified during the period, towards more resource intensive activities, including investigating serious sexual offences and responding to those in mental health crisis (College of Policing, 2015).

More generally, the period saw a growing recognition of the way that crude quantitative performance regimes had skewed police activity and generated perverse incentives and behaviours, including in respect of crime recording[14]. Within policing, the language began to shift away from 'performance' and 'targets' towards a focus on 'threat, harm and risk'. The College of Policing, announced as the professional body for policing in late 2011, published a Code of Ethics for the police service in 2014 (College of Policing, 2014).

Arguably the most significant change during the life of the project has been the introduction of public sector austerity, following a decade of police force budget increases (Crawford, et al., 2015). Between 2010/11 and 2015/16, police services in England and Wales

[14] Concerns about crime data integrity were raised by the PCC for Kent in early 2013, resulting in an HMIC inspection of the force and ultimately all forces in England and Wales. The Police Recorded Crime statistics lost their 'National Statistics' quality designation in January 2014 (UK Statistics Authority, 2014).

Key events in policing during the timeframe of the *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project

2011

- Riots and widespread disorder in London spreading to other towns and cities (August).
- Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 gains Royal Assent, paving the way for introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (September).

2012

- London Olympics (July).
- MP Andrew Mitchell involved in altercation with police officers outside 10 Downing Street leading to 'Plebgate' affair (September).
- Operation Yewtree launched to investigate allegations of sexual abuse by Jimmy Savile and others (October).
- First non-police HM Chief Inspector, Sir Tom Winsor appointed (October).
- First elections for Police and Crime Commissioners held (November).
- Leveson Inquiry concludes and makes criticisms of Metropolitan Police investigation of phone hacking (November).

2013

- College of Policing officially launched (February).
- Police Scotland formed (April).
- Fusilier Lee Rigby murdered in Woolwich, South London (May).
- National Crime Agency becomes operational (October).

2014

- Police recorded crime figures lose National Statistics designation (January).
- Police Code of Ethics launched (July).
- Professor Alexis Jay publishes the findings of an inquiry into service failings over the handling of child sexual exploitation cases in Rotherham (November).

2015

- National Police Chief's Council (NPCC) established and replaces ACPO (April).
- Conservatives win majority at general election (May).
- Inquiry into undercover policing announced by Home Secretary (July).
- 130 people killed and several hundred injured in terrorist attacks in Paris (November).
- Police funding substantially protected in Comprehensive Spending Review (November).

experienced a 25 per cent real terms cut in central government funding[15]. Driven in part by these challenges, a 'mixed economy' of force collaboration, strategic alliances and private sector outsourcing has emerged (see for example, Flannery and Graham, 2014). More broadly, police forces froze recruitment,

[15] This resulted in an overall real terms cut of 18 per cent to police budgets. However, those cuts have fallen more heavily on forces where low council tax precepts meant that the police force was disproportionately reliant on central government grants (National Audit Office, 2015).

made redundancies, slashed overtime budgets and reorganised their workforces, while a politically-driven narrative of 'protecting the frontline' skewed cuts towards police staff. In many force areas the distinction between response and neighbourhood policing roles has become increasingly blurred as the workforce has been remodelled.

Community safety and other public service police partners also suffered significant cuts during the period, most notably local authorities saw spending per person fall by 23 per cent in real terms. With community safety budgets largely transferred from local authorities to PCCs, CSPs seem to have diminished in importance, although the legislative apparatus of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 remains in place.

As the project drew to a close, the November 2015 Comprehensive Spending Review heralded a period of notionally protected police budgets, subject to council tax precepts being raised every year by the maximum amount permitted (Hales, 2015).

1.5 Police effectiveness

A project of this title requires some early consideration of what exactly it means for the police to be effective and of related debates about police role and purpose. These are contested issues that have traditionally divided opinion – and research activity – into two camps. On one side, driven by persistent managerialist concerns, effectiveness has often been formulated in terms of 'crime-fighting' based either on measurable 'outputs' (arrests, response times, 'clear-ups' etc.) or (supposed) 'outcomes', crime counts and rates, which at least in theory allow for a more imaginative set of activities to be considered as appropriate police work. With crime reduction as the assumed police goal, a growing body of 'what works?' research is accumulating, documenting the impact of various activities, tactics and initiatives on crime (summaries and syntheses of which include Sherman, 1998; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Lum et al., 2010; Karn, 2013)[16]. In contrast, others have emphasised the messiness of the police workload and the vast range of issues and social problems (in addition to crime), with which the police are called on to deal (Bittner, 1974; Goldstein, 1979; Reiner, 2010). Within this framework – which has influenced innovations such as community policing and the public confidence agenda – effectiveness relates to the extent to which the police use their powers to deal with this workload in ways that are legitimate in the eyes of the communities they serve.

At its inception, the project hoped to explore whether changing social conditions and accountability structures might provide fertile ground on which to bring these competing ideas together, particularly with reference to a growing body of evidence suggesting that meeting community expectations of legitimate policing can increase compliance with the law (Tyler, 2004), including in areas of concentrated disadvantage and diversity (Sampson and Bartusch, 1998; Hough et al., 2010).

As was perhaps inevitable for an action research project requiring close cooperation and considerable input from those doing difficult jobs in 'the real world', it was necessary throughout the life of the project, to make pragmatic decisions about focus and direction – which brought new issues to the fore – while some areas of initial interest dwindled in relevance. The decision to focus on burglary in Luton[17], for example – a highly traditional policing concern – brought some

[17] See also the College of Policing *What Works Centre for Crime Reduction* toolkit http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Pages/default.aspx.

[18] In Slough the project focussed on violence.

'changing world' themes into focus, such as the impact of the burgeoning private rented housing sector on deprived urban neighbourhoods (Higgins and Jarman, 2015), but familiar concerns with problematic drug-using offenders and good household locks proved at least as relevant to understanding and tackling the problem. The impacts of organisational change also played out somewhat differently than anticipated; PCCs were elected and served most of a full term during the project lifespan, yet the new accountability structure had little visible impact on the day to day business of local policing or police/community relations. On the other hand, the impacts of austerity and the local decisions made in response to it were an ever-present influence during and on the project's intervention phase.

To keep the project relevant to local gatekeepers, an operationally conventional definition of 'police effectiveness' emphasising crime-reduction became the pragmatic reality – although important learning about the relationship between policing styles, public engagement and effective crime reduction did emerge. The formulation of effectiveness developed during the project starts with the current orthodoxy – in which an effective police function is defined as *'one that keeps people safe and reduces crime'* (HMIC, 2016a) – but also draws on the evidence-base on how is best achieved.

Weisburd and Eck's 2004 synthesis of research findings pertaining to the question *What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder and Fear?*, concludes that there is little evidence to demonstrate the efficacy of 'standard model' policing activities (general patrol, rapid response, reactive investigation etc.). They argued that more promise can be found in innovations that extended from the traditional activity set along two axes; the *diversity of the approach*[18] (as opposed to a narrow reliance on law enforcement) and the *degree of focus* (for example on hotspots). Most promising of all were initiatives that combined diverse approaches and were highly focused (for example problem-oriented policing interventions). More recently Lum, Koper and Telep (2010) have developed a three dimensional framework for mapping research outputs. This indicates that evidence of effectiveness is greatest in relation to policing interventions that are *proactive*, *place-based* and *specific*.

The image that crystallises from these syntheses, of the police ***intervening creatively, purposefully, and proactively, (with others) based on an understanding of the conditions that make specific types of crime more likely (and jeopardise safety) in particular places***, is central to the concept of effectiveness developed during the project and is consistent with the Problem-Oriented Policing approach that was used to structure both the action research activity and this report.

1.6 A problem-oriented approach

Problem-oriented policing developed from a critique of conventional police activities first made by Herman Goldstein more than thirty years ago. Goldstein questioned the assumption that better policing simply meant doing more of 'what the police do', or doing it more quickly (Goldstein, 1979; Weisburd et al., 2008). He challenged the prevailing view of police work as a series of discrete incident responses and the corollary assumption that 'crime prevention' amounted to deterring offenders by increasing their odds of getting

[18] Although a greater diversity of approaches alone – for example in the form of Community Policing initiatives – has produced stronger evidence of an impact on fear of crime than on crime itself.

caught, including by (more or less randomly) patrolling the streets. Within this framework, improvement efforts inevitably focused on 'the means' – responding more quickly, arresting more offenders, getting more officers on the street – while the 'ends', crime and its impact on the community, remained largely unaltered.

The corrective was to be a new model, refocused on 'problems' rather than incidents. It was suggested that by collecting information from a range of new and conventional sources, employing new analytic techniques and enlisting the support of other agencies and individuals to develop and deliver solutions, the police could 'get upstream' of the endless succession of incidents that occupied their shifts, tackle their causes rather than the symptoms, and become 'outcome' rather than 'output' focused. This new problem-orientated approach was field-tested by Eck and Spelman (1987) and codified into a four stage problem-solving process of Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment (or SARA). Aspirations for this new way of working were ambitious; not only would it change the way the police responded to crime, it could transform them into *'the front line in a comprehensive human services system'*.

The 'SARA' Problem solving model [19]

- **Scanning**: Identify and prioritise the problems.
- **Analysis**: Gather information to identify underlying causes and narrow the scope of the problem.
- **Response**: Design and deliver activities to address the identified causes.
- **Assessment**: Measure if the response is having the anticipated effect – and refine the response if required.

Problem-oriented policing has had considerable influence; it has catalysed numerous crime reduction initiatives in the US, UK and elsewhere and there is good evidence of its (at least 'modest') effectiveness as an approach (Weisburd et al., 2008). It is right that it is widely recognised as 'best-practice'. However, as police forces in England and Wales have begun to remodel in response to austerity, concerns have been raised that proactivity, analysis, innovation and Problem-Oriented practices are under threat, at precisely the time that conventional understandings of crime and its drivers are in danger of becoming obsolete and concerns for (cost) effectiveness have become particularly pressing [20].

1.7 Exploring police effectiveness in a changing world – key questions

With these foundations, the *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project set out to find innovative and sustainable solutions to persistent crime problems in Luton and Slough. Of at least equal importance however, was the opportunity to learn lessons from the process of doing so about the prospects for, routes to and dependencies of police effectiveness, in the context of external and internal change. This included addressing a number of key questions:

- Can a problem-oriented (SARA) approach deliver effective and sustainable crime reduction at a time when:
  - crime is changing and new understanding of its drivers and determinants is required;
  - populations of towns and cities are changing and diversifying – along with their vulnerabilities, expectations, efficacy and resilience; and

[19] Adapted from College of Policing (no date).

[20] In 2014 HMIC noted that *'Current practice on using a problem-solving approach demonstrates a missed opportunity for effective neighbourhood preventative policing by the majority of forces'* (HMIC, 2014).

  - police (and partner) resources, capabilities, structures, preoccupations and modes of working are changing?

- What are the limitations and dependencies of a problem-oriented (SARA) approach and how might conditions for its use be optimised?
- Which aspects of 'the changing world' (both internal and external) are most relevant to delivering effective policing at the local level and what are the implications of this for practice?
- Can an external agent, bringing different research and analysis techniques, a fresh theoretical perspective, and freedom from organisational constraints and distractions, effectively catalyse improvement in local police practice and aid effectiveness?
- And finally, what can be learned about the broader challenges facing policing at the current time, and how the demands of the changing context in which the police operate can best be met?

We return to these questions in the final discussion **(Chapter 7)** having set out the learning and findings from each of the project's (SARA) phases:

Chapter 2 deals with the process of ***scanning*** for the most appropriate problems and locations on which to focus, balancing research interests with the 'real-world' priorities of local stakeholders.

Chapter 3 details the findings of a programme of research and ***analysis*** carried out to better understand the selected crime problem, in its local context and with reference to aspects of the changing world.

Chapter 4 deals with the process of moving from ***analysis to action*** by designing a problem-oriented, evidence-oriented, and pragmatically-oriented response, and preparing to deliver this. (This is a development on the SARA model as originally defined).

Chapter 5 covers the ***response*** phase documenting the achievements made and implementation challenges encountered, and – drawing on a process evaluation – placing these within the context of service delivery in Luton during the period.

Chapter 6 presents the findings of an impact ***assessment*** in which recorded crime data indicators were analysed to identify whether the activities undertaken had been effective.

2. Scanning: identifying local problems

2.1 Scanning objective and activity

Within the SARA model, scanning is the 'jumping on point' to what is often conceived as a cyclical process (Clarke and Eck, 2003). It is typically seen as closely related to the analysis phase – mainly because preliminary data scanning flows naturally in to more in-depth analysis (Knutsson, 2010) – and as a result the terms are often used conjointly (ie 'scanning *and* analysis'). However, scanning should serve a distinct purpose in identifying and defining those crime and community safety issues that are a cause for concern amongst the public, the police and other stakeholders. Scanning also obliges decision makers to gauge the relative 'seriousness' of problems to ensure that the analysis and responses that follow are focused on the issues that matter most. In this regard scanning shares some overlap with formal prioritisation processes such as strategic assessments and setting control strategies, although the form and generality of the strategic priorities identified through these may not always be the best starting point for a problem-oriented approach, without further refinement (Scott, 2000; Clarke, 1998).

More than at any other stage of the project, the process followed during this initial phase necessarily deviated from a standard SARA procedure. To stand any chance of success, the focus of the project needed to align with the 'real world' concerns of the police and their partners, and as such crime and harm reduction were prominent project goals. Nevertheless, as a situated action research project, with learning as well as impact objectives, additional scanning criteria needed to be applied. Between January and July 2012 the project team undertook a programme of scoping and fieldwork to identify local issues that:

- Were of sufficient significance to be addressed through a long-term project of this type.
- Might be amenable to improvement, primarily through changes that could be implemented locally (ie by the police and their partners at Community Safety Partnership (CSP) level, with support at force level).
- Were of sufficient concern to the police and their partners locally to enable the project team to find support and co-operation in working to address them.
- Had potential to enable the project to contribute to current thinking about what is effective in crime reduction.
- Allowed exploration of issues that characterise the challenges for contemporary policing resulting from prevailing global economic, social and demographic changes, such as migration and population mobility, rapid communication and global markets.

This fieldwork included a mix of quantitative and qualitative investigation, which also served to familiarise the team with Luton, the crime and other concerns of those living there and the challenges faced by the police and others working to address them. This activity included:

1. An audit of existing information – in national and local reports and unpublished local analysis – about crime and disorder issues, strategic priorities and socio-economic trends affecting the town.

2. Analysis of recorded crime data, including both national comparative (iQuanta[21]) data and local police datasets, to explore town and ward level crime prevalence and trends, and the characteristics of victims and offenders.

3. Developing a harm/impact matrix to assess and compare crime types based on incidence levels, Home Office *Cost of Crime* estimates, under-reporting multipliers and performance, trend and policy considerations.

4. More than 30 introductory interviews with representatives from the police and their community safety partners.

5. Observation of a number of police and CSP management and strategic meetings.

6. A review of existing survey findings on public perceptions of crime and disorder in the town.

7. Face-to-face interviews with representatives of community organisations and observation of police-community engagement and community governance meetings.

8. A small number of focus groups with 'seldom-heard' and 'emerging' communities in the town, specifically young people, members of the Polish, Somali and Black Caribbean communities, and international students from the University of Bedfordshire.

2.2 Developing options

In synthesis, the findings of this work programme suggested three potential ways in which the project might be focused; on *types of crime*, on *parts of the town* or on specific *population groups* who were particularly impacted and/or involved in crime. No pre-judgement was made at this stage, as to the number of these issues to be taken forward or on the ways in which they might be combined. Figure 2.2.1 summarises the options that emerged from the scanning activities which were presented to local stakeholders and the project's National Advisory Group[22] in and after July 2012.

Figure 2.2.1: Scanning options for project focus in Luton (July 2012)

Option	Reasons for consideration	Concerns
Crime types		
Burglary (Residential)	Scored highly on harm/impact Index. Incidence rates in Luton consistently higher than national comparators and falling at slightly more shallow rate. Particularly impacted most deprived residents and (more recently) most ethnically mixed neighbourhoods. High priority issue for Bedfordshire police.	Long and short term reductions mean burglary was of less concern to the broader Community Safety Partnership compared to other issues. A considerable base of research existed around burglary reduction. While patterns in Luton may suggest new challenges, it may be difficult to add significantly to this evidence base.

[21] iQuanta is a web-based data platform that allows police forces, CSPs and HMIC to access provisional police performance data prior to official publication. It also allows comparisons to be made against those areas judged by the Home Office to be most similar.

[22] The *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project benefited from the guidance of a panel of expert advisors drawn from policing and academia. The group met on five occasions during the course of the project (including in July 2012) and provided invaluable feedback, insight and support. A full list of advisory group members is included as appendix 2.2.

Option	Reasons for consideration	Concerns
Burglary *(continued)*	Regularly highlighted as concern in public surveys and among 'seldom heard' groups. Local practitioner appetite for new analysis and innovative approaches. Indications of changing victimisation patterns suggested need for new analysis and opportunities for changing practice. Changing geographic distribution may suggest patterns relating to changing population profile and themes around a 'changing world'.	A focus on vulnerable minority ethnic and deprived areas with new migrant populations could link to themes related to the 'changing world', however burglary is generally not considered a crime with particular links to broader socio-economic, technological and political changes.
Robbery (personal)	Scored highly on harm/impact matrix (although below burglary). Marked performance improvements in previous years had reversed more recently, with rates above national comparator areas – consequently a strong concern for police and CSP. A common safety concern among public, particularly young people and international students. Disproportionate victimisation of Asian population identified. Outside of town centre changing incidence rates in suburbs suggested changing drivers. Doubts about effectiveness of 'saturation patrol' tactics expressed by practitioners and appetite for innovation. Potential to foster/strengthen partnerships, for example with university.	Although a focus on youth robbery/violence would echo wider themes around Luton's changing demographics, robbery in general is not a crime with clear links to 'changing world' issues.
Drugs	Perceived locally as a key driver of much of the serious and acquisitive crime within the town and consequently featured strongly in local priorities and plans. Treble the national average incidence of problematic opiate/crack users within the population.	Considerable previous research and practice development in this area, may limit the extent to which project could contribute to the evidence base. Little robust evidence to show the extent to which serious (and non-serious) acquisitive crime was related to drug offences – could

Option	Reasons for consideration	Concerns
Drugs *(continued)*	*But* substantially fewer recorded possession offences than comparators – might suggest previous lack of active policing attention. Strong community concerns, particularly among younger residents and those from more deprived wards. Indications that public lacked confidence that the police were willing (or able) to address the problem and concerns about some of the tactics used. Clear links to international organised crime and therefore to wider themes of global connectedness.	present difficulties in measuring the impact of any changes introduced. Drug use declining in the UK, so may not reflect the new challenges for policing that the 'changing world' is generating.
Identity theft	Nationally, cases of identity fraud had more than doubled in the five years to 2012 affecting a broader, less affluent set of victims. This resonated strongly with the project's 'changing world' theme. Luton had been identified as one of the top five identity fraud hotspots in the UK[23] and outside of London, the LU1 postcode area (Luton and surrounding area) was linked to more fraud cases than any other[24], suggesting a significant local problem. Despite this, Luton recorded fewer fraud and forgery offences than comparator areas and detection rates had fallen, suggesting the issues may be hidden and unaddressed. The issue was raised spontaneously by international students as a problem of concern. Presents opportunities for innovation.	It may not be considered of sufficient relative harm. Not a crime type in which police and CSP partners appeared to have a particular interest, so focusing attention and securing input could be challenging. May be difficult to address at the local level.
Hate crime	Focus groups echoed existing evidence of on-going tensions between various new and established minority ethnic communities within the town. Previous community safety surveys had revealed high levels of concern about hate	Hate crime constitutes a small number of recorded offences so may not provide the project with a focus of sufficient scale. The issue did not emerge as a concern for local police officers and it may be a challenge for the project to leverage support to address it.

[23] (Experian, 2012).
[24] (CIFAS, 2012).

Option	Reasons for consideration	Concerns
Hate crime *(continued)*	crime, particularly from residents of diverse wards close to the town centre. Recorded racially/religiously motivated crime had fallen faster than the comparator average over the previous decade, while diversity in Luton had increased markedly. Along with a local survey finding that a quarter of respondents did not feel *'the police were accessible to everyone'*, this was suggestive of under-reporting. 'Community cohesion' was a key priority in Luton and this focus could provide a sensitive way to address related issues and challenges. Addressing crime that reflected tensions between new and established groups and policing in very ethnically diverse places, was closely related to wider themes for the project.	Demonstrating reductions in victimisation may be particularly challenging, given likely hidden victimisation.
Geographic areas		
Wards surrounding the town centre	The Community Safety Partnership had formally prioritised crime reduction in (four) *'neighbourhoods* [wards] *adjacent to the town centre'* in which crime levels, concerns about crime and deprivation were disproportionately high. Taking an area approach may provide opportunities to impact a range of crime types by identifying problems that manifest in different ways. High proportions of young and new migrant residents were living in these wards and indications of problems with global market connections (eg drugs markets) fit well with themes of policing in a 'changing world'.	A focus on a number of areas across different wards might spread project resources too thinly and be insufficiently focused to allow effective intervention. May require additional specification in terms of crime types or problems in order to demonstrate relevance to local practitioners.
Spring Hill [25]	Spring Hill is a deprived area of town with a large established BME community. Focus groups and surveys indicated concerns about personal safety, the drugs market, robberies in shops, gang crime and prostitution.	A focus on this area may prove politically sensitive. As this is *one of* but not *the* highest crime area within the town a rationale for focussing on the area would need to be articulated

[25] The names of wards or other areas within Luton have been changed here and throughout this report.

Option	Reasons for consideration	Concerns
Spring Hill *(continued)*	The area had one of the highest overall crime rates in the town and had seen recent increases in recorded violence. The area was at the centre of police and partner concerns about community cohesion. The diverse population, including large numbers of new migrants allowed potential to explore 'changing world' themes.	which might stretch the project away from its crime focus.
Population groups		
International students	University of Bedfordshire campuses in the town centre and on the edge of town had expanded in recent years and attracted a large number of potentially vulnerable international students. Police and CSP partners expressed concerns about harmful crimes including burglaries, robberies in the town centre and violence against international students. Spikes in certain types of crime had been linked to university term dates. Students themselves echoed these concerns and added others about fraud by bogus and unscrupulous landlords. Opportunities existed to develop partnership working with the university.	The university may have reputational concerns about an overt focus on this group. Weaknesses in police data recording (for example on whether a victim or offender was a student) may hinder good analysis and impact assessment. A focus on this group over other vulnerable groups in the town may not be warranted and could prove politically sensitive.
New migrants	Initial analysis suggested new migrant communities may be particularly vulnerable to victimisation and links were identified between 'gateway' neighbourhoods and higher crime rates. Focus group respondents suggested under-reporting due to language barriers and mistrust of police based on experiences in home countries. The challenge for local policing in responding to a diverse population closely aligned with the project's focus on a 'changing world'.	It could be politically sensitive in Luton to focus attention on this group (or any other group defined in national/ethnic/racial terms). There may be challenges in relation to defining new migrants and collecting relevant data. The quality of the data on victimisation of minority ethnic groups is poor and may have distorted the picture on which the identification of this option was based.

2.3 Decision making

Extensive consultation with local stakeholders and members of the project's National Advisory Group resulted in the decision to focus the project in two ways; firstly on **burglary** and secondly on two wards adjacent to the town centre (**Chalk Mills** and **Wood Ridge**[26]) which were in the midst of significant social changes (see section 2.4) and in which the local burglary problem had historically been among the most acute within Luton.

With hindsight, it is clear that this decision owed much to the scanning and prioritisation processes already undertaken by Luton's Community Partnership and by Bedfordshire police. At the time, Luton's CSP was working to three crime-type priorities (burglary, violence and thefts from motor vehicles), two geographic priorities (the town centre and adjacent residential neighbourhoods) along with a strategic focus on young offenders and vulnerable victims. Arriving at a project remit which covered the overlap between these existing priorities and the scanning options identified was therefore a logical and natural outcome.

For the senior leadership of Bedfordshire Police a focus on burglary was also strategically attractive; substantial efforts had been put into policing burglary within the force over the previous period, with some success achieved in terms of improved detection rates and crime reduction (the latter most notably outside of Luton), however with funding pressures becoming increasingly urgent there were concerns that the enforcement-focused tactics with which this had been achieved were quickly becoming unaffordable. Developing alternative, sustainable solutions was therefore a pressing concern, to which the project might make a valuable contribution.

For the project team, some concerns persisted about the extent to which the project might make a contribution to the extensive evidence base around burglary, and to which the project's focus on policing in the changing world might be approached through such a 'traditional' crime type; however, these were assuaged, to some extent, by the geographic focus on two neighbourhoods undergoing substantial social changes (see 2.4, below), potential links to the local drugs economy, and a local perception that burglary was increasingly driven by organised and mobile criminal gangs, with criminal connections overseas. On balance, when set pragmatically against the need for the project to work in a space that was relevant and meaningful to the local agencies, whose co-operation and input would be essential (particularly in the response phase), tackling burglary in Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge was felt to be the most appropriate focus for more detailed analysis, on which a subsequent crime reduction response might be built.

2.4 Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge – ward profiles

The two wards chosen as the focus for the project were adjacent to each other, with each containing part of the area broadly considered to be the town centre along with high-density residential neighbourhoods. As described overleaf, despite some distinctive features, the two areas shared many similarities and were clearly subject to the same processes of flux. In both cases these conditions coincided with comparatively high rates of police-recorded crime, with burglary levels among the highest in the town.

[26] Again, place names have been changed.

Chalk Mills

- Town centre ward containing shops, amenities and transport hubs as well as residential areas.
- Population of around 14,000 – had increased by more than a third in a decade.
- Population growth concentrated in young-adult age groups (and their very young children) – the number of 25 to 29 year olds increased almost 150 per cent in 10 years – population decrease among over 60s.
- Although 60 per cent white, only 40 per cent were 'white British' with a large south and east European (recent) migrant population. Fewer Asian residents than in other parts of Luton.
- Nearly a quarter of households contained no residents with English as their main language.
- More than a quarter of residents (aged 16-74) were full-time students (reflecting nearby university campus).
- Nearly a third of households consisted of lone person under 65 (about double the Luton and national level).
- Nearly half of households lived in purpose build flats (more than twice the Luton rate) and nearly 10 per cent lived in converted / shared houses (three times the Luton rate).
- Just under half of all households rented privately (more than twice the Luton level and three times the national rate) – more than 20 per cent lived in social rented housing (inc. housing associations).
- Contained two LSOAs in 10 per cent most deprived nationally.
- Highest overall crime rate in Luton (reflecting town centre), and had seen increases in robbery, fraud, vehicle crime and burglary (in year to March 2012).
- Surveys suggested local concerns strongest around drunk and rowdy behaviour and burglary. Violence, hate crime and sexual assault also featured strongly.
- Ward with highest burglary rate in 2011/12 (30 burglaries per 1,000 dwellings compared with 20 for Luton overall).

Wood Ridge

- Predominantly residential ward bordering town centre and Chalk Mills, with small high-street and local businesses.
- Mix of more affluent areas and pockets of deprivation.
- Population around 9,000 – had increased by more than a quarter in a decade.
- Population growth concentrated among young working-age population (and very young) – small reduction in number of over 65s.
- 18 per cent of residents from 'white other' ethnic groups (predominantly south and east European) – two and a half times the rate for Luton as a whole.
- 18 per cent of households contained no residents with English as main language.
- Proportion (of those aged 16-74) in full time employment higher than for Luton as a whole; student numbers about average.
- Nearly a third of households consisted of lone person under 65; proportion of households comprising married couple with children lower than for rest of town.
- More than 40 per cent of households rented privately (twice the Luton average).
- About 40 per cent of households lived in purpose built flats; nearly a third in terraced housing.
- Second highest overall rate of crime in Luton (behind Chalk Mills).
- Increases in crime over recent years including violence, sexual offences and vehicle crime.
- Concerns about on-street drugs market and prostitution.
- Ward with 5th (out of 19) highest burglary rate in 2011/12 (26 burglaries per 1,000 dwellings in 2011/12 compared with 20 across Luton as a whole – highest rate ward over previous eight years combined).

Note: These profiles reflect understanding of wards in mid-2012 based on scanning activities (described above) and 2011 Census data.

3. Analysis: understanding burglary in Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge

3.1 Scoping and methods

With the focus of the project defined, the analysis phase set out to develop an in-depth understanding of the drivers of persistently high rates of burglary in Luton, and in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills in particular, on which a tailored crime reduction approach might be built. Although, as a 'priority' crime type, burglary in Luton routinely received analytic attention, it was hoped that by expanding the range of research techniques, by focusing intensively on two specific neighbourhoods and by seeking answers to a different set of questions, new and sustainable intervention approaches might be identified that went beyond the routine policing response.

Guidance on conducting crime analysis within a SARA process tends to stress the importance of setting and investigating hypotheses or research questions to ensure focused and relevant outputs (Clarke and Eck, 2003). In late 2012/early 2013 a series of workshops and interviews with police officers and other stakeholders was conducted to identify the working assumptions and gaps in local knowledge around burglary to which new evidence might usefully be applied. Guided by this feedback, as well as by a review of the evidence on effective crime reduction practice (summarised in Karn, 2013), a series of research questions was formulated to provide a framework for the analysis phase and, it was hoped, identify links between burglary and processes of change within these neighbourhoods.

These are summarised below with the full set of research questions and sub-questions included as Appendix 3.1.

Analysis phase – core research questions

- Do long term burglary (and general crime) trends relate to socio-economic patterns and changes within Luton at the neighbourhood level?
- What characterises, and what might explain, persistent and emerging burglary hotspots/micro-locations within Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills?
- What are the characteristics of burglary victims in these wards and are particular groups targeted?
- What is the relationship between burglary offending and drug use in Luton as a whole and in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills specifically?
- Are there other significant characteristics of burglary offenders and what other factors contribute to/motivate offending behaviour?
- What is the relationship between where offenders live and where burglaries happen?
- How do those living close to local drugs and stolen goods markets describe the connections to burglary in these areas?

Addressing these questions required a mixed-methods approach including the quantitative and qualitative components described following.

Crime data analysis

A range of quantitative techniques were used to interrogate several sets of geocoded burglary data

derived from the Bedfordshire Police Crime Management System (CMS), covering (up to) an eight-year period (ending March 2013), often in conjunction with other data sets [27].

- Correlation analysis and thematic mapping was used to investigate the relationship between Lower Super Output Area (LSOA [28]) level burglary rates and a range of socio-economic data derived from the 2001 and 2011 Censuses.
- Statistical techniques were employed to investigate seasonality and the relationship between hours of darkness and burglary rates.
- Hotspot mapping was undertaken at both town and ward levels to identify persistent and statistically significant concentrations of burglary. Data for a two year period (April 2011 to March 2013) were analysed with Kernel Density Estimate and Gi* [29] techniques.
- The relationship between the temporal and geographic dispersal of burglary and the incidence of 'repeat' and 'near repeat' incidents was investigated using publicly available analytic tools. [30]
- Victim records were analysed and compared with Census and ONS workforce statistics to identify indicators of disproportionality.
- Data describing a cohort of offenders charged with burglary offences in Luton during the most recent two year period were derived from CMS and supplemented with custody drug testing data, full conviction histories (sourced from the Police National Computer, PNC) and needs and risk assessment data (OASys data [31] – provided by Bedfordshire Probation Service). Cluster analysis was used to segment the cohort and identify an offender typology.
- Offender address data were geocoded and used to investigate the geographic relationship between offender residence patterns and crime incidence.
- Stolen property data was analysed to explore changing trends in the types of goods targeted in burglaries.

Offender interviews

Qualitative research interviews were conducted with 19 burglary offenders who were either being supervised by Bedfordshire Probation Trust or were serving or awaiting sentences for burglary at Bedford Prison (in June/July 2013). All those interviewed were resident in Luton either at the time of their offence(s) or while under supervision, and although it was not feasible to stipulate that all offenders had committed burglaries in Luton, most had done so. Interviews lasted 45 to 60 minutes and covered first involvements in crime in general and burglary in particular, criminal career progression, motivations and drivers, offending methods, target selection preferences, disposal of stolen goods and experiences of the criminal justices system as well as of their own victimisation.

Victim interviews

24 semi-structured interviews were conducted with local residents who had been the victim of residential burglary in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills wards during 2012/13. In order to focus in on issues of particular vulnerability, all interviewees had been either repeat victims or lived in areas identified as ward hotspots (based on preliminary crime mapping). Interviews lasted 45 to 90 minutes and explored experiences of

[27] All local data was obtained and handled under the terms of a set of Data Sharing Agreements put in place for the purposes of this project.

[28] LSOAs are small administrative areas, typically consisting of around 650 households for which a range of descriptive Census data are available.

[29] Gi* is an advanced form of hotspot mapping that allows statistically significant concentrations of (in this case) burglaries to be identified against the general 'background' level. See Chainey (2010) for an overview.

[30] Available at www.jratliffe.net.

[31] A system used by the probation and prison service for assessing the risks and needs of an offender.

victimisation as well as perceptions of the local area; most were conducted in respondents' homes.

Security survey

A street-by-street visual survey of household security features and vulnerability indicators in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills was conducted during July 2013. Street segments were categorised according to the prevalence of visible security features such as alarms, lights, CCTV and security stickers; colour-coded ward maps were generated and compared against hotspot maps.

Engagement with police and partners

Building on interviews conducted in the previous phase, the project team continued to engage formally and informally with police and partner agencies during the research period as well as observing police and Community Safety Partnership management and governance meetings.

This programme of analytic work was undertaken during the middle and latter part of 2013 with findings fed back to local stakeholders in a detailed report in December of that year. This chapter contains a summary of the key findings from the analysis phase, focusing particularly on those that were felt to have most potential to inform subsequent practice development.

3.2 Where burglary happens

Socio-demographic correlates[32]

As previously noted, Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills wards experienced some of the highest levels of burglary in Luton. Over the eight years to March 2013, Wood Ridge had an average annual rate of 32 burglary offences per 1,000 dwellings, which was the highest of any Luton ward and compared with an average for the town of 22 per 1,000.[33 34] Chalk Mills had an average annual burglary rate of 26 per 1,000 dwellings; the third highest average rate in the town.[35]

During the year prior to the analysis phase (April 2012 to March 2013) both wards had experienced burglary reductions (both in absolute terms and relative to other parts of the town). However rates for the year remained more than 10 per cent above the all Luton rate and both remained in the top six wards for burglary – with no indication that these reductions were part of a more sustained downward trend.

Like Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills, other wards with typically higher burglary rates tended to cluster around the town centre, suggesting a classic 'transition zone' – a ring of residential housing around a town or city centre characterised by deprivation, population churn, crime, and other social problems (Parket al., 1967).

To examine the extent to which these and other socio-economic factors were associated with burglary (and crime more generally) in Luton, burglary rates (per 1,000 households) and all-crime rates (per 1,000 population) were calculated for each of Luton's 121 Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) for both one year (2012/13) and eight year (2005/06 to 2012/13) periods; these were then compared against a set of demographic, LSOA-level Census variables, using correlation calculations[36].

While none of the correlations was exceptionally strong (suggesting that other types of explanations – individual offender sprees for example – also impacted on neighbourhood rates) a number of statistically significant correlates were identified, which paint a

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[32] The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of Malcolm Hibberd who conducted much of the statistical analysis summarised in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

[33] Wood Ridge had ranked in the top five of Luton's 19 wards for burglary in each of the eight years to March 2013.

[34] For consistency, rates quoted throughout this report are based on a geocoded dwellings database provided to the project in early 2014 (see section 6.3), these differ slightly, but not materially from rates calculated using Census data produced during the scanning and analysis phase.

[35] Although rates had been more variable in Chalk Mills over the period, it had ranked in the top six wards in five of the eight years, including each of the last three (and had the highest rate in 2011/12 – the year prior to scanning). Figures for Chalk Mills also masked considerable internal variation with offences concentrated in the North West part of the ward.

picture of the *type* of neighbourhoods in which burglary occurred most frequently within the town. Briefly summarised:

- LSOA **Population growth** (between the 2001 and 2011 Censuses) was significantly (positively) correlated with both burglary and all-crime rates[37].
- **Deprivation** was significantly correlated with burglary rates, but the correlation was slightly less strong for burglary than for the all-crime rate.
- **Unemployment** rates were significantly (positively) correlated with burglary rates, and were generally more strongly correlated with burglary than all-crime rates.
- The proportion of **residents born outside of the UK** was (positively) correlated with burglary rates and was correlated more strongly with burglary than with all-crime.
- The proportion of households with **families** was strongly (negatively) correlated with all-crime rates but this was much less strong for burglary.
- The proportion of households in **rented accommodation** (social and private renting combined) was highly significantly correlated with all-crime and (slightly less strongly) with burglary rates, however:
  - **Social renting** was modestly correlated with all-crime rates but was **not significantly correlated with burglary rates**.
  - **Private renting** was significantly correlated with both all-crime and burglary rates; and in fact (over the eight year period) was the **strongest socio-demographic correlate of burglary identified**.
- Burglary and all crime were significantly correlated with measures of **overcrowding**.

A full table of correlation coefficients is included in Appendix 3.2.

In summary, mirroring analysis of national surveys (Higgins et al., 2010) this analysis confirmed that burglary, like crime in general, tended to be concentrated in more deprived parts of town. It also showed that in Luton, burglaries tended to occur more frequently in places that appeared to be experiencing some 'population flux', indicated by marked population growth and greater numbers of those born outside the UK (an indicator of recent immigration). Linked to these factors, and potentially of particular significance, these also tended to be places with high levels of private rented housing – and in all probability (given the correlations with overcrowding, unemployment and deprivation) of *poor quality* private rented housing. While it is important to remember that these are correlates and not causal explanations, in the context of other findings and evidence, they helped to inform hypotheses about drivers of burglary within the town. In particular they raised questions about access to household security for more deprived households, particularly those living in privately rented housing, and about the resilience and capacity of communities in these diverse and transient neighbourhoods to come together to resist criminal predation. These theories are discussed further in section 3.8.

Micro-locations

Gi* statistics were used to identify a number of hotspot 'micro-locations' within Wood Ridge and

[36] Supplementary regression analysis carried out later on the same dataset is reported in the project companion paper *Safe as Houses?* (Higgins and Jarman, 2015).

[37] Luton's population grew by ten per cent in the decade to 2011; however six LSOAs including three in Chalk Mills and one in Wood Ridge saw growth in excess of 50 per cent.

Figure 3.3.1: Number of residential burglary offences per month in Luton (April 2005 to March 2013) [39]
(with linear trend lines for periods April 2005 to March 2013 and April 2009 to March 2013)



Chalk Mills that had experienced particularly strong concentrations of burglary over the two years to March 2013.[38] These locations were later fine-tuned (based on an updated data set and ground level 'sense checking') and formed the focus for activity undertaken in subsequent phases of the project. To preserve the anonymity of the wards and the hotspot locations, no maps have been included in this report. However to give a general sense;

- In Wood Ridge, five small areas were selected for attention. Each contained between 190 and 670 dwellings which, when combined, accounted for 40 per cent of the dwellings in the ward, 19 per cent of the area and 64 per cent of the previous burglaries.
- In Chalk Mills, four areas were selected containing between 530 and 800 dwellings each. In combination these accounted for 32 per cent of the dwellings, 11 per cent of the area and 52 per cent of previous burglaries in the ward.

3.3 When burglary happens

Seasonality

Figure 3.3.1 (above) shows the number of burglary offences in Luton per month, between April 2005 and March 2013. Overall there is little evidence of a consistent trend in burglary within the town, particularly since early 2009, although the number of recorded burglaries varied considerably on a month-to-month basis. On average, totals varied by

[38] Gi* is an advanced form of hotspot mapping that allows statistically significant concentrations of (in this case) burglaries to be identified against the general 'background' level. see Chainey (2010) for an overview.

[39] Monthly counts have been adjusted to reflect a standardised 31 day month.

20 per cent from one month to the next (and by up to 65 per cent); as would be expected, this was even more exaggerated at the ward level.

Such volatility had previously posed problems for seasonal operation planning, and had led to some uncertainty about whether the force's regular autumn/winter burglary reduction operation was appropriate for Luton. Analysis was undertaken to test the degree of seasonality within Luton's burglary profile and the widely held assumption (in Luton and beyond) that a winter peak was related to increased opportunities for/vulnerability to burglary, due to darker evenings. It was found that:

- Broadly speaking, winter months (between October to March) did tend to see an above average number of burglaries in most years;
- However this was not consistently the case and the only month in which a seasonal peak could reliably be anticipated (with at least 90 per cent confidence) was November – when levels were typically around 25 per cent above the average for the year.
- Monthly variation in the proportion of burglary offences that occurred during darkness could only be partially explained by sunset and sunrise patterns – this allowed for the possibility that other factors, such as changes in offender behaviour in response to seasonal darkness, might account for the unexplained variance.
- Seasonal offending patterns were also consistent with the finding that darker evenings specifically [40] (when unlit houses might more reliably indicate that a property was unoccupied – see Section 3.7) better predicted the seasonal changes in darkness burglaries than total hours of darkness.
- Overall however, hours of darkness accounted for very little of the month to month variation in burglary rates – tentatively, an offender preference for darkness might replace rather than add to offending at other times of day – and more generally, seasonality/darkness should not be over-emphasised in explaining month-to-month variation.

In the light of these findings it was tempting to explain the consistent November peak in terms of offender's response to the onset of darker evenings; however, the absence of a similarly consistent peak in other dark months cautioned against a simple explanation. More broadly, while a November focus was broadly appropriate, this analysis suggested that seasonal operations should form a relatively minor part of a year-round reduction strategy.

Time at liberty

With neither long-term trends nor seasonality able to account for the volatility in Luton's burglary rate, it was appropriate to investigate the extent to which offender factors might provide an explanation. An attempt was made to assemble 'time at liberty' histories for a cohort of known prolific offenders – using data from the Prisoner Intelligence Notification System (PINS) – with the intention of comparing these to temporal spikes in burglary rates. However, the available data was insufficient to build an accurate record of previous time at liberty and these efforts proved inconclusive. While it is tempting to see the peaks and troughs in burglary as the product of sprees by prolific offenders, the recognition that non-specialist / occasional burglars were active in Luton, as well as more prolific individuals, warns against a simplistic explanation (see Section 3.4).

[40] Defined as the period between sunset and midnight.

Geographic distribution of temporal spikes

Analysis was conducted to identify the geographic areas of Luton that saw the greatest increases in burglary during several recent peak periods [41]. Although no consistent pattern emerged, this analysis showed that offence peaks could to some extent be accounted for by increases *within* existing, longer term hotspot areas – including those within Chalk Mills, although less so in Wood Ridge – as opposed to sudden 'outbreaks' in previously 'quiet' area. In general terms this suggested that a concerted focus on long-term priority locations would be appropriate, rather than chasing shorter term hotspots.

3.4 Offenders and offending drivers

Knowledge of local burglary offenders will inevitably always be partial; less than ten per cent of the burglaries recorded in Luton during 2011/12 and 2012/13 had been linked to an offender (or group of offenders) and there was no way of telling the extent to which those individuals charged during the period were representative of the broader active offending cohort [42]. It was the view of local practitioners, however, that the profile of burglars in Luton was changing, with the number of problematic drug-using offenders reducing, while a younger generation of more sporadic offenders was increasingly coming to attention. Testing and developing these hypotheses required both quantitative analysis and qualitative research [43] which were brought together to inform the offender typology described in this section.

Cluster analysis

Data describing the 215 offenders charged with burglaries in Luton during the two years to March 2013 were compiled from a range of sources (see Section 3.1) and then subjected to cluster analysis, to identify groups of offenders, as defined by their statistical similarities and differences.[44] This resulted in four main cluster groups being identified, the largest of which, containing 118 individuals, was then subdivided into four sub-groups using the same technique.

This process segmented the cohort along broadly generational lines with a large group of *Young adult burglars*, with an average age 23 (which was then segmented into four smaller sub-categories), a group referred to here as *Adult, persistent poly-drug using burglars* (average age 35), a small group of *'Revolving door' acquisitive specialists* (average age 47) and finally two 'older outliers' (average age 67) who were prolific shoplifters and occasional burglars forming a marginal fourth group.

These groups, which reduced in size as the average age went up, can be seen as representing those increasingly residualised as their age-group peers had desisted from crime. Mirroring what is known about criminal careers more widely (Farrington et al., 1988), the groups also had a progressively earlier average age of offending onset (first conviction) – in other words, those who had continued to offend the longest had started youngest. It is also of note that some groups were more prolific than others (as illustrated in Figure 3.4.1 overleaf).

The characteristics of each of the seven clusters and sub-clusters were examined and compared, and a theoretical typology comprising three main types (with some sub-categories and outliers) was assembled [45]. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.4.1 with a more detailed description of the cluster groups provided as Appendix 3.4. The three theoretical 'types' derived

[41] Analysis was conducted using a 'dispersion calculator' publically available at www.jratclffe.net.

[42] 428 of 4,538 burglary records for the period indicated that one or more individual had been charged with committing the offence. In total 215 different individuals were charged with between one and 43 burglaries in the period.

[43] See Section 3.1 for offender interview methodology.

[44] The cohort was almost exclusively male, had an average age of 27, but a broad age range including a quarter who were 35 or older. More than 70 per cent were from 'white British' or 'other white' ethnic backgrounds, with both these ethnic groups over-represented compared to the local population.

[45] Two of the cluster groups, 1.1 (*Little known late entrants*) and 4 (*Older outliers*) are not included within the typology and were considered the least important for

Figure 3.4.1: Burglary offender typology



from the analysis are described below, drawing on the offender interviews to illustrate some of the key characteristics indicated by the data.

Type 1: Problematic poly-drug users

Two of the clusters (1.4 and 2, see figure 3.4.1) have been grouped together within the typology, based on a principal offending driver of problematic (poly)-drug use. This type represents 39 per cent of the cohort and was the most prolific, accounting for 57 per cent of all the burglaries known to have been committed by the cohort, in Luton, during the two year period. The two sub-groups within this type represent younger (mean age 29) and older (mean age 35) more entrenched generations of offending problematic drug-users, with a clear pathway from the former to the latter for those who do not desist.

In addition to positive custody drug tests (often for both cocaine and opiates), this type of offender was characterised by extensive acquisitive criminal records, including multiple theft and shop-lifting offences as well as burglaries, but with relatively few violent offences (including robberies); they were also less likely than other types to be charged as part of a group. Probation assessments (particularly for the older, more entrenched sub-group) indicate that emotional issues and relationship problems were regularly identified as needs/drivers, along with drug use.

understanding burglary in Luton. See appendix 3.4 for a description of these and all seven cluster and sub-cluster groups.

Problematic drug use featured strongly in the accounts of ten of the 19 convicted burglars interviewed for this research, of whom eight were heroin users and four were crack cocaine users (including two who used both). With a few exceptions these individuals described withdrawal symptoms or the need to raise money or goods to swap for drugs, as the trigger for their offending.

> *"I suppose I needed to feed my habit and at the time … if an opportunity arose like, to break in* [to] *someone's house then I'd do what I had to, to kind of feed my habit really, if I'm honest".*

> *"I might run out of drugs, or I might be going to score or something and I'd see the opportunity … to quickly go in there because I know I need more drugs … or didn't want to get ill* [suffer withdrawal] *and that, because especially with heroin … that was like the main drive really, that fear of not having any drugs".*

The indicators of mental health problems and emotional issues suggested by probation assessments were also reflected in offenders' accounts. For some, drug use was a symptom or means of managing their emotional and mental state and burglary a product of the combination of both. For some, alcohol misuse added additional complexity. A number of offenders fitting this typology disclosed child abuse and domestic violence in their childhood and saw a direct link from these experiences to their offending; time spent in care was mentioned by several as a point of criminal onset.

> *"So the only way I could think of, for a cry for help and that, was do daft things like commit crimes and stuff like that to try and get noticed, and that's the reason why I started doing burglaries".*

> *"I was in a children's home* [aged 13] *and at night-time you go out, just walking the streets and whatever … and the next thing you know you're involved".*

These accounts hint at the complexity in the challenge of supporting desistance and reducing reoffending among this offender type. It is of note however that the older, more entrenched sub-group had more members than the younger group, which might reflect practitioners' perceptions of an ageing and shrinking problematic drug-using offender cohort within the town.

Generalist 'lifestyle' offenders

The problematic drug-using burglars described above were clearly differentiated by the cluster analysis from a younger set of generalist 'lifestyle' offenders, who committed burglaries as part of a broader offending repertoire, often with others. Again this type contained two age-based sub-groups (clusters 1.2 and 1.3, with average ages of 21 and 25 respectively), with the older group characterised by much higher levels of cocaine use (but very little opiate use).

Unlike the problematic drug-using group, these more generalist offenders had comparatively high levels of violence and robbery within their offending histories, along with burglary and other acquisitive crimes. Although the two sub-groups had slightly different sets of probation assessed needs and drivers, the most frequently identified factor for both was 'lifestyle', which reflects criminogenic associations and activity patterns.

Perhaps because the sample was slightly skewed towards older offenders, it was less easy to identify these younger 'lifestyle' generalists among those interviewed, however a number of respondents did demonstrate characteristics consistent with this

type, (although perhaps at a slightly later phase of their offending career).

Five from 19 offenders interviewed provided a highly distinctive account of committing burglaries with the specific intention of stealing cars by taking car keys from houses. As well as being financially lucrative, these offenders' responses indicated that they were clearly attracted by the 'buzz' of the offence and the thrill of driving fast cars as well as working in tight-knit teams.

> *"Because I don't do crime for drugs, alcohol, nothing like that. I'll do it for, purely, for money and buzz ...Yes, I love it. I love driving a fast car, you know, going down the motorway at 140 mph or something ... and then parking that car and getting paid for it".*

An 'aspirational' criminal identity seemed to be an important characteristic of these generalist lifestyle offenders. Interviewees who displayed these characteristics also disclosed a broad range of previous offending, including vehicle offences, violence and robberies, which were sometimes gang/group/territory related. This suggested a greater willingness to engage in confrontational behaviour and social or identity-based dimensions to offending motives.

> *"It was just more, like, the people that I was associating with, I guess. I just wanted to be one of the crowd or something. ..Yes, just to be one of the gang or something, I suppose".*

> *"It was just something that's going on in my area at the moment ... And they called it something stupid like the postcode wars, but it's not ... It's not a gang. It's just a group of lads ... It's just people from different areas that just don't like each other ...Yes. That's what I grew up in, that's it".*

While the appeal of a criminal lifestyle may be familiar to those used to working with young (and young-adult) offenders, it is perhaps a motive less often associated with burglary and burglars. The finding that around a quarter of known burglary offenders (and a quarter of burglaries committed by known offenders) fell into this generalist 'life-style' category may have implications for the way reduction efforts are targeted and how offender management approaches are tailored.

Revolving-Door Acquisitive Specialists

A small but distinctive third type of offender was also identified by the cluster analysis (cluster 3). These were older individuals (average age 47) with extensive criminal careers. Their offending was less clearly linked to drug use (a minority had positive drug tests) and their – particularly recent – offending profile suggested more serious or specialist types of acquisitive offending, such as residential burglaries and car crime, rather than petty-theft and shoplifting. They tended to have gaps in their conviction histories, suggesting long periods of imprisonment and generally had identified finance and accommodation needs which may be indicative of resettlement issues.

Three of the offenders interviewed described their offending in ways that suggested they engaged in specialised and more organised offending. At least one described patterns of long prison sentences and very high numbers of offences committed in a relatively short space of time. For several interviewees, imprisonment had reportedly escalated offending (including by introducing them to others with deeper involvement in the drugs economy) with post-release supervision doing little to alter offending behaviour.

"Yes, I needed something like this [a resettlement scheme] *years ago. Because I've never ... had, like, community service ... I've just had* [prison] *sentence after sentence after sentence after sentence. And after the third sentence, someone should have looked at it and thought, well, prison's not helping this person. Maybe something else. But no, I done sentence, sentence, sentence, sentence, sentence. And then, I'm back to square one".*

Several offenders mentioned post-prison housing issues as a particular barrier to desistance, either because they were housed with other drug users or by returning to live around former associates.

"It's about ... staying away from certain company ... The reason why I did get recalled was because there was some positive tests and that was due to the area I was put to live ... [an area] *known for drugs and I was put in a ... shared house with, like, bedsits ... and there was users in the house".*

"I'm trying to come out of the gang mentality ... [But last time] *they let me out of prison homeless, put me back in Luton. I got back involved in gang crime ... I didn't have anywhere else to go".*

Overall, this typology suggested that while crime reduction approaches that focused on drugs (either on the local drugs markets or on treatment and rehabilitation for problematic drug-using offenders) remained appropriate, there were also other offender types and offending drivers that needed to be taken into account. The extent to which burglary formed part of the repertoire of younger offenders, with aspirations to a criminal identity, is perhaps surprising and poses difficult questions about how best to support routes out of criminogenic associations and lifestyles, while a small, persistent group of acquisitive specialists brought resettlement issues to the fore. Perhaps most notably, relating these typologies back to the places where their members offended suggested that Chalk Mills was principally targeted by problematic poly-drug users, while (although numbers were small) Wood Ridge appeared to be affected more by generalist 'lifestyle' offenders (and to some degree by 'revolving-door' acquisitive specialists). The relationship between offenders, their behaviours and the patterning of burglary is explored in Section 3.7.

3.5 Victims and vulnerability

Luton practitioners put forward several hypotheses about the targeting of particular groups of residents including; Asian households (because of the perception that gold jewellery would be found on the premises), students (because they had laptops, lived in relatively insecure rental accommodation and could predictably be absent out of term time), and elderly residents (who might be susceptible to distraction burglaries and less likely to resist if disturbed).

On the whole (and although these patterns have been identified in other parts of the country), little evidence of targeting of this kind was identified in Luton. Although one burglar interviewee did suggest that he would target Asian gold and another mentioned student laptops, more often the apparent characteristics of householders were cited as a reason *not* to burgle a property (to avoid victimising elderly people or young families for example) although the extent to which such 'honourable' considerations applied in reality is open to question. Much more prominent in offenders' accounts (as described in Section 3.7) were target selection decisions made on property and situational characteristics (ease of access, lack of surveillance

etc) and this 'non-discriminate' attitude to victims is borne out in the data.

As shown in figure 3.5.1 the age and gender profile of reporting burglary victims was broadly in line with Luton's population profile, with some modest over-representation of younger adults (probably reflecting the profile of hotspot areas, time spent away from the home, and perhaps also reporting habits in multi-generational households) with no indication of disproportionate targeting of either older residents or younger students [46]. Figure 3.5.2 compares the ethnicity profile of recorded burglary victims against the population and again shows only minor discrepancies. Those from Asian/Asian British ethnic backgrounds (when Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian and other subgroups are combined) make up 27 per cent of the population and 27 per cent of victim records and in fact it is the white British group who are (slightly) over-represented, accounting for 49 per cent of victims and 45 per cent of the population.[47] Victim analysis conducted at the ward level was consistent with these findings and showed no marked demographic differences from local populations.

Socio-economic comparisons show clearer signs of disproportionality, although this is likely to reflect geographic concentration of offences in more deprived areas rather than offender targeting. While substantial hazards are acknowledged in comparing police recorded victim records with official workforce statistics, analysis suggests that burglary disproportionately affected unemployed residents. On a Luton-wide basis, 15 per cent of burglary victims are recorded as unemployed, compared with an official figure of just five per cent, while in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills this was 15 per cent and 22 per cent, compared with six per cent unemployment.

In summary, analysis suggests that any disproportionality within the profile of burglary victims in Luton is the indirect product of the population characteristics in the parts of town where burglary rates are highest, rather than discriminate targeting by offenders, and that this manifests most clearly in socio-economic rather than demographic differences.

Analysis also showed that:

- Those victims identified as 'vulnerable' by the police tended to reflect indicators such as age or health issues. These victims were no more likely to become repeat victims than 'non-vulnerable' victims.
- Burglary *offenders* were slightly (but statistically significantly) more likely to be victims of burglary than the population in general, however the extent to which this was the product of area factors (see Section 3.7) as opposed to other risk factors is unclear. The same was not true for a larger group of all offenders (regardless of crime-type committed).

As a caveat it is important to note that all of the five overseas students interviewed as burglary victims *felt* that they were deliberately targeted (for burglaries and other crimes) on account of their ethnicity and/or based on a perception that they were likely to have valuable items of property. Whether or not this view reflects the reality, the relevance of community connectedness for tackling crime and the need to address resilience within sections of Luton's diverse and sometimes vulnerable population was made clear – as illustrated by the quotation below.

> *"If you want to take my stuff, that's fine, but there is a racial hatred as well as an intention to burgle you; it's attached to it. … I think people who hurt students or burgle students; they can easily*

[46] 14 per cent of burglary victims in Wood Ridge and 25 per cent in Chalk Mills are recorded as being students; however this is not disproportionate to the proportion of students in the ward populations (15 and 27 per cent of those over 16 respectively).

[47] It is acknowledged that possible differences in the average size of households between ethnic groups might distort this comparison, although this is considered unlikely to alter the general finding of a broadly proportionate victim ethnicity profile.

Figure 3.5.1: Luton population and burglary victims by age-group and gender



Figure 3.5.2: Luton population and burglary victims by ethnic group



differentiate between a local guy and an international guy. ... he thinks ... the community will not care because this guy doesn't belong from this place".

3.6 Stolen goods

Analysis of the items of property stolen in burglaries over the eight years prior to 2012/13, revealed some marked changes in the types of items targeted. Most notably:

- Laptop computers, which were the twelfth most frequently stolen property type in 2005/06, were stolen in more burglaries than any other property type from 2011/12 onwards.
- Jewellery had risen from being the sixth most frequently stolen item in 2005/06 to the third (after laptops and cash) from 2009/10 onwards; this may reflect an increase in the value of precious metals over the period.
- Mobile phones were the second most frequently taken item in 2005/06, fell to sixth in 2009/10, but had since moved up to third; this is likely to reflect the emerging mass ownership of smart phones during the latter period.
- Bank and credit cards had dropped out of the top 10, having been the fourth most frequently stolen item in 2006/07; this is likely to reflect improved card fraud security measures.

The increase in the theft of personal technology was particularly marked in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills; in 2012/13 laptops were stolen in 32 per cent of burglaries in Wood Ridge and 35 per cent in Chalk Mills, compared with 27 per cent in Luton as a whole[48], probably reflecting younger populations (including a substantial number of students).

Offender accounts were consistent with these trends with cash, jewellery, laptops and phones frequently mentioned as cashable and readily disposable targets. In contrast the price that could be obtained for larger electronic goods (TVs, DVD players, computer consoles etc) was reported to have fallen, with both supply and demand-side explanations offered:

"The problem with the electricals nowadays; they don't hold much price because ... drug addicts will sell it for nothing, for just a fix".

"It got harder over the years. People didn't want to buy nothing. You're giving things away for ... next to nothing, to people who don't want to buy it, people ain't got no money".

"People don't want to have stolen stuff in their houses and that no more".

Offenders' accounts of the local stolen goods market indicated that it was normal for items to be moved on quickly – within hours if not minutes – to known, usually local, criminal contacts (although occasional mention was made of travelling to specialist jewellery quarters in various towns and cities to sell stolen items). Direct sale to the public, either face to face or online was to be avoided and second hand shops, pawn brokers and other 'legitimate' outlets were seen as a risky last resort:

"First port of call would be the drug dealers ... and if that's a no go then try and sell it round to friends or get friends to sell it for you, then if not, then it would be down to Cash Converters or somewhere just to pawn it".

[48] The equivalent figures for mobile phones were 17 per cent and 18 per cent compared with 15 per cent for the town.

3.6.1: Rank order of most frequently stolen items in burglaries in Luton 2005/06 to 2012/13 [49]



> *"I often gave them to other drug addicts to go and sell it for me* [in second hand/pawn shops] *as well, as an incentive for them to get some money out of it".*

There was less consistency in accounts of the overlap between local drugs and stolen goods markets. It was regularly suggested that drug dealers would exchange stolen items for drugs (or occasionally for a mix of drugs and cash *'to make it last'*).

> *"He'd come out, I'd tell him a price and then he'd just pay me with drugs, really ... might as well cut out the middleman and just go straight to him".*

However it was suggested that the return was generally lower when paid in drugs, which some drug dependent offenders recognised as a facet of the exploitative relationship.

> *"Somebody else can make some money on you, they're going to, aren't they, you know? They go, 'he's a junkie ... he'll take the money'".*

By contrast, others indicated that the younger generation of local drug dealers were particularly unwilling to deal in stolen goods.

> *"Not so much no more, not what I've seen of it now. The* [drug] *dealers don't want nothing to do with buying stolen stuff".*

> *"Some* [drug] *dealers don't take goods ... because I think they think that it just brings heat on their head so they won't touch stuff, you know".*

[49] Ranking is based on the number of burglaries in each period in which one or more item of each type was stolen.

Despite these insights, this research points more broadly to some significant gaps in knowledge (among burglars as well as law enforcement) about the onward journey of stolen goods after initial transfer to dealers/handlers. For example, little insight was available into the processing and distribution of stolen laptops and mobile phones, and hence as a result the potential for market reduction or disruptive interventions remained unclear.

3.7 Why burglary happens where (and when) it does

This section explores the combination of offender behaviour and target vulnerability that link the findings presented in the previous sections together; it provides a framework for understanding the patterns of burglary observed within the town and the two focus wards.

Offender residence and 'journey to crime'

An important factor for understanding why burglaries tended to cluster in particular parts of Luton is the concentration of burglary offenders living in these and nearby areas. Statistically significant correlations were identified between the number of resident burglary offenders (per 1,000 population) and the burglary rate (per 1,000 households) at both the LSOA and ward level [50] and a visual examination of mapped offender residence data revealed a striking correspondence with burglary hotspots. This was particularly relevant for Chalk Mills, which was home to 22 per cent of Luton's charged burglary offenders (compared with seven per cent of the population) but also applied to Wood Ridge which was home to nine per cent of offenders (and four per cent of the population) and indeed other higher rate wards with above average burglary rates.

As this suggested, burglary in Luton was found to be a largely locally generated phenomenon; half of all burglaries (for which an offender with a recorded address had been identified) took place within two kilometres of the offender's home and 29 per cent took place within one kilometre. In Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge, offenders' 'journeys to crime' were even shorter at an average of 2.0 and 1.4 kilometres respectively, compared with a Luton mean of 2.6 kilometres. While those offenders living further from the site of their crimes (including outside of the county – see figure 3.7.1) should not be overlooked, and while generalisations from the small subset of 'solved' crimes must be made cautiously, it does appear that the concentration of offenders living in some neighbourhoods of Luton is likely to be relevant to understanding persistent geographic clusters of offences, including within Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills.

Given the above, it is unsurprising that the neighbourhoods (LSOAs) with higher levels of offender residence, had very similar socio-demographic correlates to those with higher burglary rates (described in section 3.2); these tended to be more deprived places with higher levels of unemployment and overcrowding, high population growth and with a greater proportion of residents born outside of the UK (see appendix 3.7). Like burglary offences, offender residence was also highly correlated with higher levels of privately rented housing ($r=0.54$, $p<0.001$), however unlike offence rates, the correlation was stronger still when private and social renting were combined ($r=0.58$, $p<0.001$). This difference is subtle

[50] At the LSOA level the correlation coefficient is 0.273, p=0.002 and at the ward level the correlation coefficient is 0.562, p=0.012.

Figure 3.7.1: Luton burglars' 'journeys to crime' – distance of burglary location from offender's home address (2011/13)



but revealing, it suggests that burglary offenders tend to live in areas with mixed tenure, (social and privately rented) but that they tend to *offend* in nearby areas where private renting predominates.

Movement and routines

This picture of relatively local (but slightly removed) offending territories fits well with many of the offender accounts heard in interview. Although there was some variety, including reports of long-distance offending sprees from more 'aspirational' individuals, the most common reports (especially from problematic drug users) were of offending on foot, within walking distance from home and other anchor points – but not too close to home.

> *"Well, I'd be on foot, so it was in a certain area because I didn't drive ... Depends if one come up. It could be five minutes, it could be ten minutes".*

> *"I wouldn't do that on my doorstep. It must be about, say, two, three miles out of the area, out from where I was living".*

> *"Maybe I just felt safe in that area, I ... knew the area, I knew the roads, I knew the back alleys. I, kind of, knew people that lived down there as well. I knew houses that I could run into if need be, to hide from police".*

As a corollary of this, and again despite some variation, most offenders generally did not indicate that they would select or travel to particular areas based on perceived easy targets or 'rich pickings'; opportunities could present themselves anywhere and were spotted and taken (or noted for later) in the course of regular routines.

> *"I wouldn't say it was any particular area that was better than others. It was just for closeness, for ease".*

"No, it just depends where you are at the time because I could be [in a named area]*, just going to do something ... and I would just see it and I would return later or at that time ... There's no specific streets".*

"Well, a lot of the time I was just walking around the back of town and stuff, or I might be on my way from [home area] *to go out and score and that ... so if I'm walking in to town, like anything from where I lived down to town would be a goal if I see the opportunity".*

"You're going about your everyday business, I might be going for probation and just see something ... you're doing your normal thing and ... you're looking around at the same time, you know".

In light of these comments, the location of Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge – and of most of the identified hotspots within them – can be seen as relevant to understanding elevated burglary levels in these areas, both being on the edge of, and with through-routes leading to the town centre, its amenities and its nearby drugs markets.

Opportunities and risks

While some offenders spoke about looking for signs of affluence as indicators of a potentially lucrative target, others suggested these could be misleading:

"To be honest, I've gotten into houses which look lovely outside, and there's been nothing inside worth stealing, you know. I've been into houses which the windows are falling off from the outside and there's been thousands in, so it wasn't a case of 'let's hit all the big houses' ... you never knew".

In general, ease of entry and avoiding risk featured much more prominently in accounts of target selection than anticipated gains – although for problematic drug-users risk judgement was contingent on their state at the time of the crime.

"You just don't know how bad that [withdrawal] *gets ... You're in trouble, you know, and you'll keep going until you've got what you need to get, you know. You're not going to stop and nothing's going to stop you".*

Signs of easy entry described by offenders included open doors and windows, certain types of locks and (particularly older style) PVC windows and patio doors which could be easily (and quietly) 'popped' with a screwdriver or small implement. Just as importantly, indicators that a property was unoccupied (or the absence of indicators of occupation) also featured strongly in target selection decisions. Corresponding with the preference for winter darkness (see Section 3.3) – several suggested that an unlit house on a dark evening was a good indicator of an empty property.

"I preferred to do it ... evening time, so there was more chance of no one being in and stuff like that. Because I never done them with people in ... In the winter, it's getting dark, right, half three, four o'clock, so as soon as it started getting dark ... Till about nine o'clock".

Taking care to avoid unwanted attention featured strongly in many offender accounts, with alarms (particularly newer models) and dogs (particularly small, loud ones) cited as deterrents, as was natural surveillance:

Interviewer: *"Are Neighbourhood Watch signs a deterrent?"*

"Not really, if I'm honest, no, because a lot of people have got like Neighbourhood Watch [signs] *and that, but if there's a lot of activity around the house ... builders in the area ... or a lot of people are looking out their windows and that yes, a lot of times it's not worth the risk ... because it just draws too much attention".*

"If there were people walking up and down the street, or neighbours out in their gardens and that I won't bother".

"Sometimes ... residents are looking out on other resident's houses ... and I've looked suspicious ... obviously, I just go away then ... The most annoying thing for a burglar is a milkman!"

It was also suggested by several that in some parts of town it was best to 'hide in plain sight'.

"Sometimes it was better to do it more blatantly, when there's a lot of people around, where they're just getting on with what they're getting on with, do you know ... and you don't stick out like a sore thumb".

"I'd try not to act suspicious so ... if I was ... knocking on a door I'd just go really confident like I'm supposed to be there".

Repeat and near-repeat burglary

Although not common-place, several offenders gave accounts of repeat burglary that fitted both 'boost' (offender reinforcement) and 'flag' (vulnerable premises) explanations (Tseloni and Pease, 2003):

"I went back to the same house about three times before ... Because it was just easy ... Just literally put your hand on the door and give it a little shove and it'd open".

"There would be a house here that I haven't burgled, but someone has already burgled; because you could see the pop-marks on the door and then you pop it again. ... I haven't burgled a house twice, but I have burgled a house that has been burgled twice".

However, in line with the territorial routines described above, more described returning to the vicinity of previous crimes:

Interviewer: *What would make you go back* [to an area]*?*
"Just the way I walk ... just, like, a route ... I could walk a different way ... coming back down this road to go home or to go somewhere else ... I come out, whatever way I would turn, that's the way I would walk".

Consistent with well-documented patterns (Townsley, Homel and Chaseling, 2003; Chainey, 2012), Luton's burglary data contained evidence of a statistically significant incidence of burglary offences reoccurring at the same location (in this instance within three days), and in the near vicinity (up to 200 metres within six days – extending over a wider radius during the first three days) [51]. Repeat and near-repeat offending was particularly evident in Chalk Mills, tentatively reflecting a greater prevalence of more prolific problematic drug-using offenders in the area.

Access to security

Offender accounts of opportunist offending and evidence of repeat and near-repeat victimisation bring the issue of household security to the fore. Research has highlighted how the substantial reduction in burglary victimisation, witnessed nationwide over the last two decades, has been least marked among

[51] Analysis was conducted using the Near Repeats Calculator available at www.jratliffe.net. Using this method, offences 'at the same location' includes those sharing geocoded coordinates which are not necessarily at the same dwelling (eg where flats within a block share the same coordinates).

poorer households, and that differential access to basic security measures appears to explain this trend (Tilley et al., 2011). Given the correlation of burglary rates with deprivation and housing factors (overcrowding, and high levels of (poor quality) privately rented housing), home security standards may be an important determinate of burglary vulnerability in Luton.

The street-level security survey carried out in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills broadly supported this hypothesis. Based on a detailed street by street inspection, ward maps were generated with street segments colour coded according to the combination of household security features identified. When compared with (Gi*) hotspot maps, a number of observations were apparent:

- In Wood Ridge, one hotspot micro-location principally consisted of a low-rise social housing (and former-social housing) estate; it had few obvious security features (alarms, security lighting, CCTV etc) and had multiple ungated (or gated but regularly insecure) access routes.
- In Chalk Mills a housing estate with scant security and a problematic layout (unlit alleys and stairwells, vulnerable ground floor windows, informal access routes with poor visibility), experienced persistent burglary problems (although a nearby area, with similar issues but with a reputation as a strong criminal/'gang' territory did not).
- Other hotspots in both wards principally contained Victorian terraced housing with few obvious security features and often with ungated arched passageways through to rear yards.
- An area of Wood Ridge with larger houses where alarms, security lighting and cameras were common place, saw very few offences; less well protected pockets of housing within this area suggested a 'halo effect' from better secured neighbours.
- A small area of low rise blocks had little history of burglary, despite minimal security features. This was an area described by local officers as a place with an established community and strong community spirit, which implied strong informal social control.

Although qualitative and to some extent anecdotal, these observations appear to underline the importance of access to security to understanding burglary vulnerability within Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills, however they are also suggestive of the role that social and community based factors might play in offering some protection against opportunist offenders.

Wood Ridge – access routes

Interviews with burglary victims explored experiences of living in the wards (and particularly the local 'micro-location' neighbourhoods), including crime and other concerns.[52] In Wood Ridge residents repeatedly raised the issue of the layout of paths and alleyways, car-parks and waste land, as conducive to crime, antisocial and nuisance behaviour.

> *"The way it's designed, it's like they're designing trouble into it ... because they're all little nooks and crannies where people can hide and look, and whatever ... It's a haven for antisocial behaviour".*

> *"It's easy for them to get away ... there's a lot of ways, he can shoot that way, run up, run down ... And the other thing is that they always enter through the back, from all the people that we've spoken to who've been robbed* [burgled]*. So it's*

[52] In the analytical report delivered locally, insights into potential drivers were presented at the level of micro-locations, however to avoid identifying neighbourhoods and because the differences between the wards were greater than those within them, only ward level themes are reported here.

quite easy once you've accessed the back of one of the houses to just keep jumping over the walls".

Given that burglars' accounts suggested that opportunities were often spotted in the course of routine movements around the local area, the layout of these through-routes would appear to be relevant to persistently high rates in parts of the ward.

Chalk Mills – drugs markets, problems inside blocks, disappointment with the police response

Resident victims' accounts of some of the most persistent burglary hotspots in Chalk Mills drew attention to the problems caused by local drugs markets, particularly where the individuals concerned were operating from within communal blocks of flats. Several also expressed a conspicuous lack of confidence that the police were taking the problem sufficiently seriously and, as some of the comments below illustrate, dialogue and active communication between residents and the police appeared to be limited and fraught with barriers.

"We had drug dealers living in the top flat next door ... it's like they're sort of ignored, because they're here".
Interviewer: *"The police ignore them?"*
"Well, that's how it feels. You know it's going on, but nothing ever seems to get done about it until something really big has to happen, or somebody has to make a complaint, you know".

"Because I've heard things here and there, that there's someone in the building ... that the guy is a drug dealer".
Interviewer: *"Would you ever think about telling the police about that or not?"*

"I wouldn't expect them to investigate. And suppose they do investigate and they don't find anything and they don't try, that would get me in trouble with the guy".

"I told them, I don't know how many times I've called the police because there are a lot of drug dealers on this street. They say the same, 'yes, we are watching', but in the corner, all the days, there is a Mercedes ... The police don't care about that".

These accounts fit with the concentration of problematic drug using offenders operating in Chalk Mills and re-emphasise the relevance of local drugs market on offending in the area; they also highlight the engagement challenge facing the police in working with residents, to tackle these and other local problems.

3.8 Analysis – conclusions

To recap briefly, the previous sections of this chapter have described how burglary in Luton:

- Has tended to concentrate in places that were deprived, had experienced significant population change and had high levels of privately rented accommodation.
- Persisted throughout the year, with some modest tendency to increase in winter months (especially November) – with some evidence of temporal concentration during darker winter evenings.
- (To the extent that it can be known) was carried out by offenders of three main 'types': those principally driven to offend by problematic drug use, a smaller, younger group of general 'lifestyle' offenders and a small number of older 'specialists'.

- Was generally not targeted against particular groups of victims (although the experience of being burgled could be isolating and victims could feel singled out); however due to geographic factors, it did disproportionately impact poorer socio-economic groups.
- Increasingly involved the theft of items of personal technology as well as cash and jewellery, with little known about what happened to these items after that.
- More broadly, these findings should be understood as the product of a predominantly locally resident cohort of offenders who:
  - Typically looked for opportunities within territorial ranges defined by their every-day routines, based on ease of access and avoiding attention.
  - Tended to find opportunities in places with poorer home security and (more speculatively) with weaker community ties, close to the routes that they routinely used (including to local drug markets).

Considered together, these findings suggested three broad areas in which potentially effective crime prevention interventions might be developed.

First, there appeared to be significant potential for reducing opportunities for burglary in Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge, focusing on 'micro-locations' with persistently elevated victimisation rates. In particular, scope existed to improve access to home security for residents living in these neighbourhoods. Analysis indicated that burglars tended to find opportunities to offend in parts of town with higher levels of private renting, and therefore – although we must be cautious about moving from area level to property level conclusions – a focus on improving security within the private rented sector, where, conditions of high demand and minimal regulation gave landlords little incentive to maintain standards, might prove particularly appropriate. In Wood Ridge an opportunity reduction approach might also include addressing through-routes, alleyway and the environmental design of public spaces, while in Chalk Mills measures to mitigate the impacts of the local drug market and improve confidence in police efficacy could be explored. Additionally, taken together, the findings suggested that there may be value in attending to less tangible 'community' factors, which research has shown can be protective against crime and disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). Burglary in Luton tended to concentrate in places characterised by population churn and diversity, where ties between neighbours were likely to be weak and social capital and 'collective efficacy' low [53]. Victim interviews illustrated how crime and the fear of crime could erode resilience and increase isolation, while offenders' sensitivity to natural surveillance suggested that efforts to encourage residents to engage with their neighbours, turn their attention outwards to notice those out of place and come together to achieve shared security goals, might be usefully explored.

Second, the predominantly locally confined territories of burglary offenders suggested that opportunities might exist for reducing offending by improving the management of a relatively contained cohort of offending individuals. Analysis showed that this was a mixed cohort, with a range of drivers and motivations and therefore tailored approaches would be required. Problematic drug-use was a key factor for many and

[53] 'Collective efficacy' refers to the extent to which neighbours know and trust one another and are willing to intervene (together or individually) to protect their neighbourhood from crime and related problems. It can act as a protective factor in neighbourhoods that might otherwise experience high levels of crime (Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson and Raudenbusch,1999).

offender interviews provided a reminder of the complex combinations of mental health and other needs that often underpinned persistent offending in such cases. Other offender types, however, would require a different approach; it was identified that a younger offender type with aspirations to a criminal lifestyle also included burglary within their repertoire and that there was a small group of older 'specialist' acquisitive offenders for whom 'revolving door' sentences were doing little to bring about desistance.

Third, although substantial gaps in understanding remained, scope existed to explore interventions linked to the local market for stolen goods and the criminal desirability of frequently stolen items. In particular, opportunities might exist to reduce the attractiveness of personal technology items (laptops and smart phones), which were both inherently 'locatable', and were likely to require some 'processing' within onward handling networks. The next chapter deals with the process of transforming these insights into a practical and deliverable burglary reduction plan.

4. Analysis to Action: developing problem oriented responses

Having reported and presented the analysis findings back to local practitioners and stakeholders in late 2013, attention turned to developing a practical response to burglary reduction in Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge that built on these new insights.

Although the SARA acronym might imply otherwise, problem-oriented responses do not follow automatically from analysis; instead, reflecting the experience here, they are the product of an active design process in which new local insights can be blended with the broader evidence-base and pragmatic considerations of 'what might be feasible here'. Just as importantly, once designed, problem-oriented responses do not *just happen*, strong implementation requires thorough preparation and, as in this case, some refinement of the plan may be necessary.

This section focuses on this crucial 'hinge' in the SARA process. It describes the process followed by the project team in working with local practitioners to transition from desk-based analytical insights to a practical community-based response.

4.1. Developing response options

In early February 2014 around 50 local practitioners, representing a range of functions from across Bedfordshire police, Luton Borough Council and other relevant stakeholder agencies were brought together to begin the process of developing response options.

Three workshop sessions set about exploring practitioners' reactions to the analysis findings, focusing on broad themes of place and geographic differences in vulnerability; offender typologies, offending drivers and barriers to desistance; and, the market for stolen goods. These sessions were designed to tap into the local delivery context and capture experiences of current and previous practice.

Most importantly, they also sought to generate ideas for new interventions and practice development, with delegates encouraged to voice all suggestions, including those to which significant barriers could be anticipated.

It is both reflective of practitioners' open-mindedness and perhaps a sign of frustration with their existing tools for leveraging change, that the list of options generated (summarised overleaf) included some radical as well as well-trodden solutions.

It was also clear that delegates were willing to acknowledge weaknesses in current practices and draw on promising developments in other areas of business. As well as broadening the pool of intervention ideas, as a broad-based consultation exercise, the sessions proved valuable in collectivising responsibility for later delivery.

As one of the operational leads later commented:

> *"The whole … consultation and research, development phase … the workshop in particular … I think that was a really good way* [to] *get people's buy-in, so when the point came where we're chairing* [working group] *meetings, as opposed to myself … trying to sell something to people, we were able to change that terminology, and it's actually about: you've all been involved in developing this, this is about now achieving what we have collectively said is the way that we want to go about it."*

Practitioners' ideas for practice development – key themes

Place based suggestions

- ***Improving environmental design of public space in identified hotspots.*** Ideas included alley gates for access routes, more visible CCTV and better maintenance of public trees to improve natural surveillance – all based on a detailed survey of each hotspot area.
- ***Incentivising landlords to improve security.*** This included suggestions relating to landlord accreditation and ratings systems, working with lettings agencies, providing students with an 'Approved Providers' list and educating tenants and multi-agency colleagues about private sector housing standards and enforcement powers.
- ***Better crime prevention advice for people living in hotspot areas.*** Suggestions included better publicity of an existing free home-security survey service, providing free/heavily discounted security devices (eg window locks and timer switches) and encouraging people to gate-off rear-access, lower fencing (to improve lines of sight) etc. It was felt that existing police 'cocooning' visits could be used as a 'gateway' to support and practical assistance from a range of agencies.
- ***Work to promote community efficacy/encourage natural surveillance and watchfulness.*** Measures such as Community Action Days, building up/on Neighbourhood Watch, and general community resilience programmes (with crime prevention only a part of the focus) were put forward.
- ***Multi-agency, risk-based approach to vulnerable victims/areas.*** Regular 'MARAC style' meetings (perhaps sitting under the local Partnership Delivery Board) could bring together key agencies to problem-solve high risk issues and ensure better communication and tasking.
- ***Patrolling and increasing guardianship of hotspots by improving cocooning programmes.*** Those involved in delivery suggested that existing cocooning procedures could be tightened, literature improved and other agencies brought into the process. Combining this with high-visibility patrols was also suggested.

Offender based suggestions

- ***Residential drug rehabilitation (orders).*** Delegates reflected on a small cohort of entrenched problematic drug using offenders who needed more radical (and expensive) interventions. Physical removal from exploitative associates and dealers to 'break the cycle' was advocated.
- ***Prescribing heroin.*** More radical still, some participants were aware of positive outcomes from prescription trials and felt this might be effective with a small number of persistent offenders.
- ***Improving rehousing/resettlement support for offenders leaving prison.*** Luton's housing pressures were felt to be particularly acute for those leaving prison. Knowledge about 'ways through the system' could be better shared among support agencies. 'Through the gates' resettlement support was seen to be patchy and could be improved and systematised.
- ***Better coordination of drug, alcohol and mental health services for offenders with multiple needs.*** Some participants reflected that substance misuse could sometimes prove a barrier to accessing mental-health treatment (and vice versa); improving multi-agency case coordination was advocated.
- ***Increased use of restorative justice.*** Conditional cautions and restorative justice conferences were suggested as mechanisms to promote effective and tailored responses to offending.
- ***Custody 'triage' for young adults.*** Positive experiences of youth custody triage led to suggestions that equivalent mechanisms to divert young adults from graduating to more protracted criminal careers could be developed.

Stolen goods market suggestions

- ***Increasing proactive intelligence gathering around handlers of stolen goods.*** Gaps in working-knowledge around the onward sale of stolen goods were acknowledged and intelligence building as a means to inform a Market Reduction Approach (Sutton, 1998) was put forward.
- ***Making better use of tracking technology to investigate and deter theft of laptops and mobile phones.*** Responding to the increased targeting of personal technology items, it was suggested that more systematic use could be made of built-in tracking technologies to deter, detect and recover. Opportunities to engage with key groups (such as students) around prevention were also noted.

4.2. Checking the mechanism, being pragmatic and building on the evidence

In practice, designing a burglary reduction response that drew on both analytical insights and practitioners' ideas for change involved a number of interlinked processes. Although SARA emphasises 'problem-orientation' – that is identifying plausible mechanisms that respond to the particular characteristics of the problem (Tilley and Laycock, 2002) – on reflection, it proved just as important to be pragmatically-oriented and evidence-oriented. These three facets of the design process are described briefly below.

Checking the mechanism

Several of the intervention options put forward by practitioners were ruled out on the basis that they were not sufficiently 'problem-oriented'; in other words, when scrutinised, a convincing mechanism that addressed the local problem (as described by analysis) could not be clearly identified. Young adult triage, for example, was ruled out on this basis. Although discussed enthusiastically by practitioners, a direct and convincing path from providing a broader range of options to deal with young adults arrested for minor offences to (specifically) reducing burglary was difficult to establish. A clear route from improving knowledge of the stolen goods market to burglary reduction was also felt to be questionable, although this option was not ruled out completely at this stage.

Being pragmatic

It is worth stressing that identifying response options also involved a heavy dose of pragmatism; several of the options put forward by practitioners were clearly unfeasible given cost and political constraints (heroin prescription and residential drug rehabilitation being two obvious examples) and the feasibility of others, given the organisational context of the time, was also in question. At the start of 2014 for example, local probation and Integrated Offender Management functions were in the midst of large scale re-organisation with considerable uncertainty about the future; in this context it was probable that the offender-based options would be difficult to plan and implement. It is of note however that in mid-2015, with new working arrangements bedded in, local interest resurfaced in building on the offender insights from the analysis phase. Timing, it appears, is crucial.

Building on the evidence

Problem-oriented policing has been identified as a potential vehicle for institutionalising the use of research within policing (Lum et al., 2012). If this is to be realised, it is in this central programme design phase that the evidence-base, as well as local problem analysis, needs to be folded in. A systematic review of the research evidence on effective crime reduction provided a key cornerstone for this project (Karn, 2013) and distilled a number of general principles for effective crime reduction practice which strongly influenced design decisions, these included:

- Targeting high-crime 'micro-locations' in which the risks of harm are greatest.
- Focusing on problems (rather than incidents) and addressing these with a broad range of multi-agency resources.
- Involving and engaging local communities, including by using tactics that promote legitimacy and are procedurally just.

More specifically, evidence indicating the effectiveness of property-level target-hardening (Roe, 2009; Pease, 1991; Donaghy, 1999), public space modifications such as alley-gating (Bowers, et al., 2004; Haywood, et al., 2009; Armitage and Smithson, 2007) and initiatives to prevent repeat victimisation (Grove et al., 2012) also influenced the tactics proposed for responding to burglary in identified hotspots and related micro-locations.

In areas where the evidence-base was less directly applicable, other evaluated practice suggested potentially effective intervention avenues, which could also introduce elements of innovation to the programme. For example, The Oakland Beat Health Programme (Mazerolle and Roehl, 1999), which achieved reductions in drug-related disorder by focusing on physical decay and property management through multi-agency 'interaction with non-offending third parties' (including civil enforcement, training and dialogue with property managers and landlords), provided an intriguing template for improving security standards in Luton's privately rented housing stock.

Elsewhere, the body of research around 'collective efficacy' (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999), in particular evidence of a link between offenders' target choices to perceptions of community connectedness (Bottoms, 2012), provided a theoretical basis for attempting to strengthen community resilience in hotspots (although evidence on *how* to do this was less readily available).

4.3. Programme design

After weighing the considerations set out above, in late February 2014 the project team presented local leaders with a proposed model for burglary reduction in Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge that was rooted in analysis, shaped by consultation, grounded in the evidence-base and tempered by pragmatism. It consisted of a 'core programme' for reducing vulnerability and building resilience in hotspots supplemented by a number of possible additional work-streams relating to reducing reoffending and disrupting the stolen goods market, which provided the opportunity to assemble a comprehensive, multi-dimensional programme.

Figure 4.3.1 is taken from the proposal document. In it a version of the Problem Solving Triangle[54] (in red) is used to organise some of the key analytical findings (in the blue triangle); each finding has a corresponding response option – including many suggested by workshop participants (shown in the green triangle).

Although these differed in terms of the strength of the supporting evidence and several came with feasibility concerns, each option was considered a suitable candidate for further scoping and development as part of a composite programme. It was proposed that the place-based 'core' elements (shown above the dotted line) be pursued in combination, within small hotspot areas – tailored to the specific character and needs of each, and drawing on resources from a range of agencies. Supplementary offender and market-reduction options are shown below the dotted line.

The component aims and objectives of the core programme and the supplementary options are summarised below, with more details on the tactics suggested for achieving these provided in appendix 4.3.

[54] See for example Ashby and Chainey, 2012.

Figure 4.3.1: Model for burglary response in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills (proposed February 2014)



'Core programme' – objectives for identified hotspots in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills

- *Improve access to security for tenants living in privately rented accommodation.*
- *Improve access to security for low income home owners.*
- *Increase the resilience ('collective efficacy') of those residents living with limited access to security.*
- *Reduce the impact of burglary events on victims.*
- *Improve environmental design to deter and prevent burglary.*
- *Mitigate the impact of the drug market in hotspot areas.*
- *Anticipate and avert repeat and 'near-repeat' burglaries.*
- *Anticipate and avert the autumn peak in burglaries.*

Additional options

- ***Option 1:*** *Make best use of widely available tracking and location technology to deter, detect and recover stolen laptops and smart phones.*
- ***Option 2:*** *Develop intelligence and pursue proactive police operations against handlers of stolen goods.*
- ***Option 3:*** *Improve service coordination for offenders with multiple-needs.*
- ***Option 4:*** *Improve coordination of housing provision for offenders leaving prison.*
- ***Option 5:*** *Increase the use of pre-sentence restorative justice.*

4.4. Formalising, mobilising, preparing, refining

In the weeks that followed, the proposed response model was presented for consideration by local project leads, as well as at the Partnership Delivery Board (PDB – Luton's community safety delivery forum), Bedfordshire Police Performance Board and Luton's Community Safety Executive. It is worth noting at this point that although broadly supported, momentum behind the plan was slow to accumulate; 'sign-off' and decision making around the additional work-streams took several months to finalise and nominations for individuals to take forward work-streams were slow to materialise. The reasons for this, in terms of the delivery context into which the initiative fell in 2014/15, are explored in detail in the following chapter. For now, it is important to record that, from the project team's perspective, the ambition to hand over a response plan for local delivery (while the Police Foundation team focused on monitoring, development and evaluation) was quickly reappraised. It became increasingly clear that hands-on support and considerable persistence would be required to avoid abrupt implementation failure.

In light of this realisation the project team set about turning the proposal into a concrete set of 'Initial Actions' for operationalising the core programme (see Appendix 4.4, which includes a diagram used to map the core programme objectives to work-streams and actions). In April 2014, working with appointed operational project leads from Bedfordshire police and Luton Borough Council (individuals without whom the initiative would not have got off the ground), work began to identify the individuals needed to take the action plan forward, as part of a project working-group that would continue to meet throughout the implementation year (with operational governance provided by the PDB). In response to a positive first meeting convened in early May (and more patchily attended follow-ups in June and July) progress was made on:

- Finalising the hotspot areas to be targeted (based on updated crime mapping, consultation and on the ground 'sense-checking');
- Developing a Home Security Assessment (HSA) process, which would act as a gateway to support for residents in making security improvements, through a number of channels;
- Developing a single-sheet letter for hotspot residents advertising the HSA service and providing crime prevention advice;
- Developing and delivering a training package to equip multi-agency staff to carry out HSAs;
- Planning a street-survey programme in which multi-agency teams would visit hotspot areas, identify 'at risk' properties, deliver HSA letters, advise residents and identify environmental issues;
- Identifying administrative resources and processes to coordinate activity;
- Devising processes for property-level record keeping to help keep track of actions arising from street-surveys and HSAs, and to enable evaluation.

Working group members later reflected positively on the experience of contributing to this process; when surveyed, 10 out of 11 respondents agreed that different agencies worked well together during the process, and nine out of 11 said they felt their contribution was valued, however views on meeting

attendance were less positive and turning positive engagement into action was often challenging, as comments from group members (when interviewed later) acknowledge.

> *"It's fairly easy to agree what we need to do, it's getting the people to actually go out and do it. That's the hard bit."*

> *"People, from day one, are, 'yes, great', but then when you get to trying to make it happen, the enthusiasm has, kind of, waned."*

Even for more senior working-group members, securing small amounts of resource and input from other teams or agencies often required significant effort and careful negotiation. Teams called on to assist were frequently under-staffed and carrying vacancies, roles changed frequently and even committed group members constantly had to make prioritisation decisions about whether they could attend meetings and how much time they could contribute. As a result, much of the activity described above principally fell to Police Foundation project staff.

Other notable developments in the preparation phase included bringing Luton's Home Improvement Agency (HIA) on board. The HIA's remit enabled them to offer basic home security improvements to any resident in receipt of benefits and not housed in social housing – including those living in the private rented sector, given appropriate agreement from landlords. They agreed to take referrals arising from HSAs, as did Luton Borough Council (LBC) housing department for those in social housing. LBC's Community Development team were also engaged to progress the 'community efficacy' strand of the project and initial conversations began about techniques for bringing neighbours together in places without strong existing ties.

After some negotiation, the relevant police team agreed to provide a cocooning response, in line with their existing 'gold-standard', within the project hotspot areas (this entailed visits to burgled properties and neighbours within 72 hours of a crime report) – but little enthusiasm was forthcoming for making more general process improvements.

Less encouragingly, little progress was made on identifying options for leveraging home security improvements within the private rented sector more strategically[55], and developing a 'problem solving hub' to address intelligence and crime driver issues relating to particular hotspots was deferred until later in the project.

By the end of July 2014 the working-group had developed and agreed a 'Statement of Intent' for what became known (adopting local community safety branding) as the soLUTiONs Burglary Reduction Initiative (BRI), for delivery in the year commencing August 2014 (included overleaf). Although there are clear connecting strands back to the analysis and initial intervention proposals, the statement reflects how some elements were abandoned or de-emphasised in the crucible of realistic action-planning. There is no mention, for example, of responding to the local drugs market or reducing the impact on victims, and no mention of leveraging change in the private rented housing sector (other than through individual cases taken up by the HIA). Likewise, the 'collective efficacy' strand, along with tracking technology and offenders with multiple needs options (chosen from the list of additional work-streams in May 2015) remained under-developed on the initiative launch date.

[55] The structural context for this is explored in the project companion paper *Safe as Houses?* (Higgins and Jarman, 2015).

soLUTiONS Burglary Reduction Initiative – Statement of Intent (August 2014)

The initiative will run for one year (from August 2014 to July 2015), during which time a number of activities will be undertaken:

- Police and partner agencies will provide burglary prevention advice and offer Home Security Assessments (HSAs) to residents living in the identified hotspots. This will be achieved using a combination of face-to-face contact and bespoke literature.
  - In the first instance, households considered particularly vulnerable will be targeted; this will include repeat burglary victims, partner referrals and properties identified as visibly vulnerable during a street survey.
  - Advice and HSAs will subsequently be offered to all households in the hotspot areas – a phased approach may be considered appropriate
- A Project Administration point will be established (within the police) to handle all HSA appointments, process referrals, coordinate work and record activity at a household level.
- In appropriate cases, residents found to be in need of home security improvements will be referred to Council Housing and/or The Home Improvement Agency, to assess eligibility for grants or assistance and provide these where appropriate.
- Where security improvement needs are identified in privately rented properties, referrals will be made to the Home Improvement Agency who will work with landlords, using the available incentives and levers, to make the required changes.
- In cases where grants are not available and where home owners require extra support in making the necessary changes, a fairly priced 'handyman' services will be made available to home owners. This will be administered through the Council Housing department of Luton Borough Council.
- By the end of 2014 a 'virtual' multi-agency 'Problem Solving Hub' will be established to:
  - Expedite any security improvement requirements experiencing on-going delays or barriers.
  - Ensure any community intelligence or particular 'driver' issues in hotspots are identified and dealt with appropriately.
  - Liaise with the appropriate council department regarding public space modifications (eg lighting, alley gating etc) required to reduce the risk of burglary in hotspots.
- 'Gold-level' cocooning, including crime prevention visits to burglary victims and their neighbours within 72 hours of a burglary, will be delivered in the hotspots areas, through the police crime reduction team.
- Activities to increase 'community efficacy' will be developed and undertaken in a number of the hotspot areas in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills.
- Measures to improve the deterrent effect and investigative value of tracking technology in relation to stolen items of personal technology will continue to be developed.
- Measures to improve the coordination of services for known burglary offenders with complex needs will continue to be developed.
- A communications strategy to promote the BRI and unify its different aspects in the minds of residents will be jointly developed by the communications teams at Luton Borough Council and the police.

The description of the challenges experienced in moving from an analytically informed programme design to a deliverable action plan, provided in this section, should not be taken as a criticism of local practitioners or agencies – a number of key individuals dedicated considerable amounts of time, effort, skill and resource to this project (in this phase and later) based on a strong commitment to its rationale and potential benefits. Rather, these difficulties should be seen as a reflection of the highly challenging operating conditions in which practitioners in Luton found themselves during 2014 and 2015. These are explored in the next section and provide insights into some of the pre-requisites for effective crime reduction activity, within this rapidly changing organisational context.

5. Response: implementing locally tailored solutions

This chapter deals with the implementation phase of the soLUTiONs Burglary Reduction Initiative (BRI), which ran from August 2014 to July 2015 and includes the findings of a process evaluation conducted by the Police Foundation team throughout the period.

After setting out the process evaluation methodology (Section 5.1), the chapter provides a chronological summary of delivery efforts over the period that amount to a story of constant implementation struggle (Section 5.2). This builds a programme narrative in which a number of hard-won achievements (a systematic programme of engagement with residents delivered in vulnerable areas, a number of households supported to better secure their homes, a new community group brought together) are set against areas of planned activity where little or no progress was made (no real 'problem solving hub' was established, little enthusiasm or capacity was identified to take forward the tracking technology or offender service coordination strands, no resources were identified for environmental improvements and the community resilience work began late and was limited to one ward). It also highlights the extent to which the BRI's effectiveness was limited by constant resourcing challenges, difficulties in coordinating activity across agencies and, perhaps most unexpectedly, by an underwhelming response from local residents.

The latter part of the chapter (Section 5.3), sets out to locate these challenges in the broader context of service delivery in Luton in 2014/15 drawing on the candid interview responses of local practitioners, supplemented with other evidence collected during the process evaluation.

As previously stressed, no criticism of local services is implied by laying bare these implementation shortfalls – that is not the purpose of this research project, nor is it deserved. Within the constraints of a shrinking resource base and a shifting set of priorities, local agencies fulfilled their commitment to support and resource the project's response phase as best they could. At the operational level, key individuals gave the project considerable time and support, while others were ready to help out when called upon. Instead, the purpose of this chapter is to understand the dependencies for effective crime reduction practice and to point to the factors that had undermined that bedrock in Luton in 2014/15.

5.1 Process evaluation – data collection

The BRI was subject to a continuous process evaluation throughout the implementation year, with data collected via a number of channels.

Participant observation

BRI delivery was supported throughout the period by a Police Foundation Project Development Officer who took on a dual role as an embedded, reflective researcher. As will become clear, the Development Officer's role in hands-on project management became more involved and extensive than had been envisaged, however this central position ensured that they were well placed to monitor progress, understand local dynamics, and examine the enablers and dependencies of effective delivery. The officer's field-diary entries, along with documentary material collected along the way, provide an invaluable resource for understanding the implementation process in its context. In addition, the Police Foundation project team attended and observed street-survey visits, Wood Ridge community group

meetings, and project working-group, Community Safety Partnership governance and delivery meetings throughout the year.

Practitioner interviews

A total of 17 semi-structured research interviews were conducted with local practitioners involved in the BRI in various capacities, in three waves throughout the implementation year.[56] Interviewees included staff in a range of departments, teams, ranks and roles, including senior strategic leads and those involved in the hands-on delivery of street-surveys and HSAs. In total, eight respondents from Bedfordshire police (officers and staff) were interviewed, eight worked in various functions within Luton Borough Council and one worked for another organisation. Interviews covered both the specific experiences of working on the BRI as well as the broader context of service provision in Luton. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and content analysed to identify key themes, similarities and differences in respondents' accounts.

Direct quotations from respondents are included within the text in italics, with occasional amendments made for sense or to ensure anonymity. Where it is necessary for understanding, and where it does not compromise anonymity, respondents are identified as either 'police' (denoting officers, PCSOs and police staff) or 'LBC (Luton Borough Council)' (covering a broad range of local authority functions).

Practitioner survey

In-depth interviews were supplemented by an online survey of the wider group of practitioners involved in BRI delivery, conducted during late November 2014 (after the first four months of the BRI). A total of 56 individuals who had attended working group meetings, been trained to administer HSAs, taken part in the street-survey programme or been involved in another capacity were invited to take part, with 23 completed responses received. A follow-up survey in July 2015 received only six responses, (reflecting the reduction of active engagement with the BRI by this stage) which was not considered sufficient for inclusion in this assessment.

HSA call-backs

In April 2015 the research team conducted short telephone interviews with residents who had received a HSA to gain feedback on the process and gauge progress with on-going referrals. Four (from the possible 13) HSA recipients were available for interview.

> ***Action research***
>
> Process evaluation data was collected throughout the year both to capture the development of the BRI and so that emerging findings (along with reviews of output and outcome data) could be fed back to local leads at key points, enabling them to review progress and refine delivery. Interim findings reports were prepared for review meetings in December 2014 and May 2015 (the *Conclusions and Next Steps* section from both reports are included as Appendix 5.1).

5.2. The BRI implementation year

August / September 2014

Building on the preparatory work conducted in the summer, the BRI began with a programme of hotspot

[56] November 2014 (6 interviews), April 2015 (5 interviews) and July 2015 (6 interviews).

'street-surveys' designed to assess burglary vulnerability at a household level, as a basis for focused 'target hardening' efforts. Although it took some persistence to pull together resources to staff the survey teams (exacerbated by holiday season timing), by mid-September each of the nine BRI hotspot areas had received a joint visit from local police (PCSOs), Luton Borough Council staff and colleagues from Bedfordshire Fire and Rescue Service (who provided a valuable resource throughout, having identified a geographic overlap with their own priority areas). The teams were tasked with:

- Carrying out an external visual inspection of every residential property in the hotspots for signs of vulnerability to burglary.
- Knocking on the door of any property with obvious security flaws, attempting to engage residents in conversations about home security and offering a free Home Security Assessment (HSA), which interested residents could arrange by telephone for a later date.
  - If residents were not at home a letter offering the survey and providing general crime prevention advice was left.
- Identifying any 'public-space' environmental risk factors (street-lighting, over-grown foliage, access routes and alley-ways etc) for remedial attention.
- Keeping records of vulnerable properties for future follow-up.

This resulted in more than 500 'vulnerable' properties being identified – around 12 per cent of all (4,360) dwellings in the hotspots – with issues ranging from the easily rectified (open doors and windows) to those requiring significant repairs (broken doors, damaged fences and ungated side alleys). The level of vulnerability surprised some staff – particularly with regard to rented properties:

> *"I did talk to one guy, and I mean his door, I swear I could have just pushed it open anyway, whether it was locked or whether it wasn't. And he said, 'well you know I don't want to lose my house, I don't want to be awkward with the landlord'."*

The response on the door-step was generally polite, but non-committal, although one PCSO did experience a less guarded reception, which hinted at deeper engagement issues faced in these locations.

> *"I remember I did one … I stuck it [a leaflet] through the letterbox, and the gentleman opened the door, looked at it and lobbed it straight back out, into the middle of the road."*

A modest list of public-place issues, with varying relevance to burglary vulnerability was also identified, passed to Luton Borough Council Environmental Services and reported as dealt with within a matter of weeks. This included insecure alley-gates, over-grown foliage and fly-tipped waste, the latter at the request of Bedfordshire Fire and Rescue Service.

Staff who took part in the street-surveys generally reported positively on the exercise. Despite some minor issues with paper-work and occasional difficulties accessing blocks through locked communal doors, the process was felt to have run smoothly and participants reported that they enjoyed meeting and working in a different way with those from other organisations. In response to questions in the practitioner survey, 12 out of 15 participating staff (80 per cent) agreed that the street-surveys were worthwhile as part of a plan to reduce burglary.

Bedfordshire's Bobby Van [57] scheme agreed to take referrals for home security upgrades for older residents and provided 200 PCC funded timer switches for distribution to those requesting HSAs.

October / November 2014

Working-group members were surprised and disappointed that the take-up rate to the offer of Home Security Assessments made during the street-surveys was very low. In the preparation phase, concerns were raised about the capacity of the agencies to deal with the expected influx of requests, yet in response to more than 500 leaflets and numerous face to face contacts, only five residents called the BRI phone line to request the service.

Keen to maximise the return on efforts already expended, attention turned to follow-up communications. In late October a more visually arresting 'while you were out' card (see Appendix 5.2), that could be tailored to particular security flaws, was produced and delivered to all identified 'vulnerable' properties. With only five further HSA requests received in response, the decision was taken to extend the HSA offer to all homes in the hotspot areas; however a further leaflet drop and promotion at a community event in Wood Ridge in November resulted in only seven additional requests.

While it is clear that the initial street surveys were seen as a multi-agency team effort by staff, these follow-up tasks principally fell to local Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), which clearly caused some consternation and reflected broader delivery pressures, as these comments from the survey illustrate:

> *"It is a common issue that these projects are launched with everyone on board and committed but it's the local community officer* [PCSO] *that gets left with all of the work without any support at all".*
>
> *"I think the crime reduction team should be on the ground taking the lead in any future work of this kind. Obviously LPT* [Local Policing Team] *should be involved but not just left to sort it all out".*

Additional volunteers from Victim Support and the HIA were trained to deliver HSAs and meetings were held to progress the community resilience/collective efficacy project strand, although little progress was made at developing the principles into feasible activities (the problems experienced in developing a response to this strand are discussed towards the end of Section 5.3).

December 2014

In December it became clear that the tasking processes put in place to allocate, arrange and progress HSA requests – and for the onward referral of appropriate cases to the Home Improvement Agency and Council Housing department – were not functioning well. Although fewer than 20 HSA requests had been received, only about half had been completed and, where these resulted in onward referrals, action was slow to follow. Although the right communications were generally being sent out from the central administrator, a lack of scrutiny meant that BRI tasks were being overlooked among busy, more 'time-critical' work-loads, and clarity on progress was being obscured by non-responses to emails and non-attendance at meetings. The allocation of hotspot burglaries for a 'gold' cocooning response was also found to be erratic. In short, with the busy operational leads unable to follow-up and scrutinise actions at a granular level, coordinating a process that required action compliance across a number of agencies and departments, was proving difficult to manage.

[57] The Bedfordshire Bobby Van scheme provides help with home security to vulnerable and elderly residents. It is run on a charitable basis by Bedfordshire Police Partnership Trust http://bedspolicepartnership.org/.

December also saw the first formal progress review meeting in which – equipped with the findings of the first wave of process evaluation (and some early and tentatively encouraging outcome figures) – the Police Foundation team met with key leads to discuss progress and feed back emerging insights. A set of 'next steps' for the coming phase of the intervention year were put forward and broadly supported, these included:

- Persisting with target hardening activity by:
  - Improving 'hands on' management of delivery (in response to the concerns raised above).
  - Broadening communication channels with hotspot residents.
- Developing the 'collective efficacy' strand of the project, which had been discussed in working groups and meetings but had resulted in no firm action, particularly in the light of a growing sense that the low response rates may be linked to disengagement between residents and the police and other agencies in these locations.
- Developing a 'problem solving' function within the project to identify and bring resources to bear on particular local crime driver issues.

(See Appendix 5.1 for the full set of 'next steps' proposed in December 2014.)

The tracking technology and offender services co-ordination options were formally dropped as it had not been possible to push these forward.

January / February 2015

The New Year began with a set of staffing changes that amounted to a serious set-back for the project. A combination of promotion, redeployment and sickness saw the police strategic lead for the project replaced, project administrative duties split-up and handed over to new staff and, most crucially, the project lost its police operational lead – the driving force behind much of the progress made during early months – with no replacement formalised for a number of weeks. As a result, the project stagnated to a large degree in early 2015; working-group meetings (as well as Partnership Delivery Board meetings) were cancelled due to poor attendee availability and Police Foundation staff were unable to leverage progress on the 'next steps' discussed with the (now largely replaced) project leads in December. In February, a meeting between the Police Foundation team and senior officers reaffirmed the police commitment to the project and identified personnel to take over operational responsibility. Although concerns about staff capacity and problems pulling a functioning working-group together persisted, new processes were agreed for monitoring progress on outstanding HSA requests and referral actions, with weekly update requests to be sent out by email, and blockages addressed at monthly meetings.

Discussions also began about a new round of leafleting to promote the HSA service, this time incentivised with a prize draw. Overall it was clear that much of the BRI's previous impetus had been lost and that a premature end to the initiative was a real possibility.

March 2015

March was spent attempting to re-energise the BRI. Progress concerns were discussed at a (sparsely attended) Partnership Delivery Board and at the Community Safety Executive. A request for an emergency meeting to address the risk of project failure

was agreed by police and local authority strategic leads, but could not be scheduled before mid-April.

It became clear during March that burglary was likely to receive less strategic attention in Luton in the future, as CSP priorities for the new administrative year were formalised. The challenge of identifying resources to take the project forward persisted, with the extra attrition of sickness, training courses and peak leave periods regularly thinning teams down to skeleton cover.

April 2015

Although postponed due to poor (Easter period) availability, a working-group meeting was convened in early April and arrangements made for a new round of hotspot visits. Staff resources were secured for visits in late April and May, with the Foundation's Development Officer taking on the bulk of the administrative, briefing and project management work. This time, PCSOs along with Bedfordshire Fire and Rescue Service and Luton Borough Council staff visited vulnerable properties in the hotspot areas during the evenings (to maximise the possibility of face to face contact with residents) while police cadets delivered leaflets and crime prevention material to other addresses.

The emergency meeting resulted in a commitment from the Luton Borough Council Community Development Team to support and develop the community resilience/'collective efficacy' strand of the project during the remaining months, although priority and staffing changes meant that beyond this, Luton Borough Council's commitment would be limited. The police also committed to confirm an operational lead and support the remainder of the project.

May 2015

The evening hotspot visits were completed in May with those involved reporting a relatively good 'hit-rate' in terms of doorstep engagement. Again however, only a small number of additional HSA requests were forthcoming.

Work continued to expedite outstanding tasks arising from referrals to the Home Improvement Agency and the Council Housing Department, spurred in part by feedback from the call-backs conducted by the Police Foundation team. Due to resourcing issues, the HIA scaled back their commitment to the project (to sending a single enquiry letter to landlords and following up only in the event of a response), although closer collaboration through the working group did result in some police input (on security standards) to the HIA's review of its guidelines for landlords.

LBC Community Development staff succeeded in convening a group of Wood Ridge residents to begin the process of building a forum for developing community-based solutions to local neighbourhood problems. During a positive first session, discussions covered a broad set of neighbourhood issues (rather than being tightly focused on burglary), with the intention of seeding a mechanism for bringing together and empowering local people, while providing communication channels to local police and council departments. Although largely attended by 'active' community members, the group agreed broad aims of encouraging 'neighbourliness' and encouraging involvement from those with English as a second language, new arrivals, and those in short-term accommodation. The community development officer and an attending police officer took away short lists of actions and further meetings were scheduled.

Following a further round of research interviews, the Foundation team met with local project leads to reflect on the delivery challenges in the middle part of the implementation year, and discuss realistic expectations for the final months.[58] A number of matters including nominating individuals to continue to oversee and administer the HSA process and offering the HSA service more widely across Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills were left with leads for consideration. The Luton Borough Council project lead was also changed, for the second time in the delivery year.

June / July 2015

Without a response to decisions outstanding from the May review meeting, progress in the final working-group meetings was limited to tying up loose ends, in terms of outstanding HSA requests and actions from onward referrals, with further progress curtailed by the transition to a new policing model, the peak summer leave period (again) and inevitable project wind-down.

More positively, the second meeting of the Wood Ridge neighbourhood group was held and some progress made on a number of local issues; for instance, a meeting was arranged between residents, and Luton Borough Council environmental and traffic services to discuss concerns about speeding in a particular location. It was decided that the group would continue as a sub-group of a wider neighbourhood forum with the Luton Borough Council Community Development Officer, having brought the group together, taking a step back. It was confirmed that no resource was available to begin an equivalent process in Chalk Mills.

BRI implementation challenges

A number of recurring themes are apparent from the implementation narrative set out above:

- Identifying resources to take on BRI work was a constant challenge. Throughout the year, plans were fragile and could easily be derailed by staff sickness, peak holiday periods, agency reorganisations or last minute abstraction.
- Encouraging staff to take ownership of elements of the programme, to project manage and make independent decisions (as opposed to just completing tasks) was particularly difficult.
- Maintaining project momentum was a constant battle – without constant reinforcement the BRI work became drowned out in the cacophony of competing priority areas and short-term demands.
- With notable exceptions, securing interest, commitment and resource from individuals and teams within the local authority was particularly difficult.
- The local systems for setting, completing and reporting back on tasks – within, but particularly across agencies – often faltered.
- There were difficulties in conveying the relevance of community resilience/collective efficacy element of the project to practitioners and delays in turning theory in to practice.
- The response from residents in the hotspot areas to engagement attempts by the police and other agencies was generally reticent and disinterested.

This set of factors amounted to a highly challenging implementation process and ultimately presented a substantial barrier to *effectiveness*.

[58] See appendix 5.1 for the *Conclusions and Next Steps* discussed at the May review meeting.

Given the extent of these challenges it is not surprising (as described in detail in Chapter 6) that the activities delivered as part of the BRI, were found to have had no identifiable impact on burglary within the target areas. The remainder of this chapter explores the context for these difficult implementation conditions, drawing heavily on the accounts of those who work within them on a daily basis.

5.3 The delivery context

As will become clear, the landscape into which the BRI landed in 2014/15 was significantly shaped by currents of austerity and 'mission change' that were starting to become evident in 2011, and that have continued to affect policing and public service provision much more widely ever since. Understanding the particular ways these have played out in Luton, benefits from a brief review of the recent history of policing approaches in the town. The following narrative draws on the accounts of individuals who were well placed to observe these developments and their consequences; it is inevitably a partial and simplistic account, yet it helps add context to a number of the factors that impacted on BRI delivery.

At the inception of the *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project in 2011, the Bedfordshire Police Executive were pursuing a strategy heavily oriented towards achieving detection targets and volume crime reduction. While some success was achieved in the former, the emphasis on 'catch and convict' did not result in equivalent falls in crime, as these police officers recalled:

> *"Reduction of acquisitive crime was the main driver of the force. We'd solved detecting it and we wanted to reduce it".*

> *"As a force culturally, we were still embroiled with some of that serious acquisitive crime, what I would consider to be the traditional types of crime that we have historically always focused and concentrated on".*

It was in an attempt to find alternative solutions to the volume crime reduction challenge that the *Police Effectiveness* project was embraced (particularly by the police leadership of the day) and directed towards burglary – a decision which in hindsight (though not at the time) has been called into question by others:

> *"I remember the deep feeling of disappointment when I heard that it* [burglary] *had been set* [as the focus of the project] *... It was a problem they* [the police] *couldn't bottom out".* (LBC)

> *"It* [the project] *wanted an owner in the local area and the Community Safety Partnership ... took ownership but I think quite a lot of the work around priorities had been discussed with Bedfordshire Police in advance of that".* (LBC)

As the Police Foundation team set about developing an understanding of the local burglary problem, the police executive began to experience mounting criticism for maintaining a volume crime focus while issues of risk and vulnerability began to rise up the local and national agenda. At the same time the force's response to funding cuts and a challenging demand picture was to reconfigure policing functions around a more centralised and response-oriented model.

> "[The] *response to austerity involved sucking back officers from their community teams and the neighbourhood teams. We* [had previously] *built up quite a strong neighbourhood policing model with neighbourhood officers working in*

sergeant led teams alongside PCSOs in all the main areas of the force and under [the then Chief Constable] *we sucked all that back to deal with core policing functions of responding to and investigating crime".* (Police)

"I'd point to history and I'd say that the project was initiated at a time just when the Council and the police were going off in different directions, because the police were being absolutely driven by the budget reduction and so they withdrew ... and the Council were still exploring preventative work". (LBC)

This decision was (reportedly) taken with minimum consultation with local partners, and resulted in some tension, but was one that the police, we were told, were able to initially defended on efficiency grounds while crime levels fell in line with national trends.

From May 2013, following a change in Chief Constable, issues of risk and harm (including counter terrorism, gang violence and gun crime, domestic abuse and child sexual exploitation) increasingly came to be reflected in the local policing agenda and were accompanied by a change in style to embrace a more integrated, partnership-focused approach (the redrafting of the force mission statement from *'Fighting crime, protecting the public'*, to *'Protecting People and Fighting Crime, Together'* is telling in both regards).

Some decentralisation of leadership did then occur, along with a small migration of PCs – badged as Neighbourhood Specialist Officers – back to (nominal) community policing roles. However, funding constraints and demand pressures – including a substantial dip in response-time performance in 2013/14 [59] – provided little scope for reversing the structural changes made under the previous leadership [60].

Luton community safety delivery context 2014/15

At the start of the BRI implementation period in summer 2014, the local operational picture was therefore characterised by:

- Keenly felt **demand and service pressure** across the police and other local agencies.
- A **changing priority picture** in which issues of risk and vulnerability were increasingly dominating the police and community safety agenda, and to some extent squeezing out acquisitive crime.
- A policing model strongly **aligned to deliver reactive** (response and investigation) **rather than proactive policing**.
- A policing model which had, for some time, had **minimal neighbourhood presence** and few resources for consistent community engagement.
- A local **partnership dynamic** that was rebuilding after a period of some discord and retrenchment.

Each of these factors and their combined implication for the BRI (specifically) and *effectiveness* (more generally) is explored below.

Demand and service pressure

"At the moment we're still struggling to meet demand in this town". (Police)

[59] From 77 per cent within an hour in 2010/11 to 58 per cent in 2013/14 (BBC, 2014).

[60] Although a new policing model has since been introduced, with a greater emphasis on community policing.

Figure 5.3.1: To what extent do you feel that the response to crime and related social problems in Luton has been impacted by recent changes in funding? *November 2014 (2 from 23 respondents 'did not know')*



This blunt admission from a senior police officer in 2015 reflects the view of every practitioner interviewed in Luton. Across agencies, staff were working under the pressure of an intense and highly diverse demand profile, for which the available resources were felt to be limited and diminishing. It is a pressure that was felt acutely and often personally, as these quotations from police officers and staff illustrate:

> *"It is sheer competing demands, spinning plates, every single hour or every day that you're at work".*
>
> *"Absolutely everything comes at you. And it was quite a shock, actually, just how busy and how demanding it* [working in Luton] *is".*
>
> *"It does tire people out because they're trying to manage considerable risk without probably the resources and support that we* [would] *get in a bigger force".*

Frustrations about the consequences of these conditions for service delivery were also frequently expressed:

> *"*[There is] *a service gap, that is one we just have to accept is there, because there's just not enough of us to go round".*
>
> *"We haven't got the labour force, and things become dissolved and diluted, and then you don't get the result that you hoped for".*
>
> *"I don't think partners at the moment feel like they're fully functioning ... the question isn't 'what am I going to do this week?' It's 'what am I not going to do this week?' That's not sustainable".*

The degree to which austerity was felt to have impacted on policing and community safety delivery is evident from responses to the practitioner survey, with all but one of 21 respondents agreeing that crime reduction efforts had been impacted by recent funding changes (to at least some extent), with more than half stating that this was the case to a great extent.

The impact of resource pressures and high demand on service delivery played out through a myriad of mechanisms, accumulating to a sense that 'everything is more difficult than it used to be'. To give three examples:

- Teams operating at minimum strength were increasingly vulnerable to sickness or abstraction. One police officer described a period in early 2015 in which several key personnel were absent – and

during which the BRI stagnated significantly as a result – as, *"Very much a time where we just clung on"*.

- Every resourcing decision required additional negotiation and persuasion:

  "It just can be a little bit more difficult to get to the right person and get the resources released ... it's actually [about] *making our case stack up in terms of why the resources should be* [made available]*".* (LBC)

- One practitioner described how the multiplication of roles that each individual had to cover – each with its own set of meetings and commitments – had created a situation in which non-attendance had become inevitable and *'culturally acceptable'*.

Respondents also reflected that the *process* of contraction and reorganisation had exacerbated the raw impact of cuts.

"We were relying on colleagues ... who were not attending the meetings, [but] *back at their base, they were going through a massive restructure. All their jobs were changing, and yet they were hanging on to this thread of their old job through this piece of work".* (LBC)

"In the context of massive cuts to public sector funding, [we have] *very much developed a culture whereby when any post becomes vacant, there is a strong likelihood that the post wouldn't be recruited to ... So I think we've been very stretched ... our Community Safety function as a council is very small, anyway ... we've been reducing in size, but we've also never been at full capacity".* (LBC)

Respondents, particularly those speaking towards the end of the BRI year, were candid about the cumulative impact these factors had had on the BRI – often also expressing some frustration and professional disappointment that more could not be achieved;

"[I] *don't think there was an official decision ... but on a day to day basis decisions were constantly made that would've undermined the effectiveness of the project and ... putting those small decisions collectively together, it was always going to be difficult. They would've had a big impact on the effectiveness of the project".* (Police)

"I think the overriding response is a level of frustration that ... we weren't able to do more. That we couldn't find a way to do more ... And I don't think among anybody there was a sense that this isn't something that we want to do, I think it is just that recognition that we haven't been able to do it now". (LBC)

"If I'm honest, I'm disappointed at where we are now in terms of what we've been able to achieve, but there was also a sense that priorities of people that were involved had changed significantly from when the project was first developed, and the focus of the police and ourselves had moved considerably in relation to other areas ... and our resources had just been decimated." (LBC)

As this last quotation illustrates, while resourcing issues provide a significant part of the context for the BRI's implementation difficulties, they do not tell the whole story. At both the national and local level, the project period coincided with a marked – and perhaps unprecedented – shift in the type of crime and community safety issues that the police and other agencies have treated as most urgent and important, with issues of risk and harm increasingly prioritised over more 'traditional' concerns for acquisitive, volume

crime. In this context, local commitment to a burglary reduction programme was inevitably hard to sustain.

The changing priority picture

> *"Four years is a long time in which to run a project. I mean, you look at police priorities now; modern day slavery, CSE* [child sexual exploitation]*. I'm not saying they didn't exist four years ago, but they weren't really on the radar, were they? And, you know, it feels like the world has changed so much".* (LBC)

Across Luton's agencies, senior staff were acutely aware of the criticism that their organisations could expect in the event of significant harm arising from apparent service failure. This was described as resulting from a perceived general intensification of scrutiny around public protection issues, the fall-out from high profile cases elsewhere, and a sense that Luton's 'profile' has meant that it has received (unfairly) close attention. The resulting mind-set, which one respondent described as a *"paralysing fear"*, has a substantial bearing on decisions about what does, and therefore what does not, get formally prioritised and operationally done. It also places an extra, and often frustrating, emphasis on demonstrating and evidencing prioritisation over actually delivering on it.

> *"Every local authority in the country, I think, is terrified of being the next Rotherham or Rochdale or Oxford, so they're all desperate to do something to make sure ... we'll be desperate to safeguard children, but now we have to* ***demonstrate*** *that we're safeguarding children"*. (LBC)

> [In relation to the on-street sex trade as a community safety priority] *"I think we are always concerned that we will be the next Ipswich".* (LBC)

> *"Your actions are monitored very closely and you're challenged by the local community, by the elected members, by people from external pressure groups as well and then overlay that with the official scrutiny of the HMIC and I can understand why people feel they're under a massive amount of scrutiny ... And that does influence sometimes decisions that are made and it does influence the way we do our job".* (Police)

> *"The focus for us now is driven by what we perceive the consequence of something to be. I think it's almost infantilis*[ing] *actually,* [as] *professionals. You do what you're told you have to do ...* [We've seen] *massive cuts driven by central government,* [and] *at the same time a message that says it's all about localism and doing what you think is the right thing. But at the same time then generating a general agenda where we have to have a response to* [certain issues] *... And I think it's incredible really to think of the shift we've had in terms of our priorities in the past three years, and the extent to which that has been led externally rather than locally".* (LBC)

The result has been what one police officer described as a 'paradigm shift' in police and community safety thinking, with public protection and safeguarding concerns, involving identifying and managing 'threat, risk and harm', increasingly dominating the workload.

> *"Public protection issues, around domestic abuse, drugs, sexual exploitation, issues particular to Luton, such as counter terrorism prevention, I think it's absolutely right that we're in a position whereby we are addressing issues of vulnerability".* (Police)

For both the Community Safety Partnership (CSP) and the police (separately, at the force level), formal priority

setting follows a thorough Strategic Assessment process; however, several interviewees questioned whether, in the current climate, this exercise could be genuinely 'evidence-led'. Several suggested that, given the external agenda and limited and contingent discretionary funding, priority setting had principally become a political rather than analytic activity.

> *"The whole process of undertaking strategic assessment and setting your own priorities feels a bit of a falsehood. We went into that process … We looked at all of the data. We spoke to all of our partners …* [but it] *just feels entirely predictable, because we couldn't not have CSE as a priority because the national message is you have to make this a priority … We couldn't not have domestic violence as a priority … it almost feels that our priorities, realistically, are dictated to us in advance".* (LBC)

> *"Child Sexual Exploitation is probably an example … Is it as much a priority because we know it's going on, or is it a priority because we feel it's very important to have it as a priority to make that statement?"* (Police)

> *"The resources and the structure seem to pre-date the Strategic Assessment in the sense that, yes, there was already leads in place with plans that are already one year old in a three year cycle that seem to match up to what the strategic assessment told us was a priority … the Strategic Assessment fulfilled what we already thought was a priority".* (Police)

> *"And the absolute fear is the minute you say it's not a priority, the resource that it has around it would be lost. So you sort of fight to keep it as a priority in order to maintain the resources around it".* (LBC)

Capturing the output of these processes within formal priority frameworks had required some creativity, as while the resources that can be brought to bear are diminishing, the number of priority areas has expanded. This is reflected in the mix of 'priorities' and 'themes' presented in Luton CSP's Partnership Plan for 2014-17 (soLUTiONs Community Safety partnership, 2014) and in the 'tiers' and 'issues' used to organise 21 areas and sub-areas for focus in the Bedfordshire Police Control Strategy – under a single heading of 'Protecting People' (Bedfordshire Police and Crime Commissioner, 2015).

> *"I think ideally we would have fewer priorities; however, I think all the priorities that we've got are necessary. That's not a very useful answer but I think it's reflective of the situation".* (LBC)

> *"At the moment there are seven priorities which is amazing. It's too many. On top of those, we've got these sort of 'cross-cutting themes' which in reality, to some extent, are priorities in their own right".* (LBC)

Partly as an attempt to rationalise this proliferation, the CSP Strategic Assessment, carried out in early 2015, adopted a mode of thought which had developed among practitioners, that placed particular emphasis on selecting only priorities for which coordination across multiple agencies was considered a necessity. As one interviewee explained:

> "[Where] *the work is carried out by a particular organisation as part of the day job, it being a partnership priority didn't bring any value because actually it was something that sits quite clearly within* [that organisation's remit]*, and featuring as a CSP priority didn't really make sense when the broader range of partners didn't bring value to that piece of work".* (LBC)

Although, in the main, individual agency priorities are seen to be well aligned around shared concerns for harm and vulnerability, this condition clearly opens up the possibility of individual agencies pursuing different priorities in terms of the crime types and community safety issues to which they direct most resource and attention. During the BRI intervention year, burglary fell squarely into this inter-agency consensus gap (discussed further in the *Partnership realignment* section). In April 2015, citing evidence of falling incidence rates and in light of other more urgent problems, the Community Safety Partnership adopted the Strategic Assessment recommendation that burglary should be dropped as a formal priority, agreeing that it *"does not require a sustained partnership priority response in order to tackle it effectively"*, a decision that one respondent suggested owed more to organisational risk aversion than community concern.

> [Priority areas are those where] *"We could get it wrong. There'll be a big story. Whereas other issues, that are of concern and are significant ... particularly in terms of the community, which is burglary ... When we did all of our consultations, without exception it was burglary and serious violence that were the concerns for the public".* (LBC)

Meanwhile, for the police, burglary was retained as a 'tier two' priority, which meant – in the words of three different police officers:

> *"It's not to say that it doesn't remain a priority for us, but when we are making those hard decisions, as to ranking the prominence of various crime types, then it doesn't feature as highly as it once did".*

> *"*[It is] *within the control strategy, but, you know, down the bottom part".*

> *"It has changed. It is not a priority, and it's come well down now on the bottom. It is a priority but not like terror attacks, ... Child Sexual Exploitation, etc. So it has come down. And as I say, it's not a priority of the police anymore. But it's still your* [The BRI project's] *priority, so that's where the balance is different".*

As the officer quoted last suggests, the removal of burglary from the CSP priority set, and its relegation within the police Control Strategy during 2015 (and indeed the 'pre-formalisation' drift to these positions), had considerable implications for securing sustained interest and resources to deliver the BRI – particularly from outside of the police (and Bedfordshire Fire and Rescue Service).

> *"One of the issues for this project overall is that when you started tackling long-term burglary and burglary hotspots* [it] *was everyone's priority but actually over the course of the project that's reduced down and it's still there as an issue that we need to tackle, but actually it's not flagging in one of our top priorities".* (LBC)

Just as important for understanding the delivery context are the 'ground level' implications of priority flux for practitioners, who increasingly have to make individual decisions about how they use their scarce time and resource. In general terms, aside from those issues requiring an urgent response, some uncertainty was noted in deciding what was most important on a day to day basis. One respondent described *"feeling guilty* [about] *the things you make time for"* and of the 11 working group members who completed the practitioner survey, four agreed with the statement 'time and effort spent on the BRI would be best spent elsewhere', four disagreed and three reported 'mixed views'. This

Figure 5.3.2: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: Time and effort spent on the BRI would be best spent elsewhere? *November 2014 (asked of 11 respondents who had attended working group meetings)*



suggests that even among those most closely involved in BRI delivery, there was no consensus on whether the initiative was sufficiently aligned with current priorities.

Finally, there are also questions about how well (particularly police) systems and processes that had been developed to manage one type of priority have adapted to the new paradigm. Compare for instance, the contrasting description of police daily meetings below, the second and third of which, suggest a degree of systems inertia, which perhaps explain how the BRI managed to make any headway at all given the formal de-prioritisation of burglary by the CSP.

> *"When I think about what we discuss at our daily management meeting ... we will talk about issues of significant risk of harm to the town, a bunch of things we need to manage, so sometimes levels of crime are not that much of a concern in terms of threat, harm and risk".*

> *"Even though it's* [burglary is] *low down* [in the control strategy] *... all they seem to talk about in the morning meetings is burglaries."*

> *"Obviously the ... Control Strategy's changed. But I wouldn't say that's necessarily massively changed the way that the ...* [police] *teams are working. We are obviously very aware of the Control Strategy ... but ... we haven't suddenly dropped anything. We're still doing what we're doing, but being very aware of the exploitation and the counter terrorism. I mean, that was already there for us, really".*

A reactive policing model

> *"Years ago we had the resources where people could be proactive, and they would go out looking for burglars. They would go out looking for robbers ... And that doesn't happen now because we're so reactive. We're so driven by what's going on on the* [police] *radio".*

As previously noted, at the time of the BRI delivery, the police in Luton were working to a model which, in the face of funding cuts, had been reset to focus on 'basic' reactive capabilities.

> *"There was definitely a focus, in terms of when somebody picks up the phone, what is our core purpose? Our core purpose is that, when somebody needs us in an emergency, we're in a position of being able to go and respond to it. When a crime has happened that we've got the ability to be able to investigate it effectively".*
> ***Interviewer:*** *"Do you know what the driver was for that change?"*
> *"Austerity".*

Unsurprisingly, this had impacted negatively on capacity to deliver proactive crime-reduction work, for example:

- Local analytical support was scarce, had to be bid for and was predominantly focused on tactical, short-term intelligence.
- The Crime Reduction Team had been reduced in size and been given a tightly prescribed coordination rather than 'front-line' role.
- Neighbourhood/community policing teams had been stripped back to a skeleton head-count, almost exclusively made up of PCSOs.

One implication of this response focus, in the context of high demand, was that even the small amount of resource (nominally) allocated to community-based, proactive work, regularly became tied up in dealing with 'today's issues'.

> *"It does feel like we are … robbing Peter to pay Paul. You know, we have a daily management meeting where we actually decide what our priorities are for the day. Very often that is the STORM* [the tasking system] *summary of the outstanding jobs, and very often the neighbourhood officers will be volunteered to help, because we just haven't got resources".*
>
> *"PCSOs were not designed to be a stand alone role;* [they] *have now ended up drifting along without a clear mandate. Operational demands and acute shortages on Section* [in police response teams] *have resulted in the PCSOs being used as a spare resource. Even with the introduction of NSOs* [Neighbourhood Specialist Officers (PCs)] *they are simply used for executing warrants and vice duties".* (Survey response)

This was particularly acute given the sheer volume and range of events, incidents and issues to which police in Luton are called on to provide 'exceptional' responses – both directly and indirectly, in terms of reassurance and community liaison. In the course of the BRI year these events included (but were not limited to):

- Marches by the English Defence League (November 2014) and Britain First (June 2015).
- The death in police custody of Istiak Yusuf in June 2015.
- On-going issues following to the death in custody of Leon Briggs in November 2013 including in relation to the memorial outside of Luton police station.
- The trial (and acquittal) in November 2014 of two police officers accused of assaulting an autistic man in Luton in February 2014, and associated community protests.

- The death of three year old Mayah Shazad in a traffic accident in August 2014 and subsequent criticism of the way this was handled by police and local council.
- A number of terrorism related arrests, enquiries and trials including the arrest of two men by Metropolitan Police counter terrorism officers in December 2015.
- The disappearance of a family of 12 from Luton in June 2015, believed to have travelled to Syria.
- Local reassurance responses to international events including terrorist incidents in Sydney (December 2014), Paris ('Charlie Hebdo' attacks, January 2015) and Copenhagen (February 2015).

"We went through a series of critical incidents ... A lot of our time was spent then managing the fallout from those". (Police)

"So you had, over the time that you've been doing this there's been some pretty critical incidents going on which have all impacted on the trust in the police but some of the issues we were dealing with were also about what can the council do". (LBC)

It is unsurprising therefore that only limited police resources were available to work on the BRI, or indeed on any other proactive crime reduction work during the period, and that the pre-planned activity that did take place tended to be limited to short-duration, enforcement work (such as 'crack-house' closures and executing warrants at suspected brothels).

"[The BRI is] *... for the police ... resource and time intensive. It's taken a lot of time. We don't have many PCSOs ... you say you only want four? Well, there are only four some days, so it's been intensive that way".*

"We're not at the moment doing anything to reduce crime long term. We're doing an operation [relating to the on street sex trade]*, and that's long-term. We're doing operations ... for the drugs, which is meant to be long-term ... But around burglaries or robberies, vehicle crime, we don't, no".*

A response-oriented policing model not only limited proactive capability in terms of resource availability, it also promoted short-term mind-sets and working habits and had resulted in a deficit in the skills and systems required to plan and deliver a sustained programme of discretionary work;

"We're probably quite good at quick-time, but it's when it's slow-time I just wonder if it goes off the radar and gets forgotten".

Several police respondents noted that communication channels (in relation to the BRI and more generally) were not always clear, requests had not 'filtered down', and that to 'get things done' the Police Foundation would have benefited from getting 'closer to the ground' rather than relying on internal tasking and coordination processes to initiate work. It was also acknowledged that the project relied heavily on the Foundation to provide a project management resource and that within the force, that expertise was generally confined to headquarters business improvement functions (or bought in from consultants), and not available to aid operational delivery.

"I don't think it would have happened as effectively or as efficiently as it has... it's just all

coming back to those competing demands … if it wasn't for [the Police Foundation Project Development Officer] *this would have drifted, without a doubt".*

"In terms of analytical skills and problem solving, project management skills, those people will be probably already consumed in continuous improvement or intelligence or something".

In summary, some of the implementation challenges encountered in the BRI relate to a policing model firmly set on a responsive footing. This was not simply a matter of a deficit in proactive resources, but also in the capabilities and systems required to deliver coordinated, strategic work with a longer-term focus. While it is tempting to see this 'pull to the urgent' as an inevitable consequence of demand and austerity, this is not a view shared by all of the police's local partners;

"I think the criticism that I've generally heard in relation to the police as an organisation, is that they're … too responsive. A situation will happen and they'll deal with that situation. And they do that very well. But that doesn't lend itself as well to long-term strategic planning and sort of maintaining objectives". (LBC)

"Part of having a firm hand on the tiller is to say, 'right, you know, yes, we've got a fire to fight now but if we don't [focus on prevention] *… we're going to have ten fires to fight if we don't keep our five per cent resource alive and focused on* [prevention]*', you know, and that's just good management, isn't it?"* (LBC)

Although it came too late to assist the BRI, it should be acknowledged that in the latter part of the year, a new policing model, with a stronger community and proactive emphasis was devised and began to be rolled out. At the time of the final interviews, the question of whether these arrangements would free-up sufficient resource to begin addressing some of the drivers of crime and demand in Luton, rather than just responding to it, was very much a live issue.

"What we want to do … is … shift resources back into more of a community focused, problem-oriented approach to reducing crime and demand … we've moved too much into the … geography of the county, and actually we need to understand what's happening within our local communities … by having that regular contact with recognisable cops".

"it's having that courage for saying well, we have to put some resources into problem solving … into long-term demand reduction, … the plan is that we will have the resources and they will focus on demand reduction, they will focus on problem-solving, but the way we're implementing the model at the moment, my fear is that when we get these extra resources they will be swallowed up because we are adding layer upon layer of extra responsibility around investigation".

"They say [the new model is] *going to be community* [focused]*, but I think it's going to be engulfed in Section work* [non-emergency response and investigation]*, and that will include everything else … in my opinion, it's clumping us all together".* ***Interviewer:*** *"And the danger of that is?" "There will be no community work done".*

The withdrawal from communities

"In the past, when we've had … a dedicated local police officer and a dedicated team in an area,

they've established a working relationship. But then something happens and then that team is dissolved, and away we go, and then six months later we're back in a neighbourhood saying, 'hello, this is us, can we work with you?' People become resistant because there is no continuity". (Police)

Both police and local authority respondents suggested that a policing model focused on response and investigation had limited not only proactivity, but also the capacity of the police to engage with local communities, gather intelligence and – crucially for the BRI – to involve local people in efforts to reduce crime. While the police and other agencies had invested heavily in community cohesion work (promoting harmonious relations between, and countering extremism within, Luton's diverse communities) the withdrawal of a consistent, community-focused local policing presence was seen by many to have had a negative impact on trust and cooperation between the police and local people.

"[Previously] *we could deal with a lot of community issues. So, we'd break down barriers by going into schools, seeing the kids, speaking with the parents, doing school talks all the time, literally just doing general patrol whilst on foot, getting to know the area. Now – no time for it at all. It's a lot of: 'do this, do that', you haven't got time to go into schools ... We're losing touch with the community".*

"I knew exactly what was going on. Who the 'bad boys' were, so to speak, and where they lived and what was going on, what times they'd be somewhere. ... But it's quite hard, now, to gauge what's going on".

"When I first started, in my opinion ... [it] *was better. You had your dedicated teams, they got to know their communities and they got things done. Now, we are just response police, and there are just not enough hours in the day for the work that's coming in".*

Several interviewees made a direct connection between the police pull-back, coupled with a broader disappointment with police services, and the low take up of BRI Home Security Assessments.

"The community are disheartened by what they see as a lack of response by police. They get told to phone 101 for non-urgent items and then get held on the line for long periods of time. The demise of Neighbourhood Teams has not been helpful ... people no longer seem to know their PCSOs so the relationships that were developed have been a complete waste of time. If there is some consistency in Neighbourhood Teams people would have more confidence". (Survey response)

"You're trying to re-engage with people that you've disappointed, and that's the way the circle keeps going". (Police)

"Sometimes it's probably down to the police force. I've had occasions where I've turned up and they're like, 'oh, I'm surprised someone's turned up', because the night they've called the burglary in, it's probably taken an officer two or three hours to get there". (Police)

It was also emphasised that some Luton residents, particularly those living in some of the BRI hotspot locations, posed a significant challenge in terms of engagement and were often characterised as transient, insular and reticent by (mostly police) respondents – however it was also noted that this could conceal significant need and vulnerability.

"There's no community. It's very hard to get and establish a working relationship ... people pigeon hole themselves and the problem is you don't have time to get out there properly ... create a relationship that you can build on".

"Luton is very funny, no one wants to interact, everyone is resistant".

"Nobody wants [the police] *seeing how many people live in there, it's probably illegal. So they're not going to be honest to a copper are they, seriously? And nor are they going to be honest with the housing representative. But there needs to be loads more checking. Because people are living in terrible, terrible situations and the landlords are getting away with it because there's a huge demand".*

"I would say they're concerned about crime, but it's very much a case of: keep my head down and hope it doesn't happen to me".

There was a general acknowledgement from the police that more needed to be done to re-establish stronger ties with local communities. Significantly, this had been brought home by the challenges faced in dealing with the community reaction to several recent critical incidents; the experience of the BRI emphasises the additional importance of strong neighbourhood engagement for effective crime reduction delivery.

"People hadn't seen police officers. They had no real relationship with police officers. For instance they didn't have a local beat officer who they may say, 'well we don't trust the police, but we trust you because we see you'. We didn't have that footprint in those communities. People didn't see police officers very often ... the individual officer reputation we realised carries an awful lot of weight in managing concerns in small communities".

Partnership realignment

"As the cuts kicked in police and partners strip[ped] back to basics ... there was a sort of draw-back from some of what we used to do, but I really think we've come a long way to getting back to that good, sort of, healthy partnership working again".

As previously suggested, historically and at the strategic level, the police and local authority in Luton have not always seen eye to eye, and the community safety agenda, past and present, can be seen as a product of the shifting power dynamic within the partnership.

"I don't get the sense that they [the police] *are allowed to dominate it* [The Community Safety Partnership] *... And I don't think historically that was necessarily as true. I think they had much greater influence".* (LBC)

"Some might say they [the local authority] *realise they could get their claws back into the police service and what we can deliver for them ... I think they see themselves as the senior public servants".* (Police)

Respondents from both agencies suggested that part of this dynamic relates to the seemingly continual churn of local police leadership which has both interrupted working relationships and limited the police influence.

"Engagement with the police and this constant churn of individuals [is a challenge] *in terms of who you're working with, how you work with them, building up those on-going relationships, moving towards delivery.* [Change] *has been more or less constant".* (LBC)

"Our staff turnover has been massive in Luton ... about three Division Commanders to deal with ... numerous people at Chief Inspector level and two changes in structure ... so very much, they've [senior local authority staff have] *got their feet under the table. They actually know how it works and nobody here has been here long enough in the police service to actually start to become an influence".* (Police)

There was also agreement that the current dynamic rests on a moderately functional working-tension, but that this in turn creates space for divisions to emerge and persist, both in terms of the alignment of objectives and between planning and delivery.

"I think there are some areas where there are key differences between our partnership plan and the police priorities. And I think sometimes that's levelled as a criticism of this kind of lack of join up. But actually ... geographically speaking, the police have a wider area and a very specific remit in terms of what their organisation is there to deliver. As a partnership, we've got a smaller geographical remit, but actually I think a wider role in terms of what we need to deliver. And I think it's inevitable that there are going to be differences ... I think, if you had plans that were just consistently absolutely identical, then actually what that to me would demonstrate was that you've got one partner within the partnership who has too much influence and too much control". (LBC)

"They [the local authority/Community Safety Partnership] *have got a plan, but it almost seems, like a lot of partnerships I've worked on, it's a matter of just actually satisfying the plan, completing the actions. So linking that plan to any real tangible outcomes doesn't generally have ... there's not really a strong link".* (Police)

The persistence of these distances between agencies provides some context to the inability, or lack of motivation, of local partnership governance structures to push through delivery of a more comprehensive BRI programme, despite repeated statements of support – or, alternately to decisively cancel the initiative as no longer an appropriate use of resources.

At the operational level, multi-agency working in Luton is less highly charged and generally viewed in a positive light locally. 21 out of 23 survey respondents (91 per cent) thought 'agencies, organisations and teams work together to tackle crime, disorder and related social problems in Luton' either 'very' or 'fairly well', and more than two thirds felt agencies were at least fairly good at 'innovating, identifying emerging problems, understanding the causes of crime and prioritising'. Integrated offender management, antisocial behaviour and community cohesion were identified as discreet areas of particularly strong collaboration, and more than half of survey respondents thought multi-agency working had improved recently in Luton.

"I think there are good relationships there, I mean, particularly because when I started [relationships weren't as good] *so it's completely changed. People didn't know each other at partnership meetings, people didn't know what information other people had, people didn't know what people were doing".* (LBC)

However, it is clear that given current resource conditions, delivering sustained, coordinated community safety activity is a challenge and had resulted in a degree of retrenchment at the operational level:

"We had people from the council working in with us, one or two. And that was really good because that was always a point of contact. And they knew everything. And then the council cut back on their personnel, and then we were brought back into the station". (Police)

"It is getting harder now because there aren't so many resources around, and I suppose the different areas of the partnership are focused on what they need to focus on and their core business". (LBC)

"I would say we have become a bit more siloed with certainly a lot of the meetings with partners that we would have had, or we'd have created even, we just don't resource anymore … We know it's happening but are just powerless at this point to stop it". (LBC)

Under these conditions the functionality of the Partnership Delivery Board (PDB) (the main coordination mechanism for multi-agency delivery around priority areas), was recognised as a persistent issue.

"Tasking is difficult and .. we've tried to move Partnership Delivery Board so there is a bit more task focus in getting stuff done but we're part way through that process … a lot of priorities means it's difficult for it to deliver and that's kind of the balance we've got to get". (LBC)

"I think it hasn't worked quite well … It wasn't focused on delivery. It wasn't a delivery board. And I think it took quite some time and effort to focus it on actually identifying appropriate leads for the priorities and looking at going forward, the Partnership Delivery Board actually having some value within the CSP. So I don't think we can disguise the fact it hasn't been working". (LBC)

The BRI's attempts to work through, and in the same conditions as, the PDB reflect many of the same tasking and coordination frustrations. Both experienced difficulties in securing good meeting attendance, in delegating ownership for tasks and work-streams and, as one respondent reflected, in reconciling different organisational tasking cultures. Whereas the police (and the fire service) operate a direct and hierarchical command structure, coordinating activity with and across local authority functions required a different type of approach.

"What struck me as a local authority; we are almost a series of different organisations, with divides between teams … And although we can sort of bring people together, and have those conversations, actually we've got very little mandate to sort of instruct things to happen. So from a local authority perspective, even in terms of what we would want our staff to be doing to support this project, we have to be quite persuasive about it". (LBC)

In summary, while there was a general willingness to work together in Luton, the systems and processes to enable this had been undermined by austerity, and attempts to rebuild limited by the distance between partners at the strategic level, caused by divergent geographic remits, priorities and historic tensions.

Building community resilience

"I think one of the things [responding to austerity] *is about is providing people with the ability to deal with things themselves".*

The idea of building community resilience or 'collective efficacy' as a defence against burglary (specifically) and social harms (more broadly) grew in resonance

with local practitioners throughout the year. Respondents suggested that early hesitancy in the uptake of this strand may have been due to difficulties in communicating the more abstract concepts, translating these into practical activity and an initial inclination from some to 'pull evidence from what's already happening' (ie to insist that equivalent work was already going on). However, particularly as concerns about hidden, unmet need and the disconnect between local agencies and some parts of the community grew, understanding and interest developed – as did some frustration at the lack of progress.

"It's about understanding how persistent we need to be, and how we need to look at different approaches to influence individuals that live within those areas to take responsibility, to try and develop a sense of community, to own and deal with some of the issues that are going on there".

"I'll be very frank about it, right from the off we were saying, 'well, we need to look on this, if it's a long-term project, from a community perspective ...' So, it is rather odd that we reached the end of a four-year project and we're only just now implementing some community efficacy [work] *... it reflects the lack of clarity and strategic thinking around, you know, what it is that a community partnership could or should be doing".*

"It's quite difficult to build, in terms of the likes of Neighbourhood Watch, difficult to get people engaged, because in terms of that community efficacy, and I have to say, that's why it's really frustrating for me that we're not getting the traction in terms of implementation ... because I can still really see the benefits".

Much of the context for these delays has already been covered; resources and skills within Luton Borough Council's Community Development function were scarce and in high demand, police community resources were minimal, burglary and the BRI were not of sufficiently high priority and tasking processes were not resilient enough to mandate speedier activity. However there were also disjunctions between the requirements of the work programme proposed here and the prevailing orthodoxy of community engagement work in the town, which added an extra barrier. At the core of the local community development programme is the objective of helping local communities to achieve their goals through schemes like participatory budgeting and neighbourhood governance programmes. Particularly given the focus on community cohesion and with a democratic ethos, activity tends to focus on empowering established (though by no means well resourced) community groups, to influence what gets done and in which areas. Conversely the BRI set out with an aspiration to build community ties between disconnected individuals, in pre-defined places, where they did not previously exist, in order to deliver socially valuable outcomes. As one respondent realised;

"That is the difficulty because actually our efforts are concerted around those communities who already have enough of a sense of being a community to engage, or warrant or make demands. And that's where we respond to ... But your issue here is what do you do with those communities that aren't a community as such? That are actually disparate people who live together ... Keep their heads down, get on with it, move in, move out, move on, but are just as important ... are residents of Luton, just as much as any

member of any other community who has got that voice and has got that sort of identifiable status".

The disjunction between these approaches presented a barrier that was only eventually overcome by an individual practitioner recognising the value of the work and securing a limited amount of resource to kick start a community group in Wood Ridge;

"I can see it's proper community development work, it's what I do, it's what I've always done, and because you can see a difference happening and people's pride coming up and, you know, new people are linking in and want to join the group".

The failure of the BRI to initiate equivalent work in Chalk Mills during the year was attributed by some to a more disjointed and less well established community base in that part of town, but by others simply to the lack of a suitably skilled and motivated individual to take the work forward.

5.4 Response and implementation – conclusions

Section 5.2 told the inside story of efforts to implement the soLUTiONs Burglary Reduction Initiative in Luton during 2014/15. It documents the way in which an analytically informed crime reduction plan – that had already been scaled back in the preparation phase – was further diminished in the execution. Compared with its original ambition the BRI's outputs were disappointing to many of those involved, although these should not be dismissed entirely and included several hard-won achievements, including:

- A set of 'street-survey' inspection visits carried out by multi-agency teams in hotspot areas.
- A year-long programme of targeted communications with those judged to be at greatest risk of burglary victimisation.
- Individual target hardening assistance (through Home Security Assessments and onward referrals where applicable) provided to the small number of households that requested assistance.
- A neighbourhood improvement group established in Wood Ridge, dedicated to enabling local people to make practical changes in their area and improving community connectedness.

As previously described however, much else was left on the page and even these achievements were hampered by constant resourcing and coordination struggles and were undermined by an unexpectedly stony public reception.

Reflecting on this narrative, with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to identify opportunities that were missed and things that could have been done differently, both by the Police Foundation team and by local partners. It is difficult to escape the conclusion however, that the conditions in which the BRI was delivered (described in section 5.3) were highly significant to the outcome and amounted to an inhospitable environment for effective crime reduction practice to take hold. As such, this chapter reveals much about the prerequisites of police effectiveness, and provides a reminder of what must be protected as the building blocks of local policing and community safety infrastructure are rearranged in response to 'the changing world'. These dependencies are discussed in detail in Chapter 7; in summary, if the police are to take an active role in improving the conditions in the areas they oversee, in ways that make crime and

other social harms less likely to occur (in other words, if they are to be *effective*), then a number of fundamentals need to be in place. They need:

- The resources with which to do proactive work.
- Appropriate mechanisms for prioritising the issues to tackle.
- Proactive capability, including resources, mind-sets, skills and processes.
- An underlying bedrock of community engagement and connection to those living in the places they police.
- Productive working relationships and effective processes for coordinating work with other agencies who seek to bring about improvements in the same places.

6. Impact assessment: analysing effectiveness

This chapter presents the methods and findings of an impact assessment undertaken to investigate the effect of the BRI on burglary levels in the hotspot target areas. This is a thorough assessment employing a number of different techniques and as such, this is a detailed – and in places technical – chapter. Readers more interested in the findings than the process of assessing impact may wish to skip to the chapter conclusions summarised in Section 6.13.

6.1. SARA assessment and evidence-based policing

Assessment is widely acknowledged to be the phase of SARA completed least often and least adequately (Weisburd et al., 2008; College of Policing, no date), yet it can hold the key to transforming a limited, static police response into a dynamic process of continuous, evidence-based improvement. Too often, if completed at all, assessments or 'results analyses' tend to be based on *general* performance data that rarely allow observed outcome changes to be attributed to the *specific* activities undertaken, and provide little scope for ruling out competing explanations of change.

At the other end of the spectrum, the growing demand that policing should be 'evidence-based' has led to increased interest in evaluated crime reduction trials that draw their rigour from the upper tiers of the Maryland Scale, which emphasises multiple-unit comparisons and, in particular, randomisation (Sherman et al., 1998)[61]. While the value of embedding strong scientific principles within policing is beyond dispute, it is perhaps surprising how little this focus on the highest standards of evidence offers the real-world practitioner seeking to understand the effects of a local problem-oriented response. There are two main reasons for this, form and scale.

First, real world policing problems rarely arrive in problem-solvers' in-trays in a form that is easily divisible into multiple units. Although a problem might occasionally be presented in terms of reducing reoffending or improving victim satisfaction (for example) in which case cohorts or samples made up of *multiple* subjects can be formed, 'treated' and compared against suitable control groups, much more often – as in this case – the core aim of proactive police work is to bring down a type of crime in a *single* (or small number of) designated geographic area(s). In most cases the response will effectively be a one-case trial of a tailored treatment, meaning that more powerful evaluative designs (at Maryland levels four and five) are unavailable.

Second, both where multiple-unit options are available (see the equivalent section of our Slough site report) and in examples like this where they are not, scale presents a challenge to real-world assessment. A number of factors, including a tendency to focus on more 'serious' but lower volume crime types (such as burglary), limited resources, the desire for speedy results, general downward crime trends, and the sound logic of focusing on specific problems in small 'micro-locations' (Braga et al., 2012) mean that the analyst tasked with assessment will often need to search for evidence of impact within relatively small sets of incident data. This inevitably brings challenges in terms of distinguishing impact from natural variance and from more general long-term trends, particularly when mining the data to examine specific subsets. In short, the appropriate scale for the initiative, in its real-world context, is often sub-optimal for the evaluator.

Given these challenges there is understandable debate about how assessment should be undertaken,

[61] Sherman et al. (1998) developed a five-point scale to grade the methodological rigour of studies of impact.

and the standard of evidence to which SARA practitioners should aspire, when evaluating effectiveness (Clarke, 1997). Our approach to these assessment challenges follows three principles.

The first principle is to make use of control or comparison sites. The ideal here is to establish a counterfactual; a strong estimate of what would have happened in the absence of the intervention. Without multiple units, and therefore opportunities to randomise, a well-matched control or comparison site, observed over the same period as the intervention, is generally considered to be of greater value in ruling out alternative explanations of change than relying on simple pre-to-post comparisons (including within the Maryland Scale). Use of an appropriate comparator group or site was also the key criteria used by Weisburd et al. (2008) to select studies for inclusion in their meta-assessment of the effectiveness of problem-oriented policing and, as such, represents a pragmatic benchmark for good (SARA) assessment. The rationale for selecting suitable comparison sites for assessment in this case is discussed in Section 6.9.

The second principle is to be highly specific, both about the mechanisms through which interventions might be expected to bring about impact, and about the patterns of outcome that would be expected if those mechanisms had been activated. Particularly for smaller scale interventions where outcome datasets are modest, the most convincing indications of impact can often be found in the fine grained 'data-signatures' left by the intervention design, rather than in more general measures of crime reduction. For example, in Section 6.5 we examine the outcome data at a dwelling-specific level to explore whether dwellings that received the most intensive and targeted attention demonstrated different patterns of victimisation.

Third, this attention to identifying programme 'footprints' or 'outcome patterns' is a key characteristic of the 'realist' approach to evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 2004) which is of particular relevance to carrying out assessments within a SARA model, and which informs the approach taken here. In particular, the realist approach emphasises the importance of examining how mechanisms of change operate in specific contexts and of exploring sociological factors, both in relation to how interventions are delivered and then how they are received. The realist approach also encourages the use of multiple information types to 'make sense' of situated intervention outcomes and to add nuance to the theories of change on which they are based. As such, and resonating with the functional role of assessment within the SARA cycle, realist evaluation is less interested in questions of 'what works' and more with developing insights into what might work better, for particular groups of people, in particular circumstances.

Based on these principles, this section explores local crime data to identify and examine the impact of soLUTiONs Burglary Reduction Initiative (BRI) activity on burglary, while being mindful of the substantial implementation challenges described in Chapter 5. In addition to assessing impact it has two broader purposes. First, as part of a situated SARA cycle, it attempts to secure insights that might usefully inform future local crime reduction efforts. Second, within the context of the *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project, it seeks to highlight some of the broader challenges for delivering a locally-tailored, evidence-based policing response, at a time of organisational and societal change.

6.2. Credible mechanisms

As previously described, the implementation of the Burglary Reduction Initiative (BRI) was severely compromised by a number of contextual challenges. It is therefore important to be realistic about the mechanisms through which the activity undertaken might be expected to have impacted on burglary within the targeted areas.

As reported, take-up of the Home Security Assessment (HSA) offer by hotspot residents was very limited, with few verifiable security improvements made at those properties assessed. Public-space alterations were also minimal and activity within the 'collective efficacy' strand of the programme was restricted to one ward and began too late in the project year to have credibly led to any impact on burglary.

Despite these setbacks, residents living in the hotspots did receive a number of communications that provided home security advice and crime prevention reminders in different formats. Much of this advice was targeted at properties that were ostensibly at greater risk; some of it was delivered face to face and some was tailored to particular vulnerabilities at the household level. Against a baseline of low public engagement it is conceivable that – even though very few residents were motivated to take up the HSA offer – these communications and interactions did lead to basic behavioural changes from residents that reduced opportunities for burglary within the targeted areas. It is this mechanism that we principally set-out to test in this section.

6.3. Assessment data

The impact of the BRI has been assessed through analysis of a dataset of point-level burglary data extracted from the Bedfordshire Police crime recording system (under the terms of the project's data sharing agreement).[62] The geo-coded dataset included details of all recorded burglary offences occurring within the whole of Luton during the initiative period (August 2014 to July 2015) and during the previous nine years (from August 2005 onwards). Records included all offences classified as Burglary in a Dwelling or Attempted Burglary in a Dwelling (this excludes break-ins at commercial premises and out-buildings).

In addition, a geo-coded Ordnance Survey data file, containing all residential addresses in Luton, was made available to the project by Luton Borough Council (under licence and under the terms of the data sharing agreement). This represented the best available data on residential dwellings in the town, as of March 2014.

Using these data files it has been possible to calculate annual burglary counts and rates (expressed here per 1,000 dwellings) for various aggregate geographies, including wards, Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) and the designated hotspot target areas.[63] For comparability and because no historic data was available, the 2014 dwellings data has been used to calculate rates for all time periods, with no attempt made to adjust for changes in the number and distribution of dwellings over time. By matching the two datasets it has also been possible to produce counts and rates for subsets of dwellings within the target areas, categorised by the level and type of communication received.

6.4. Change in burglary rates

85 burglary offences occurred within the nine BRI target areas (combined) during the initiative year

[62] Point-level geo-coded data includes the exact geographic coordinates of (in this case) burgled properties. It allows the data to be analysed using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) such as MapInfo (which was used in this instance).

[63] The data presented in this section is the product of exploratory searches of police crime recording systems for the purpose of evaluating the BRI; it should not be considered official crime data. Crime statistics for police forces and

Figure 6.4.1: Burglary rate per 1,000 dwellings in BRI target areas, the rest of Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills, and the rest of Luton (2005/06 to 2014/15)



(August 2014 to July 2015), at a rate of 19.5 crimes per 1,000 dwellings. As illustrated in figure 6.4.1, this was exactly the same number (and therefore rate) as recorded during the previous 12 months, with both years markedly below the ten-year average, but above the threshold required to establish a statistically significant difference at the conventional 95 per cent confidence level.

The headline finding therefore is that the BRI did not accompany a reduction in burglary offences within its target areas; however there are two other

neighbourhoods can be found at www.police.uk and for local authority areas, within the crime section of http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/index.html.

Figure 6.4.2: Change in burglary rate 2013/14 to 2013/15 by ward, and with BRI target areas split out [64]

Rank	Ward	Change in rate per 1,000 dwellings (2013/14 to 2014/15)
1 (greatest reduction)	O	-5.3
2	I	-5.0
3	N	-4.0
4	L	-3.5
5	Wood Ridge	-1.2
6	D	0.2
7	P	1.2
8	J	1.4
9	Q	1.7
10	G	2.3
11	A	2.6
12	F	2.7
13	C	2.9
14	B	3.5
15	E	3.7
16	Chalk Mills	5.4
17	K	6.1
18	M	6.5
19 (greatest increase)	H	6.8

Rank	Ward	Change in rate per 1,000 dwellings (2013/14 to 2014/15)
1 (greatest reduction)	O	-5.3
2	I	-5.0
3	Wood Ridge (BRI target area)	-4.7
4	N	-4.0
5	L	-3.5
6	D	0.2
7	Wood Ridge (non-target area)	1.1
8	P	1.2
9	J	1.4
10	Q	1.7
11	G	2.3
12	A	2.6
13	F	2.7
14	C	2.9
15	Chalk Mills (BRI target area)	3.0
16	B	3.5
17	E	3.7
18	K	6.1
19	M	6.5
20	Chalk Mills (non-target area)	6.5
21 (greatest increase)	H	6.8

observations apparent from figure 6.4.1, which warrant further attention.

First, while burglary remained unchanged in the BRI target area, levels in the rest of Luton, including in the non-BRI parts of Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills wards, increased year-on-year during the initiative period. In Luton as a whole, there were 132 additional burglaries recorded in 2014/15 (measured August to July) compared to the previous year (a 10.5 per cent increase, resulting in a rate increase from 15.8 to 17.4 per 1,000 dwellings). Therefore the *share* of the town's offences accounted for by the BRI target area reduced slightly, from 6.8 per cent in 2013/14 to 6.1 per cent, during the intervention year. Within the area covered by the two (contiguous) focus wards, the proportion of offences contributed by the BRI target areas reduced from 43.8 per cent to 36.3 per cent over the same period.

Although, in the context of historic variation, these proportional changes are also non-significant (see Appendix 6.4), this does suggest the possibility that BRI activity may have had a modest protective effect in the target areas, which 'insulated' these dwellings against the increase in burglary experienced

[64] To maintain anonymity, non-target wards have randomly been assigned a letter code.

Figure 6.4.3: Burglary rate per 1,000 dwellings in BRI target area, the rest of Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills, and the rest of Luton (three-month rolling averages)



elsewhere in Luton (in line with the behaviour change mechanism outlined previously).

This possibility is further illustrated in figure 6.4.2 which shows the year-on-year change in the burglary rate in each of Luton's wards from 2013/14 to 2014/15, with the BRI target areas split out from the non-target areas of Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills in the right hand panel. It shows that the small reduction in burglary in Wood Ridge was the result of a downturn in the BRI target area while the rate in the rest of the ward went up slightly, and that although burglary went up across Chalk Mills, this was less marked in the BRI target areas.

This suggestion of a possible protective effect makes it particularly important to identify the most appropriate comparison sites for the BRI activity area, in order to provide a sound estimate of the change that would have been expected in the target areas in the absence of the intervention (see Section 6.6 onwards).

Second, figure 6.4.1 also shows that (with the exception of 2009/10) the burglary rate in the BRI target area has historically been well above that in other parts of Luton, reflecting and justifying the selection of these areas as long-term hotspots for strategic intervention. However, it is also apparent that in 2013/14 the gap narrowed and that rates have continued to converge in 2014/15. This appears to hint at changes in burglary patterns that pre-date the start of the BRI. As well as posing questions about potential changes in local drivers, this complicates efforts to detect and attribute impact. Figure 6.4.3 uses three-month rolling averages to illustrate this pattern of convergence more clearly, and shows rates in the BRI area fell into line with the rest of the town from early 2014 onwards, before the start of the one-year BRI 'active period'.

Figure 6.5.1: Summary of BRI communications activity and classification of 'priority' and 'standard' dwellings

	BRI communications received												
1. August and September 2014. Street by street visual inspection of target areas conducted during the day. Dwellings exhibiting apparent vulnerability and those identified as previous repeat victims, received an attempt at face-to-face contact and a letter providing home security advice.	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓				✓	✓	
2. October 2014. With a few exceptions all properties identified as vulnerable during the street survey received a follow-up *'while you were out'* style postcard, tailored to the particular vulnerability at the dwelling.	✓		✓	✓	✓				✓				✓
3. November 2014. With a few exceptions all properties in the target areas received a general burglary prevention leaflet. No attempt at face-to-face contact.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓
4. April and May 2015. The original list of 'vulnerable' dwellings, plus any others with obvious security flaws, received a door-knock during evening, face-to-face advice and a leaflet.		✓	✓		✓			✓					
5. April and May 2015. With few exceptions all dwellings at which face-to-face contact was not made (at 4) received a leaflet.	✓					✓			✓			✓	
Number of dwellings	**301**	**143**	**142**	**42**	**5**	**3,669**	**15**	**14**	**10**	**9**	**7**	**2**	**1**
	Priority Dwellings					**Standard Dwellings**							
Category total	**633**					**3,727**							

Priority communication
Standard communication

6.5. Investigating dwelling-level impact

The nine BRI hotspot target areas contain a total of 4,360 dwellings. During the BRI year the amount and type of communication received at these dwellings varied, principally according to whether the dwelling was considered 'vulnerable' (based on an external visual inspection or previous repeat victimisation) but also due to other factors including; acceptance or out-right rejection of the HSA offer, appearance on a local 'do not approach' list,[65] and occasional practical problems such as difficulty accessing multi-dwelling blocks. In combination, these factors meant that some dwellings (generally those considered most vulnerable) received more intense and targeted information and advice, whereas other dwellings received fewer and more generic communications. Figure 6.5.1 illustrates how property-level record keeping has been used to identify a 'priority' group of 633 dwellings that received at least two of the three tailored/face-to-face communications, as well as at least one general communication, and a residual group of 3,727 other dwellings, most of which received just two generic posted leaflets in November 2014 and April/May 2015.

If the BRI communications activity had brought about behavioural changes among residents resulting in a

[65] Intelligence checks were conducted prior to the street-surveys to identify any addresses that should be excluded due to safety concerns or for police operational reasons.

reduction in burglary vulnerability, it would be reasonable to expect that any impact on victimisation would be most marked for dwellings in the 'priority' category, compared to those receiving only 'standard' communications. This hypothesis is tested below.

By matching the address data for burgled properties with the BRI activity log (which lists all 4,360 dwellings in the hotspot areas, along with details of the communication and HSA activity delivered at each), it has been possible to calculate burglary rates for 'priority' and 'standard' dwelling sub-sets for both the BRI initiative year (2014/15) and the previous year (2013/14) [66].

Figure 6.5.2 shows that the burglary rate for the priority dwellings sub-set fell between 2013/14 and 2014/15 from 33.2 to 25.3 per 1,000 dwellings, while the rate for standard dwellings fell only slightly, from 16.9 to 15.6. It would be a mistake however to conclude that priority BRI activity can be associated with a marked reduction in burglary rate. This is because one of the criteria for selecting dwellings for priority communications was previous repeat victimisation, during a time period that included (but also extended back further than) 2013/14. In other words the selection criteria on which the priority dwellings group was identified are not fully independent of the burglary rate measure for the 2013/14 period and therefore the 2013/14 rate cannot be considered a valid basis for comparison against the 2014/15 rate, for this subset of dwellings [67].

This can be dealt with by taking those dwellings identified as previous repeat victims out of the pre-to-post comparison; this removed 66 dwellings from the priority group and 13 dwellings (for which a priority response was planned but not delivered) from the standard group. As shown in the lower half of figure 6.5.2, for the remainder of the priority group (those that received priority communications because they were identified as vulnerable based on external visible indicators) the burglary rate *increased* markedly from 15.9 per 1,000 dwellings in 2013/14 to 24.7 in 2014/15, while the rate for standard dwellings increased only slightly.

This suggests three conclusions. First, it implies that a relatively cursory external visual scan of a neighbourhood for basic indicators of vulnerability can have value in predicting which dwellings are most likely to be burgled in the near future. Second, the fact that priority dwellings were only at slightly elevated risk of burglary in the year *before* assessment, suggests that the vulnerabilities were relatively transient in nature and might for example, owe more to habits of residents (leaving doors and windows unlocked) than more permanent weaknesses. Third, while it remains impossible to estimate what would have happened to these dwellings had the BRI communications activity not taken place, it is clear that the priority communications activity was not sufficient to reduce the risk at these dwellings to the 'standard' level. Evidence of impact, via the behaviour change hypothesis (or any other mechanism), remains elusive. On a methodological note, it is worth emphasising that this level of analysis was only made possible by detailed and thorough record keeping activity and those working on the ground during the BRI should be applauded for their methodical work.

6.6. Enabling comparisons – adopting a proxy geography

Although there is good evidence to support targeting crime reduction activity in small hotspot locations

[66] Due to inconsistencies in address data it has only been possible to match 84 of the 85 burglaries recorded in 2013/14, and 74 of the 85 burglaries from 2014/15, to a specific dwelling record.

[67] This resulted from a methodological oversight during the evolving delivery process; the implications for assessment resulting from the local decision to treat repeat victims as 'priority' dwellings were not initially identified, illustrating the challenge of assessment/evaluation in a 'real world' context.

Figure 6.5.2: Number of burglaries and burglary rate per 1,000 dwellings at 'priority' and 'standard' dwellings within BRI target areas (including and excluding those assigned for 'priority' treatment due to previous repeat victimisation) 2013/14 and 2014/15

		2013/14		2014/15	
	No.of dwellings	No.of burglaries	Rate per 1,000 dwellings	No.of burglaries	Rate per 1,000 dwellings
All priority dwellings	633	21	33.2*	16	25.3
Standard dwellings	3,727	63	16.9	58	15.6
Identified 'repeat victims'	79	27	341.8	2	25.3
Other (non-repeat) priority dwellings	567	9	15.9	14	24.7
Standard dwellings	3,714	48	12.9	58	15.6
Burglaries unmatched to dwelling records		1		11	

* non-independent measure

(Braga et al., 2012), creating 'bespoke' hotspot geographies (such as the BRI target areas) can pose problems for selecting appropriate comparison sites to use in assessment. A number of evaluation studies have dealt with this by identifying multiple hotspot areas and restricting 'treatment' to a subset, either at random or based on a 'matched pairs' design (Braga et al., 1999; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd and Green, 1995). However, such studies tend to place the objective of robustly testing an intervention above achieving local crime reduction (ie they generally involve withholding sensible, if un-evidenced, policing activity from a number of places identified as vulnerable) and were thus not considered suitable templates for this programme. More practically, the 'double targeting' approach adopted here – focusing on wards and then on hotspots within them – would have added complication to any selection of 'control' hotspots from outside of Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills. Randomisation would not have been an option as these wards had already been chosen as the focus for activity and matching would not be possible as data to describe the characteristics of bespoke hotspots was not available.

In this instance, these issues have been addressed by using Luton's Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) as a 'proxy' evaluation geography. By overlaying the BRI target areas onto a map of Luton's 121 LSOAs it is possible to identify the six LSOAs in which an impact of BRI activity on burglary (if indeed there had been one) would be most likely to be evident. For example, 58 per cent of the area covered by LSOA 051 [68] falls within the boundaries of the BRI target area, however this overlapping area contains 93 per cent of all the dwellings in LSOA 051 and accounts for 97 per cent

[68] To maintain an anonymised geography, Luton's 121 LSOAs have each been randomly assigned a number between 001 and 121.

Figure 6.5.3: Proxy evaluation LSOAs with proportion of dwellings, area and per cent of historic burglaries covered by BRI target area

LSOA	Per cent of LSOA dwellings in BRI target areas	Per cent of LSOA area in BRI target areas	Per cent of LSOA burglaries (Aug 2012 to Jul 2014) in BRI areas
051	93.4	57.8	**96.7**
002	67.3	65.6	**80.0**
023	56.6	35.3	**72.4**
101	39.1	25.5	**64.1**
008	56.2	38.1	**62.9**
034	27.1	8.3	**55.0**

of the burglaries recorded there in the two years prior before the start of the BRI (see Figure 6.5.3). It is therefore likely, that any impact of BRI activity would be reflected in burglary data for LSOA 051.

While the extent of the overlap with the other five selected proxy LSOAs (shown in Figure 6.5.3) is progressively less comprehensive, it is reasonable to expect that an impact on burglary within the BRI target areas would be evident in data for these LSOAs, displacement notwithstanding (see section 6.12).

The advantage of switching attention from the bespoke BRI target areas to the LSOAs with which they correspond most closely is that the latter form part of a predefined geographical set, from which the most suitable 'untreated' comparators can be selected. As demonstrated in the rest of this section it is possible to use this comparator set in different ways, to place changes in the BRI LSOAs in the context of change throughout the town and to enable the selection of the most appropriate specific comparators.

6.7. A note on scale

As noted in the introduction to this section, scale can pose challenges for assessment in the real world context of delivering a problem-oriented response. As previously discussed, relative to the local capacity to deliver, the BRI was not a small-scale commitment; it represents all that was practically feasible given the delivery context in terms of area coverage and project duration, yet these parameters yield only a limited burglary dataset within which to investigate impact. Particularly when it comes to sub-dividing the data to look for potential effects in smaller sub-areas – or for example, within particular 'sub' time-periods – the numbers of burglaries in question can drop to levels at which only very tentative indications of impact could ever be detected. For this reason, in the temporal comparisons presented earlier, the BRI target hotspot areas have been aggregated together rather than separated into the nine component hotspots (some of which generally have only single digit annual burglary counts). In switching to the proxy LSOA geography it is

necessary however, to deal in smaller geographic units with lower incident counts, which are inevitably prone to greater variance. It is acknowledged therefore that the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis are provisional and indicative; all we can do is look for the patterns in the data that we would expect an effective intervention to leave behind. It is also recognised that reporting burglary rates (rather than counts) can obscure the fact that some annual LSOA burglary counts are low, and in the interests of transparency, raw counts are shown alongside rates in Appendix 6.8.

6.8. Change in BRI LSOAs compared with all other LSOAs

The table included in Appendix 6.8 shows the change in the annual burglary rate from 2013/14 to the 2014/15 (the initiative year) in all 121 LSOAs in Luton, ranked from that with the greatest decrease to the greatest increase. With BRI activity strongly concentrated in the six BRI LSOAs (and with any other non-negligible BRI activity limited to two others) it is reasonable to expect that if the BRI had had a marked impact, rates in these LSOAs would reduce to a greater extent than in other LSOAs where the activity was not undertaken.

Overall, the difference between the change in the LSOA BRIs and that in other LSOAs is negligible [69]. In four of the BRI LSOAS (051, 034, 101 and 002) burglary rates actually increased in the initiative year and by more than the town average change, (with these four LSOAs ranked 67th, 74th, 76th and 87th respectively out of a total of 121 [70]), offering no suggestion of any 'out of the ordinary' change or any BRI impact.

The change in rate in the other two BRI LSOAs (023 and 008) – both part of Wood Ridge ward – of -9.9 and -9.0 per 1,000 dwellings respectively, appear more promising and represent the tenth and 13th greatest rate reductions within the LSOA set. To test whether the change in these LSOAs was statistically significant from the average change across the set, z-scores (which measure how many standard deviations above or below the mean an observation is) were calculated [71]. As shown in appendix 6.8, neither BRI LSOAs 023 nor 008 [72], showed a statistically significant decrease in burglary rate [73]. Overall only two LSOAs saw statistically significant year-on-year reductions during 2014/15, with three showing significant increases.

It is worthy of note that the largest rate increase occurred in LSOA 072; a large LSOA in Chalk Mills that saw an increase from 14.4 to 37.7 burglaries per 1,000 dwellings (18 to 47 burglaries). This is significant because LSOA 072 covers an area located *between* the two main areas of BRI activity in Chalk Mills, which was excluded from the initiative due to historically lower burglary levels. It appears to represent another example of recent and unexpected change in the pattern of burglary within the town.

6.9. Comparison site selection

The analysis presented so far provides little indication that the static burglary rate in the BRI target area (set against modest increases elsewhere) can be attributed to the impact of the BRI. However, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, it is important to make use of suitable comparison or control sites, as a basis for estimating what would have happened in the target area had the activity *not* been undertaken. In the absence of opportunities for randomisation, it is crucial that the basis for control site selection is logical and theoretically grounded.

[69] On average a reduction of just -0.25 burglaries per 1,000 dwellings for the six BRI LSOAS compared with a small increase of +1.6 per 1,000 dwellings for all other LSOAs.

[70] Where the 1st had the greatest year-on-year rate reduction and the 121st had the greatest increase.

[71] This test relies on the assumption that the data are approximately normally distributed; although difficult to demonstrate categorically within a relatively small data set, the distribution of rate change across LSOAs (illustrated in Appendix 6.9) and a skewedness score of 0.08 suggest that such tests are not inappropriate.

[72] With z-scores of -1.34 (P=0.18) and -1.23 (P=0.22) respectively.

[73] This method is adapted from Bowers, Johnson and Hirschfield (2003).

Figure 6.9.1: Coefficients of correlations between annual LSOA burglary rates and selected 2011 Census variables

	Population change	Deprivation	Employment	Born outside of UK	Families	Private renting	Over crowding
Aug to July	Per cent change in population 2001 to 2011	Per cent households deprived on at least three dimensions	Per cent residents aged 16-74 in employment	Per cent residents not born in UK	Per cent families in households with children	Per cent households in privately rented accommodation	Per cent households with room occupancy rating of -1 or less
2005/06	0.156	0.177	-0.090	0.204	-0.057	0.270	0.232
2006/07	0.093	0.141	-0.038	0.183	-0.021	0.286	0.170
2007/08	0.249	0.283	-0.183	0.317	-0.238	0.315	0.313
2008/09	0.313	0.291	-0.234	0.325	-0.295	0.335	0.317
2009/10	0.283	0.177	-0.182	0.246	-0.250	0.143	0.162
2010/11	0.372	0.242	-0.267	0.388	-0.217	0.337	0.293
2011/12	0.454	0.300	-0.326	0.543	-0.270	0.501	0.438
2012/13	0.306	0.173	-0.193	0.313	-0.150	0.177	0.174
2013/14	0.128	0.048	-0.083	0.079	0.007	0.038	0.049
2014/15	0.156	-0.009	-0.017	0.099	0.065	0.101	0.023

P< 0.05	P< 0.01	P< 0.001

In this case, a socio-demographic matching model was originally favoured. As described in Section 3.2, correlations between a number of Census variables and burglary rates at the LSOA level helped shape the understanding of local burglary patterns that informed the design of the BRI response. In designing this impact assessment, it had been anticipated that these same analyses would provide a basis for selecting the most appropriate control/comparison LSOAs. If socio-demographic variables are relevant to understanding local burglary distribution – such as the extent of private renting, the proportion of residents born outside of the UK, and population change – it makes logical sense to select comparator LSOAs, that are as similar as possible to the initiative LSOAs in terms of these correlated variables.[74]

In the execution however, the LSOA matching process was undermined by the breakdown of the underlying correlations (indeed, of *any* correlations) between burglary rate and socio-demographic Census variables, in the more recent period during which the BRI interventions took place.

Figure 6.9.1 shows the strength of the correlations between annual LSOA burglary rates for each year from 2005/06 to 2014/15 (August to July to align with the BRI intervention year) and a selection of socio-demographic Census variables. It shows that while a number of variables were significantly correlated with burglary rates during the years up to and including 2012/13, this was not the case for the years 2013/14 and 2014/15[75].

[74] A socio-demographic matching approach is often used to select comparison sites, see for example Tuffin, et al. (2006).

[75] The same applied to 11 other Census variables tested – many of which were closely related to those illustrated.

In other words, while it is possible to use Census data to provide some descriptive characterisation of higher and lower burglary areas prior to 2013/14, from that time onwards (including during the BRI intervention period) the data are no longer of value in doing so.

There are at least two possible explanations here. First, it might be the case that the factors that influence the spatial distribution of burglary in Luton have changed in the recent period and that these demographic factors are no longer relevant [76]. Second, and more intriguingly, it is also possible that the socio-demographic composition of Luton's LSOAs has changed to such an extent that (1) the Census snapshot, taken in March 2011, is no longer an accurate reflection of the socio-demographic reality 'on the ground' (it is of note that the correlations generally appear stronger closer to the Census day, which falls in the later part of the 2010/11 year); and (2) that as the demography has shifted, burglary patterns have followed them. The potential implications of this for conducting Problem-Oriented Policing 'in a changing world' are considered in Chapter 7. Returning to the selection of control LSOAs, it is clear that these findings undermine the rationale for selecting comparison sites based on socio-demographic similarity and an alternative approach must be sought.

Although the planned basis for identifying control areas has been undermined, it remains the case that among the shifting 'ultra-local' burglary trends, some groups of LSOAs have moved in similar ways over time. Although we can say little about the reasons why, there are strong and statistically significant correlations between burglary rates in some of Luton's LSOA, over both the longer and more recent term. In the absence of alternative grounds for matching, this covariance provides a basis for selecting comparator areas, on the assumption that LSOAs that have changed in similar ways historically would be likely to continue to do so during the subsequent initiative year.

In order to identify suitable covariant matches, coefficients describing the correlation between burglary rates in each of the six BRI LSOAs and every other Luton LSOA were calculated for the nine-year and five-year periods immediately preceding the initiative year and tested for statistical significance. In addition, given that LSOAs are being compared in terms of 'raw' rather than proportional burglary rate change, it was considered appropriate to ensure that comparator areas had relatively similar historic burglary rates to the target areas. To achieve this, the average annual burglary rate for each LSOA was calculated. For each BRI LSOA, comparator LSOAs were then selected based on three criteria:

- A statistically significant correlation in annual burglary rate over the previous nine years (at the five per cent confidence level).
- A statistically significant correlation in annual burglary rate over the previous five years (at the ten per cent confidence level).
- A 'similar' average annual burglary rate, based on one standard deviation of the sample mean, above or below the average burglary rate for the BRI LSOA.

This process resulted in the selection of between one and three comparator LSOAs for each BRI LSOA [77]. In short, this shows that for each BRI LSOA there are small areas in other parts of Luton that have generally similar burglary rates and where increases and decreases in rate have historically tended to mirror

[76] Recall the correlations conducted during the analysis phase made use of the data available at that time, up to March 2013.

[77] In two cases it was necessary to flex one of the three criteria by small amounts to ensure at least one comparator was selected.

those in the target LSOAs (including during the recent period when local burglary patterns have ceased to correspond to the available demographic data). The following comparisons are therefore based on the logic that, in the absence of impactful intervention, similar changes could be expected during the 2014/15 year and therefore that substantial differences between the BRI and the relevant comparator might be indicative of impact. Data tables describing the comparator matching process are included in Appendix 6.9.2.

6.10. LSOA level burglary rate change against comparators

Figures 6.10.1 to 6.10.6 show the change in burglary rate in the six BRI proxy LSOAs in the initiative year (2014/15) compared with the previous year, as well as against the average level over the previous five years and the average level over the previous nine years. They also show the equivalent changes in each selected comparator LSOA (with an average of the comparators calculated where there is more than one). It is clear from these comparisons that in five of the six BRI LSOAS (02, 063, 0202, 051 and 034) the change in the burglary rate during the initiative year closely mirrored that in the comparator wards (in LSOA 034 the change in the two comparator wards is inconsistent; comparator 016 reduced slightly while the rate in 089 went up; the rate in the BRI LSOA increased slightly more than the average change in these two comparators). There is therefore no indication that previous patterns of covariance have been interrupted by the impact of the BRI (or any other factor).

In LSOA 008, the picture appears somewhat different. During the initiative year the burglary rate almost halved, from 17.9 to 9.0 per 1,000 dwellings compared with the previous year and by even more compared with longer-term average levels. In contrast, the three comparator LSOAs saw rate increases of, on average, 12.1 per 1,000 dwellings. This pattern suggests the possibility that the BRI (or another factor) had an impact on burglary levels in LSOA 008 during the initiative year. This is examined in detail below.

6.11. LSOA 008 – examining 'ultra-local' impact indicators

LSOA 008 covers a residential area of Wood Ridge ward, predominantly comprising Victorian terraced housing. Three of the BRI hotspot areas fall within or partially overlap with BRI LSOA 008 and in total 56 per cent of its dwellings fall within these areas; 63 per cent of burglaries in the LSOA over the previous two years had occurred in the area covered by the BRI. 13 per cent of dwellings in the part of LSOA 008 covered by the BRI received 'priority' communications, which equates to seven per cent of dwellings across the whole LSOA.

Overall, burglary halved in the LSOA from 14 offences (17.9 per 1,000 dwellings) to 7 (9.0 per 1,000 dwellings) in 2014/15 compared to the previous year. As shown in figure 6.11.1 however, the majority of that reduction can be accounted for by the area *not* covered by the BRI; within the BRI target area there were six burglaries in 2014/15 compared with eight in the previous year, whereas in the rest of the LSOA the reduction was greater, from six to one. It appears therefore that the pattern of burglaries within LSOA 008 does not fit the hypothesis that its divergence from its comparators can be explained by the BRI activity. Even in this most promising of sub-areas, the

Figures 6.10.1, 2 & 3: Change in burglary rate during initiative year in (proxy) BRI LSOAs and comparators

6.10.1



6.10.2



6.10.3



Figure 6.10.4, 5 and 6: Change in burglary rate during initiative year in (proxy) BRI LSOAs and comparators (continued)



Figure 6.11.1: Change in Burglary within BRI LSOA 008

BRI LSOA 008	Dwellings	Burglaries 2013/14	Rate per 1,000 dwellings	Burglaries 2014/15	Rate per 1,000 dwellings
BRI target area	**438**	**8**	**18.3**	**6**	**13.7**
Priority dwellings*	58	4	69.0	2	34.5
Standard dwellings	380	2	5.3	4	10.5
Non target area	**342**	**6**	**17.5**	**1**	**2.9**
Total	**780**	**14**	**17.9**	**7**	**9.0**

* includes previous repeat victims

crime data, when examined in detail, do not show he signature patterns of an impact of the activities delivered under the BRI.

6.12. Displacement

Without evidence of impact it makes little sense to consider the possibility of displacement to other areas. Given the small proportional decrease in the BRI target areas, however, it is technically possible to apply techniques such as the Weighted Displacement Quotient (WDQ) (Bowerset al., 2003; Bowers and Johnson, 2003) to mapped data covering the target area and a number of concentric buffer-rings surrounding it (which were prepared in anticipation of more relevant circumstances).

These calculations again tend to point towards unusual changes in the local burglary patterns. For example, within a 600 meter buffer zone surrounding the BRI target area (an area which was not selected for intervention due to historically lower burglary levels) burglary went up by 13 times what would be expected if the small proportional reduction in the target area had simply been displaced outwards.

6.13. Assessment – conclusions

The top-line finding of this impact assessment is that there is no evidence that the activity undertaken within the soLUTiONS Burglary Reduction Initiative had an impact on burglary. At first glance the data appear to suggest that the BRI may have had a modest protective effect that 'insulated' the target areas against the increases elsewhere in the town. However, when examined at the dwelling level, when comparisons are made against the full set of Luton LSOAs, and in particular, when matched comparison sites are examined, the outcome patterns that would support this protective hypothesis are not visible in the data.

Given the implementation challenges described in Chapter 5, this conclusion is not entirely surprising; in a delivery context characterised by resourcing constraints and shifting priorities it proved impossible to deliver several of the activity strands (leveraging change within the private rented sector, offender management options and making better use of tracking technologies for instance) which analysis suggested might prove beneficial.

This lack of 'programme integrity' also means that there is little evidence on which to assess the merits of the original programme design, or to assess whether the analysis conducted provided an adequate local evidence base on which to mount a response. However, limited conclusions can be drawn about effectiveness in relation to two elements of the approach that could inform future initiatives and may have broader implications.

First, the 'street-survey' process of visually inspecting dwellings to identify obvious signs of vulnerability – in much the same way that a burglar might – appears to have some predictive value. As described in Section 6.5, dwellings that were identified by street-survey teams for priority attention did indeed go on to have a higher burglary rate during the initiative year. There is potential therefore for this exercise to be usefully repeated as part of future target hardening efforts, or 'routinised' into general neighbourhood patrols. It is telling, however, that providing advice and offers of assistance – at least in the form delivered and in this local context – were not enough to reduce that level of risk once identified, and a different approach to intervention would be required. A 'nudge' alone proved insufficient.

Second, this outcome analysis raises questions about the predictive value of using historic data to select small geographic areas as the focus for longer term problem-oriented intervention. As described in Chapters 2 and 3, at earlier stages of the project there were good reasons to focus attention, first on Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge wards, and then on specific 'micro-locations' within them, as well as a strong rationale for seeking to do so. However, by the time interventions were ready for delivery, victimisation rates in these places were returning to levels that were unremarkable within the town. In this instance, applying hotspotting techniques to predict victimisation risk over the long-term appears to have been of questionable value.

It is unclear whether a more effective approach could have been taken to identify small areas for priority attention. There are several indications within the data that burglary patterns are changing in Luton, in ways that are not currently understood, and therefore (other than for guiding patrols and other short term tactical activity), this analysis suggests that identifying historic concentrations may be of limited use for directing more strategic/structural burglary reduction efforts. Areas with historically higher rates have seen these return to more typical levels (see Figure 6.4.3), new hotspots (like LSOA 0072 in Chalk Mills – see Section 6.8) have emerged and, most interestingly, from 2013/14 onwards, 2011 Census data that previously correlated with the geographic patterning of burglary now appears to be unrelated. Could it be that the socio-demography is changing so quickly as to make these datasets obsolete, while associated crime problems follow these presently invisible trends across town? If so, what are the implications for a proactive, problem-oriented approach to crime reduction that takes account of the nature of the places in which crime occurs? These questions among others are considered in the concluding chapter.

7. Conclusions and discussion

7.1 Police effectiveness in a changing world

The issue of police effectiveness has never been more pressing. Austere times call for greater attention to delivering value for money and the logic of cutting costs by reducing demand has intensified the appeal, at least in theory, of impactful 'up-stream' intervention. It is no coincidence that in these conditions (and during the lifespan of the *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project) the College of Policing has come into being with a remit including improvement of policing through better use of research evidence, and that formal scrutiny (specifically) of the *effectiveness* of police forces has been introduced, as part of HMIC's PEEL inspection regime.[78] Within the framework provided by the latter, an effective police force is defined as *"one that reduces crime and keeps people safe"* (HMIC, 2016a). On the assumption that what the police should keep people safe from is (mostly) crime and that the best way to do so is to prevent it – this is a starting point we have been happy to share for the exploration of effective policing undertaken in this project.

Unlike HMIC however, whose effectiveness assessments cover crime investigation, protecting the vulnerable and tackling organised crime (as well as crime prevention) we have chosen a narrower conceptual focus, grounded in the evidence-base on 'what works' in crime reduction. Taken in synthesis, this research provides a pen-portrait of an effective police function as one that *intervenes creatively, purposefully and proactively (with others), based on an understanding of the conditions that make specific types of crime more likely (and jeopardise safety) in particular places* (Karn, 2013; Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Lum, et al., 2010). Henceforth, we refer to this mode of activity as *informed or problem-oriented proactivity* and assume that this is the working style to which local police should aspire, if they are to be effective. Problem-oriented approaches (such as SARA) provide a route map to this vision of effectiveness that has been shown to work at least 'modestly' well (Weisburd et al., 2008).

The context in which local policing operates is one of rapid external and internal change. While crime is falling, the police workload is becoming more complex (College of Policing, 2015), new forms of crime and new drivers for 'old' crimes need to be understood in their local contexts, and innovative practices and responses must be designed to match. In places like Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills in Luton, the populations that are impacted by crime, who create demand for the police and may be involved in committing crime, are increasingly transient, heterogeneous, and less well connected to one another. Under these conditions, harm can be more difficult to identify, social capital less potent and cooperation and support for the police less forthcoming. On top of these challenges, policing is changing internally; the crimes and harms it is being asked to prioritise have shifted, the resources it can call on have shrunk and – as have those of its main collaborators – and the ways in which it is held accountable have been overhauled.

The *Police Effectiveness in Changing World* project set out to investigate the challenge of effective crime reduction (through informed proactivity) in towns where the forces of social change were clearly apparent, at a time when internal change was reshaping the way that local policing was delivered. The Police Foundation team set out to find new and impactful ways to deal with persistent local crime

[78] In 2014 HMIC began an annual inspection of police effectiveness; efficiency and legitimacy (PEEL) of all police forces in England and Wales https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/peel-assessments/peel-2014/.

problems and, most importantly, to learn from the experience of doing so. We sought to do this by taking a problem-oriented (SARA) approach, drawing on the wider evidence-base, working in (and attempting to catalyse) partnership with (and between) local police and other community safety agencies, and searching for solutions that were sustainable. In this report we have set out the process, experience and findings from each of the sequential (SARA) phases in the project's Luton site – Section 7.2 provides a brief recap.

7.2 Problem-oriented proactivity in the context of change – the Luton story

In the initial scanning phase of the project (described in Chapter 2), the team undertook a quantitative and qualitative familiarisation process which led to the identification of nine options for focusing on pressing crime problems, priority places and/or challenging population groups, that were also relevant to the project's 'changing world' brief. The decision, made in conjunction with local stakeholders, to focus on burglary and on two town centre wards (Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills), reflected the local priority landscape as it existed at the time (in 2011), and demonstrates the pragmatism required in conducting action research in partnership with those doing complex and difficult work in the 'real-world'.

The 'analysis phase' (Chapter 3) used crime data analysis, mapping techniques and interview research to expand local understanding of the burglary problem, with a particular focus on Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills wards. This indicated that burglary offences tended to concentrate in parts of town that were deprived, were experiencing significant population change, and where there were high levels of privately rented housing. It also showed that the problem persisted throughout the year, with only a modest tendency to intensify in winter months (particularly in November). Acknowledging the necessarily partial knowledge base, analysis suggested that three main 'types' of burglary offender were operating in the town; those principally driven to offend by problematic drug-use (who were most numerous and prolific), a younger group of general 'lifestyle' offenders, and a small number of older 'specialist acquisitive' offenders. The evidence suggested that burglary offending was generally not disproportionately targeted against particular groups of victims (such as students, Asian households or older residents), although the experience of being burgled could be isolating and victims could feel singled out, however due to geographic factors, it did particularly impact on poorer socio-economic groups. Burglary increasingly involved the theft of items of personal technology (laptops and mobile phones), as well as cash and jewellery, but knowledge gaps remained in relation to what happened to these items after quick initial transfer to local handlers. Based on the available evidence, burglary within the town was predominantly attributable to a cohort of locally resident, 'opportunist' offenders operating within territorial ranges defined by their everyday routines. Target selection was principally influenced by ease of access and concerns to avoid attracting attention. In line with this, opportunities (and thus offences) tended to be concentrated in places with poorer home security and (more speculatively) with weaker community ties close to routinely used routes – including those leading to local drug markets. Overall, the analysis phase suggested that burglary in Luton should best be understood in terms of a mix of traditional and 'new' crime drivers (see later) and that

responses that improved access to home security and increased 'collective efficacy' within persistent hotspot areas (in Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge), improved the effectiveness of offender rehabilitation and/or reduced the attractiveness of stolen technology items might be usefully explored.

Chapter 4 dealt with the process of moving from 'analysis to action', including developing intervention options through consultation workshops, drawing on the broader evidence-base and factoring in pragmatic concerns about the local delivery context. The process of moving from an initial proposal for a 'core programme' of work aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in hotspots (along with some additional offender management and market reduction options), to an 'action ready' delivery plan and 'Statement of Intent' is described – as are the first indications of some of the implementation challenges to come.

Chapter 5 told the story of the 'response' delivered during the BRI intervention year (August 2014 to July 2015). It described the considerable efforts expended across local agencies to deliver a number of programme outputs. These included a set of multi-agency 'street-survey' inspection visits to burglary hotspots, a year-long programme of targeted communications focused on those residents judged to be at greatest risk, the provision of a Home Security Assessment service, on-going target hardening support to a small number of hotspot residents (who responded to offers of assistance) and the formation of a neighbourhood improvement group in Wood Ridge. However, several aspects of the original programme plan were left on the page and, overall, the delivery year was characterised by substantial implementation challenges. Identifying resources to deliver BRI activity and owners to take on work-streams was a continual struggle, with plans easily derailed by unplanned abstraction. With notable individual exceptions, maintaining interest and commitment from outside of the police (and local Fire and Rescue Service) was an on-going challenge, local systems and processes for setting, completing and reporting back on tasks (particularly across agencies) often faltered, and the response to engagement efforts from hotspot residents was unexpectedly stony. Chapter 5 also detailed the findings of a process evaluation that drew on interviews with key practitioners, as well as surveys and observational research, to provide a context to these implementation difficulties. In particular it emphasised the acute demand and service pressures experienced, often very personally, by police and other agency staff in Luton during the period. It also described the implications for the BRI of a changing local priority picture, in which issues of risk and vulnerability were squeezing out concerns about acquisitive crime (including burglary), particularly among non-police community safety partners. As discussed in more detail later, the policing model operated by Bedfordshire Police at the time also had a major bearing on the BRI, providing very few proactive resources, and fostering processes, mind-sets and skill-sets geared to short-term reactive, rather than pre-planned preventative activity. The impact of the local partnership dynamic, which was rebuilding after a period of some discord and retrenchment, was also apparent.

As might be expected, given these implementation difficulties, the impact 'assessment' (Chapter 6) showed that the work undertaken had no identifiable effect on burglary levels in the hotspot areas; although initial pre-to-post comparisons suggested a possible,

modest protective effect (via a resident 'behaviour change' mechanism), when examined at a dwelling level and when a proxy (LSOA) geography was used to make comparisons to non-intervention areas (including those matched to activity areas based on historic co-variance in burglary rates), the outcome patterns that would be expected to correspond to impact could not be identified. This analysis did, however, indicate that the 'street survey' work undertaken had some predictive (although not protective) utility, and that previously persistent geographic burglary patterns appeared to be changing and becoming less predictable, with long term hotspots 'cooling' while new ones appeared.

The lack of a programme impact on crime in Luton is a disappointing outcome for the project, however delivering crime reduction was only one of its aims. Of equal, if not greater importance, was the opportunity to learn lessons about the prospects for, routes to and dependencies of police effectiveness (via problem-oriented proactivity) in the context of external and internal change. The following sections pull together what has been learned in this regard in Luton. Overall, this research suggests the high-level conclusion that the prevailing conditions of internal (policing) and external (social) change make problem-oriented proactivity both more important but also more difficult to achieve.

7.3 The *importance* of informed proactivity in a changing world

The first reason why informed police (and partner) proactivity is more important relates to what one Luton police officer described as a 'paradigm shift' in the priority subject matter of local policing. As described in the introduction, during the lifespan of this project, a combination of falling volume crime, the removal of central targets and a series of national scandals over the failure of police and others to respond adequately to 'hidden' harm perpetrated against the vulnerable (both recently and longer ago), have increasingly put issues of 'threat, harm and risk' to the front and centre of the local policing workload. New priorities have emerged in forms ranging from child sexual exploitation (CSE), honour based violence, female genital mutilation (FGM), modern day slavery, terrorism and domestic extremism, hate crime, domestic abuse, mental health and missing persons (Bedfordshire Police and Crime Commissioner, 2015). On one level these shifts in purpose reveal police effectiveness *itself* to be a changing concept however, (and we accept that there may be a need to verify this empirically) it seems likely that the qualities of approach shown to lead to effective crime reduction during previous decades with different priorities (problem-focus and specificity, broad based creativity, place-based proactivity) will be equally applicable to these new challenges. On the whole, the principal form of response that has emerged to these 'new' crimes and harms has tended to take a case-by-case approach (often within a multi-agency framework), while this is clearly necessary, preventing and responding to these new challenges will also benefit from an analytically informed understanding of local 'problems', and multi-agency practice development, from a baseline well below that which already exists for 'traditional' problems like burglary, robbery and vehicle crime.

Second, as we have demonstrated in this study, the drivers of these 'old world' crime problems have also been altered by forces of contemporary social and

technological change. If the local responses to these crime types are to resist obsolescence it will be necessary to continually review and refresh understanding, based on up to date local analysis. Although many well documented characteristics of burglary problems were found to be relevant in Luton – a locally resident offender cohort, including a significant proportion of problematic drug-users, deficits in access to security and environmental design issues such as ungated alleyways – other features of the local problem showed clear connections to recent patterns of social change.

In particular the finding that the level of privately rented housing in an area was the strongest socio-demographic predictor of neighbourhood burglary rates (see Section 3.2 and Higgins and Jarman, 2015) provided an intriguing indication that recent transformations in tenure structure in parts of Luton – which, like those elsewhere are linked to a range of societal factors including housing policy, differential access to finance, localised population growth and mobility – may also be contributing to crime. While caution is required in moving from area level findings to property level conclusions, this suggests that, in conditions of high housing demand and low regulation, private landlords have little incentive to provide adequate home security, leading to increased opportunities for burglary. This theory resonated with local knowledge and fits with broader explanations of the residualisation of victimisation among those unable to access good locks and bolts (Tilley et al., 2011).

In addition, analysis showed that neighbourhoods afflicted by relatively high rates of burglary tended to be those that were changing the most and were home to churning, growing, heterogeneous and more deprived populations. We have suggested that social capital and 'collective efficacy' in such places may be weak, and found qualitative evidence that this could be further undermined by crime and the fear of crime. Given the sensitivity identified among local burglars to natural surveillance and evidence that offenders can be aware of residents' willingness to look out for one another and modify their behaviour accordingly (Bottoms, 2012), it seems plausible that weak social ties in particular areas, and the defensive behaviours they inhibit, may be recognised and exploited by local offenders.

Patterns of technological change were also found to be relevant to burglary in Luton, specifically in relation to the types of goods targeted by burglary offenders during recent years. In eight years, laptop computers grew from being the twelfth to the first most frequently stolen item in burglaries in Luton, mobile phones fell from second to sixth, then returned to fourth with the mass uptake of smartphones, while bank and credit cards became much less frequently targeted, probably reflecting improved counter-fraud security over the period.

Insights like these demonstrate the importance of continually examining the ways in which the drivers of 'familiar' as well as new forms of crime are being altered by social and technological change. Most importantly they suggest new and creative avenues for intervention, be that through regulation of the private rented housing sector, community development work or market reduction approaches for stolen goods. As discussed later however, it is equally important that the police and others are capable of developing and implementing innovative responses based on insights like these.

Thirdly, informed proactivity is important because we cannot rely on those who suffer the types of harm now being prioritised, or those living in the fractured neighbourhoods where burglars and other offenders can find footholds, to come to the police with their problems, or to cooperate in police-led activities, without concerted and ongoing engagement efforts. During the course of delivering the Burglary Reduction Initiative (BRI) in Luton, practitioners were surprised by the degree of reticence shown by those living in burglary hotspots to offers of assistance in better securing their homes. This was in the context of a policing model set firmly on a response footing and in which neighbourhood engagement work had been substantially eroded. Relying on a reactive police response to 'patent' demand (that is, crimes actively reported to the police) and taking a baseline level of public trust and cooperation for granted, will not deliver effectiveness – particularly in fluxing and atomised places like Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills.

7.4 The *challenge* of informed proactivity in a changing world

A key conclusion from the *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project is that problem-oriented proactivity (and therefore police effectiveness) is made more difficult by the changing world, both external to and within policing.

Starting with the external challenges, in section 6.9 and 6.13 we suggested (tentatively) that fast-paced social change is making burglary patterns less stable and predictable in Luton and therefore less easy to target through attention to hotspots. The patterns of historic burglary concentration that directed the project's focus to Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills and then to long-term hotspot areas within them, did not follow through particularly strongly into the intervention period, while new concentrations sprang up elsewhere. This raises the possibility that the resources deployed during the BRI were not necessarily 'in the right place'. There are implications for the nimbleness of problem-oriented processes (and we acknowledge later that timescales in this case were particularly elongated), as well as for the development of more sophisticated predictive techniques. However, there are also more general ramifications for any longer-term, strategic response to crime problems in 'micro-locations'. In particular, it is intriguing that the demographic indices that correlated with LSOA burglary rates close to Census day were progressively less relevant in subsequent years (and produced no statistically significant correlations three years later). One interpretation could be that in the fast changing places studied here, demographic patterns, and the crime patterns that accompany them, are shifting at a pace that quickly makes data collected at ten-yearly intervals of limited value. The implication is that the information that analysts have available to make sense of a fast changing world may be becoming less reliably accurate and useful. A changing world may also be a more opaque one.

Overall, we have found that the internal organisational changes that are taking place within policing – and particularly as these have manifested in Luton – are having at least as much impact on police effectiveness as the changing world outside. This was most evident in relation to implementation capability; as evident in the challenges faced in delivering the Burglary Reduction Initiative (BRI) in Luton during 2014/15.

The process evaluation of the BRI implementation (section 5.3) described and contextualised the delivery

issues encountered in Luton during 2014/15. While it is important to remember that implementation failure has been a familiar blight on crime reduction programmes in comparatively more abundant and stable times (Bullock et al., 2002; Hope and Murphy, 1983), this process revealed much about the general prerequisites of police effectiveness and provided a reminder of what must be protected as the building blocks of local policing and community safety architecture are rearranged, in response to the changing demand and resource profile. If, rather than just stepping in when bad things happen, the police are to take an active role in improving the conditions in their territories, in ways that make crime and other social harms less likely to occur (ie if they are to be *effective*), then a number of fundamentals need to be in place.

The essential ingredients of effectiveness

Most crucially, the police need the resources to do proactive work. The question of whether the acute pressures felt in dealing with reactive demand in Luton, and the consequent lack of resource for proactivity, were due to 'raw' under-funding as opposed to a product of the way in which funds were utilised (*efficiency*), is beyond the scope of this study (but is a topic of much local debate[79]). What is clear, however, is that it proved extremely difficult to corral resource to deliver the BRI – a work programme that might, in other circumstances, be considered a modest and focused piece of discretionary work – and this was not uncharacteristic of the everyday experience of service delivery in the town.

Second, particularly when resources are scarce, the police need appropriate mechanisms for prioritising the issues they need to tackle, and for these to lead to realistic and substantive programmes of discretionary work (discussed further later). It is also important to align these priorities with local partners and embed them within corporate and individual decision making. It is unfortunate, and an inevitable risk of long-term work, that burglary was deprioritised locally in the course of the project. While with hindsight the factors that led to this were emerging in 2011, it is unlikely that even the most prescient planner could have predicted that such a 'core' policing problem as burglary could be decentred from the local agenda in quite the way that transpired.

Third, local policing needs to be structured in such a way as to enable efforts to be directed at non-immediate goals which, if achieved, may well result in some reduction in immediate demand. At its most basic level this involves ring-fencing resources for proactivity, but it also involves embedding a more strategic mind-set at all ranks and developing tasking and compliance monitoring systems that mean non-time critical tasks do not get forgotten. It also means equipping staff with project management skills and carving out the space in which they might use them.

Fourth, perhaps *the* key learning from the BRI delivery phase is the extent to which the police must have an underlying bedrock of community engagement and consistent personal connections with those who live in the places they are trying to police and improve. Whether it is by paying attention to crime prevention advice, being willing to invite officers in to homes to assess security, passing on messages to neighbours, providing intelligence, or listening and starting a dialogue when things get tense, local populations hold

[79] See Bedfordshire Police and Crime Commissioner's Save Our Police campaign www.saveourpolice.org.uk.

a crucial key for unlocking police effectiveness. They will only allow it to turn if there are trusted officers embedded in communities who stand as guarantors that this will lead to appropriate and legitimate action. In Luton in 2014/15 the wholesale removal of neighbourhood police officers and the regular abstraction of remaining community policing resources to other tasks had significantly weakened these connections and assurances, and the effectiveness of the BRI, as well as other aspects of policing, was compromised as a result.

Finally, if the police are to change places for the better, they need to work productively with the other agencies who share the same broad goals. Fundamentally this involves developing a close consensus on priorities and joining-up objectives to delivery, through tasking processes that function across agencies, backed by solid accountability to a united executive. While it is acknowledged that the BRI landed on an unfortunate inter-agency fault-line, given that the CSP and local authority attention had moved away from burglary – and that agencies do work well together in a number of areas in Luton – inter-agency tensions at the strategic level, retrenchment in austerity and different tasking cultures all contributed to difficulties in delivering the BRI as a multi-agency initiative.

During 2015 the debate about the model of policing required to deal affordably with the 21st century demand profile became increasingly urgent. At the national level, a number of senior figures evoked a bleak future in which local policing would be reduced to a 'blue light' emergency service (BBC, 2015), taken back to the 1970s (Davenport, 2015) and forced to operate in an increasingly 'paramilitary' style (Dodd, 2015). In some places, and to varying degrees, austerity-driven force remodelling exercises pushed local police functions in the direction of this pared-back vision (most often resulting in contractions in neighbourhood policing and proactivity in order to maintain 'core' response and investigation functions).

The available data would suggest that the model operating in Bedfordshire during the implementation phase of this project was at the extreme end of this 'back to basics' experiment[80]. Based on the evidence collected here, it is clear that it is an experiment that did not work, an assessment shared by HMIC (2016b) and indeed one recognised locally, leading to the introduction of a new operating model in late 2015. This is a clear demonstration that informed (and publicly-engaged) proactivity must be considered a core function of policing. With the breathing space offered to policing by the Comprehensive Spending Review at the end of 2015 (HM Treasury, 2015), retrenchment to a reactive model is a strategic option that should (and we hope can) now be ruled out.

7.5 *Achieving* informed proactivity in a changing world

Finally, some reflections on the problem-oriented (SARA) process, as it was deployed here and more generally, as a vehicle for delivering police effectiveness in a demanding and changing environment. The failure of the BRI intervention to reduce burglary should not count against the value of problem-oriented policing (or SARA) as a working model. Its credentials have been established elsewhere (Weisburd et al., 2008) and the common-sense logic of finding out what you are dealing with before you act, and checking if what you

[80] In March 2015, 11 per cent of the police officers and PCSOs employed by Bedfordshire Police were in designated 'neighbourhood' roles compared with an average of 23 per cent (Home Office, 2015). Only City of London police had a smaller proportion. Three forces employed in excess of 40 per cent of officers and PCSOs in 'neighbourhood' roles, although it is likely that the functions delivered by 'neighbourhood' officers varied across forces.

do works, is irrefutable. As so often, however, the key to success is in the implementation, and there are potential weaknesses in the way SARA was applied in this case that should be acknowledged.

For reasons of thoroughness and to serve research as well as crime reduction purposes, the version of SARA followed here was protracted over an unusually long period. With hindsight, the project may have benefited from moving through the scanning and analysis phases more speedily. Although there were good intentions behind the time-consuming approach (consulting widely and regularly and layering in additional research methods to the analysis phase), the priority afforded to burglary locally declined in the time-gap between scanning and response, with consequences for resourcing the response phase. Meanwhile, in the gap between analysis and response the geographic focus of the burglary problem (unexpectedly) shifted. More generally, during the extended pre-response period, several key local personnel moved on, taking project momentum and advocacy with them (although staffing churn, particularly within the police, appears to be a prevailing feature of the service landscape in Luton). On the other hand, we would defend the preparation time taken between analysis and response as a worthwhile opportunity to ensure resources are corralled, action is properly planned and participants are briefed, trained and 'brought on board'. Given the importance of implementation and the 'can-do' police inclination to 'start today' it seems a shame that this central *preparation* phase is not reflected within the SARA acronym (SA*P*RA perhaps?).

At the more tactical level, conditions of fast-paced 'natural' change would tend to favour more rapid (but less thorough) scanning and analysis leading to prompt, (but less thoroughly informed) responses. At the strategic level however, if the specifics of tomorrow's problems and priorities are becoming harder to anticipate, the focus might be best placed on fostering more general and flexible resources and capabilities, such as resilience within neighbourhoods, strong links and information flows between agencies and communities and operating models and work processes that are agile and adaptable to change.

Finally, SARA applications are most commonly associated with relatively simple, tactical or situational forms of intervention. In the ambition to identify new solutions that were *sustainable* the project aspired to push SARA toward more strategic, structural forms of response (intervening in the dynamics of local private rented housing sector and building local 'collective efficacy' for example). Given the delivery context discussed previously, these more ambitious intervention approaches proved very difficult to progress, but (as examined below) this may also indicate that this was an over extension of the problem-oriented model.

More generally, we offer some reflections on the challenges of delivering each of the SARA phases in current conditions.

Scanning

With relevance to scanning, our experiences in Luton indicate that problem prioritisation is a key area of challenge for local policing at the current time. In section 5.4 we described how legacy National Intelligence Model (NIM) processes for formalising priorities (through strategic assessments), at both force and CSP level, were struggling to accommodate the proliferation of 'new' high-harm crime types –

particularly in the context of very limited discretionary resources. We also described how local stakeholders were increasingly conscious of (and frustrated by) the political rather than operational aspects of priority setting, all of which had led to some inter-agency disharmony and individual uncertainty in deciding what was most important on a day to day basis. There are no easy routes to practice improvement here. Fundamentally, prioritisation (particularly in austerity) involves difficult moral decisions, about which harmful issues should receive more or less (or indeed no) resources. We would suggest that this is an area that needs further development; based on our experience in Luton, three points appear salient. First, ownership for priority setting needs greater clarity; we found tensions between force and local levels and muddiness in the respective roles of Police and Crime Commissioners and Community Safety Partnerships. Second, name checking an inventory of issues that carry potential organisational risk, but about which little is known (and to which few resources can be allocated), serves no-one; priority setting should lead to substantive, discretionary proactivity, it should not be a defensive strategy to head-off future criticism if things go wrong. Third, the more resources that can be freed up for priority-focused, discretionary activity the better; this is easy to say, but difficult (perhaps impossible) to achieve. Perhaps the only option here involves activating a 'virtuous circle' of demand reduction (through informed proactivity) and resource reinvestment. Although the policing model introduced in Bedfordshire in late 2015 was built on this aspiration, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that progress here – swinging the pendulum back from a reactive model, to problem-oriented proactivity – would require an injection of up-front resource in excess of what is currently possible.

Analysis

The analytical resources that can be called on to inform policing and community safety in Luton (and, we suspect, in many other places) are scarce and often tied up in intelligence-led activity or providing management information, rather than problem-oriented analysis. In this project we sought to deepen understanding of a local crime problem by providing a focused resource and by expanding the range of research techniques used in this phase of SARA (eg cluster analysis and other statistical analyses, qualitative interviews with victims and offenders, and 'on the ground' security surveys). This was moderately successful; new angles on the burglary problem were identified which informed local thinking in relation to the role of the privately rented housing sector, the relevance of 'collective efficacy' and (to a lesser degree) an emerging younger 'generalist' offender type. This demonstrates the potential to use a broader range of techniques and information sources to inform local problem analyses.

More generally, however, we suggest that improving problem understanding through local analysis (being *problem-oriented*) is only one of three factors that need to be taken into account in designing viable and impactful crime reduction interventions. If policing practice is to become more evidence-based then research on what has 'worked' elsewhere, and the generalisable knowledge that can be derived from it, also needs to be taken into account; we agree that problem-oriented processes could provide a useful vehicle for operationalising this knowledge (Lum et al., 2012). Most fundamentally however, in the current climate, intervention designs need to be highly pragmatic and realistic about what might stand a

chance of reasonable implementation success, given the local organisational context. Proactivity must be *problem-oriented* but it must also be *evidence-oriented* and *pragmatically-oriented* as well.

Response

A number of dependencies for delivering effective responses within problem-oriented processes have already been set out (at 7.4). No matter how good the scanning and analysis, where these conditions are not conducive (as was the case in Luton in 2014/15), the range of viable options available at the response stage is likely to be limited. As mentioned briefly above, in this context some of the more structural and innovative response options suggested during this project proved too ambitious to make significant headway. For example, no effective levers were identified to improve home security standards in the local private rented housing sector, community development work to empower and build ties between disparate neighbours was modest and took some months to initiate, no capacity was found to develop systems for making better use of tracking functionality on laptops and smart-phones, and organisational changes prevented progress on offender management options.

Reflecting on these challenges prompts the observation that the SARA process has relatively limited utility in catalysing the kind of strategic changes that might improve the range of available response options. This is because the locally and specifically defined crime problems, from which good problem-oriented practice should start, rarely carry enough weight (on their own) to justify the big decisions needed to create a broader range of response options and have a wider impact. For example, we have argued elsewhere that the range and potency of options available to respond to burglary in Wood Ridge and Chalk Mills would have been greater if a private rented sector (PRS) licensing scheme had been in operation (Higgins and Jarman, 2015), however it would clearly not be proportionate or reasonable, to introduce such a scheme purely as a response to local burglaries. On the other hand, it may be the case that, when viewed across the spectrum of crime and other social issues affecting an area (such as overcrowding, homelessness, environmental health, council tax and benefit fraud, planning enforcement and antisocial behaviour), the strategic case for a policy of this kind would stack up. This is an example only to illustrate the point that focused and discrete problem-oriented responses can only do so much. Optimising the conditions in which tools such as SARA can be impactful requires more strategic and holistic forms of thinking from local policy makers (including those within the police). This thinking must be informed by an understanding of the *range* of problems that impact on a place; it might also benefit from being more 'top-down' in nature (ie rather than building 'bottom-up' from problems, it might usefully start with what might be possible, perhaps based on promising practice elsewhere, and assess whether this might be of value in the broad local context).

Assessment

There is a mismatch between the appropriate form and scale of local interventions designed to reduce crime (including through use of SARA) and those designed to *generate knowledge* about reducing crime. The former should be grounded in local analysis, specifically focused and tailored to 'micro-locations', can include nuance and complexity,

and may benefit from reflexive adaptation over time. The latter (when informed by the higher tiers of the Maryland Scale that tend to dominate the discourse on evidence-based policing) tend to be grounded in theory rather than local insight and demand scale, multiple-units, relative simplicity, and consistent delivery. Consequently, a well-constructed SARA response is usually sub-optimal for more rigorous evaluation techniques, but equally an evidence-based trial will rarely be oriented to the specific problems of particular places. In the assessment described in Chapter 6 we hope we have trodden a pragmatic middle-ground. By identifying appropriate comparators (by adopting a proxy LSOA geography) and by being highly specific about the particular 'data signatures' expected in the case of impact (by looking at property-level outcomes), we have aimed to produce a convincing and insightful impact assessment that did not compromise the problem-oriented integrity of the intervention (although other factors perhaps did). Along with realist concerns to understand the influence of interventions on actors' decision-making in their specific contexts, (for example the reluctance of hotspot residents to take up home security assessments in the context of diminished police engagement in communities), we suggest these are pragmatic principles that can be used to improve the quality of assessment within a SARA framework.

As a last word, we remind the reader that findings described in this report, and the issues discussed in this chapter, reflect only half of the *Police Effectiveness in a Changing World* project. Our findings from the parallel investigation of police effectiveness in Slough – a place with marked socio-demographic similarities to Luton, but with a strongly contrasting policing context – are presented in a companion report. These two reports also provide the source material for a set of shorter papers exploring key, current issues in policing.

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Appendices[82]

Appendix 2.2: National Advisory Group

Role

The project's National Advisory Group met on five occasions between December 2011 and April 2016 to provide strategic, specialist and practical advice. The group's remit included:

- Offering guidance on methods for conducting the project, from research design to organisational change and practice development.
- Providing advice and support in addressing any problems that emerged as the project developed.
- Providing robust but constructive criticism of the project.
- Providing access to relevant policy and practice mechanisms and knowledge of relevant good practice.
- Advising on, and contributing to, the dissemination of the project's outcomes.

Membership

Sir William Jeffrey KCB	Chair of Trustees, the Police Foundation (*Chair*)
Professor Sir Anthony Bottoms	Emeritus Wolfson Professor of Criminology, University of Cambridge
Jon Collins	CEO Restorative Justice Council (formerly Deputy Director, the Police Foundation)
Andy Feist	Programme Director, Crime and Policing Analysis Unit, Home Office
Kate Flannery OBE	Formerly HM Inspector of Constabulary
Professor Martin Innes	Director, Cardiff University Crime and Security Research Institute; Director, Universities Police Science Institute
Professor Tim Newburn	Professor of Criminology and Social Policy, London School of Economics
Sara Thornton CBE	Chair of the National Police Chiefs' Council (formerly Chief Constable, Thames Valley Police)
Professor Nick Tilley	Department of Security and Crime Science, UCL
Rachel Tuffin OBE	Director, Knowledge, Research and Education, College of Policing
Chris Williams	National Adviser, Home Office (formerly Senior Advisor, Local Government Association and Head of Community Safety, London Borough of Brent)

Bedfordshire Police and Thames Valley Police were represented on the National Advisory Group by their Chief Constables or their representatives.

[82] Appendices are numbered according to the report sections to which they relate.

Appendix 3.1: Analysis phase research questions

Core research questions	Sub questions
Lower Layer Super Output Area (LLSOA) crime and socio-economic trends	
Do long term crime and disorder rates and trends of recorded crime echo socio-economic patterns and trends at (LLSOA) level?	Do burglary and wider offence category rates and trends at LLSOA level (in Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge) echo patterns and changes in: population growth; population density (overcrowding/houses in multiple occupation); population turnover; occupation; housing tenure; and/or deprivation?
Understanding micro-hotspots within the ward	
What are the characteristics and explanations suggested for persistent and emerging micro-location burglary hotspots within these ward areas?	Where are the persistent hotspots for burglary?
	Which hotspots are most responsible for seasonal rises?
	What proportion of burglary offences are repeat or near repeat victimisation? What is the temporal and spatial impact decay (ie over what period and for what distance are near neighbours at risk of burglary following an offence at an original target)?
	How do these hotspots relate to community information about other/connected criminal activity in the micro-locations (eg drug dealing, handling, car crime)?
	How do these hotspots relate to significant routes/places identified in interviews with burglary offenders?
	How do these hotspots relate to environmental design factors (eg alleyway, UPVC doors and other security measures)?
	How do burglary offenders describe places that are attractive/ unattractive /vulnerable targets and their reasons for offending in Chalk Mills and/or Wood Ridge? How do hotspots relate to offenders' everyday activities/routes?
	How do residents of these micro-hotspots describe their experience of crime in these locations? Are they reporting all offences? Do residents feel police and partner agencies respond to their concerns about crime and disorder? What did they expect them to do? What would they be willing to do themselves?

Understanding victims (in ward and hotspot areas)	
What are the characteristics of victims of burglary in these ward areas?	See above for details of work on repeat victimisation and interviews with residents/repeat victims in hotspot areas.
	What are the socio-economic characteristics of victims living in hotspot areas compared to the ward as a whole?
	How does the likelihood of victimisation compare between burglary victims by ethnicity/nationality/age/gender/victim occupation (including students) and their population distribution?
Understanding offenders (ever) arrested for burglary who live in or offend in these ward areas	
What are the relationships between burglary offending and drug use (in Luton compared to the two ward areas)?	What proportion of offenders (living or arrested for burglary in these wards) test positive for particular drugs (heroin, crack, cocaine)? Do those arrested for burglary who test positive for drugs commit different offences on average from those who do not test positive for drugs?
	What proportion of burglary offences for which there is an identified offender are committed by a small number of prolific offenders?
	Do prison release dates of the most prolific offenders correlate with increases in burglary offending in these different ward areas? Is there a difference between Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge?
	Is there a difference in likelihood of testing positive for drugs and otherwise between offenders with a prolific burglary and more generalist arrest history?
	How do offenders engaged in burglary describe the relationship between their drug use and offending, and other factors contributing to their offending behaviour? Eg did they offend before beginning to use drugs? To what extent do they offend to fund their drug habit?
What other factors contribute to offending behaviour among those arrested for burglary who live or offend in these ward areas?	Of those offenders arrested for burglary who live or offend in the ward areas and receive a probation/YOS assessment, what other factors are assessed as related to their offending (ie among those who test positive for drugs/do not test positive)? How do these differ?

Are there any other significant characteristics of burglary offenders in these ward areas?	What are the demographic characteristics of burglary offenders who are/are not problematic drug users living and offending in these wards (ie age, gender, and ethnicity)?
	What proportion of those arrested for burglary (who live/offend in these wards) in the past two years burgle alone or co-offend?
What is the relationship between offender residence and the location of burglary offences?	Do Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge have high rates of offender residence? Are areas of high offender residence related to/the same as areas of high victimisation?
	What is the average and range of distances travelled by offenders from address to burglary offence? Are some offenders travelling long distances?
	How do drug-using burglary offenders differ from non-drug using generalist offenders in their distance travelled?
Understanding inter-relationships between drugs and stolen goods markets and burglary in the wards	
How do those close to local drug and stolen goods markets describe the connections to burglary in these areas?	How do burglary offenders describe the inter-relationships between burglary, stolen goods and drugs markets?
	How do burglary offenders and residents talk about the drug markets in Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge?
Understanding organisational practice and barriers to improvement	
What do police and partner agency officers and staff identify as key organisational barriers to understanding and addressing crime in these wards?	What approaches do police and partners currently use to reduce or control burglary rates in these areas?
	What do police and partner agency staff identify as barriers to or opportunities for developing sustainable approaches to reducing burglary and related crime and disorder in these wards?
	Are there any particular barriers to information sharing between police and health/social care/housing that hinder effective development of sustainable crime reduction approaches?

Appendix 3.2: Burglary rates and Census variables – correlation analysis

Pearson correlation coefficients for correlation between Census variables and crime per 1,000 population and burglary figures per 1,000 households for April 2005 to March 2013 and April 2012 to March 2013, across all LSOAs in Luton.

	All crime, April 2005 – March 2013	All crime, April 2012 – March 2013	Burglary, April 2005 – March 2013	Burglary, April 2012 – March 2013
Per cent change in population from 2001 to 2011 census	0.348***	0.407***	0.365***	0.396***
Per cent households deprived on at least one dimension	0.322***	0.350***	0.323***	0.289**
Per cent households deprived on at least two dimensions	0.290**	0.316***	0.257**	0.253**
Per cent households deprived on at least three dimensions	0.305***	0.336***	0.316**	0.271**
Per cent households deprived on all four dimensions	0.376***	0.429***	0.397**	0.259**
Per cent residents aged 16-74 in employment	-0.327***	-0.354***	-0.298**	-0.294**
Per cent residents aged 16-74 unemployed	0.230**	0.242**	0.328***	0.261**
Per cent residents aged 16-74 unemployed, aged 16-24	0.189*	0.187*	0.249**	0.232**
Per cent residents aged 16-74 unemployed, never worked	0.110	0.112	0.246**	0.253**
Per cent households with families	-0.548***	-0.579***	-0.281**	-0.027
Per cent families in households with children	0.048	0.041	-0.193*	-0.216**
Per cent households in socially rented accommodation	0.277**	0.265**	0.128	0.030
Per cent households in privately rented accommodation	0.414***	0.478***	0.456***	0.303***
Per cent households in socially or privately rented accommodation	0.509***	0.546***	0.425***	0.194*
Per cent households with more than one person per room	0.116	0.151*	0.287**	0.348***
Per cent households with room occupancy rating of -1 or less	0.462***	0.513***	0.444***	0.339***
Per cent households with bedroom occupancy rating of -1 or less	0.150	0.185*	0.295**	0.298***
Per cent residents not born in the UK	0.292**	0.338***	0.439***	0.430**

*Asterisks show one-tailed statistical significance of correlation: *** for p<0.001, ** for p<0.01, * for p<0.05; the absence of an asterisk means the correlation is not statistically significant.*

Appendix 3.3: Seasonality and darkness analysis

Seasonality

The average daily burglary rate for every month between April 2005 and March 2013 was calculated and compared against a theoretical expected value (the average day rate for each year – which is an appropriate expected value given the lack of an overall trend), the average amount by which each month deviated from the expected value, across the eight years, is shown in the table below along with the maximum and minimum variation and the number of years (out of eight) in which that month was above and below the average for the year – and the statistical significance of this at the 95 per cent and 90 per cent levels.

	Average deviation from annual mean	Maximum	Minimum	Number of years in which above annual mean	Number of years in which below annual mean	Statistically significant* at 95% or 90%
April	-0.51	0.66	-1.07	1	7	90%
May	-0.17	0.89	-1.11	4	4	–
June	-0.61	0.27	-1.70	1	7	90%
July	-0.47	0.41	-1.36	2	6	–
August	-0.63	0.83	-1.60	2	6	–
September	-0.68	0.92	-1.63	2	6	–
October	0.15	1.11	-0.62	5	3	–
November	1.34	2.96	0.09	8	0	–
December	0.43	1.61	-1.21	6	2	–
January	0.38	1.64	-0.70	5	3	–
February	0.39	2.27	-1.16	4	4	–
March	0.36	2.60	-0.79	4	4	–

* Based on a binomial distribution the probability that any month would be either above or below average in all eight of the observed years is 0.0078 (ie is less than 95 per cent, two-tailed); the probability that any month is above or below average in at least seven out of eight years is 0.0703 (ie is greater than 95 per cent but less than 90 per cent, two tailed).

Darkness analysis

Each of the 4,536 recorded burglaries between April 2011 and March 2013 was assessed to establish whether it could be definitively known to have happened during the hours of darkness (this involved comparing daily sunset and sunrise times with the recorded dates and times setting out the window during which each burglary is known to have occurred).

For every month in this period the average daily burglary rate was calculated, along with the average daily *darkness* burglary rate. These were correlated with the average number of hours of darkness in each month, the average hours of darkness between sunset and midnight (the length of the evening) and the average hours between midnight and sun rise. Correlation coefficients and r squared values are shown in the table below.

	Correlation coefficient (r)	**r^2**
Daily mean number of all burglaries		
with hours between sunset and sunrise	0.228	0.052
Daily mean number of burglaries known to have been carried out between sunset and sundown		
with hours between sunset and sunrise	0.821	0.671
with hours from sunset to midnight	0.843	0.692
with hours from midnight to sunrise	0.754	0.569

The following observations are made:

- The total hours of darkness account for only five per cent of the variation in the (mean daily) number of burglaries per month (r squared = 0.052).
- The total hours of darkness account for 67 per cent of the variation in the (daily mean) number of darkness burglaries per month, and therefore 33 per cent of the variance is not accounted for.
- The hours of darkness, sunset and midnight account for more of the variance in the (daily mean) number of darkness burglaries per month (69 per cent) than either the total hours of darkness (67 per cent) or the hours from midnight to sunrise (57 per cent).

Appendix 3.4: Offender cluster analysis – characteristics of cluster groups and sub-cluster groups

The offender typology described in section 3.4 is a theoretical interpretation of the output of cluster analysis performed on a descriptive data-set relating to 215 individuals charged with one or more burglary offences in Luton between April 2011 and March 2013. The database drew on information derived from crime reports, the Police National Computer (PNC), custody drug testing results and probation OASys assessments.

An initial round of cluster analysis produced four clusters varying considerably in size. The largest of these (containing 118 individuals) was then subjected to a second round of cluster analysis which produced four sub-clusters. Each of the clusters and sub-clusters is described below.

Cluster 1: Young adult burglars

This large group consisted of 118 individuals, more than two thirds (69 per cent) of those allocated to any cluster[83]. These individuals accounted for 59 per cent of all the 'accused records' within Luton during the two year period. This group were distinctive from the other three main clusters owing to their:

- Younger age (average 23 years).
- Older age at first conviction (average 18 years old)[84].
- Greater likelihood of having offended with another.
- Lowest likelihood of testing positive for opiates.
- Lowest average number of burglaries in a dwelling (in Luton, in the last two years).
- Greater likelihood of having convictions for violence (and being the only group to have convictions for robbery) within the previous five years.
- Greater likelihood of being assessed as having alcohol linked to their offending.

As a large and strategically important group, with a substantial degree of internal variation, it was important to gain further understanding of these younger burglars. A second phase of cluster analysis was therefore conducted to explore differences *within* the group. This revealed four sub-groups – again reflecting progressively older age groups, but also exhibiting differences in offending patterns and drivers, suggestive of typological rather than merely generational differences.

Sub-cluster 1.1: Little-known late entrants

Sub-cluster 1.1 consists of 28 offenders (16 per cent of those allocated to any cluster), who committed just 10 per cent of Luton's burglaries with a known offender, about whom relatively little is known (owing to their limited offending history). Compared against other Young Adult burglars they are:

- The youngest (mean age of 20), but have the oldest age of first conviction (suggesting that many may be destined to have short offending careers).
- Those with the least extensive criminal records, with fewer having offended in every category of crime (except for burglary in a dwelling where they are closer to the average).

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[83] 44 offenders were not allocated to any cluster. These included those where no PNC record could be matched and those with no previous convictions. It should be borne in mind that, in addition to the identified clusters, there are a group of first time offenders about whom little was known.

[84] The mean age of all the offenders for whom an age at first conviction could be calculated was 17.8 years, with a very wide range (min 10, maximum 48 years) and a median age of 16. The older age of onset of this younger cluster fits with the desistance literature: those whose offending persists into later life (including those in clusters 2 to 4) had younger ages of criminal onset.

- Least likely to have been subject to a custody drug test and unlikely to have tested positive for drugs (none had tested positive for opiates).
- Unlikely to have a probation OASys assessment (hence little is known about drivers and needs).

Sub-cluster 1.2: Young generalists

Offenders in sub-group 1.2 are only slightly older than sub-group 1.1 (mean age 21) but have more than double the average number of previous convictions, and are therefore more open to description. The group includes 37 individuals (22 per cent of those attributed to a cluster group), and account for 12 per cent of Luton's 'accused' records during the two years.

- Like group 1.1, very few had tested positive for drugs and none had tested positive for opiates (although 40 per cent had some form of previous drugs offence – which may relate to cannabis use).
- Their criminal histories are comparatively modest (average of 10 previous convictions) but include a range of offence types including other acquisitive crimes, robbery and violence.
- They were the most likely group to have committed a burglary (in Luton) accompanied by another offender.
- They were identified as having a variety of needs and drivers including education, training and employment (50 per cent), finance (68 per cent), drugs (67 per cent), and attitudes (68 per cent). The most frequently identified driver was 'lifestyle' (82 per cent).

Sub-cluster 1.3: Cocaine-using generalists

Sub-group 1.3 includes 28 offenders who were, on average, slightly older than those already described. In many ways these can be viewed as similar in profile to the *Young Generalists* (1.2) described above, but are distinguished both by more extensive criminal histories and a greater incidence of positive drug tests, specifically for cocaine. This group:

- Had an average age of 25 and were (on average) first convicted aged 18 – they are older and started earlier than those previously described.
- Had an average of 24 previous convictions but only an average of three convictions for burglary – they are 'generalist' offenders and occasional burglars.
- Had committed more violence and robbery offences than any of the other young adult clusters.

Nearly half (42 per cent) of this group had tested positive for cocaine but only five per cent had tested positive for opiates. Furthermore, those assessed by probation tended to be identified as having drugs drivers (82 per cent), accommodation needs (63 per cent) and relationship issues (79 per cent), however (like sub-group 1.2) the most frequently identified driver related to lifestyle (100 per cent).

Sub-clusters 1.2 and 1.3 (combined) form the generalist 'lifestyle' offender group within the typology.

Sub-cluster 1.4: Young poly-drug using acquisitive offenders

While sub-groups 1.2 and 1.3 can be seen as sharing many of the same characteristics, sub-group 1.4 is distinctly different. It should be noted that while they make up only 15 per cent of the offender group, they account for nearly a quarter of all burglary charges in Luton. In contrast to the other young adult groups:

- Most of these offenders had tested positive for drugs, 64 per cent had tested positive for cocaine, 41 per cent had tested positive for opiates and 32 per cent had tested positive for both.
- They had more extensive criminal careers (with an average of 56 previous convictions); however these were heavily biased towards acquisitive crime.
- While, on average, they had committed more than twice the number of previous burglaries of any other Young Adult subgroup, and four times the number of shop-lifting offences, they had committed fewer violent crimes and robberies than subgroup 1.3.
- They were least likely to have been charged with burglary as part of a group.

All of this group were identified as having a drugs driver and more than two thirds also had an alcohol driver. Linked to this substance abuse, and in contrast to other sub-groups, more than half (57 per cent) were assessed as having emotional issues associated with their offending.

Cluster 2: Adult, persistent poly-drug using burglars

Cluster 2 accounts for a quarter of the offender group and a third of the offences for which an offender was charged. They are best understood as an older generation of the younger poly-drug using burglars described in sub-cluster 1.4 and, like them, account for a disproportionately large proportion of Luton's burglary charges. They are, on average, 35 years old – well beyond the typical desistance age, having started young (average 15 years old at first conviction). Also, they:

- Are most likely to have tested positive for opiates (50 per cent) and for both opiates and cocaine (34 per cent).
- Have the highest average number of convictions for burglary in a dwelling.
- Had the highest average number of charges for burglaries in a dwelling within Luton, in the last two years.
- Have high rates of shoplifting, non-dwelling burglaries and 'breach' offences and low rates of robbery and violence (particularly in recent years), and travelled further from home to commit burglaries.
- Were less likely to co-offend than their younger counterparts (sub-group 1.4).
- Had a range of identified needs and drivers – most notably drugs (93 per cent), emotional issues (62 per cent) and relationship problems (69 per cent) – and showed no signs of desistance – their rate of offending in the most recent period of their career is no lower than in previous phases.

Sub-cluster 1.4 and cluster 2 have been combined within the typology as problematic poly-drug users. A clear pathway between the groups is suggested for those younger drug using offenders who do not desist.

Cluster 3: 'Revolving-door' acquisitive specialists

Cluster 3 consists of 10 individuals who were older and have persisted even longer than those in cluster 2. Although they have a similar number of previous convictions to those in the poly-drug using group (described above), they should not be viewed as simply an older group of the same type of offenders.

- They had an average age of 47 and had first been convicted aged 14.
- Their offending is less clearly linked to (poly) drug use – three of the ten had tested positive for cocaine and only two for opiates.
- They had committed a similar amount of acquisitive offences, over their careers, to those in cluster 2 (although given longer careers, offending was at a lower intensity).
- However, they had committed more burglaries (average of 14 per offender compared to nine for cluster 2), more burglaries in dwellings (seven compared to four), fewer shoplifting offences (six compared to 14) and (within the last five years) more car crime (1.3 compared with 0.7). It appears that they favour more 'serious' or 'specialist' forms of acquisitive crime.
- They typically have long gaps in their conviction history, indicative of lengthy prison sentences reflecting more serious offending types (which would also explain the lower overall offending intensity).
- Probation assessments reflected a range of needs notably finance (100 per cent) and accommodation (80 per cent), both of which may be linked to resettlement difficulties following custody.

This group forms the third and smallest group within the offender typology.

Cluster 4: Older outliers

Cluster 4 includes just two offenders who are essentially outliers in terms of age (average age 67), however it is interesting to note that they also had the youngest average age of onset (13 years old). Although prolific offenders with more than 100 convictions each, they are not prolific burglars, but essentially shoplifters who occasionally commit other acquisitive offences, including commercial burglary and occasional domestic burglaries.

Appendix 3.7: Offender residence and Census variables – correlation analysis

Correlation between socio-demographic variables (Census 2011) and number of offenders resident 2011-13, across all 121 LSOAs in Luton		
	r	**Statistical significance**
Per cent change in population from 2001 to 2011 census	0.477	$p < 0.001$
Per cent households deprived on at least one dimension	0.434	$p < 0.001$
Per cent households deprived on at least two dimensions	0.415	$p < 0.001$
Per cent households deprived on at least three dimensions	0.462	$p < 0.001$
Per cent households deprived on all four dimensions	0.494	$p < 0.001$
Per cent residents aged 16-74 in employment	-0.442	$p < 0.001$
Per cent residents aged 16-74 unemployed	0.399	$p < 0.001$
Per cent residents aged 16-74 unemployed, aged 16-24	0.346	$p < 0.001$
Per cent residents aged 16-74 unemployed, never worked	0.314	$p < 0.001$
Per cent households with families	-0.419	$p < 0.001$
Per cent families in households with children	-0.165	$p < 0.05$
Per cent households in socially rented accommodation	0.252	$p < 0.01$
Per cent households in privately rented accommodation	0.540	$p < 0.001$
Per cent households in socially or privately rented accommodation	0.580	$p < 0.001$
Per cent households with more than one person per room	0.365	$p < 0.001$
Per cent households with room occupancy rating of -1 or less	0.626	$p < 0.001$
Per cent households with bedroom occupancy rating of -1 or less	0.373	$p < 0.001$
Per cent residents not born in the UK	0.466	$p < 0.001$
Correlation coefficients and statistical significance (one-tailed) for correlation between demographic variables and number of offenders resident, across all 121 LSOAs in Luton.		

Appendix 4.3: Core programme objectives, tactics and supplementary options

(Adapted from proposal document – February 2014)

Improve the access to security of tenants living in private rented accommodation

- Provide advice and support to tenants (taking account of language, literacy and unfamiliarity with UK rights) to enable them to seek repairs/improvements in security.
- Approach landlords in hotspot areas to offer a security survey.
- Offer other incentives (reputation/recognition) to private landlords to improve property security.
- Work with other stakeholders assisting tenants in looking for housing to establish incentives/recognition (eg university/letting agents).
- Reinforce advice and support of tenants in seeking repairs/improvements as part of the cocooning response when an incident has occurred.
- Use housing enforcement powers where appropriate (and enable referral to housing enforcement team via other agencies eg fire, police and ASB team).

Improve the access to security of low income home owners in hotspot areas

- Offer security survey and advice about available grants to subsidise improvements and reinforce offer during cocooning operations when an incident has occurred.

Increase the resilience (collective efficacy) of those living with limited access to security

- Build community development into other work, for example:
  - Hold small scale consultation events in the evening/weekends with hotspot residents to influence problem solving approaches.
  - Include introductions to neighbours in cocooning responses or encouraging neighbours to contact each other post burglary.
  - Include clean-up days or other events to encourage residents to meet.
- Encourage neighbours to contact/welcome new tenants.
- Communicate effectively any steps taken to address issues that have been reported.

Reduce the impact of burglary events on victims post event

- Provide crime prevention advice that reduces the impact of loss of laptops or other ICT with photographs and work/studies (eg using cloud storage and backing up).
- Increase likelihood of recovery by piloting use of tracking technology (see additional option 1).
- Signpost victims to advice on financial support/debt, insurance and other support services when responding to incidents and/or as part of cocooning 'plus'.

Environmental design

- Alley-gating initiatives on public land in consultation with residents.
- Provision of incentive scheme to low income home owners for alley-gating in hotspots.
- Work with social landlords and private landlords (along similar lines to target hardening schemes) to promote alley-gating in hotspots.
- Improve lighting, clear obstructions, and install CCTV where appropriate.
- Work – as above – with residents to increase natural surveillance, especially after an incident.
- Increase visible guardianship – police/PCSO patrols supplemented by other street activity, eg street cleaning timing.

Mitigating the impact of the drug market on hotspot areas

- Emphasis may be best placed on communicating agencies' awareness of concerns and the action taken, in order to build community confidence.
- Link work in hotspots to initiatives around offender management, eg engagement in problem solving.

Predicting and averting 'near-repeats'

- Tighten up processes to provide speedy 'cocooning' response to incidents and review possibilities of strengthening the intervention, for example through signposting victims to support and advice (to build resilience), addressing access to security issues, building intelligence, fostering community efficacy and referring on to other agencies as needed.
- May need a tailored approach to cocooning and problem solving to address complex cases in some of the most difficult locations.
- Multi-agency problem solving approach focusing on vulnerable flat blocks and HMOs, in consultation with residents, including offenders living in them, to ensure likelihood of reoffending and vulnerability of residents effectively addressed.

Predicting and averting the autumn peak

- Reinforce on-going resilience/awareness in hotspots and during cocooning responses in October in the lead up to the clock change. Hand out light timers appropriate to problem at this time.
- Patrols and other agency presence timed to ensure dusk presence.

Option 1: Making best use of tracking and location technology

An intervention to utilise and develop best practice in relation to location and tracking technology in relation to stolen ICT could include the following components:

- Training of crime recording officers to ask questions around tracking devices when a burglary is reported – and fast-tracking of suitable cases to officers on the ground.
- Training of officers on the ground in how to use/follow trackers, and providing the equipment to do so.
- Publicising the use of 'approved' trackers to the public at large, and educating them on how to install different products.

Option 2: Intelligence development and pro-active police operations targeting stolen goods handlers

A proactive police operation could be established to develop intelligence relating to local handlers of stolen goods, the burglars who supply them and their onward criminal networks, with a view to disruption and enforcement activity. The operation would need to be carefully designed to ensure that plausible mechanisms for bringing about a reduction in burglary were activated and optimised.

Option 3: Improving service coordination for offenders with complex needs

While a range of more radical (and expensive) drug treatment options were put forward by workshop participants and have been considered, an initiative aimed at the better co-ordination of mental health, drugs treatment and other services for offenders with complicated diagnosis may be feasible. It would have potential to improve outcomes and reduce reoffending among this particularly problematic and entrenched offender group.

Option 4: Improving coordination of housing provision on release from prison

A package of prison-release housing coordination could include:

- 'Through the Gate' housing case-work
- Better information for practitioners
- An advocacy service for offenders

Option 5: Increased use of pre-sentence restorative justice

Triage and conditional cautioning options (for young offenders, young adults or others) were favoured by workshop participants however the link from alternative processes for dealing with 'low-level'/first-time offences, to bringing about reductions in future burglary was not direct enough to be considered as part of this project. However options remain around the increased use of pre-sentence restorative justice for young adults and other appropriate cases for those convicted of burglary.

Appendix 4.4: Initial actions list for development by local working group – April 2014

Action	Lead	Partners	Priority rank
IA1: Finalise hotspot polygons and identify those most appropriate to work in.	The Police Foundation	Police LBC – Community Safety	1
IA2: Review/update a burglary prevention package for residents, including: • Basic target hardening and environmental design • Lists of grants available to different groups which can be used for security upgrades • Rights as a tenant in asking for a security upgrade • Prevention advice regarding communal entrances to residences • Encourage neighbour interaction/ looking out for each other These need to take into account potential language and literacy barriers.	LBC – Community Safety	The Police Foundation Police	1
IA3: Develop a procedure for 'Enhanced Cocooning' and victim follow-up (including support package) in hotspots.	Police	The Police Foundation	1
IA4: Review and develop a process around how security assessments will be managed and delivered, and by whom. Then review and develop a security assessment to be used by practitioners in assessing household security needs. This should be able to function as an initial assessment, and a follow-up assessment.	Police	The Police Foundation LBC – Community Safety	1
IA5: Develop an 'assessment and assistance pathway' for *homeowners* of advice, support and follow-up to increase levels of home security.	The Police Foundation	Police LBC – Community Safety	2
IA6: Investigate whether there are any levers (or enforcement measures) that can be used to encourage private landlords to improve security. There is a need to investigate what can be used by different agencies and in what circumstances.	LBC – Housing	LBC – Community Safety Police Fire	1

IA7: Develop an 'assessment and assistance pathway' for *landlords and tenants* of advice, support, follow-up and potential levers to increase levels of home security.	The Police Foundation	Police LBC – Community Safety	2
IA8: Develop and provide training for all officers who might be involved in delivering: • New crime prevention packages and advice • Security assessment • Enhanced cocooning • Victim support package	Police	The Police Foundation LBC – Community Safety	2
IA9: Investigate the use of multi-agency referrals for residents lacking home security (similar to Home Shield).	LBC	The Police Foundation Police	1
IA10: Develop and/or decide on branding for the project, ie if it is to be branded as part of soLUTiONs then there is probably still a need for an agreed project name, and standardised project blurb etc.	LBC – Communications	Police – Communications The Police Foundation	1
IA11: Identify multi-agency resources for street survey	LBC		3
IA12: Identify a 'Problem Solving Hub' for the project	Police		3
IA13: Investigate the role of community development in the project, and where they can add value	LBC		1
IA14: Development and dissemination of a record keeping process for the project	The Police Foundation		3


Overview of Core Programme Model for Hotspots
Core Programme Objectives
Improve the access to security of tenants living in private rented accommodation
Improve the access to security of low income home owners in hotspot areas
Increase the resilience (community efficacy) of those living with limited access to security (all tenure)
Reduce the impact of burglary events on victims
Improve environmental design to deter and prevent burglary
Mitigating the impact of the drug market on hotspot areas
Anticipate and avert repeats and near-repeats
Anticipate and avert the autumn peak
IA1
IA2
Resident advice and support package – Develop burglary package for residents in hotspots:
General prevention advice
Target hardening for owners (grants)
Target hardening for tenants (rights)
How to reduce impact if burgled
'Look out for each other' / NW messages
Information about programme in area
Offer of assessment / assistance
IA3
Cocooning
Develop hotspot victim visit and cocooning protocol (build in community resilience)
IA4
IA5
Assessment and assistance pathway for home owners – Develop appointments system for managing target hardening assessment requests. Identify and train advisors, identify and facilitate access to available grants. Design follow-up procedures to expedite and monitor progress.
IA6
IA7
Assessment and assistance pathway for tenants & landlords – Process map 'general' and 'concern' pathways of advice for tenants and offer for landlords to encourage target hardening. Identify rewards and incentives. Clarify enforcement powers / referral triggers.
IA6
IA10
Partner referrals
Leaflets (self referral)
Hotspot 'launch' events
IA11
Hotspot street survey
Multi agency visits of hotspots
Identify 'concern' properties for target hardening (inc. previous victims) and encourage into assess. Pathways.
Identify environmental design improvement opportunities
Identify of issues for referral to problem solving
IA12
Hotspot specific problem solving
Identify 'hub' for problem solving co-ordination
Identification of specific local generators
Identify community intelligence e.g. drugs markets, issues in flat blocks, etc
Community consultation on environmental design proposals
Problem solving delivery
Environmental design
Enforcement activity
Other activity
Patrolling and increased guardianship
Seasonal operations
Response to identified clusters
Identifying other guardianship
IA13
Other localised 'efficacy' and resilience building
Local events e.g. in advance of clock change
IA14
Address level record keeping
to enable evaluation

Appendix 5.1: Initial evaluation findings and progress reviews

Review 1: Conclusions and next steps – (December 2014)

Conclusions

The launch of the soLUTiONs Burglary Reduction Initiative brought together a multi-agency working-group to deliver a core programme of work in long-term burglary hotspots; initially focusing on delivering physical target-hardening where most needed. In doing so it tapped into a willingness to 'work together' and provided a number of local practitioners with a refreshing opportunity to work in a different way, with new colleagues and to step out of the day-to-day barrage of short term demands. The working group's most significant achievement to date has been the delivery of a set of hotspot street surveys. These took substantial effort and persistence to organise (securing sufficient multi-agency staffing proved a particular challenge), however they appear to have gone relatively smoothly, and achieved their aims of identifying vulnerable premises, delivering crime prevention advice to residents and offering further assistance to those at risk.

Resident take-up of home security assessments has been very low, with only three per cent of vulnerable households (and less than 0.5 per cent of all households) accepting the offer. This means that it has not been possible to fully test the tasking and referral processes put in place to deliver these assessments and to progress subsequent actions. There are, however, indications of weaknesses within these processes (including in recording activity so that subsequent actions can be effectively coordinated), which have potential to undermine quality of service and the residents' experiences. Similarly, there appear to be flaws in the processes through which a 'premium' cocooning response within the hotspot areas is tasked and coordinated.

Following initial successes in ensuring a multi-agency delivery commitment, there are indications that follow-up work has been less of a 'team-effort' and is viewed less positively by delivery staff as a result. This raises questions about the on-going ownership and organisation of the initiative going forward.

Practitioners tend to see the low resident uptake as symptomatic of the 'transience' and 'insularity' of residents in these localities, however some are also critical of the way in which the police have apparently disengaged from these (and other communities) by paring back local policing and through the regular abstraction of PCSOs to other duties. Despite this, practitioners also have a number of positive suggestions for improving uptake which could be explored further.

The soLUTiONs BRI has been shaped (and is likely to continue to be shaped) by the demand and resource context of service delivery in Luton at the current time. This is felt acutely by practitioners as:

- A sense that delivering planned/pro-active work is made more difficult by a multitude of 'everyday' factors ultimately rooted in reduced funding.
- Some uncertainty about how the limited resources available should best be directed among a myriad of competing priorities – (even among the working-group, opinion was evenly split on whether the time and resource being put into the BRI would be *better spent elsewhere*).

- A recognition that police restructuring has thrown up obstacles to proactive/preventative crime reduction work (including in relation to analysis, crime prevention and local policing).
- The appreciation that, despite a general willingness to work across agencies to tackle crime, and a feeling that things are 'getting better' in this area, the structures and processes for doing so are still being (re-)developed.

Overall, these resource concerns raise questions about the sustainability of the level of activity delivered under the initiative to date, particularly in the area of project management (which has been largely provided by the Police Foundation).

Although progress has been limited, there is evidence that introducing the concept of 'collective efficacy' to the project has found some resonance with strategic leads and links are being made to the 'engagement gap' and broader crime reduction and community resilience concerns.

Although the outputs of the BRI in its first months have been limited, outcome analysis suggests that levels of burglary in the target hotspot-areas are slightly reduced compared with the equivalent period last year and substantially below the nine-year average. This is against a backdrop of year-on-year increases in the rest of Luton (including in the rest of Chalk Mills and Wood Ridge), while it is too early to draw even the most tentative conclusions about impact, this data is consistent with a potentially protective mechanism linked to raising awareness and provision of crime prevention advice in the target areas – this is a cause for persistence and keeps the possibility of collecting good evidence of a positive impact, over its full year initiative year, very much alive.

Next Steps

Based on these emerging findings we would recommend that key leads consider endorsing a number of actions and development areas for the next phase of the BRI. There are also considerable links and connections between these strands which should be recognised and exploited.

1. Persist with target hardening in the hotspot areas

Practitioners reinforced the need for persistence and determination in following through delivery plans in Luton; significant effort has been invested in attempting to target harden premises in the hotspot areas and there are (tentative) indicators that this might be having a protective effect. There is more work to do in this area. We recommend that key leads:

- Consider who is best placed to own the on-going and 'hands-on' delivery of this strand of the work, including elements of project management, tasking and compliance management.
- Task the working group to improve the collection of output data, allowing referral process issues and activity-blockages to be better examined and addressed.
- Instigate a review of 'cocooning' allocation and tasking processes, to examine the reasons for apparent delivery gaps and identify how the efficiency of processes can be improved (the Police Foundation can assist with this).

- Task the working group to develop new channels for promoting security awareness, encouraging uptake of the HSA and referrals to the HIA in the hotspot areas, including:
  - Developing a media / communications strategy.
  - Exploring developing links with existing community groups to promote the message.
  - Engaging with 'trusted professionals', to help convey the message and carry the offer.
  - Exploring options for enhancing the offer (through, for instance exploring funding, sponsorship opportunities or developing lists of accredited providers).

2. Build on the initial exploration of 'collective efficacy'

The concept of collective efficacy has been discussed with practitioners and is beginning to inform thinking about community resilience and the interaction between the police, partner agencies, residents in vulnerable areas and interlocutor groups. Links with broader work streams are being made. A separate, smaller workgroup made up of key partners and local residents groups will begin to meet to discuss this strand of work in the New Year. We recommend that this group is tasked to:

- Develop key community contacts among residents in hotspot areas.
- Work with those residents to understand local community problems or issues (including issues beyond burglary and crime).
- Empower and encourage those residents to work together and with PCSOs and other partners to solve local problems and enhance their communities,
  - and through doing so develop, stronger more supportive relationships which are supported by, but not dependent on, the police and partners.

3. Develop a hotspot problem identification and problem-solving strand

Although it formed part of the initial core programme, progress has not been made on developing a 'problem solving hub' for the initiative. There is good evidence of the effectiveness of taking a problem solving approach in small 'micro-locations' and despite some initial local observations during the street surveys, this option has not been fully exploited. This approach can support the work described above and address some of the deficits in local knowledge/engagement. One potential model for this approach might include:

- Identifying individual 'hotspot owners' (PCSOs, PCs or appropriate LBC staff – a staggered approach could be taken if it is not possible to identify owners for all nine areas at once).
- Tasking, resourcing (and potentially training) each owner to identify specific local problems and issues which might be linked to an increased risk of burglary, for instance through:
  - Reading and reviewing recent crime reports.
  - Identifying any existing intelligence reports.
  - Re-visiting the hotspots to identify further vulnerable premises or environmental issues.

  - Gathering community intelligence by engaging with residents.
- Owners bringing the problems identified to a specially convened multi-agency working group for problem-solving and response development.

It has not been possible to catalyse local activity in relation to the 'technology tracking' strand of the project; it is suggested that key leads formally drop this strand of work.

The Police Foundation will feed project findings into on-going work relating to provision of support services for offenders.

Review 2: Conclusions and Next Steps – (May 2015)

Conclusions

With considerable investment of effort, the BRI 'core programme' got off to a positive start in 2014, but struggled to maintain impetus during the middle-part of the initiative year. This was the result of a combination of factors including unexpected personnel changes and challenges securing attendance at project work-group meetings. A number of the intervention 'strands' originally planned have been dropped due to a lack of take-up by local agencies, and between December and April barely any activity took place 'on the ground'. With considerable persistence and following an emergency meeting in mid-April, commitment was secured from the police to resource a further round of hotspot resident engagement, and from LBC to support development work on 'collective efficacy' – and in the very recent period some project momentum has been regained.

Given this mid-term stagnation, this report has focused on attempting to understand the context in which the BRI is being implemented, developing themes introduced in the previous (Wave 1) evaluation report. A number of issues have been highlighted, notably the on-going impact of austerity on community policing and more general proactive capacity, changing partner priorities, including the de-prioritisation of burglary by the CSP, and a partnership delivery function rebuilding after a period of retrenchment. These contextual factors will continue to be examined during the remainder of the implementation year (to the end of July 2015) and the Police Foundation would welcome additional perspectives and insights to ensure that partners in Luton recognise the picture being described, here and in future reports, a number of which will be published.

Given these implementation challenges it is unsurprising that the BRI does not appear to be on course to deliver a statistically robust reduction in burglary. However tentative indicators that crime prevention advice may have insulated the target areas to some degree against the broader upward trend are intriguing, given that they might indicate an effective and 'resource-light' mechanism.

While many of the observations in this report suggest strategic challenges beyond the scope and timeframe of this project, they also inform the suggested next steps for the remaining two (plus) months of the BRI, which are set out below.

Next Steps

- Recent weeks have seen the BRI regain some of the momentum lost in early 2015. To capitalise on this we would ask key leads to **clarify the operational leadership** (both police and LBC) of the project for the remaining period (and for any subsequent legacy work).
- Much has been invested in delivering targeted 'target-hardening' advice and support in the BRI hotspot areas. During the remaining period we would suggest exploring **less resource intensive methods of communicating home security messages** (posters, press, newsletters, community groups etc.). To aid this, it is acceptable at this stage of the project to allow the geographic focus to widen from the specific hotspots to ward level (or perhaps even wider).
- In conjunction with the above we recommend that the BRI **continues to offer and promote the Home Security Assessment service** including keeping open active referral processes to LBC Housing Services and the Home Improvement Agency.
- In order to facilitate this it will be necessary to **identify a coordinator/administrator/expeditor** to ensure the smooth coordination, tasking and completion of the small number of HSA requests, onward referrals and follow-up work. **Consideration should be given to building a 'call-back' function into this process** to monitor the overall quality of service and maintain dialogue with hotspot residents.
- **Build on the first Wood Ridge *'Neighbourhood Problem-Solving Group'***, with continued involvement and support from the police and council at subsequent meetings. Encourage and assist the group to clarify its goals and take on a piece of **resident–led neighbourhood improvement activity**, broadening involvement out to involve other local people where possible.
- **Seek to instigate an equivalent *Neighbourhood Problem-Solving Group* in Chalk Mills**.
- **Support the LBC Community Development Team in organising a seminar/presentation** (in conjunction with field specialists Mutual Gain) to a broad based partnership audience, which will focus on approaches to building 'collective efficacy' and social capital. Ensure this is linked to the emerging neighbourhood group(s) and the expansion of police community teams within the restructured policing model.
- Ensure that **police provide an input to the Home Improvement Agency's review/re-launch of guidelines for landlords**, to ensure appropriate household security recommendations are included and any opportunities to engage and influence local landlords are exploited.
- **Consider arrangements for ensuring an appropriate legacy of the BRI project**, including using the learning from the project to define a (police) 'core-business' approach to burglary. **Consider the most appropriate local lead to take this work forward**.

Appendix 5.2: BRI 'while you were out' card

Appendix 6.4: Proportion of Luton burglaries in BRI target areas 2005/06 to 2014/15



Appendix 6.8: Burglary rate change in Luton LSOAs 2013/14 to 2014/15 (part 1)

LSOA	Dwellings	Burglaries 2013/14	Rate per 1,000 dwellings 2013/14	Burglaries 2014/15	Rate per 1,000 dwellings 2014/15	Change in rate	Z	P	Rank: Greatest decrease to greatest increase
068	466	19	40.8	6	12.9	-27.9	-3.39	0.00	1
047	567	19	33.5	8	14.1	-19.4	-2.41	0.02	2
026	757	16	21.1	7	9.2	-11.9	-1.55	0.12	3
010	597	20	33.5	13	21.8	-11.7	-1.53	0.13	4
015	632	17	26.9	10	15.8	-11.1	-1.45	0.15	5
013	649	13	20.0	6	9.2	-10.8	-1.42	0.16	6
075	470	12	25.5	7	14.9	-10.6	-1.40	0.16	7
111	669	15	22.4	8	12.0	-10.5	-1.38	0.17	8
112	577	11	19.1	5	8.7	-10.4	-1.38	0.17	9
BRI LSOA 23	**1,013**	**16**	**15.8**	**6**	**5.9**	**-9.9**	**-1.32**	**0.19**	**10**
063	615	10	16.3	4	6.5	-9.8	-1.30	0.19	11
058	543	14	25.8	9	16.6	-9.2	-1.24	0.22	12
BRI LSOA 8	**780**	**14**	**17.9**	**7**	**9.0**	**-9.0**	**-1.21**	**0.23**	**13**
009	703	13	18.5	7	10.0	-8.5	-1.16	0.25	14
115	469	6	12.8	2	4.3	-8.5	-1.16	0.25	15
012	720	19	26.4	13	18.1	-8.3	-1.14	0.26	16
085	610	15	24.6	10	16.4	-8.2	-1.12	0.26	17
082	735	11	15.0	5	6.8	-8.2	-1.12	0.26	18
053	619	13	21.0	8	12.9	-8.1	-1.11	0.27	19
091	626	10	16.0	5	8.0	-8.0	-1.10	0.27	20
043	507	10	19.7	6	11.8	-7.9	-1.09	0.28	21
046	555	15	27.0	11	19.8	-7.2	-1.01	0.31	22
099	730	12	16.4	7	9.6	-6.8	-0.97	0.33	23
006	638	12	18.8	8	12.5	-6.3	-0.90	0.37	24
054	650	10	15.4	6	9.2	-6.2	-0.89	0.38	25
061	684	13	19.0	9	13.2	-5.8	-0.85	0.39	26
118	710	15	21.1	11	15.5	-5.6	-0.83	0.41	27
064	603	6	10.0	3	5.0	-5.0	-0.75	0.45	28
019	2,215	35	15.8	24	10.8	-5.0	-0.75	0.45	29
066	639	6	9.4	3	4.7	-4.7	-0.72	0.47	30
007	676	10	14.8	7	10.4	-4.4	-0.69	0.49	31
114	718	12	16.7	9	12.5	-4.2	-0.66	0.51	32
096	727	9	12.4	6	8.3	-4.1	-0.65	0.51	33
108	502	11	21.9	9	17.9	-4.0	-0.64	0.52	34
055	768	18	23.4	15	19.5	-3.9	-0.63	0.53	35
110	525	5	9.5	3	5.7	-3.8	-0.62	0.54	36
052	551	12	21.8	10	18.1	-3.6	-0.60	0.55	37
024	846	13	15.4	10	11.8	-3.5	-0.59	0.56	38
016	592	4	6.8	2	3.4	-3.4	-0.57	0.57	39
062	508	8	15.7	7	13.8	-2.0	-0.40	0.69	40
042	536	22	41.0	21	39.2	-1.9	-0.39	0.70	41
059	594	11	18.5	10	16.8	-1.7	-0.37	0.71	42
022	634	12	18.9	11	17.4	-1.6	-0.36	0.72	43
095	678	7	10.3	6	8.8	-1.5	-0.35	0.73	44
065	705	8	11.3	7	9.9	-1.4	-0.34	0.73	45
057	731	24	32.8	23	31.5	-1.4	-0.33	0.74	46
021	750	13	17.3	12	16.0	-1.3	-0.33	0.74	47
048	757	9	11.9	8	10.6	-1.3	-0.33	0.74	48
090	524	7	13.4	7	13.4	0.0	-0.18	0.86	49
003	615	14	22.8	14	22.8	0.0	-0.18	0.86	50
071	674	10	14.8	10	14.8	0.0	-0.18	0.86	51
029	546	7	12.8	7	12.8	0.0	-0.18	0.86	52
078	712	6	8.4	6	8.4	0.0	-0.18	0.86	53
067	590	3	5.1	3	5.1	0.0	-0.18	0.86	54
080	652	12	18.4	12	18.4	0.0	-0.18	0.86	55
070	525	2	3.8	2	3.8	0.0	-0.18	0.86	56
005	599	6	10.0	6	10.0	0.0	-0.18	0.86	57
050	628	5	8.0	5	8.0	0.0	-0.18	0.86	58
004	632	3	4.7	4	6.3	1.6	0.01	1.00	59
092	631	5	7.9	6	9.5	1.6	0.01	0.99	60
083	624	9	14.4	10	16.0	1.6	0.01	0.99	61

P<0.05
BRI LSOA
Other LSOA with BRI activity affecting 15%+ of dwellings

Table continued overleaf

Burglary rate change in Luton LSOAs 2013/14 to 2014/15 (part 2)

Table continued from previous page

LSOA	Dwellings	Burglaries 2013/14	Rate per 1,000 dwellings 2013/14	Burglaries 2014/15	Rate per 1,000 dwellings 2014/15	Change in rate	Z	P	Rank: Greatest decrease to greatest increase
028	525	8	15.2	9	17.1	1.9	0.04	0.97	62
081	515	4	7.8	5	9.7	1.9	0.05	0.96	63
104	514	0	0.0	1	1.9	1.9	0.05	0.96	64
086	500	7	14.0	8	16.0	2.0	0.05	0.96	65
011	491	6	12.2	7	14.3	2.0	0.06	0.95	66
BRI LSOA 51	**1,143**	**23**	**20.1**	**26**	**22.7**	**2.6**	**0.13**	**0.90**	**67**
069	744	6	8.1	8	10.8	2.7	0.13	0.89	68
088	672	14	20.8	16	23.8	3.0	0.17	0.87	69
001	649	9	13.9	11	16.9	3.1	0.18	0.86	70
120	632	5	7.9	7	11.1	3.2	0.19	0.85	71
103	552	9	16.3	11	19.9	3.6	0.24	0.81	72
077	550	9	16.4	11	20.0	3.6	0.24	0.81	73
BRI LSOA 34	**1,646**	**6**	**3.6**	**12**	**7.3**	**3.6**	**0.24**	**0.81**	**74**
060	506	6	11.9	8	15.8	4.0	0.28	0.78	75
BRI LSOA 101	**1,177**	**16**	**13.6**	**21**	**17.8**	**4.2**	**0.31**	**0.75**	**76**
031	702	15	21.4	18	25.6	4.3	0.32	0.75	77
073	687	14	20.4	17	24.7	4.4	0.33	0.74	78
020	592	9	15.2	12	20.3	5.1	0.41	0.68	79
045	762	14	18.4	18	23.6	5.2	0.43	0.67	80
097	535	5	9.3	8	15.0	5.6	0.47	0.64	81
038	520	11	21.2	14	26.9	5.8	0.49	0.62	82
121	513	9	17.5	12	23.4	5.8	0.50	0.62	83
025	483	5	10.4	8	16.6	6.2	0.54	0.59	84
037	643	9	14.0	13	20.2	6.2	0.54	0.59	85
035	911	10	11.0	16	17.6	6.6	0.58	0.56	86
BRI LSOA 2	**736**	**18**	**24.5**	**23**	**31.3**	**6.8**	**0.61**	**0.54**	**87**
094	564	0	0.0	4	7.1	7.1	0.64	0.52	88
033	700	13	18.6	18	25.7	7.1	0.65	0.52	89
036	550	4	7.3	8	14.5	7.3	0.66	0.51	90
041	807	10	12.4	16	19.8	7.4	0.68	0.50	91
044	531	5	9.4	9	16.9	7.5	0.69	0.49	92
098	514	2	3.9	6	11.7	7.8	0.72	0.47	93
074	632	5	7.9	10	15.8	7.9	0.74	0.46	94
107	619	6	9.7	11	17.8	8.1	0.76	0.45	95
089	613	6	9.8	11	17.9	8.2	0.76	0.44	96
087	705	12	17.0	18	25.5	8.5	0.81	0.42	97
076	813	17	20.9	24	29.5	8.6	0.82	0.41	98
116	539	7	13.0	12	22.3	9.3	0.89	0.37	99
117	535	5	9.3	10	18.7	9.3	0.90	0.37	100
040	696	14	20.1	21	30.2	10.1	0.98	0.33	101
093	566	11	19.4	17	30.0	10.6	1.05	0.30	102
017	844	29	34.4	38	45.0	10.7	1.05	0.29	103
056	648	10	15.4	17	26.2	10.8	1.07	0.28	104
113	547	3	5.5	9	16.5	11.0	1.09	0.28	105
049	709	16	22.6	24	33.9	11.3	1.13	0.26	106
079	511	7	13.7	13	25.4	11.7	1.18	0.24	107
014	505	2	4.0	8	15.8	11.9	1.19	0.23	108
018	492	6	12.2	12	24.4	12.2	1.23	0.22	109
105	565	12	21.2	19	33.6	12.4	1.25	0.21	110
106	692	5	7.2	14	20.2	13.0	1.32	0.19	111
039	741	11	14.8	21	28.3	13.5	1.38	0.17	112
032	569	3	5.3	11	19.3	14.1	1.45	0.15	113
027	523	7	13.4	15	28.7	15.3	1.59	0.11	114
100	636	11	17.3	21	33.0	15.7	1.64	0.10	115
084	569	5	8.8	14	24.6	15.8	1.65	0.10	116
102	742	18	24.3	31	41.8	17.5	1.84	0.07	117
030	615	6	9.8	17	27.6	17.9	1.89	0.06	118
119	637	5	7.8	17	26.7	18.8	2.00	0.05	119
109	574	10	17.4	23	40.1	22.6	2.44	0.01	120
072	1,247	18	14.4	47	37.7	23.3	2.51	0.01	121

P<0.05
BRI LSOA
Other LSOA with BRI activity affecting 15%+ of dwellings

Appendix 6.9.1: Distribution of change in LSOA burglary rates 2013/14 to 2014/15



Appendix 6.9.2: Comparator LSOA matching

Note: In order to identify suitable matches, coefficients describing the correlation between burglary rates in each of the six BRI LSOAs and every other Luton LSOA were calculated for the nine and five year period immediately preceding the initiative year and tested for statistical significance. In order to ensure that comparator areas had relatively similar historic burglary rates to the BRI LSOAs the average annual burglary rate for each LSOA was also calculated. For each BRI LSOA, comparator LSOAs were then selected based on three criteria:

- A statistically significant correlation in annual burglary rate over the previous nine years (at the five per cent confidence level);
- A statistically significant correlation in annual burglary rate over the previous five years (at the ten per cent confidence level);
- A 'similar' average annual burglary rate, based on one standard deviation of the sample mean, above or below the average burglary rate for the BRI LSOA.

Summary data showing the comparator selection process is shown below, in each case only the 20 LSOAs with the strongest nine year correlation are shown.

Comparator selection for BRI LSOA 023			
LSOA	Correlation coefficient (9 years)	Average 9 year burglary rate per 1,000 dwellings	Correlation coefficient (5 years)
039	0.87	14.1	0.52
036	0.86	23.0	-0.87
065	0.83	19.1	-0.78
018	0.80	23.9	0.09
063	**0.78**	**17.2**	**0.81**
017	0.78	44.5	0.17
093	0.77	28.3	-0.34
034	0.76	14.0	-0.32
024	0.76	14.6	0.73
108	0.75	16.8	0.34
079	0.74	17.8	-0.70
056	0.74	31.9	-0.54
120	0.72	19.0	-0.79
054	0.72	16.9	0.42
095	0.70	17.4	0.25
066	0.69	12.3	0.51
074	0.69	12.8	-0.49
101	0.68	33.8	-0.56
055	0.68	19.7	0.31
118	0.68	14.4	0.60
Key & notes			
9 year average rate for LSOA 023 = 20.9 Sample SD = 7.5	Significant correlation P<0.01	Within +/- 1 x sample SD of BRI LSOA 9 year average	Significant correlation P<0.05
	Significant correlation P<0.05		Significant correlation P<0.1
	Selected comparator(s) (in bold)		

Comparator selection for BRI LSOA 101			
LSOA	Correlation coefficient (9 years)	Average 9 year burglary rate per 1,000 dwellings	Correlation coefficient (5 years)
020	**0.89**	**31.3**	**0.90**
032	0.84	21.3	0.79
008	0.83	34.6	0.42
036	0.78	23.0	0.82
005	0.77	22.6	0.37
030	0.76	14.8	0.65
054	0.73	16.9	0.30
027	0.71	18.5	0.18
117	0.71	12.0	0.03
050	0.71	16.8	0.24
018	0.70	23.9	0.51
098	0.69	10.6	0.09
041	0.69	29.2	0.56
094	0.69	10.4	0.23
023	0.68	20.9	-0.56
065	0.68	19.1	0.08
061	0.66	32.3	0.47
121	0.65	26.6	0.71
100	0.64	32.0	0.33
033	0.63	34.9	-0.36
Key & notes			
9 year average rate for LSOA 101 = 33.8 Sample SD = 7.5	Significant correlation P<0.01	Within +/- 1 x sample SD of BRI LSOA 9 year average	Significant correlation P<0.05
	Significant correlation P<0.05		Significant correlation P<0.1
	Selected comparator(s) (in bold)		

Comparator selection for BRI LSOA 008			
LSOA	Correlation coefficient (9 years)	Average 9 year burglary rate per 1,000 dwellings	Correlation coefficient (5 years)
033	0.86	34.9	0.24
101	0.83	33.8	0.42
049	**0.82**	**31.5**	**0.87**
098	0.81	10.6	0.77
102	**0.80**	**36.8**	**0.97**
030	0.78	14.8	0.27
087	0.78	26.8	0.67
041	**0.78**	**29.2**	**0.82**
032	0.77	21.3	0.83
027	0.75	18.5	-0.22
074	0.71	12.8	-0.42
094	0.71	10.4	0.50
086	0.69	21.3	0.88
045	0.69	33.2	0.80
050	0.68	16.8	0.95
120	0.67	19.0	0.52
020	0.67	31.3	0.42
036	0.66	23.0	0.51
061	0.66	32.3	0.68
092	0.65	18.5	0.47

Key & notes

9 year average rate for LSOA 008 = 34.6 Sample SD = 7.5	Significant correlation P<0.01	Within +/- 1 x sample SD of BRI LSOA 9 year average	Significant correlation P<0.05
	Significant correlation P<0.05		Significant correlation P<0.1
	Selected comparator(s) (in bold)		

Comparator selection for BRI LSOA 034			
LSOA	Correlation coefficient (9 years)	Average 9 year burglary rate per 1,000 dwellings	Correlation coefficient (5 years)
016	**0.90**	**14.3**	**0.85**
056	0.82	31.9	0.61
120	0.80	19.0	0.65
089	**0.78**	**15.8**	**0.92**
023	0.76	20.9	-0.32
036	0.75	23.0	0.55
061	0.70	32.3	0.86
095	0.70	17.4	0.50
039	0.68	14.1	0.08
066	0.68	12.3	0.59
024	0.67	14.6	0.06
017	0.66	44.5	0.48
018	0.66	23.9	0.81
067	0.64	15.8	0.65
065	0.63	19.1	-0.21
020	0.63	31.3	0.56
070	0.63	12.3	0.85
069	0.61	20.2	0.89
109	0.60	27.7	0.46
079	0.60	17.8	0.51

Key & notes

9 year average rate for LSOA 034 = 14.0 Sample SD = 7.5	Significant correlation P<0.01	Within +/- 1 x sample SD of BRI LSOA 9 year average	Significant correlation P<0.05
	Significant correlation P<0.05		Significant correlation P<0.1
	Selected comparator(s) (in bold)		

Comparator selection for BRI LSOA 002			
LSOA	Correlation coefficient (9 years)	Average 9 year burglary rate per 1,000 dwellings	Correlation coefficient (5 years)
086	0.73	21.3	0.97
098	0.70	10.6	0.91
066	0.81	12.3	0.91
018	**0.81**	**23.9***	**0.89**
050	0.87	16.8	0.86
006	0.86	27.5	0.65
113	0.78	15.2	0.61
025	0.70	26.2	0.58
054	0.80	16.9	0.56
017	0.80	44.5	0.46
075	0.74	23.2	0.32
097	0.72	16.2	0.10
077	0.71	24.2	0.09
067	0.69	15.8	0.08
005	0.73	22.6	-0.05
115	0.72	14.9	-0.06
109	0.79	27.7	-0.18
068	0.67	32.9	-0.46
106	0.66	23.3	-0.15
037	0.65	15.6	-0.10

Key & notes

9 year average rate for LSOA 002 = 32.2 Sample SD = 7.5	Significant correlation P<0.01	Within +/- 1 x sample SD of BRI LSOA 9 year average	Significant correlation P<0.05
	Significant correlation P<0.05		Significant correlation P<0.1
	Selected comparator(s) (in bold)		

* No LSOAs matched the original selection criteria. LSOA 018 was considered to be the best match as it met both correlation criteria and was only 1.09 SD from LSOA 002 9 year average.

Comparator selection for BRI LSOA 051			
LSOA	Correlation coefficient (9 years)	Average 9 year burglary rate per 1,000 dwellings	Correlation coefficient (5 years)
104	0.80	11.9	0.78
086	**0.78**	**21.3***	**0.98**
021	0.77	17.3	0.71
083	0.69	17.6	0.60
116	**0.68**	**28.2**	**0.64****
088	**0.67**	**22.8**	**0.78**
105	0.66	32.3	0.60
110	0.66	22.9	0.56
052	0.64	27.0	0.66
001	0.63	22.8	0.62
002	0.60	32.2	0.93
072	0.60	25.6	0.69
006	0.55	27.5	0.55
028	0.55	22.2	0.66
004	0.55	12.5	0.71
121	0.54	26.6	0.58
025	0.53	26.2	0.59
035	0.52	20.7	0.62
113	0.51	15.2	0.52
032	0.51	21.3	0.75

Key & notes

9 year average rate for LSOA 051 = 31.6 Sample SD = 7.5	Significant correlation P<0.01	Within +/- 1 x sample SD of BRI LSOA 9 year average	Significant correlation P<0.05
	Significant correlation P<0.05		Significant correlation P<0.1
	Selected comparator(s) (in bold)		

* No LSOAs matched the original selection criteria. Two LSOAs were considered good matches. LSOA 086 matched on both selection criteria but had an average burglary rate 1.4 SDs from the LSOA 051 9 year average. LSOA 116 had a similar average rate and was significantly correlated over the nine year period but was less strongly correlated over 5 years (p=0.24).

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